

Mikhail Yuriev

THIRD EMPIRE

Russia that should be

Mikhail Yuriev (2006)

This book first came to my notice via a [newspaper article](#).

This translation by [Google Translate](#), with minor adjustments by me (DRB).

Hyperlinks, and notes in square brackets, are mine.

Notes in round brackets are original.

The original Russian text is [here](#). Corrections are [welcome](#).



Dramatis Personae

Dates follow the conventions of the book.

This list is not exhaustive. Before Vladimir II [Putin] they are historical, after him, they are fictional.

Grand Dukes

Dmitry	Donskoy	1359-1389
Vasily I		1389-1425
Vasily II		1434-1462
Ivan III	the Great	1462-1505
Vasily III		1505-1533

Empire of the Tsars

Ivan IV	the Terrible	1530-1584
Boris I	the Usurper	1598-1605
Vasily IV		1606-1610
Mikhail I	the Meek	1613-1645
Alexei	the Quiet	1645-1676
Peter I	the Great	1689-1725
Catherine II	the Great	1762-1796
Alexander I	the Righteous	1801-1825

Alexander II the Liberator 1855-1881

The Red Empire (USSR)

Vladimir I Judas 1917-1923 Lenin

Joseph I the Great 1924-1953 Stalin

Mikhail II [the Marked](#) 1985-1991 Gorbachev

Boris II the Damned 1991-1999 Yeltsin

Vladimir II the Restorer 2000-2012 Putin

The Third Empire

Gabriel I the Great 2012-2030

Mikhail III the Suppressor 2030-2040

Vasily V the Builder 2040-2050

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The world is infinitely far from justice. Its current arrangement has ceased to suit everyone. Iran wants to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. America promises to do the same for Iran. Russia, afraid of Iran, dislikes America even more. Muslims are burning the suburbs of Paris. All countries are tightening immigration laws. The Japanese, considering themselves the highest Asian race, despise China. But

China is objectively a future superpower. Blacks slaughter each other in Africa. This has already happened in the twentieth century in world history, when all countries and peoples were dissatisfied with their position and with each other - on the eve of the First World War. And the Second.

*Consequently? A third world war is inevitable, just as a new order of the world is inevitable after the end of this war! About what kind of war it will be and how this world will be arranged after it, Mikhail Yuryev described it in his book *The Third Empire* in an exciting, detailed, even meticulous, convincing and bold way.*

The world will be divided among five superpowers, says M. Yuriev. And Russia is one of them.

Foreword

Dear compatriots! I, Alvaredo Branco dos Santos, was born in the city of São Paulo in 2025, in that memorable year for our Federation, when two events took place, the anniversary of which we celebrate on the holidays of Full Independence and the Triumph of Catholicism. The family of my father, dos Santos, are old Brazilian industrialists who have specialized in the tire industry for the past few decades: our brand, Bratir, has been one of the most valued by consumers for more than forty years and is now the second largest seller in the Federation. My mother, Veronica dos Santos, née Branco, well known in society both as a society lady and as the head of one of the largest pan-American charities, comes from an even higher line: her uncle, my great-uncle Alvaredo Branco, is the legendary founder and the first president of our country, and her great uncle, the space magnate João Branco, the second richest person in the Federation, alive and well, thank God, to this day. I grew up in prosperity, surrounded by love and respect for myself as a person, in a zealous Catholic environment, the values of which they tried - quite successfully - to instill in me. I graduated from the University of Sao Paulo in 2049; fellow students treated me well, did not blame me for wealth and high birth - I can't remember anything more seriously than when in 2044 the capital of the Federation was renamed Alvareda after the death of my grandfather, I was constantly teased by the hit of that season "Come with me to Alvaredu". I did not want to go into family or other business like my older sister Gabriela, or politics like older brother Antônio dos Santos, now sitting in Alvaredo in the Senate of the Federation, and not from his native state, but from the state of Dixieland, where he worked in 2047— In 2048, he was the chairman of the government commission for the elimination of the consequences of the tsunami (remember when the asteroid fell?) and earned great respect. Instead of all this, I was attracted by an academic career: I wanted and want to understand how human society works, how countries and peoples function and develop - and only then, maybe, to go into politics. My family didn't mind, of course, and I went off to do my Ph.D. at the Bush Family University in Houston, Plainsland; my topic was called "Self-Sustaining Network Organizations in the Human Community". But most of all I was attracted by the so-called comparative studies, that is, a comparative analysis of how something works in different countries, and I really wanted to make such an analysis the topic of my dissertation, at least for a start limiting myself to the Christian world. Moreover, I wanted not only to study through the Web how it all works in Russia, but to go and see for myself - perhaps this was due to the genes of my distant ancestor, Captain Pedro the One-Eared, who in the 17th century carried slaves from Africa and arrived on his frigate with valuable cargo pawn-brazil [sic] timber even as far as China. I began to convince my supervisor, Professor Higginbotham, of this, who resisted for a long time - all Yankees (and even more so Yankees from New England, like my professor) do not like Russia for obvious reasons, unlike us Latinos and Brazilians. But finally he gave in, which I did not doubt, because he treats me very well. Having completed the sabbatical at the university, I went to Alvareda and came to the Russian embassy for a visa; about 12 thousand dollars, which had to be paid for it, although it is a large sum, for me was not a problem. The famous techno-interrogation, which I went to with bated breath, turned out to be a rather quick and not terrible procedure; in general, getting a Russian visa and boarding the Alvaredo-Moscow spaceplane turned out to be much easier than everyone thinks (if there is money, of course).

I spent almost twelve months in Russia, having previously learned Russian; I met and talked during this time with different people - both simple and high-ranking. I did not notice the notorious Russian xenophobia toward myself at all - the vast majority of people were quite friendly with me. Moreover, many rather important and well-known people agreed to give me an audience, including even the leaders of the state - however, I attribute this primarily to the name of my grandfather, who in Russia is considered as great a person as we are. I also read various books and materials, looked through the press, watched movies, and - to be honest - I was interested in much more than I needed for a dissertation. I had an idea to write a book about Russia in general - about all aspects of her life, in comparison of the current and past eras, from which the reader will be able to form some objective impression of this country. Because I understood more and more that we do not know and do not understand Russia at all. There is no malicious intent in this - it's just that this civilization is so different from ours, with a very great external similarity, that you need to immerse yourself in it in order to understand - exactly this, dear compatriots, I am trying to help you do. And so I present this book to you - I tried to remain as much as possible in the position of an outside observer who does not give assessments, as befits a scientist, and I ask you to excuse me if in some places I did not succeed in this. I divided it into two parts - "History of Russia" and "Russia Today", and in that order, because I think that the structure of Russia is easier to understand through its history; whether this is so, you be the judge.

*Alvaredo dos Santos,
City of Houston, Plainsland,
American Federation,
2054 A.D.*

PART I HISTORY OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1 The First and Second Empires

The history of Russia spans more than eleven centuries - before that it was nothing more than tribal prehistory. Speaking of "Russians", I do not mean here the entire population of the Russian Empire, but only its original and main nation (there it is referred to as "core"), otherwise called the Great Russians; for a number of other peoples of the Empire, written history began twenty or more centuries earlier, for others, on the contrary, much later. By the way, this ambiguity of the word "Russians" - either a very specific people with its own history and customs, or the entire population of the Russian state - is a traditional and very significant thing for Russia, which will be discussed more than once in these notes. So, the state history of the Russians begins with the fact that by about the ninth-tenth century AD, the Varangians, who had previously passed annually with their squads - herds through the territory of the future Russia for the purpose of robbery or trade, settled there completely and turned into a feudal nobility ruling the local population, mainly represented by Slavic tribes. These tribes settled the territory between the Danube and Volga basins after the Scythians and Sarmatians; their exact origin is not known. Semi-officially in Russia, it is believed that the Slavs did not descend from the biblical Japhet, the youngest son of Noah, like, for example, all Western European peoples, but from his eldest son Shem, like Arabs or Jews (semi-officially - because the official Russian history does not include the so-called number of peoples from the Book of Genesis; on the other hand, it is, like everything in Russia, under the strong influence of Orthodoxy and cannot deny this either). It is believed that part of the descendants of Elam, the eldest son of Shem, the Elamites (this is a completely historical people, one of the oldest known to us), moved from their habitats - now it is the west of the province of Iran of the Islamic Caliphate - to the northeast and there, in the confluence of the Volga and Don, gave rise to the Slavs, who subsequently settled everything around. This biblical opposition to Western Europeans plays an important role in

Russian ideology: in the Bible, Japhet personifies power, and Shem personifies spirit (“[God shall enlarge Japhet, he shall dwell in the tents of Shem¹](#)”); this is how the Russians present themselves.

The Varangians were one of the tribes of the warlike northern peoples, the Normans, otherwise called the Vikings. Previously it was believed that these were identical; now it is argued that this is a separate people who lived on the eastern and southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea. Their culture was intermediate between the Norwegians and Danes, on the one hand, and the Slavs, on the other; like the first, it was a people of unsurpassed warriors, putting military prowess above all else. They shaved their beards and the hair on their heads, wore long mustaches, and the leaders also had a long strand left on the crown; the most famous warriors received the right to dye their mustaches blue. Having become the ruling nobility among the subjects - the Slavs, they gradually mixed with them, forming the Russians. By blood, their contribution was small, since there were many fewer of them than the Slavs; genetically, their place in the creation of the Russian nation is approximately the same as that of the Spaniards in the creation of the Mexican nation. Nevertheless, the attitude towards military ethics, especially among the upper classes, was taken from the Russians precisely from them: a truly great ruler is only one who crushed the enemies, and not just filled the treasury - this is also part of how the Russians present themselves.

At the end of the 10th century, the Russians adopted Christianity, and of the Eastern rite, since they were in the civilizational sphere of influence of the Byzantine Empire. The 250-year period of Kievan Rus began - the first Russian state with a grand-ducal capital in Kyiv. It is interesting that the Russians consider their state to be the successor not of Kievan Rus, but of Moscow, which is in no way connected with it; therefore, the transfer of the capital to Kyiv is never discussed, although in general the topic of transferring capitals or part of the capital's functions is one of the Russians' favorites. Therefore, the numbering of the rulers of Russia with one name comes only from Muscovite Russia, and not from Kievan: for example, now Emperor Vladimir III rules, who is the third after Vladimir I Judas ([1917-1923](#))² and Vladimir II the Restorer (2000-2012); and many Vladimirs - the great princes of Kiev, starting with the holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Vladimir the Baptist, are not counted. Not so with Muscovite Russia: the previous emperor, Vasily V the Builder (2040-2050), was named after the Grand Dukes of Moscow Vasily I (1389-1425), Vasily II (1434-1462), Vasily III (1505-1533) and the Tsar of Moscow and All Russia Vasily IV (1606-1610). The period of Muscovite Russia begins at the end of the 13th - beginning of the 14th century, during the reign of the Mongol-Turkic Golden Horde. Moscow Rus became the center of the Russian lands at the end of the 14th - beginning of the 15th century, when the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry, later nicknamed Donskoy, in numerous wars weakened the main rivals for primacy in Russia - Tver, Suzdal, Novgorod, Ryazan and others - and took away from them many lands. In addition, he first defeated the Mongol army of Mamai, who allegedly usurped power from Khagan Tokhtamysh, in the battles on the Vozha and especially on the Kulikovo field, and then, on the contrary, took an oath of repentance to Tokhtamysh and even gave him an army for the war with Tamerlane, which brought him and his descendants support for the Horde in the further struggle against Russian rivals. They were finally broken and absorbed by Muscovite Russia under Ivan III the Great (1462-1505), the penultimate Grand Duke of Moscow (his grandson, Ivan IV the Terrible, was already the king of all Russia), and under him the dominion of the Horde ended. At the same time, after the fall of Byzantium, a thesis appeared that became the quintessence of the Russian national idea, which is inscribed on the coat of arms of the Russian Empire, on a pennant that hangs from the paws of a double-headed eagle: Moscow is the [Third Rome](#)³, and there will be no fourth.

In the 16th century, the Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberian khanates were conquered and annexed, which turned Russia into a major power, and, as a natural consequence, from that time on, the image of Russia as an enemy of Christian (meaning Western) civilization began to take shape in Western European countries. At the same time, the reign of Ivan the Terrible, with its cruelty and departure from established traditions, weakened the nation from within, which led to prolonged civil strife and unrest, moreover,

against the background of the actual occupation by the Poles, which was called the first Time of Troubles (1605-1613). During the 17th century, after the end of the Time of Troubles and the expulsion of the Poles, Russia regained everything that it had lost in the process, and also annexed Central and Eastern Ukraine, which belonged to Poland. At the end of the century, the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725) began. At this time, Russia, having defeated Sweden, annexed a significant part of the eastern Baltic and gained access to the Baltic Sea - the main European trade artery of that time; in connection with this, the state was rebuilt in a Western European fashion, and any ties with Western Europe were stimulated in every possible way. At the end of the reign of Peter the Great, Russia was declared an empire, later called the First Empire, and Peter himself was declared emperor. Russia achieved special power under Catherine II the Great (1762-1796), when she annexed Lithuania, Courland, half of Poland and the Crimean Khanate. At that time, Russia had already become one of the great powers, which led to the realization and the beginning of the implementation of a consistent and purposeful anti-Russian course by the ruling class of the then superpower, England, a course subsequently followed by all of Western Europe and the United States and continuing until the Twelve Day War. In the 19th century, Russia developed in line with the same trends - its status as a great power, confirmed by the victory over Napoleon at the beginning of the century, was only briefly shaken by the defeat in the Crimean War and continued until the entry into the First World War in 1914. During the 19th century, Russia annexed the Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Finland and Central Asia. At the same time, the confrontation with the West, especially with England, has become a permanent factor, repeatedly breaking through direct clashes; the allied treaty concluded at the end of the century with England and France (the Entente) pursued tactical goals and did not change this alignment. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20th century, in other words, by the First World War, Russia emerged as a great and prosperous power, in which, however, a critical mass of internal unresolved problems had accumulated, which soon broke through.

In 1917, a revolution took place in Russia, as a result of which the communists came to power, who won the ensuing Civil War (1918-1921). In terms of cruelty, intransigence and persistence in the physical extermination of entire social groups, it roughly corresponded to the Great French Revolution (1789-1794), but had one distinguishing feature - due to the peculiarities of the ideology of the then communists (the so-called Bolsheviks), they were anti-nationalists who aspired exclusively to world peace: the socialist revolution and Russia was considered only as a springboard for this. Accordingly, they were not at all interested in the national interests of Russia, they gave up Poland, Finland, Bessarabia and the Baltic states without a fight (both literally and figuratively); with the same ease they sold or donated works of art that were national treasures abroad. The words "Russian" *русский* and "Russian" *русское* were considered obscene, and the non-Russian nationality of a person was a great help in any career - this went back to the Civil War, when the most combat-ready parts of the Bolsheviks consisted entirely of representatives of national minorities or foreigners. So it was under Vladimir Judas [*Lenin*] and in the first years of the reign of Joseph I the Great [*Stalin*](1924-1953), until he changed this situation. He understood that it was necessary to revive the Russian national state, and used the communist ideology exclusively as a basis for this. He carried out a series of mass repressions in the 1930s, directed mainly (but not exclusively) against the country's elite, as a result of which many innocent people died and suffered. But he fulfilled the task set by himself - the main part of the Bolsheviks were exterminated; in addition, the country's industry and social structure were modernized. Further, from the moment the war with Germany began (1941-1945), Joseph the Great accelerated these processes - he returned the cult of pride to Russia with its glorious history, lifted the ban on Orthodoxy introduced by the Bolsheviks, restored many symbols of the past, such as epaulettes in the army, uniforms at school, etc.; the so-called new morality, for example in the sexual sphere, was replaced by the traditional one. After the victory in the war, he carried out a second wave of repression, which had slightly different goals and objects, namely the neutralization of real and potential collaborators, recalcitrant peoples who rebelled against the Moscow authorities, as well as those who did not accept the departure from communist-internationalist principles and the return to the Russian traditions.

From his diaries, sensationally found and published on the 150th anniversary of his birth, in the last year of the reign of Gabriel I the Great (2012-2030), we know that he intended to carry out the last series of repressions in 1953, in particular, to change almost the entire leadership of the country, then return market relations in the economy, primarily in agriculture, restore private property (except for large property), make the main part of power in the Communist Party and the state really elected and turn Orthodoxy into the state religion of Russia. Death from [poisoning](#)⁴ prevented him from realizing these plans; it also shows that his conviction that the enemy inside the country was not completely destroyed was not at all paranoid. The identity of Joseph I and the assessment of his reign were long the subject of fierce debate within Russia, until the nation came to a consensus around 2020 - and before that, epithets ranged from "monstrous" to "greatest." Indeed, the level of cruelty and the number of atrocities of that period were quite comparable (if not exceeded) to the times of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, whom no one in Russia would ever think of calling the Great. True, we should not forget that Joseph the Great took over the country not from the last king of the First Empire, when everything was not so bad, but from Vladimir Judas, who created a truly satanic state, incommensurably more vile than that created by Joseph I. Nevertheless, Russia under Joseph I had reached the maximum greatness in its entire history (not counting, of course, our time). She regained the Baltic States, Bessarabia, Western Belarus and South Sakhalin, annexed Western Ukraine, established satellite governments in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and East Germany, fenced off with a cordon of these countries from her eternal enemy - Western Europe. She became one of the two superpowers, having the strongest army in the world with nuclear weapons, and the first in history, long before the [Celestial Republic](#)⁵, to successfully challenge the technological leadership of Western civilization: thanks to the legacy of the reign of Joseph the Great, four years after his death, it was the first in the world to enter space. From the diaries, we know that Joseph the Great intended, immediately after the surrender of Germany, to denounce the allied treaty with England and the USA and continue the offensive until the complete capture of Europe (in which it is unlikely that anyone could prevent him then), but in 1945 an archangel, appearing in a vision, predicted that before Armageddon (and he perceived his confrontation with the West in this way) exactly 10 years remained; that's what he was preparing for. The empire created by Joseph the Great, called the Second, or Red, Empire, however, had a significant defect, however, generally characteristic of empires, including the main enemy of then Russia - America (naturally, not our Federation, but the USA): except for the the founder of the empire, it allowed only worthless people to enter the higher ranks. This was observed in the next 35 years, when Russia, under the leadership of successive such nonentities, was at the peak of greatness, but in fact it simply ate away the legacy of Joseph the Great. The result was the collapse of the regime, complete capitulation to the West, the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Moldova, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The so-called second Time of Troubles (1991-1999) began.

This period of the reign of Boris II the Damned is characterized by the complete degradation of the state and society. National interests were ignored, industry and science were curtailed, crime and deceit exceeded all conceivable limits. Mortality rose, life expectancy and birth rates fell. All this was looked upon with indifference by officials who were corrupt beyond measure and magnates who had fabulously enriched themselves on the seizure of former state property, called oligarchs. Complete demoralization and the collapse of all foundations reigned among the population, deep contempt for everyone except businessmen and bandits, especially for people in such professions as a teacher or a military man; among the elites - competition in theft and vilification of their own country. Rare attempts (quite pathetic, by the way) to raise a voice against all this were severely suppressed by America and the regime of Boris the Damned itself, unless these attempts came from clown-like marginal forces: in this case, on the contrary, they were supported - to discredit the very idea of an alternative. All this was superimposed on the war with the separatists in the Caucasus, in which the victory was practically won, although at the cost of absurd sacrifices, but at the last moment it was simply sold by the authorities for money and the goodwill of the Americans; a three-year period of actual independence of the separatists began, during which they

fed with impunity on the Russians, like wolves on a deer herd. So great was the hatred of the Russian people for Boris the Damned that in 2028 (that is, 28 years after the end of his reign), during the nomination of candidates for the election of the emperor in 2029, Boris Fetisov, one of the heroes of the Twelve Day War and the wars of expansion, who was considered the most likely future emperor, refused this. He said: "After Boris I the Usurper (1598-1605) and Boris II the Damned, we see that it is impossible in Russia to be a ruler with this name; and that I am not guilty of my name, it is so worthless not to notice God's signs." By the way, this act, like the personality of Boris Fetisov in general, is a symbol of all the best and a role model for Russians, especially for guardsmen.

Chapter 2

Restoration Period

Reforms of 2006-2007. The period of Restoration in Russia is the time between the Second and Third Empires (2000-2012) - the time of the beginning of the revival of great Russia, which coincided with the beginning of the third millennium. Since 2000 (in fact, since the end of 1999), the reign of Vladimir II the Restorer began, awarded this nickname because under him Russia again became a great power (even with elements of a superpower by the end of the reign). In addition, under him and thanks to him, all spheres of public life normalized and began to develop, although not everything is the same - some faster, others slower; all this prepared the country for a civilizational breakthrough to the unprecedented greatness that occurred under his successor. Vladimir II was brought to power by the entourage of Boris the Damned as his heir, which they quickly regretted. However, for the first and even most of his reign, although he was very popular and even loved by the people and everything went well, nothing foreshadowed those turbulent events, thanks to which he went down in history as it happened. The first term of his presidency and almost the entire second, he preferred not to destroy the existing, albeit not very tolerable, situation, which, it would seem, bordered on criminal inaction. However, through subtle actions, he managed to cause during this time radical changes in the mood of the people and in the state of society. It seems that everything is just as bad as it was a few years ago, nothing has fundamentally changed, the oligarchs and corrupt officials still rule the show, the West still presses - and yet self-abasement has been replaced by the return of national self-identification and self-respect, to demoralization and despair came confidence and anger. As we now understand, such a policy of minimal intervention was carried out by Vladimir II not because of indecision, but precisely because of the understanding that sharp turns are not made by states in the phase of complete demoralization. In addition, he understood and felt his compatriots well and knew that many, quite patriotic people were tormented by doubt: maybe try to get away from repeating the traditional cycle of Russian history? Maybe not to recreate an empire, not to set ambitious national goals, but to integrate into European civilization and become rich and calm, although not a great state? It is now known that Vladimir II, the flesh of the flesh of his people, was himself tormented by the same doubts. Now, if the course of life leads to the fact that this is impossible, he thought, then it will be possible to say to ourselves: we have done what we could, and it is not our fault that this is not our way.

But since 2004, phenomena began to gradually increase, which made the beginning of a policy of revenge inevitable. The internal enemy raised its head - first, the conspiracy of Khodorkovsky (the first of the repressed oligarchs) was revealed, then a wave of mass protests swept across the country against the unsuccessful decisions of the authorities in the social sphere, turning into riots. All of them, even those that began spontaneously, were then paid for and managed from the outside, mainly through Russian emigrants - enemies of the regime. At the same time, the United States violated the secret agreement that they had with Russia that Russia does not interfere with the United States on the world stage, in particular, does not arm their enemies and does not use its veto power in the UN Security Council against them, and the United States does not act against the interests of Russia and generally does not show activity in the post-Soviet space. In 2004-2006, America successfully organized coups in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which brought pro-American and at the same time frantically anti-Russian

regimes to power, and also unsuccessfully tried to do this in Belarus. All this was aimed not only and not so much at encircling Russia with enemies, but at working out methods for seizing power in the post-Soviet states in order to apply them further on Russia itself. At the same time, pressure on Russia was increased on all fronts of international politics - the most revealing example is how, under far-fetched pretexts, it was not allowed into the World Trade Organization for many years (the irony is that Russia, with its then WTO export structure, was and was not needed, and the West lost much more). All this was a reaction to the realization that Russia, in spite of everything, has the potential to restore greatness (just after the first five years of the reign of Vladimir II), which means that it must be destroyed or drastically weakened - all the talk about its retreat from democracy was nothing more than verbal fluff. The basic operational scenario was to cause a crisis in Russia (real) by any means, and against its background to stage a democratic revolution (not real, due to the absolute marginality of the so-called democratic movement in Russia) and to help it carry out an intervention by NATO forces. Then the new authorities would renounce nuclear weapons (even Khodorkovsky promised this if he came to power), liquidate the military-industrial complex, and then arrange a “voluntary” separation of Russia into several Russian and several non-Russian states, repeating the path of Yugoslavia.

But the Russian elite in the mid-2000s, despite all the nationwide criticism against it (quite fair, too!), was no longer the same as in 1995 and even in 2000. Lessons were learned from the so-called revolutions in these countries of the near abroad, and the authorities took all the necessary preventive actions - weakened and isolated the potential centers of such a “revolution” in their country, cut off funding channels, etc.: nothing particularly tough had to be done. Still, in Russia of that time, unlike its neighbors, corruption, injustice and similar manifestations (called in Russian “lawlessness”) did not cross all conceivable boundaries - on the contrary, since 2000 they have been decreasing, albeit slowly. The most odious mistakes (such as the so-called monetization of benefits) were promptly corrected, and administrative measures were taken to prevent their ill-conceived appearance in the future. As a result, by 2006 it became clear to everyone that there would be no revolution in Russia. In the international arena, Russia has sharply increased the independence of its behavior, but at the same time did not run into a confrontation with Western countries and did not give them the slightest serious reason to find fault with itself. And for the United States, on the contrary, these were not the most successful years - they were drawn into a number of unnecessary adventures, and their relations with allied Europe and loyal *[sic]* China began to strain. As a result of all this - both the US foreign policy mistakes and Russia’s clear and balanced behavior - the latter’s shares in world politics began to rise sharply. This culminated in her presidency in 2006 of the so-called G8, a club of eight industrialized countries claiming to solve world problems, sort of like the current World Five-Power Forum in Saint Helena. However, already during the annual meeting of the G8 in St. Petersburg, it became clear that this idyll would not last long.

Realizing that the time had come, Vladimir II began to act - the period of peace still continued, but was rapidly approaching its end. First of all, it was necessary to take care of the economy - in fact, at that time it was on the rise, but in terms of its sectoral and institutional structure it was completely unprepared for any shocks. The dependence on imports was unacceptably high, as well as on the export of raw materials and semi-finished products, and the bulk of the investment potential fell on large, cosmopolitan players (although mostly of Russian origin). In addition, huge funds for Russia at that time - the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank and the government’s stabilization fund, totaling more than 300 billion dollars - were directly in currency, and mainly in US dollars. This meant that they could simply be frozen at any moment, and with any aggravation of the international situation, America, and under its pressure, Europe would not fail to do so. All this had to be solved somehow. By mid-2006, a number of decisions were made that allowed the Russian ruble to become a reserve currency, but this only concerned the removal of restrictions on capital transactions that had remained by that time. At the end of 2006 - beginning of 2007, measures were promptly taken to withdraw gold and foreign exchange reserves from dollars held in the United States, partly by transferring them to other currencies, and partly by transferring

them to dollar accounts, but in banks in other countries. After all, you can also have a dollar account on a subaccount, for example, in the Bank of China (which Russia did) - there the Americans technically cannot freeze it, except perhaps together with all the dollars of China. And in 2007, in the famous Yekaterinburg speech, Vladimir II already clearly formulated the theses of the new economic policy. To you, dear compatriots, they will seem self-evident and were so in our countries in those days - but in Russia in 2007, after 15 years of pseudo-liberal madness in the economy, they produced the effect of an exploding bomb. There were seven theses: 1) large-scale state investments in the real sector - both in commercial enterprises based on market principles, and in infrastructure; 2) all-round stimulation of import substitution; 3) the creation of large state-owned leasing and mortgage finance companies to stimulate corporate demand; 4) a set of measures to stimulate the savings of the population and their transformation into investments, including the involvement in circulation of additional assets and the creation of new financial instruments; 5) a set of measures to multiply the construction of housing, including the mass creation of new small towns; 6) a ban on exports for foreign currency - now it could be carried out by exporters only for rubles; 7) diversification of instruments for storing state financial reserves - now they are partially invested in their own economy.

All this was accompanied by a number of other, not so large-scale measures, the significance of which, however, can hardly be overestimated. A tax reform was carried out that replaced the value-added tax with a retail sales tax, and also reduced real payments on the unified social tax - this made life much easier for businesses, although the tax burden was already not very large since the early 2000s. A number of provisions were adopted aimed at normalizing law enforcement activities related to business: the reform of arbitration proceedings, which made it very difficult both for corruption in the courts and for legal lawlessness; new rules and special control of criminal proceedings on economic crimes; new rules for maintaining registers of property (shares and real estate) and control over this. Very significant benefits have been introduced for those who create new enterprises - that is, physically build new factories or shops, and not simply buy them from a previous owner. "We need to make an economic breakthrough, commensurate in scale with the thirties and fifties of the twentieth century, but on the basis of the market," Vladimir II said in his Yekaterinburg speech. - "And for this we need not to reshuffle the existing enterprises left over from the USSR, but to create new ones - hundreds of large ones, tens of thousands of medium ones, millions of small ones. And with what has yet to be created, you won't fill the treasury - the calves are not milked. When all these measures began to be implemented and earned, their effect was colossal. Like mushrooms after the rain, enterprises began to grow, mainly import-substituting - both very large, like two automotive corporations (see the chapter "[Economy](#)"), where the state acted as an investor directly, and smaller ones created by private capital. The latter used both the above-mentioned benefits and direct state assistance - state guarantees for part of the collateral for loans, allowing them to receive a larger loan with the same equity capital and master a larger investment project. New modern cities began to be massively built, or rather, small towns (as in North America in the 19th century, during the development of the Wild West) - they gave not only an economic effect, but also a completely different quality of life than the asphalt jungle of megacities. And the people living in these cities, especially since childhood, have become citizens of a completely different "quality" and a different value for the state. The construction of the transpolar St. Petersburg-Anadyr railway began, which in the future ensured the development of the natural resources of gigantic territories, and immediately gave an economic effect due to the loading of industry. The country's financial reserves were largely spent on investments in the economy and infrastructure, ceasing to hang like a dead weight.

These were the economic reforms of 2006-2007. As I said, they were perceived by Vladimir II and his associates as part of Russia's response to the challenge of the West - a challenge that was not their choice. But the economy was, of course, not the only area in which changes took place. Since 2005, but especially since 2006, military orders began to increase, moreover, mainly for [supernova](#)⁶ equipment - they grew several times every year. By the way, this not only increased the country's defense capability,

but also gave a huge impetus to science and high-tech production, and through it to the entire economy. The monetary and other allowances of servicemen in the army and in the law enforcement system were sharply increased, which began to restore the prestige of the profession of a man in uniform. But the law enforcement system also needed a hard eradication of corruption, which had reached unheard of proportions, and this was started in earnest, including with the widespread involvement of state security agencies (as in civilian ministries). An active demographic policy aimed at increasing the birth rate was announced - a natural measure for a country preparing for war. Back in 2005, the direct election of governors was abolished - this dramatically increased the country's manageability. From the end of 2006, but especially in 2007, the state apparatus was "cleansed" in order - people from the circle of Boris the Damned and his "family" were completely removed (oddly enough, there were still quite a lot of them even in 2006), all adhering to extremely liberal views, as well as corrupt officials who have created fortunes for themselves with the help of their official position. True, we were talking about fortunes only in excess of a certain size - if all those who generally earned at least something with their public office, that is, in fact, stole, were removed, then in Russia at that time it would be impossible to run the country at all. At the same time, the groundwork for more systematic work was made for the future - a nationwide personnel service was created, which was tasked with looking for promising people almost from the school bench, tracking them, if necessary, "pulling them up", by providing this or that assistance, and at the right time to call to public service or to send to other areas to ensure the interests of the state (in the press, for example, or in political parties). There were also some structural innovations - for example, the institute of presidential assistants was greatly increased; in fact, they became commissars, to whom Vladimir II entrusted one thing today, and another tomorrow. The powers and resources of assistants and the presidential administration in general, where they were included, were considerable before, but since 2007 they have become especially extensive - both the strategic and control functions of governing the country during this period were largely carried out by them (naturally, under the leadership of Vladimir II) and not by the government.

Elimination of the oligarchy. However, the economic innovations of 2007 can hardly be called blessed and bloodless. Although the vast majority of market participants felt like a convict from whom the shackles were suddenly removed, there were also a minority. First of all, these were corrupt officials and criminal leaders - by that time, these two categories represented a mass group of the Russian elite, in particular in business, and were not even particularly disguised. Back in 2006, mass dismissals of corrupt officers and generals of the special services began, but these were, in the Russian expression, "still flowers." During the famous so-called clean night in 2007, about 150 major government officials, current and former, were arrested; moreover, among them were many people from the president's close circle, the so-called St. Petersburg people, who were considered untouchable by everyone. Arrest warrants were also issued for about 400 major crime bosses, most of whom, however, were shot while resisting (it is now difficult to say whether real or fictional). The people froze; the corrupt officials and bandits who remained at large were completely demoralized, mainly due to a sharp, almost instantaneous transition: yesterday, all-having and powerful and fearless masters of life, as the Russians say, "godfathers to the king, matchmakers to the minister" - and today hunted game awaiting the hunter's shot. But apart from the victims themselves, there were no particularly dissatisfied people - both corruption and crime got everyone; no one expected such decisiveness from Vladimir II, but no one objected. They only argued about whether the president could now somehow agree with the oligarchs on limiting their influence on the country, since it is difficult to even imagine how significant this influence was - not at all the same as in 1996-1999, but still colossal. In fact, Vladimir II was not going to negotiate with anyone and about anything.

There were many reasons for this, the main of which, as it is now clear from the height of the past half century, was not even the fact that they were all, to one degree or another, the fifth column of the West. The main thing was that the ways in which they achieved their position predetermined a very specific

type of personality that did not fit into a normal economy and a normal society in general, especially with a strong state. It is no coincidence that all the oligarchs, especially the first rank, looked alike like twin brothers. This was a type of people, of course, outstanding: smart, tenacious, decisive, well versed in people, completely fearless - in general, those who survive in any circumstances. On the other hand, these were people completely incapable of strategic planning, incapable of any form of interaction and cooperation, constantly waging a war of all against all, deeply contemptuous of other people and the country as a whole - more precisely, not able to understand at all what country, except as a place for their hunting and feeding. Perhaps it would be most correct to compare them with cancer cells in the body, which, of course, are much superior to other cells, but only in their ability to survive and grow, and not in their benefits to the body - they are deadly for the body. It cannot be said, dear compatriots, that we do not have such people - but they are much more typical for the criminal world than for the elite of our big business. Rather, they are the antithesis of such famous industry captains as, for example, the information technology magnate Bill Gates from Seattle or the nanotech magnate Jorge Lopez from Guadalajara, who for the first time in history created a trillion-dollar fortune, lived rather modestly until the end of his life. And it is absolutely impossible to imagine them in the place of the space magnate João Branco (my second cousin), who, during the investigation of the alleged environmental damage from the launch of nuclear-powered rockets in 2034, said that his internal investigation showed that yes, this damage really takes place and that he himself stops all launches until its elimination. To the question of journalists, what about the tens of billions of dollars of losses (which he suffered as a result), he angrily replied: "And where do you want me to live with these tens of billions, in the Amazonian forest?" So, the complete absence of such an identification with the country and aspiration for the future among the Russian oligarchs, then still future, gave them the inner freedom to tear their country apart, when everyone else thought that this was impossible. For the same reason, most of the oligarchs of the first wave were non-Russian by nationality (despite the fact that there were more than 80% of Russians in Russia at that time, and, as later showed, they are quite good entrepreneurs), and far from being only Jews, which has traditionally been a sore point in Russia, but representatives of many non-Russian nationalities. It was easier for them to consider the country not their own: to decide to tear apart a stranger, even a distant relative, is still easier than their own father.

However, one should not think that the claims of Vladimir II to the oligarchs were limited to these general philosophical considerations - rather, they were the real background to the five specific claims that were against them. This is, firstly, that they practically without money and without any other reason took possession of the state, that is, in fact, public, property worth billions and tens of billions of dollars each; secondly, the fact that, having already possessed this property, they practically did not invest anything (in proportion to the size of the property) in its renovation, expansion and diversification, preferring to extract cash and take it abroad, with pleasure "laying down" under Western governments; thirdly, the fact that they practically did not pay taxes or paid as much as they saw fit; fourthly, the fact that the only thing they did not skimp on "investing" in was the appointment of their own and the corruption of existing government officials; fifthly, they treated any entrepreneurs smaller than themselves, just like the state, considering it normal to take away their business with the help of their corrupt and criminal capabilities. Therefore, Vladimir II separated, so to speak, the sheep from the goats and identified a group of the largest and most odious of them, twenty people, with whom negotiations were conducted on only one thing: how much money the state was ready to leave them, if they voluntarily give everything else, including all industrial assets and capital transferred abroad; with this money, they could either go abroad or stay in Russia and build a new business for themselves, but on a regular market basis. The public knew nothing about these negotiations and learned only a few years later from Gabriel the Great, when he was already the ruler of Russia. I know much more about them, because I was lucky enough to meet and talk with several living participants in many events of that time - now they are all in their eighties or nineties. So, for example, one of them recalled how Vladimir the Restorer, addressing several oligarchs at his residence, said: "If one of you, left with a small one, by your current standards - but gigantic, by the

standards of everyone else, - capital and without corruption, decides to continue business in Russia and build a financial empire a second time, before I not only admit, both personally and publicly, that I was wrong about him, but I will also find a way to compensate him for my mistake.

However, it cannot be said that this made any impression on the oligarchs. Negotiations were not shaky, even with those who were arrested and were in prison - they were not shy people. But this is until one of the oligarchs was blown up in his car in London - after that, all negotiations were completed in a relatively short time; none of the oligarchs chose to stay in Russia. The enterprises that were essentially taken away from them were divided into two groups: raw materials, mainly oil, were declared state property (in the sense of forever), and the income from them is a significant item of the state budget revenue to this day, and in those years it was the most important. For efficiency, they were merged not into one fuel and energy company, but into four competing ones (six, if you count with the two companies into which Gazprom was divided - a state corporation that produces, as opposed to oil, a lot of gas and relatively little oil), controlled by private management companies that are not related to the property; curiously, four out of six of these management companies in 2007 were foreign, including three Western, despite the opposition. "Why should we transfer to private ownership the oil and gas industry, which is a combination of what God gave us, and what our fathers created by work and blood," Vladimir II asked the people in a television address, "if this is just that industry - one of the very few - where state-owned companies perform as effectively as private ones, such as Saudi, Chinese or Mexican?" Other selected companies, such as coal, steel and chemicals, were advertised for sale within five to six years, and before that were also managed by the winning management companies.

As for the next, after the oligarchic, echelon of large Russian business, an agreement was concluded with them (also, of course, not in a legal sense), later called the Bocharov Ruchia pact (after the name of the place), the essence of which boiled down to one phrase: do not just as the oligarchs did (and you, too, on a smaller scale!), and you can firmly count on the safety of yourself and your property and on all kinds of state assistance. Let's determine in a dialogue mode with each of you, we told them how much you owe the state for state property taken for nothing and for unpaid taxes - honestly, including taking into account all discounting factors. And to those with whom an agreement is reached, we will give almost any installment plan and other indulgences. In addition, spend the bulk of your income not on casinos and not on yachts and planes, but on modernizing, expanding and diversifying your own - not someone else's! - business. Do not take capital abroad, except when it is really necessary to build a multinational corporation; honestly pay all taxes - we guarantee you that they will not be ruinous or even very burdensome; do not have corrupt relations with officials, and if they extort you, call quickly, we will tell you where, and do not be afraid of anything; do not keep security services beyond what is absolutely necessary, do not deal with crime, do not engage in crime yourself, from wiretaps to murders; and do not run into each other and those who are smaller for the purposes of weaning, except for purely financial and market methods. You are not bandits, but businessmen, the backbone of society - so behave accordingly! And for those who will do this, we will not only allow breathing as a reward, as they say - we will allow you to access any government programs, including the military, and any government resources; we will seriously help you with money - huge money! - in any projects to create new industries and businesses, without claiming a share; we will provide all our opportunities and efforts to promote your interests in other countries; and we will protect you from criminal, bureaucratic and foreign encroachments in a way that no "roof" has ever protected. I must say that large Russian business has basically adopted these rules - apparently, it managed to get tired of lawlessness. Together with public investment, tax reform, demand stimulation, import substitution, military production and the normalization of the law enforcement system, this was the spark from which the Russian economy wound up and gained momentum.

First expansion. However, all these actions were not in themselves a confrontation with the West - only preparation for its consequences. They naturally led to sharp statements from the West, to which Russia responded in the same spirit - but such exchanges of barbs, generally characteristic of international

diplomacy in the era of nation-states, remained nothing more than words. The spark that ignited this tinderbox and took the confrontation from the realm of words to the realm of action came from neighboring Ukraine. This country, which broke away from Russia in the second Time of Troubles, caused particular irritation in Russia by the very fact of its existence, much more than in other post-Soviet states. The reason for this is obvious - after all, they were national states of peoples ethnically very far from Russians; and Ukrainians were no different from Russians and, in fact, were Russians. In this sense, one could say about the book "Ukraine is not Russia", which was written by the second president of Ukraine Kuchma, with the words from the book of the Russian-Ukrainian writer Bulgakov: "Congratulations, citizen, you lied." Nevertheless, Russia has not interfered in Ukraine's affairs (except to the extent that big countries always interfere in the affairs of smaller neighbors), despite the sometimes hysterical anti-Russian rhetoric there. At the end of 2004, the so-called Orange Revolution, organized by America, took place there, as a result of which a pro-American, anti-Russian government came to power - it came as a result of falsifications and unrest, against the will of the population of the eastern and southern parts of the country. These territories, which accounted for up to half of the country's population and the lion's share of its economic potential (quite modest, however), never considered themselves part of Western European civilization, but, on the contrary, always felt themselves to be part of Russia - in contrast to the population of Central and especially Western Ukraine. In 2006, parliamentary elections were held there, and from their moment, Ukraine, according to the adopted changes in the constitution, became a parliamentary republic - so these elections determined who would rule the country. Contrary to the expectations of the president and the government and their Western patrons (to be more precise, puppeteers), they lost the elections, despite all their administrative resources, which they used without any shame. As a result of a protracted crisis, or rather a series of them, the president dissolved parliament in 2007, after all, preventing the prime minister, who was a protege of the eastern regions, from ruling the country, although he relied on the parliamentary majority. People had different attitudes towards this majority, which was backed by oligarchs, moreover, mostly of a criminal type, but the dissolution of parliament in this situation could not be regarded otherwise than wiping one's feet on the voters. And therefore, at the end of 2007, an uprising began in Eastern and Southern Ukraine - it simply could not help but start.

This uprising, in its historical essence repeating the uprising of 1649-1654 (as a result of which Eastern Ukraine became part of Russia), broke out under the slogans of reunification with Russia and abandoning the policy of forced integration into Europe and joining the anti-Russian NATO bloc under the patronage of America and Poland . As a result, nine regions (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporozhye, Luhansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, Mykolaiv and Crimea) declared their non-recognition of the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian statehood in general and the proclamation of the Donetsk-Black Sea Republic. They removed the representatives of the central government (except for those who went over to the side of the rebels), nominated their leaders and announced a referendum on secession from Ukraine and entry into Russia. When the Ukrainian authorities ordered all troops stationed in the east and south to oppose the rebels, it turned out that most of them had already gone over to the side of the rebels (as well as a significant part of the police and special services). The rest did not want to join the battle and partly left the uprising zone without weapons, partly they were blockaded at their military bases. All this, of course, was absolutely illegal - but, as they say in Russia, "the rebellion cannot end in success - otherwise it is called differently"; had the rebellion failed, it would probably have been called an illegal rebellion in today's history books. Russia verbally completely distanced itself from this process, stating that this is the business of the eastern Ukrainians themselves, but that it cannot ignore the interests of the fraternal people and, of course, will accept them into Russia if they decide so. Now it is difficult to say whether Russia participated in the preparation of this uprising or whether it was purely homegrown - in any case, it is considered a heroic episode in the history of the Russian people. In the meantime, the Ukrainian authorities turned to NATO for help, and several divisions began to be transferred to Ukraine - but, of course, so far in the western and central part, and not in the uprising zone. Russia did not, in the Russians'

own words, “wait for the weather by the sea” and in March 2008 brought into Eastern Ukraine - naturally, at the request of the leadership of the rebels - a corps of 80,000 soldiers; The Black Sea Fleet, already stationed in the south of Ukraine, was put on full alert, and its coastal bases were reinforced by marines transferred from Russia. In response to this, NATO units moved towards Eastern Ukraine, and Russian units moved towards them; the contact took place on the border of the Dnepropetrovsk and Kirovograd (these were the names of the cities of Yekaterinoslav and Elizavetograd) regions, near a place called Pyatikhatki. More than 140 thousand people took up positions opposite each other, with armored vehicles and firepower; the so-called Lenten confrontation began (because at that time there was an Orthodox Lent).

The anti-Russian hysteria in the press and in the political establishment in Europe and the United States during this period reached a completely surreal level. It became commonplace to say that the Russians are immeasurably more terrible for humanity than Genghis Khan and Hitler put together, so that it seemed that they were eating babies for breakfast. Ukrainians were portrayed not just as victims, but almost as the center of everything bright and worthy on Earth - despite the fact that the vast majority of Europeans and especially Americans had no idea where Ukraine was and who the Ukrainians were (I saw quite a lot of them and I can testify that they are ordinary Russians). We must pay tribute to the Russians - although their press at that time also did not show miracles of objectivity, it was nevertheless much more moderate and did not fall into such collective insanity. For all that, however, the American leaders hesitated to order an assault, as the Russians were clearly demonstrating their readiness to go all the way. Filmed on Western television (apparently not without the help of Russian intelligence) films about how Russian nuclear missiles are redirected to the United States, and cruise missiles are suspended from bombers for launching across Europe, aroused the already forgotten feeling everywhere in the West that if the Russians wanted to, the end of the world will come in half an hour. The fact that the Russians themselves would die in the process was not taken as great consolation, since everyone felt that the Russians were ready for this, without bluffing. The United States overestimated the significance of the fact of the complete decay of the Russian military elite, almost all of whose members had illegal bank accounts in the West (this is not counting a significant number of those who directly worked for Western intelligence). In a matter of weeks, Russians replaced almost the entire top generals - then for the first time techno-interrogations were used, representing an interrogation with the use of psychotropic drugs (we call it the truth drug); in our time, this is a very wide practice in the Russian Empire (see the chapter [“Law Enforcement System”](#)).

Meanwhile, in the eastern regions of Ukraine itself, a referendum was held, where 82% of the population voted for joining Russia. It does not look like it was a falsification, because in these areas in the presidential elections of 2004 almost the same number voted for a candidate who was considered pro-Russian (despite the fact that the candidate himself was, to put it mildly, specific). Russia announced a referendum at home: on consent to the admission of Eastern Ukraine to Russia; looking ahead, I will say that 93% of the Russians who took part voted “for” on it. Politically, time was working against the West, its leaders were expected to act against the Russian monsters - but the leaders were afraid to start actions; and over the Russians, as they say, “did not drip” - the victim was not their side. As a result, the West had to back down (in colloquial Russian this is called the word “merge”). In May, the so-called Dnieper truce was concluded - it was signed on a barge in the middle of the Dnieper River, at an equal distance from the Poltava (“western”) and Dnepropetrovsk (“eastern”) regions between NATO and Russia. NATO was a signatory because by that time Ukraine had already been - within two months - accepted into NATO and the European Union. In the agreement, although the accession of the east of Ukraine to Russia was not politically recognized, a demarcation line was fixed, passing along the borders of the Sumy, Poltava, Kirovograd and Vinnitsa regions from the western, that is, the Ukrainian-NATO side, and Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev and Odessa regions from the eastern, that is, the Russian side. The parties undertook not to violate the line, as well as to ensure the free passage of civilians through it; it was

specifically stipulated that Russia renounces any encroachment on the territory to the west of the demarcation line. It was purely a PR campaign on the part of the United States, because they knew perfectly well that Russia did not expect anything like that; but it was hyped in America and Europe as a great victory in curbing Russian imperialism.

Further, Russia was very lucky - the American authorities made a gross foreign policy mistake. Wanting to prevent such a huge and strategically important country as Kazakhstan (also a fragment of the Red Empire) from rapprochement with Russia, the United States bet on the overthrow of the regime led by President Nazarbayev and ensuring the election of a pro-American “democratic” president. They absolutely should not have done this, because Nazarbayev built in his country a very successful economy oriented to the world market and a very stable welfare state. He was already ready to be an American client, and even looking at Russian expansion during the Ukrainian events, he was completely ready for a lot. But in the United States, it was decided that, by his very origin, he was too oriented towards Russia (he came from the system of the Second Russian Empire, his children studied in Moscow, etc.). In addition, he is allegedly authoritarian and corrupt (in the United States for several years there has been a trial of bribes to Nazarbayev, in Switzerland his accounts were frozen), and therefore he will certainly come to an agreement with the Russians - therefore, he must be changed. In fact, the systemic weakness of the American empire was manifested here - it was not the point of view that was more correct or at least more useful for America that always won, but the one that was more audible (which usually means that it simply lobbied better). This was precisely the aforementioned position promoted in the United States by various expatriate dissidents from Kazakhstan, each of whom very much wanted the Americans to make him the Kazakh president.

As a result, mass demonstrations and actions of civil disobedience began in Kazakhstan demanding the departure of Nazarbayev and his family. They were inspired by the people of the aforementioned emigrants, and although they did not have time to go into riots, this would certainly have happened further. Nazarbayev was quite defenseless against such a threat - because he was not a dictator (which he was accused of), and it was dictators who could best resist the technologies of “color revolutions”. Therefore, he made concessions: he dismissed the government and several governors, removed his eldest daughter and the husband of his middle daughter from public office, and also arrested a number of very high-ranking people suspected by everyone of corruption; at the same time, however, many opposition leaders were arrested. By this he managed to bring down the wave of speeches that threatened to turn into a revolution, but it was clear to everyone that this was not for long; and then he had no choice but to turn to Russia for salvation - especially considering that in neighboring Kyrgyzstan (where such a revolution had already won and the Americans ruled the country), 6,000 American commandos were in full readiness at a military base. Nazarbayev and Vladimir II signed an allied treaty, which was approved by the parliament under his control in a closed session on the same day - but this was not announced until a few days later, when Russian troops had already begun to arrive by rail. Nazarbayev delivered a speech to the nation, announcing the threat of American intervention, the only hope - Russia, and that he began preparations for a referendum on reunification with Russia. He called on the army, police and the population not to resist the fraternal Russian troops.

The vast majority of the Kazakh army complied with this order, there were almost no cases of opposing Russia - for the same main reason as half a year before in Ukraine: in the army, a significant part of the personnel were ethnic Russians, and ethnic Kazakhs were mainly represented by older ages who served in the Armed Forces of the unified Second Empire. This happened because in all the new states formed during the collapse of the Second Empire, covered by the myth of capitalism and profit, it was extremely unprestigious to go to military service, and representatives of the titular nation almost did not go there. In Kazakhstan, this was exacerbated by the fact that Russians made up almost half of the population. The army is an army, but on the whole, the population did not at all joyfully and unanimously accept the prospect of the loss of sovereignty, the intrinsic value of which they had been told for 15 years, especially

since ethnically and historically its kinship with Russia (in any case, among the Kazakh half of the population) was not at all such as the Eastern Ukrainians. But the whole world was already engulfed in a military, or at least pre-war, atmosphere, and this could not but affect the mood of the people. In June 2008, a referendum was held, in which 58% of those who came voted “yes”; it could not be otherwise, because some part of the Kazakhs, who made up about 55% of the population, was clearly in favor, while the Russians, who made up the remainder, were completely in favor. Nazarbayev became chairman of the Russian Senate, and his family retained its assets, and their descendants are still among the ten richest people in the Russian Empire. But it’s ridiculous to think that this is what President Nazarbayev negotiated with the Russians for: he really didn’t see any other way out for his country, and, apparently, there wasn’t one.

Without letting the Americans come to their senses, the Russians seized Turkmenistan already in July 2008; that is, a coup allegedly took place there, and the new government called on Russia for help - but this government was clearly just an advanced detachment of Russian special forces, recruited from ethnic Turkmen living in Russia. It was already an open aggression to seize a strategically important piece of the Caspian coast and strengthen its gas monopoly in Eurasia by joining the Turkmen gas complex. To justify it, a new ideology was needed - and it was put forward by Russia: the collapse of the Second Empire in 1991 was not the will of the peoples, but the result of a special operation by the West based on the traitors to their country in the Second Empire itself. And the fact that later it was approved in referendums in every fragment country (except, by the way, Russia) is not considered “later”; then in our country, and in Turkmenistan, everything was approved in a referendum. And if so, then we simply return our own, stolen - and this can be done by force. Thus, Russia claimed its rights to the entire territory of the Second Empire, although it was not at all going to annex all the deposited lands, as the future showed; at that time, its expansion was limited, in addition to the above, to the conclusion in 2007 of agreements on reunification (of course, with the introduction of troops there) with the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic (as part of the then Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (as part of the then Georgia). At that time, voices began to be heard in Russia from first the Young Guard Party of Eastern Ukraine (MPVU), and then other parties and public organizations of Eastern and Southern Ukraine and Kazakhstan: we do not want to live according to the constitution, which was not accepted by us and not by our ancestors. Now, if some foreign country, which has never been a part of Russia, suddenly asked to become part of it, then, of course, it should recognize the Russian constitution as one of the conditions for entry. Well, since we are one people, forcibly torn apart in 1991, then we want real equality: we want a new Russia with a new constitution! Vladimir, meeting with representatives of all these parties and inviting the main Russian parties there, asked them: “What about abolishing the Russian Federation?” - “Yes! was the unanimous response. And all the good that is in its structure, we will transfer to the constitution of the new Russia, leaving behind everything unnecessary.” This did not contradict the plans of Vladimir II, and a referendum was scheduled for October 2008 on the abolition of the Russian Federation, the creation of the Russian Union and the approval of its constitution. It was announced that in December, if the results of the referendum were positive, elections of the President and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Union would be held.

Immediately after that, the President of the Republic of Belarus proposed that Belarus, by quickly signing an appropriate agreement with the Russian Federation, also join the Russian Union and take part in the referendum. It was not an easy decision, because President Lukashenko was a pronounced populist dictator, really loved by a significant part of his compatriots, and here he had to become just a governor. But he had no choice, because within a few months, he was in danger of being invaded by the West, who considered him an absolutely odious figure. Or Russia would preempt the West and invade itself - but then it would not be about the governorship, but about a prisoner of war camp. The point here is that his entire strategy, as well as the strategy of the leadership of many small countries of that era in general, not only did not provide for such a possibility, but relied on inflicting unacceptable damage to the aggressor:

you, of course, will conquer us, but think how many people you lose - is it worth it? And it worked, but not in 2008, when pre-war moods took over the world, including an internal readiness for losses. Lukashenko realized that he had a choice between bad and very bad, and as a result, he bargained for himself the governorship before the end of the term for which he was once again elected president (and he was just beginning), and a number of other guarantees - Vladimir II went towards him in everything. In a referendum in October, 77% of those who came voted "for" with a turnout of 74%; Russia has become a state with a population of more than 200 million people and a territory of more than 20 million square kilometers, although still far inferior to the Second, and even more so the First Empire. The main thing is that this country was much more viable in the face of confrontation with the West. Vladimir II was elected President of the Russian Union for four years in December 2008, receiving 79% of the vote - his term expired in April, but due to extraordinary circumstances, the election of a new president of the Russian Federation was postponed to July. Then they were completely canceled in connection with the creation of a new country and the appointment of elections for its president - for the same reason, Vladimir II did not interfere with their participation in them because he had already served two consecutive terms allowed by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It was already the Cold War period.

Cold War. The Russian Union of 2009 did not differ much from the Russian Federation of 2006, before the reforms of Vladimir II, in terms of its political and other structure; but in terms of atmosphere, they were practically two different countries. In 2006, the majority of the press, including state television, was still at least anti-government, and at most anti-Russian, and in any case catastrophic and defeatist. And in 2009, although a lot of materials were published and shown that disagreed with the specific management decisions of the authorities, all this was already from a patriotic position, friendly to one's own state, as it is everywhere in the world. In 2006, all parties, except for the purely bureaucratic official United Russia, were marginal and competed with each other in who would look more oppositional in order to please the so-called protest electorate. And in the 2008 elections to the State Duma, two already quite normal parties entered the State Duma - the Imperial Party of the Russian Union (IPRS) and the Russian Progress Party (RPP), formed as a result of the peaceful divorce of United Russia - and the more left-wing Young Guard Party of Russia (MPR) representing mainly, but not only, the voters of the new Ukrainian and Belarusian territories. No marginal protest parties came close to 5%, and the general atmosphere in the elections (and later in the State Duma) was solid and consensual in basic values - as it should be, but not at all like it was in Russia before. Corruption has greatly decreased, and again, the atmosphere has especially changed - officials began to consider themselves not as businessmen on earnings, as not long before, but officials of a great country; to imagine two officials openly talking in 2009 about personal illegal earnings, in contrast to 2006 and especially 2000, is completely unthinkable. This was facilitated by the widespread use of psychotropic techno-interrogations (see above), and the return to the system of "envelopes" that existed in the Second Empire, that is, unofficial significant payments to officials; but the main reason, no doubt, was a change in the mood in society. (Interestingly, when Vladimir II was asked about the envelopes during a TV interview, he bluntly said: yes, this is the case, dear citizens, and there is no need to make these payments official yet, or ask me or others about the details, so as not to inflame passions - and the Russians accepted this normally and, on the contrary, considered that the ruler was treating them honestly, as it should be.) I don't know if the efficiency of officials increased at the same time - it seems that it increased - but meaningfulness was added to their actions exactly; this applies equally to the socio-economic bloc, and the political-power bloc. Businessmen - both medium and large - who until recently behaved like crazed and despising masters of life (but in fact constantly expecting collapse, prisons or bullets), now began to feel like solid pillars of society, which their country respects and appreciates and who have nothing to fear. And the mood among ordinary people has changed quite significantly: it would seem that the war, albeit still cold, but optimism and confidence in the future has increased a hundredfold! This was told to me in Russia by all the older people with whom I spoke: instead of a feeling of hopelessness, there was a sense of justice and meaningfulness, the justification of everything that was

happening, including difficulties, and confidence that together we would break through and everything would be fine. By the way, at that time, many more Russians came to the Church, to the faith of Christ, than from the hopelessness of the 90s, confirming a certain peculiarity of the Russian worldview, a certain special sensitivity to justice, clearly formulated in the old phrase: "God loves faith not so, like the truth." Why has everything changed so much? I think that the Russian people are distinguished by the fact that it is extremely important for them to have a clearly formulated and generally accepted national goal that gives meaning, if not to individual human life, then at least to society. And I would venture to hypothesize that this is precisely the source of Russian collectivism, in contrast to Eastern collectivism: there is no sense in individual life (except for those who are really capable of living for the sake of salvation and eternal life), but in public life there is - therefore, it is necessary to dissolve individual life as much as possible in public life, because meaning is needed, there is no way without it. Now it is clear what Russia and Russians lost in the 90s, after the collapse of the Second Empire, and what they yearned for so much, falling into complete degradation - not wealth, power or even greatness: they lost the meaning of existence. Money and personal success in general, with which they tried to replace it, is in any case a factor only in individual life - but what is the general meaning? Vladimir II did not even formulate this meaning, did not verbalize the image of the future to which one should strive, he acted, strictly speaking, reactively - but everyone felt that this meaning exists; and what it is, is not so important. For a civilization of the Russian type, such a feeling usually comes as a result of a military confrontation with an enemy, preferably a much stronger one, even better with the whole world; this is what took place. Thus, the West did with its own hands what the Russians themselves clearly could not do: gave them the meaning of existence, and with it - strength.

Naturally, during this period, ideology and foreign policy underwent quite significant changes, among other things. Even before the beginning of the Lenten confrontation, in early 2008, Russia announced its withdrawal from two related European organizations - the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (if it had not withdrawn itself, it would have been expelled). Judging by the then press, the West was taken by surprise, although it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. When another European organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, created back in the 1970s, and to a large extent by Russia itself (the Second Empire), adopted in response to this a resolution on the actual political boycott of Russia, she also left this organization. "You don't like us?" - Vladimir II asked rhetorically in an interview with French television. - "Well, go to war with us and conquer us. After all, you Europeans have already tried this - both under Napoleon and under Hitler. Well, as we say, God loves a trinity. Or refuse to buy our energy, oil and gas so that we starve to death." (It was a mockery - the rejection of Russian oil at that time would have caused a price spike that would have brought down the European economy; there was nothing to replace Russian gas at all.) But no, so know that you are like a dog that barks deafeningly because it is afraid to bite; we say about such people: "Pug, you know, she is strong if she barks at an elephant." Of course, the ritual phrases that Russia is part of European civilization were still uttered, but a new position was added to them. It was clearly expressed in the message of Vladimir II to the Federal Assembly in 2008: Russia is a separate, ancient and self-sufficient civilization, which does not aspire to "political Europe" at all - although geographically and historically it is part of Europe and desires good neighborly relations with it. Not only is integration into Europe not the main goal of Russian foreign policy, but on the contrary, one of the main goals is to prevent such attempts. Since Vladimir knew that the mentality of the Russian nation was largely oriented towards symbols and symbolic actions, he made a number of such actions. Let me give you one example: in 1918 the Communists introduced the Gregorian calendar in Russia, as in the West, while before that there was the Julian one; the Julian remained in the Church, therefore the state and the Church lived according to different chronologies. This difference probably annoyed the relatively small number of church people, but the majority were indifferent; From time to time, marginal calls were made by the so-called Renovators to make the church calendar Gregorian. Vladimir eliminated this difference by his decree - but exactly the opposite, making the state calendar Julian, so that even today the dates in Russia

differ from ours by 13 days (as before 1917). Another example: the form of license plates was changed, which by this time were of the Latinized European type. "What, did we win a bloody war against the Germans," said Vladimir II, "so that now, with our own consent, they call us "Rus"?" (The designation of the country on the numbers was "RUS".) There were other symbolic steps, insignificant in themselves, but clearly made it clear that love with the West, in particular with Europe, had ended - moreover, love was one-sided, since from the West, and in particular Europe, it never existed when it was born.

Here I would like to interrupt my story, dear compatriots, and as a historian and sociologist, I would like to speculate a little about some patterns of history. Well, why did the West, especially the USA, try to "squeeze" Russia, which ultimately led it to its own collapse, although it did not know this then? Well, why not extend, on the contrary, the hand of friendship, or at least respect? The political system, as well as the system of values in general, was in Russia approximately the same as in the United States itself (at that time it was very important for America), and the differences did not go beyond those with its allies, for example, with Europe. Back in the late 1990s and even in the early 2000s, pro-American sentiments were very strong among the Russian people, and even more so among the elites; and give them the slightest chance, the Russians would be America's best friends and its most trusted allies, and anti-American views would effortlessly become marginalized in Russia. And for this it was not at all necessary to provide significant financial assistance to Russia, as was done in Germany and Italy after World War II: Russians, unlike Western Europeans, are not a trading civilization and therefore value not so much money as status. Now it is quite clear that it was more than enough then to treat Russia as a great power, even if it was going through hard times, and in particular to declare the so-called post-Soviet space (completely, by the way, not needed by the West itself, except for to annoy Russia) as a zone of interests for her and only her - especially since this is her own former territory! Well, and rein in your press in its maniacal hatred of Russia (or perhaps - now it's impossible to figure it out - just stop inciting and encouraging it in this). No, they did everything possible to humiliate and eventually destroy Russia at every convenient and inconvenient occasion, despite the fact that it did not really threaten the West and did not even interfere, and in their blindness they led their own civilization to destruction. For what? It is usually said that strength is dizzy - but our state, the American Federation, is larger and stronger than the United States of that time in every sense - both economically and militarily. We are the largest on Earth both in terms of territory and in terms of the size of the economy, and there is no one in the world who could consider himself superior to us - and meanwhile, nothing like this is happening to us. I think that it is not power in itself, not a high position, but its monopoly that turns one's head. When someone has monopolized something, it begins to seem to him that it is no longer possible to exist otherwise, or at least very difficult (although this is not at all the case), and he begins to spend all his strength on preventing the emergence of competitors. This is precisely the danger of any monopoly, and not that it is harmful and inefficient - if it were not for its actions to prevent competition, it will quickly collapse itself precisely because of its inefficiency. We know from the published archives of the United States that the main consideration of that time was the desire not to allow Russia, or anyone else, to become a really strong state, but to remain forever the only power in the world - but this does not happen; it only causes a backlash, which is all the stronger, the stronger the efforts to prevent it were. Because if the Lord wanted all mankind to live under one power, He would have allowed the Tower of Babel to be built and would not have mixed languages. And the West, especially the United States, wanted to rule the whole world, and not to own, namely to rule without owning, despite the fact that the United States, with its natural wealth and economic power, was at that time the only one to whom the rest of the world was just not very needed. And it was precisely this approach of the West, and nothing else, that predetermined its death - just as for some reason in general in history every civilization, having reached the peak of its power, begins to dig its own grave with its actions.

But back to 2009, at the height of the Cold War. It was a rather strange war, in the sense that it was undoubtedly a war in a psychological aspect, that is, the entire population on both sides of the Atlantic

Ocean considered themselves in a war with all the ensuing consequences - but nothing more. Trade between Russia and the West remained largely unchanged because Russia could no longer get the money to buy many types of industrial equipment and consumer goods. And energy, non-ferrous metals and other raw materials and semi-finished products, that is, what formed the basis of Russian exports to the West, the West had nowhere else to buy (at least without catastrophic price consequences). All those goods that could be bought in appropriate quantities outside Russia (for example, steel), the West, as it turned out, did not allow Russian companies to sell at home even before the war, even if they were cheaper from them - and, accordingly, those that there was nowhere to buy, had to buy from Russia. Exports to Russia were also not particularly limited, not so much because of the interests of their exporters, but because everyone understood that if the Russians were not allowed to spend the dollars and euros they received, they would stop exporting for a reason; its meaninglessness. Naturally, all the so-called dual-use goods, that is, which can be used in the military industry or directly in the army, were not sold to the Russians - but, as it turned out again, they were not sold to them in the period 1992-2008 either; this was not evident only because the military industry and the defense of Russia in general were not at the center of the interests of the country's leadership at that time. It was still possible for civilians on both sides to simply travel to the enemy country: America could not oppose it, since freedom of international movement was one of the main points in the value system it defended; Russia didn't mind either.

On the other hand, America supported all the insurgents, including terrorists, acting against Russia - but it also did this before. In 2007, Vladimir II, in one of his television appearances, demonstrated materials that unequivocally testify that American intelligence services were directly behind most of the major terrorist attacks in Russia in 2002-2006, in which thousands of civilians were killed. In the West, this was interpreted, of course, as a fake, but after the publication in 2020-2022 of American secret archives captured during the Twelve Day War, it turned out that this was still true, at least in the main. The Russian leadership told the American one, first unofficially, and then publicly, that if the United States did not stop this practice, Russia would help the terrorists acting against the United States, although it was disgusted by it; but there was no constructive response from America. As a result, America received the 2009 Sears Tower bombing in Chicago that killed more than 2,500 people, and the 2010 Ohio shopping mall chemical attack that killed nearly 4,000 people. As we now know, Russia did not plan them directly and did not even know about them exactly in advance, but in every possible way helped those terrorist groups that she knew were preparing something big inside the United States. Even worse for America was that Russia warned her more than once: if you do not stop providing political asylum to people persecuted in Russia under the law (meaning primarily political criminals and enemies of the regime in general, although America did not extradite ordinary swindlers, if they declared themselves to be dissidents) and don't start handing them over to us in accordance with the agreements you signed, then we will start giving asylum to those you are looking for. (I don't make a reservation when I write about agreements - they were in effect, because formally there was no war!) You can't extradite us those who have already been sheltered for moral reasons - okay, tell them to at least stop anti-Russian activities and stop sheltering new ones; but America did not respond to this either. At that time, Russia publicly declared that there were no extraditions from its territory to the West and to pro-Western, in particular Islamic, states; all those who will not interfere in internal Russian affairs can stay in Russia, including conducting anti-Western activities from here, for as long as you like. Anti-American groups, including the famous Al-Qaeda, immediately moved their headquarters, training bases and rehabilitation centers here, which for the Americans meant the collapse of plans to eliminate them and capture their leaders. (At the same time, by agreement with the Russian special services, they helped to completely defeat the Wahhabi and Islamic underground in the Caucasus and in the rest of Russia - this was not such a big price for them for having a reliable rear.) This presence, of course, sharply strengthened these groups - they it was precisely the rear that was missing, they had money and fighters - with all the ensuing consequences for the West; the war clearly ceased to be cold, and the Americans had to do something. But then the famous Great

Financial Crisis of 2010-2014 broke out, and for a while the West was not up to Russia.

All those of us, dear compatriots, who are now over 50-55 years old, remember this crisis well: it seemed to everyone that if not the end of the world was coming, then at least the end of the usual way of life - although, as it turned out later, the end not at all in this, and before it there were still ten whole years. Russia also could not stay away from it, because due to a sharp drop in production and consumption in the West, and, as a result, in China, as well as a sharp reduction in international trade due to the lack of a reserve currency, prices and volumes of international oil, metal and other commodity markets collapsed. But in Russia, by 2010, the results of the import substitution policy were already fully manifested: due to the newly created industries, imports of chemical products, which in 2005 amounted to 10 billion dollars a year, decreased almost to zero, imports of agricultural products decreased from 11 to 3 billion, and imports of machinery and equipment - from 26 to 14 billion; in general, imports decreased from 60 billion dollars to 25 billion, and to a large extent, luxury goods that were not critical for the country remained in it. I do not mean here, of course, imports from the so-called near abroad, mainly Eastern Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, since they ceased to be imports after the accession of these countries to Russia. To carry out such imports, not so much export was required; and the rapidly growing GDP, that is, in other words, the volume of the domestic market, ensured the consumption of those goods that were previously exported - in any case, their main part. More importantly, the main part of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves had by that time been partly converted into gold and regional currencies such as the yuan, and mostly spent on investment purposes, that is, in other words, turned into natural property - into manufacturing, transport and infrastructure companies (formally speaking, in their shares). If this had not been done in 2007-2010, then all these billions would have burned down, and the unprecedented growth of the economy, most likely, would not have begun at all. Of course, this was money of the original issuance origin, so they had to be spent very carefully (which was the case): but the Russian government managed to comply with the measure, and therefore Russia met the crisis fully armed. Of course, it also affected it - it simply could not have been otherwise, because at that time the Russian economy had not yet become almost autarkic, as it later was, but it was not significant, in the medium term it only slightly slowed down growth, and even then not much. On the other hand, Russia had an extra five years to close its gap with the West, while its economy was stagnating, and its governments had no time for war, especially since Russia far-sightedly did not use the crisis situation to its advantage and actuate the levers of economic pressure (for example, by leaving Europe without gas). As a result, in 2015, Russia's GDP in comparable prices was just under \$6 trillion, while the United States and the European Union, as a result of the crisis recession, had \$9 and \$10 trillion, respectively. And as a result, the Cold War itself came to naught - the enemy somehow suddenly became almost equal to the West in terms of economic power, and in terms of military power, apparently, even without "almost". That is, the Russian Union turned out to be too strong for a "small victorious war", and none of the leaders of the West wanted to wage a real war of attrition with an unpredictable result, and even with the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon. Yes, and terrorism has become the number one problem for US President Hillary Clinton, and unlike the times of her predecessor Bush II, she - alas! - did not have to invent this problem. The secret services of the two countries came to an agreement at the suggestion of their rulers, without advertising this agreement to the public, and the terrorist war practically ceased. There was a small respite - the last in the centuries-old confrontation between Russia and the West. Russia by that time was already ruled by Gabriel the Great.

Chapter 3 Third Empire

Election of Gabriel the Great. Gavriil Sokolov, nicknamed the Great during his lifetime, the fifth ruler in the history of Russia (2012-2030) with such a nickname, the founder of the Third Russian Empire, as of today 2054, is clearly the greatest man of the 21st century - I think that with him none of the great

rulers of the past can be compared. Because the empire of most of them was either taken away during their lifetime, like Napoleon or Hitler, or fell apart immediately after their death, like Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan, or, in extreme cases, outlived them for several decades, like Charlemagne or Joseph the Great. Only a very few, like Cyrus the Great or Sultan Osman I, have had the empire they created outlive them by many generations, as it seems likely to be the case with the Russian Third Empire - but none has changed the overall situation on Earth as much as he did. Gabriel was a tall and thin man of few words, with brown hair and light eyes - in general, there was nothing particularly remarkable in his appearance and demeanor; he was born on July 26 (Gregorian style, now his birthday is celebrated on July 13), 1962, in the family of a military officer and a teacher. He graduated from law school in 1984 and worked in the police - first as a detective, then as an investigator, until 1995; then he quit his job and became an entrepreneur, importing and packaging foodstuffs such as coffee, rice and cereals. In 2003, having already become a rich man (naturally, not by oligarchic standards), he, with the help of acquired connections and money, returned to the public service, to the prosecutor's office, since by his nature he was uninteresting, but drawn to serve the state. In 2007, at the age of 45, he became an employee of the Security Council of Russia, and in 2008 - an assistant to President Vladimir II: he was engaged in the eradication of corruption ("clean night" - his doing), the annexation of Kazakhstan, the reform of law enforcement agencies, the start of construction of the Transpolar Railway; in 2009 he was appointed prime minister. When the 2012 elections approached, Vladimir II categorically stated that he was not going to be re-elected, although according to the Constitution he had the right to a second term: he had been ruling for three terms already, which, although he did not violate the letter of the law (because in terms of calculating the terms of the presidency, the Russian Union did not succeed the Russian Federation), but violated its spirit. He openly proposed Gabriel as his successor, declaring that it was up to the people to decide, but he, Vladimir, considered Sokolov the best candidate. Gabriel was by that time already widely known and quite popular, despite the fact that he did not like protocol, as well as the so-called party events and did not often appear on TV, and even then mainly in the news, but he still was prime minister for two years, that is, the second newsmaker after the president. His popularity was born during his fight against corruption and oligarchs - in 2007 he survived an assassination attempt and was seriously injured, despite the fact that, by coincidence, this happened in front of television cameras (during a solemn event). He campaigned in the same way - he did not go to meetings with voters, did not give interviews, did not put up leaflets and did not show videos; only a few times he appeared on television in the allotted free time for the candidates. His words, explaining such an unusual campaign, were: "What is there to say, you have known me for years in business"; and the key message, as we say, was that, although everything seems to be fine, the country will not win the war without profound changes. The people, however, liked this campaign, and Gabriel was elected in the first round, receiving 52.9% of the vote. And no one expected anything special - neither his supporters nor opponents - when he appeared on TV after the announcement of the election commission - but in fact these were Russia's last calm moments for many years.

Gabriel said that things were much worse than people thought, and that if it wasn't heard properly during his campaign, it was the listener's problem. Now the West is preoccupied with its crisis, but no crisis lasts forever, and when we are attacked, we will not survive in a real war of attrition, because even now our GDP is less than the combined Western one by more than four and a half times. We have a useless army, although not comparable to the one that was twelve or even seven years ago. We have backward science and poor education. The main thing is that we do not have an understanding of the true goal, therefore there is no harmony, a sense of justice in the existing order, which means that there is no properly built social structure of the state that will withstand any hardships of a collision with an external or internal enemy. And to create it, such profound changes are needed that they cannot be made by a servant of the people - a president elected under the current Constitution. And therefore I refuse to be your president, said Gabriel, even though you elected me; I am ready to harness myself and do all this, but only as an autocrat. After all, no one knew that I would be elected immediately, the polling stations were ready for

the second round in two weeks; so let there be a referendum instead, in which answer one question that I brought out for you on paper here (Gavriil shoved a sheet with a printed question into the lens): do you agree to abolish the 2008 Constitution; establish autocracy in Russia; [call](#) on Gavriil Sokolov as autocrat and [punish](#)⁹ him to prepare and submit for popular approval in 2013 a new constitution? If you do not want to, you can either consider elected the one who received the second place after me, or call new elections - as the election committee decides. With these words, Gabriel ended his speech.

To say that people were stunned is to say nothing; elderly eyewitnesses told me that for about five minutes the whole country literally sat with its mouth open in front of the TVs turned off. The next day, Gabriel was interviewed on TV, and everyone understood that this was not a joke; when they told him that one could go to jail for such a thing (we, dear compatriots, they would have put him in prison for sure), he looked into the lens and said: "Put me in," and it became completely clear to everyone that he really was not afraid of this, as and nothing at all. "And what, you will have to be called "Your Majesty"? And your children too?" - "No," Gabriel answered, "an autocrat is not necessarily a king - I do not like kings and I am proud that my and your ancestors overthrew the king; it was impossible to kill a family with children, it is a sin. The autocrat is only the sole supreme ruler, whose decision, while he rules, is final, without any separation of powers; and then he transfers power to the next autocrat. - "Who, your son?" - "To the one who will be determined according to the principle written in the constitution that will be adopted - maybe through general elections, as now, maybe in some other way; but I assure you: definitely not through inheritance - I don't like nepotism and [majors](#)³¹, nature always rests on the children of big people. So you see: the ruler, most likely, will be elected, and the constitution will operate - only it will be the ruler over you, and not a servant of the people, a "hired manager", as you like to say; and the constitution will be real, and not the current one, which is not even bad, but simply not about that." - "Why did you participate in the elections, if you do not put a penny on our constitution?" they asked him. "So, if I seized power by force, you would all say that I am afraid that nothing will shine for me in fair elections," Gabriel answered. - "Even if instead of elections I announced a referendum - and not after the elections were won, as it is now - you would still say that the referendum is not an election and that I am simply afraid of competition. And so I won in a fair fight and now I have the right to say: think about what I have proposed to you."

The first days, however, no one was going to seriously think about Gabriel's proposal - everyone considered him an eccentric trick of a respected person; then, however, they began to actively discuss and argue fiercely among themselves. By the end of the second week, the majority was already leaning towards the proposal, and as a result, as many as 58% voted for Gabriel's proposal - more, by the way, than for Gabriel himself in the elections. How could it be? Instead of sarcastically referring to the mysterious Russian soul, as our scientists like to do, I will try to express my assumption based on the fact that Gabriel the Great has always been a man of meanings: not a man of charisma, not a man of intrigue, not a man of balance - namely, a man of meanings. Unlike the great men of the 20th century, his predecessor Joseph the Great and Adolf Hitler defeated by him, he did not have a magnetic effect on the crowd and even on his associates and did not like public speaking, although he spoke quite normally. He certainly was a born leader by nature, everyone felt it, but a leader more like a military leader than a tribune of the people or a religious prophet. And just as for a military leader, the strength of personality is obligatory, but is still only an addition to a strategic gift, so for Gabriel it was an addition to the ability to understand and formulate meaning; rather, it served to convey it to his comrades-in-arms. Moreover, the meanings that Gabriel the Great brought to the life of Russia were not just the fruits of scholastic philosophizing - they always corresponded to such deep archetypes of the people's consciousness (of which the people, together with the intelligentsia, often did not even suspect) that they could not leave anyone indifferent. That is why other countries and conquered peoples subsequently perceived him not as a person, but as fate, as fate. So I think, dear compatriots, that what Gabriel offered to his fellow citizens, although it seemed from the standpoint of rational ideas, at best, funny, and at worst, terrible, on an

irrational level stirred up such depths of the “collective unconscious”, about which the Russians themselves and did not suspect. Moreover, this was not only in the idea itself, but also in its verbal design - in the term “autocrat” (and not, for example, “monarch”), in the words “call” and “punish”. The fact that a person is willing to voluntarily give up the power he has just gained in a hard struggle, and even go to prison, instead of enjoying life in the Kremlin, if it doesn’t go the way he thinks is right, also corresponded to a deep Russian idea of conviction and sacrifice. Sociological studies conducted later showed that even “advanced” youth from online communities - it would seem, the complete opposite of the idea of authoritarianism and, in general, archaic elements characteristic of premodernity - for the most part voted “for”. At the same time, they could not give any more intelligible reasons for this than “what, cool”, but it means that they were not free from these archetypes, although they did not explicitly realize this. And as often happened with the proposals of Gabriel the Great, they resonated with these deep, unconscious ideas, including among those whom Gabriel Sokolov did not particularly tempt as an ordinary president - this is the true reason for 58% of the votes received in the referendum.

Reforms 2013-2016. Nevertheless, at the beginning of 2013, nothing special happened, and Gabriel led the state exactly like Vladimir II before him; when asked about the changes for which all this was started, he answered in the sense that there would be a constitution - soon! – then we will start to act. Such behavior of his was, it would seem, in blatant contradiction with all known concepts of power - according to which emergency powers must be used, otherwise they will no longer be perceived as such! But Gabriel knew what he was doing. He somehow directed both the hopes and the discontent of society in the direction of the expectation of a constitution; everyone remembered his words “the existing constitution is simply not about that” and felt that it would not be another document at all about the list of government bodies and their relationships, but something global, determining how to live on. And when the constitution was published in January 2013 for a three-month discussion, it became clear to everyone that this was the case. It begins with the words: “This Constitution determines the goals and way of public life of the Russian people and other peoples of Russia.” The goal is defined as follows: “Since the main goal of the life of any person, whether he wants it or not, is to earn salvation and gain eternal life, the meaning of the existence of the state is to create, maintain and protect such a public life that most contributes to this goal. To do this, the state, without replacing the Kingdom of Heaven, must be organized on principles that meet God’s commandments. The goal of the people is to build such a state.” It is further said that other, purely personal and earthly goals of individual people are not the subject of the constitution, since they are not of interest to the state at all; they can be pursued by people in any way that does not contradict the true goals of the state, and are regulated by the state based on considerations of administrative expediency, while observing the principle of minimal interference. On this subject, Gabriel the Great subsequently repeatedly said that he was not at all interested in whether people live richly or poorly: if they want to live richly, let them live richly; if they are satisfied with living poorly, let them live poorly. Thus, already from the first lines of this document, which is still in force today, it becomes clear that it has nothing to do with the constitution, for example, of our American Federation or with the constitutions of most of the countries of that time - it really is not about that.

I will continue to write in detail about the constitutional principles of Russia, but here, for further narration of history, two things should be noted. First, the Constitution states: “Russia is formed by the Russian people, as well as the allied peoples of the Russian people (*listing in progress*) and other peoples living on the territory of Russia.” It is interesting here that Gabriel categorically refused the Ukrainians (they began to be called Little Russians, in an archaic manner) and Belarusians in the status of separate peoples; this has always been his uncompromising position. It cannot be said that he or his followers somehow discriminated against them, not only personally, but also nationally: the number, for example, of Ukrainian and Belarusian schools initially increased significantly, including in the “internal” regions of Russia. The creation and functioning of Ukrainian and Belarusian national public organizations was not limited in any way (all this, however, began to abruptly disappear after 2020 and is not very common

today). But it was emphasized in every possible way that this is part of the Russian people (as, for example, Siberians or Pomors) - attempts to consider them peoples separate from the Russian, Gabriel considered part of the centuries-old plan of the West to fight Russia. The only exception are the inhabitants of what was then Western Ukraine, Galicia, which was part of Poland in the 14th-18th centuries and in 1920-1940, and in the 18th-20th centuries - in the Austrian Empire, the vast majority of Greek or Roman Catholics. They were called "Galicians" in Russia, and it is believed that they have nothing to do with the Little Russians, and, consequently, with the Russian people as a whole. The allied nations in the 2013 Constitution included Tatars, Kazakhs, Bashkirs and Ossetians; in 2022, temporarily, and in 2042, Germans and Serbs were added to them permanently. There are no unambiguous criteria for referring to the allied peoples; it is rather a matter of feelings, a matter of lack of mutual hostility, and not a legal one. Further, in a number of chapters I will describe the constitutional position of the peoples of Russia. Second, the Constitution contains a number of principles that greatly distinguish it (and, as a result, Russia itself) from the rest of the world; it is, first of all, the principle of the social structure - class and the principles of Russia's national self-identification - autonomy and nationalism.

The greatest debate was caused by the doctrine of estates, according to which, in particular, the service estate was introduced, to which all power in the country was transferred, even the exclusive right to elect power. Speaking shortly before the referendum date and summing up the results of the discussion, Gabriel the Great said on this occasion: "If you don't accept the constitution in its entirety, don't, I won't go against your will. Such fundamental things as the doctrine of class, even the autocrat cannot accept himself, without having a direct mandate of the people. But keep in mind that then everyone will serve in the army and fight, if the country fights, even the crippled - in the era of computers, we will find a service for them too. This is not a threat," he explained further, "it is simply a statement of the obvious fact that there are no rights without duties. Whoever does not want to serve in the army, especially in the current hard times, will not have electoral and political rights in general: either only those who want to serve and thus have rights will have rights - this is what I propose - or rights all will have, but all will serve. And the fact that during the discussion many said that we are reviving the [oprichnina](#)¹⁰ - well, this is an accurate remark: let the service class be called guardsmen, I will put this in the final text for the referendum. By the way, the use of this term to designate the service class, which in the time of Ivan the Terrible was called ungodly executioners and punishers, was nothing more than a calculated outrageousness on the part of Gabriel, and not at all an ideology - he did not like Ivan the Terrible and guardsmen à la Ivan the Terrible I did not see the new estate even in a nightmare. In fact, the name "knights" would much more accurately reflect reality - but this word and the concept itself, unfortunately, are not Russian. As a result of the discussion, by the way, a number of other amendments, including very important ones, were taken into account and introduced into the text, but they did not change the general essence. As a result, on May 1, 2013, the constitution was adopted, including the principle of class, and since then May 1 has been a public holiday called Constitution Day.

Having a constitution, Gabriel began to act as promised. We have four phases to go through, he said: reform ourselves to become strong; crush enemies; establish a new world order that would not interfere with our plans; and begin to build a semblance of the Kingdom of God on earth. (This was a favorite expression of Gabriel the Great - "It is a sin to build the kingdom of God on earth, but we must strive to build a likeness of it.") The reforms began with the economy. By that moment, it had already become quite closed and focused on the domestic market, but then, in accordance with the doctrine of autonomy, it began to restructure itself in the direction of almost complete autarky. In particular, if in 2006-2007 full convertibility of the ruble was introduced (by removing all restrictions on transactions with rubles, and then banning any export of foreign currency and allowing it only for rubles that had to be bought on the market), now, on the contrary, even the internal convertibility that had existed since 1991 was abolished, and the foreign exchange market disappeared. The Central Bank sold foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, which was quite low for importers, mainly for import substitution programs; for the import

of other goods, it was established that the sale of currency would be carried out according to the announced schedule for a limited number of years, necessary to create the corresponding production facilities at home. It was forbidden to have accounts, firms and property abroad, both for citizens and corporations; everything that was available was ordered to be liquidated within two years and the currency to be sold to the Central Bank, at a fairly fair rate, however. Travel abroad was tightened: there was no direct ban, even exit visas were not introduced, but the prices for obtaining visas to Russia for foreign citizens were increased many times over. Naturally, all states have introduced an almost prohibitive price for visas for Russians. In addition to price restrictions, other restrictions of the same kind were introduced - however, this did not apply to emigrant visas. A new law on emigration was adopted, according to which emigration became a separate legal concept, with its own procedure; and before that, oddly enough, there was no legal concept of emigration in Russia, and an emigrant simply bought a ticket and left just like a tourist. Interestingly, although the law (it is still in force today) gives an unlimited right to emigrate, except for specific cases, this right is not indicated in the Constitution - in Russia this is not considered an inalienable right, but is allowed for reasons of expediency. That is, if tomorrow the state considers this right inappropriate, it will abolish it on completely legal grounds (just like we have no conscription in the army). True, in the modern world this is not particularly relevant, since our Federation is not at all eager to host immigrants from the Russian Empire, if they suddenly appear in massive quantities, but to imagine a significant number of Russians or representatives of any other people of Russia who have decided to emigrate to the Caliphate, India or the Celestial Empire is rather difficult.

But back to economic reforms: the change in currency rules was accompanied by a hundredfold [denomination](#)¹¹ of the ruble and the introduction of the gold standard (see the chapter "[Economy](#)"). In practice, this means that, along with banknotes, silver, gold and platinum coins came into circulation in denominations from 0.5 rubles to 100 rubles (1 ruble corresponded then, as now, to about 4 dollars). This greatly raised the psychological status of the ruble, especially considering the fact that, apart from the Caliphate, there is no such thing anywhere else in the world to this day. In pursuance of the biblical commandments, free credit was introduced (see the chapter "[Economy](#)"), which greatly contributed to the development of the economy; the tax system, land ownership, and the securities market were fundamentally changed. The policy of the state in the field of science changed radically - both in terms of the principles of organization and in terms of funding - this was of decisive importance, as it turned out later, on the outcome of a future war.

In the internal life of the country, at least in practical terms, not much has changed. Radical changes were carried out in the law enforcement sphere, namely, technical interrogations were introduced, including mandatory regular interrogations for senior officials; with their help, it was possible to practically eliminate corruption, espionage and organized crime (see the chapter "[Law Enforcement System](#)"). The administrative-territorial structure of the country and, in general, the territorial and national administration were changed, and significantly - more about this will be written in the chapter "State Structure". Serious and systematic work began to strengthen the family and increase the birth rate in the country, including for morality in public life (see the chapter "Social Sphere"). In 2013-2017, a church reform took place, which had a significant impact on the future life of Russia - it was purely within the Russian Orthodox Church, and the state had nothing to do with it, but it was initiated by certain changes in the Constitution (see section "[Religion](#)"). Although estates were proclaimed, it was announced that the transfer of exclusive political rights to the service class would take place in 2020, since it should first appear; up to that time everything had gone on to a certain extent in the same way as before. Therefore, it was announced that the State Duma and the Senate, elected in 2012 for five years, simultaneously with the election of Gabriel the Great, will continue to function, and not even five, but seven years, until the transfer of power to the service class.

As for foreign policy, since the Cold War had already been going on for five years, Russia withdrew from many European and international organizations under Vladimir II; but since there was no formally

declared war, with a break in diplomatic relations, there was still room for it. Moreover, the leaders of the West were not interested in the complete isolation of Russia, since this reduced the possibility of political pressure, which is of paramount importance during the Cold War. There was a certain balance that Gabriel decisively destroyed. In 2013–2014, Russia withdrew from all multilateral international organizations and almost all multilateral international treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The latter was of particular importance, because Russia concluded an agreement with China on the supply of intercontinental nuclear missiles capable of covering the entire territory of the United States from China (however, legal analysis shows that this could have been done between the two nuclear powers within the framework of the agreement). The final, so to speak, chord of this policy was Russia's withdrawal from the UN in 2014; Gabriel, who generally liked to argue his actions with quotations from the Holy Scriptures, said this about it in his speech: "Blessed is the man who does not go to the advice of the wicked." And although the Cold War came to an end in 2015, Russia, in accordance with the doctrines of its new Constitution, had absolutely no intention of integrating back into the international community. In addition, as it became clear later, Gabriel considered the cold war - both ongoing and over - nothing more than preparation for a "hot" war. The case didn't work for him.

Twelve Day War. As the Western world emerged from the crisis of 2010-2014, the confrontation with Russia began to again come to the forefront of the agenda. No, she had not done anything particularly aggressive towards the West since 2015, the terrorist war was ended by agreement of the parties, and there had been no aggression from her towards her neighbors since the expansion of Vladimir II. But Russia had become too big and strong, with an economy less dependent on the West and not affected by the crisis, unlike China and India. We would now, dear compatriots, make an obvious conclusion in such a situation that since someone is strong, but does not show signs of aggressiveness, there is no need to touch him. But the then leaders of the Western world had a different mentality, as I wrote above: they believed that it was impossible to tolerate anyone strong but themselves. Moreover, in 2016, Jeb Bush III became the President of the United States instead of Hillary Clinton; he believed that his father won against Russia when the Second Russian Empire lost its Eastern European satellites in 1989 and collapsed in 1991, and his older brother lost to Russia when it expanded in 2006-2007 - and his role as a member of that same family is to put an end to this long-standing vendetta. In fact, all this was complete nonsense - and in 1988-1991, the Red Empire first shrank and then disintegrated for its own internal reasons, which had extremely little connection with the policy of Bush Sr., and therefore can hardly be considered as his victory (more likely like luck). And the first expansion of Russia can be considered a defeat for Bush Jr. only insofar as he got it into his head that it hurt US interests very much - in fact, it did not hurt them at all. Nevertheless, Bush III was eager to put Russia in its place - despite the fact that any sane person understood that in the late 2010s it was already possible to do this only by destroying it (however, it is not clear how). But the atmosphere heated up and culminated in the so-called Bengal crisis of 2018-2019; its background is that Russia agreed with India on the supply of nuclear missiles of intercontinental range to it. In response to the demarche of NATO and the UN that this grossly violates international law and order and the international community would take action, Russia replied that it had withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for five years and therefore could not violate it in any way, with all its desire, and the world legal order has long been trampled on by the West. As for the measures, it was said that the West's favorite measure, economic sanctions, is unlikely to harm the Russian economy, which is practically autarchic - besides, Russia will then impose its own sanctions: first, it will turn off gas to Europe, including under already paid contracts. As for sending "blue helmets" (UN international troops), Russia answered, you can send them, but together with coffins - we will not issue them at our own expense. More serious were less hysterical reproaches against Russia that it was going to supply weapons of mass destruction to a hot spot, that is, a conflict zone - India and Pakistan have been preparing for a nuclear war since 2001 (it happened, as you know, in 2021), which is not good. To this, Russia reasonably argued that this was really not good, but intercontinental missiles simply cannot technically be used in a local Indo-Pakistani clash, they can only be used by India as a way to protect its sovereignty

from the United States, which is why Russia helps it. By the way, in complete contrast to the Red Empire during the similar Cuban crisis, Russia behaved absolutely honestly in this matter, as was customary with Vladimir II - it never denied what it was that it supplied to India. The Americans imposed a naval blockade of the Indian coast, declaring that any ship within a 200-mile zone would be inspected; the Russians replied that the Americans could inspect any ships as much as they wanted, but an attempt to detain a ship under the Russian flag would lead to opening fire. And on April 28, 2019 (I give all dates according to the Julian calendar adopted in Russia), a grouping of Russian surface ships consisting of two aircraft carriers - Ivan the Great and Joseph Stalin, three cruisers, eight large escort ships and four submarines appeared in Bay of Bengal, in the field of view of an American strike force of three CVN-21 class aircraft carriers, four missile cruisers and escort ships. To the demand of the American flagship George W. Bush to stop, the Russian flagship replied: I am following my course. Then the American ships, having requested and received from Washington confirmation of the available written orders, fired a volley from all available weapons and entered the battle.

But the times when the Russians acted reactively in world politics, exclusively reacting to other people's actions, have passed: this whole situation, in fact, was carefully prepared by the Russians for a long time and was really conceived as nothing more than a not very significant episode in the big game. The fact is that since the late 80s of the XX century, Russia has learned to build practically undetectable, especially in passive mode, submarines. True, only relatively small attack boats, and not strategic missile carriers, turned out to be completely silent, but for what we are talking about here, this was quite enough. Since 2000, quite a lot of such boats (Kilo-M class) have been built, and Russia managed, after the almost complete defeat of the CIA intelligence network, to deceive American intelligence and build them three dozen more than the US imagined. The grandiose special operation lasted for a whole decade, and during it many ways were used to create a false idea for the enemy about the capabilities and quantitative composition of these submarine forces: for example, all boats, except for the "secret", always went on not completely silent mode, but one that with effort, was discovered by the enemy - and the "secret", on the contrary, went only on completely silent. As a result, as the Russians wanted, the Americans knew for sure how many boats of this class the Russians had and where which one was currently on combat duty - but this was false, or rather, incomplete knowledge.

A few months before the events described, all the boats unknown to the enemy, keeping away from the known ones, went on duty and sat on the tail of all large groups plying on the high seas, as well as those located in ports. By April 28, four of them were near the American grouping in the Bay of Bengal, another fifteen shadowed other squadrons, and the rest guarded the US naval bases, including the main bases in Norfolk and San Diego. In addition, the Russians constantly had about ten satellites in orbit with the so-called GMDE (magnetodynamic explosion generators) - devices that, during an explosion with a power of several tens of kilotons, give a very strong electromagnetic pulse, which took up to 80% of the power; one such satellite was constantly over the Bay of Bengal. When the Americans fired a volley - and the Russians were waiting for this, literally holding their finger on the button - the coded signal went to Moscow at the same instant, and a second later Moscow responded with a signal to the satellite and boats. Three seconds after the American salvo - shells and missiles were still in the air - the satellite exploded, and all the electronics on an area of several tens of thousands of square kilometers instantly failed - therefore, not one of the missiles of the first salvo hit the target. At this very time, four American submarines included in the grouping entered into battle with Russian submarines - but only with "known" ones. "Unknown" boats, a few seconds after the electromagnetic pulse, freely hit enemy ships with missiles and supersonic torpedoes. As a result of the short-lived battle, the Russians lost one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, one destroyer and two submarines; the entire American squadron was sunk. But much worse for the Americans was that an even greater beating (because it was not at all expected) befell the rest of the American groups at sea and in ports, including at their bases: eleven aircraft carriers (out of twenty-one), sixteen heavy cruisers and a large number of smaller ships; almost 35,000 sailors died and

more than 10,000 were taken prisoner. It was a carnage that surpassed Pearl Harbor; American naval forces - as an equal or superior opponent for the Russians - ceased to exist. In the evening of the same day, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Naval Forces Boris Fetisov (who himself was on the Russian flagship sunk during the battle, was picked up on board another aircraft carrier and flew to Moscow in a supersonic fighter) gathered foreign journalists for a press conference. It showed satellite footage of burning and sinking American aircraft carriers and captured sailors taken aboard Russian ships - the Russian authorities did not want the Americans to try to hide or downplay their defeat. When asked if this meant a declaration of war on America, he replied: "If some animal becomes aggressive and starts attacking people, its fangs and claws are pulled out or its horns are cut off - but why kill it? Consider that we simply pulled out the claws of the Americans, although not all of them, and we are not going to declare any war on them, if they want, let them declare themselves; besides, the war between us has already been going on for more than seventy years. The US Senate and House of Representatives gathered for an urgent meeting, followed by emergency negotiations with the allies, and on April 30, 2019, US President Bush III informed the whole world about the declaration of war on the Russian Union by America and the entire NATO bloc.

The next day, at noon Moscow time on May 1, 36 Russian Topol missiles of various modifications were launched from their silos and mobile launchers [at targets] across the United States. After 8 minutes, at 4 in the morning, US President Bush III, who still had about twenty minutes before the missiles arrived, contacted Gabriel the Great via the so-called hotline; he was waiting for his call. "Does this mean a full-scale nuclear war?" Bush asked. "No, otherwise we would have launched not thirty-six missiles, but a thousand," Gabriel answered. "What does that mean?" Bush asked. "Or are these missiles without nuclear warheads?" - "No, the missiles are quite combative," Gabriel answered, "and you will very soon understand what this means. In the meantime, act as in a full-scale war - shoot down, respond, or do whatever you see fit; and don't worry too much ahead of time, they are not aimed at cities, otherwise you will still get a heart attack." With these words, Gabriel hung up the phone. The American National Missile Defense system shot down only 7 out of 36 missiles - it could not have been more, it was never calculated on the full delay of a massive launch; with a full-scale Russian attack, the percentage of missiles shot down would be even less. The rest of the rockets fired multiple warheads that exploded in a number of sparsely populated areas of the United States - in the deserts of Nevada, Utah and New Mexico, in the prairies of Texas and Montana, far from anything. Of the people, few were injured, there were no military or economic facilities in the places where they hit - in general, it was completely incomprehensible what this meant, and the main version was that Gabriel had gone crazy. Nevertheless, no one wanted to take risks, and the Americans responded with a volley of 500 warheads (this was about 12% of their arsenal) against all types of targets on Russian territory. Everyone in the US National Security Council clung to the screens of the monitors, which gave out a picture of the movement of missiles from radar and satellites; all missiles were moving normally, no sign of Russian anti-missile activity was visible. The warheads hit the targets, and... none of them exploded. More precisely, the satellites recorded the usual weak explosions, but not a single thermonuclear one. Giving Bush a few minutes to process this, Gabriel called him and told him that Russia had developed and deployed an absolute strategic shield; not a single nuclear weapon can explode over Russia. Then the Americans, seized with panic, immediately released most of everything they had into Russia; but even from this megavolley nothing exploded. Gabriel called again and said: "You see, we can hit you - but you can't hit us, but you already have almost nothing more. Therefore, we announce an ultimatum to you, which I will now convey to your ambassador, since he is still here: the essence of it is that you are given five hours to decide on complete surrender. If in five hours there is no such decision, we will begin to shoot you, with volleys of fifty warheads once an hour - this time they will go not through the deserts, but through cities and military installations; we give you even five hours only so that, if you do not capitulate, people have time to leave the cities. Because we don't want to kill more people, we don't even want to destroy you as a country. Just as you wished for us, we only want to liquidate you as an independent participant in world

politics. So decide.”

This, of course, was a complete shock - no one expected anything like this; it was as if a man, armored and armed, in the jungle among ferocious predators, suddenly realized that he was mistaken and in fact he was unarmed and defenseless. Looking ahead, I will say that the mechanism of action of this Russian miracle shield is unknown to this day, more than thirty years later. That is, our scientists have long understood the general principle - this is a generator of a certain field related to the so-called weak fields, which changes certain parameters inside atomic nuclei and therefore makes radioactive elements completely stable (unfortunately, only while the generator is running). Accordingly, plutonium or uranium in this field cannot in any way provide radioactive decay, and even more so an explosion. Our labs modeled this back in the 1920s, but still do not understand how the Russians scale this effect - as you know, we restored strategic parity with Russia in the early 1930s (and three years later, the Celestial Empire), but they did it asymmetrically, putting antimatter capsules on their warheads instead of nuclear charges. Then, in May 2019, with a Russian ultimatum, US leaders faced a difficult choice; when, half an hour after receiving it, Bush called Gabriel with a question about the conditions, he calmly answered him that the Americans, apparently, did not understand: this was not about a truce or a peace treaty, but about complete and unconditional surrender. This means that you surrender to the mercy of the winner in the hope (and not at all guaranteed) to save your life - otherwise you will definitely lose them. At the same time, Gabriel insisted that all this, including the recording of their conversation, be broadcast on radio, television and the Web; and the entire American people waited in a daze until the country's elite - that's right: not only politicians, but also business captains, religious leaders, and others arrived physically or by video in the White House - decide their fate. But the people also froze in anticipation in Russia, where Gabriel addressed the citizens with a speech in which he told everything that he had done. He ended by saying that the Americans have five hours, and we have an absolute shield, and now it seems to be working. But what if something goes wrong, what if the Americans also have some kind of surprise - then forgive me and all my associates, suddenly we won't have time to say goodbye later. We will not kill the Americans immediately, without giving them a chance to surrender, even though it would probably be more reliable for us. People stopped in the street and, standing in groups, waited - both in Russia and in the USA; only in Russia they did not try to leave the big cities. But the US response was a foregone conclusion - I cannot imagine a responsible authority that would order the collective suicide of the entire country, which, moreover, would not cause any damage to the enemy. And although Bush asked Gabriel for an additional hour and a half, which Gabriel prudently gave (it was important for him to give the impression of a by no means cruel winner), this longest day in history ended: at 7 pm Moscow time, President Bush announced the complete and unconditional surrender of the United States.

The first task of the Russian authorities was to secure a real occupation; order number one prescribed that the US Armed Forces be considered disbanded, all soldiers and officers of units on US soil were to leave the location of military bases without weapons and uniforms, leaving only minimal protection; all ships on the high seas and aircraft in the air were to return to their bases, which should also be abandoned. It was announced that all people in US military uniforms, all those carrying weapons heavier than a pistol, as well as all those who offered any resistance to the Russian occupying forces, would be fired upon without warning to kill. All U.S. federal, state, and municipal authorities were ordered to obey all orders of the occupying forces and provide them with all assistance. The first order also contained a requirement to ensure the safety of all state secret documents; anyone guilty of removing or destroying them will be shot. In the meantime, planes with military equipment and soldiers on board began to take off from Russia (by that time the soldiers were all guardsmen, at least in the occupation corps), heading for American airfields, freed from other aircraft by Russian order; the Russians used for this not only their military transport aircraft, but also passenger liners. At the same time from Chukotka, two armies (approximately corresponds to two of our divisions), transferred there shortly before, began to cross the ice of the Bering Strait to Alaska - on the morning of May 2 they were already loaded in Alaska onto

requisitioned American trains. On May 3-4, one army began to settle in California, forming the Pacific base of the occupying forces; the other went to Texas, settled there on May 6-7 and became the middle base of the occupying forces. Three troops were airlifted to the east of the United States in three days, which became the core of the remaining three bases: New England in New York, southern in Atlanta and mid-western in Chicago. The accuracy and speed with which this was done leave no doubt that this operation and the whole war in general were planned and planned to the smallest detail by the Russians in advance, and the US actions in the Bay of Bengal and beyond were only a planned response to a provocation. For the most part, the occupation passed quietly as the American people were in deep shock; the exception was the city of Chicago, where a significant number of residents, joined by the military who left the nearby military base, plundered the armories of this base, united in a large detachment and met with fire the Russians entering the city. Now it is difficult to determine why it was in Chicago that a center of resistance arose: most likely, the factor that a significant part of the city's population was made up of ethnic Poles, who from time immemorial consider Russians enemies, and Russian emigrants - for some reason, as a rule, they hate their historical homeland as opposed to people from other countries. It may have also contributed to the fact that Chicagoans suffered particularly heavy losses during the terrorist war - they survived two major terrorist attacks, including the bombing of their city's symbol, the Sears Tower skyscraper; or perhaps the fact that since the 19th century Chicago has traditionally been the center of all kinds of civil unrest. Be that as it may, the troops entering the city entered into battle with the defenders, and then the whole world saw for the first time (because television broadcast live without hindrance) what an *oprichnik* in full combat gear was like; hastily put together self-defense units, even with heavy weapons, could not be a serious opponent for them. Using their huge individual firepower, as well as heavy self-propelled guns and support mortars, the brutal guardsmen began, in addition to suppressing the defenders' manpower, to destroy the city, systematically firing at the buildings. As a result of a fierce battle that lasted almost a day, in which the guardsmen lost more than five hundred people, more than 30 thousand Americans died. Even when they threw out the white flag, Boris Fetisov, who had arrived half a day before that moment (he was transferred from the commander-in-chief of the Navy to the commander of the occupation corps on May 1), barely managed to stop the carnage. These events remained the only significant case of armed resistance - all Americans saw television footage of collapsing buildings and mountains of corpses. And the appeal of Fetisov, who explained that, according to Russian laws, guardsmen in enemy territory are not forbidden to kill any suspicious civilians, made a proper impression.

On May 9, 2019, after the completion of the first phase of the occupation, the signing of the act of surrender was scheduled, to which Gabriel the Great was supposed to arrive. It was supposed that this would take place in Washington, but half an hour before the approach, the supersonic bomber, on which Gabriel was flying, changed its route on his instructions and landed in New York, and the civilian and military leaders of the United States who had gathered in Washington were brought there by plane. Gabriel, who loved symbolic actions, ordered the signing to take place aboard the battleship Missouri, which was transferred to permanent parking in New York in 2012. It was a calculated psychological blow to the American nation, no less powerful in its way than the news of defeat and occupation itself: where America accepted the surrender of Japan in 1945 and became a superpower, now the Russians accept the surrender of America! The text of the act of surrender contained a clause that the peace treaty would be signed within three months (it was signed on July 26, 2019, on the day of Gabriel's 57th birthday), in connection with which the next day Gabriel for the first and last time in of his life went on television to the American nation to explain what exactly will be in the peace treaty and, accordingly, what awaits everyone.

He explained that there would be no annexation, that is, declaring America a Russian territory or protectorate (that is, a territory controlled by Russia), - America remains an independent state ruled by the Americans, albeit with some defeats in sovereign rights. "As you will understand further," he said, "these

defeats will not be burdensome or even noticeable to ordinary people, rather the opposite. There will not even be an occupation in the strict legal sense - the American authorities are not declared and will not be declared deposed; they will continue to function, however, being obliged to comply with all orders of the Russian occupation corps - but even then only until the signing of a peace treaty, that is, three months. Losses in rights will only affect the fact that the United States will be prohibited from pursuing an active foreign policy. You will not have the right to have an army, even a small one; defensive functions will be performed by the Russian-American military treaty, which will be a mandatory annex to the peace treaty. According to it, Russia undertakes to defend the United States in the event of aggression against them with all the means at its disposal, as itself. To this end, it, among other things, permanently deploys in the United States a corps of ten armies (about 120 thousand guardsmen) and three squadrons of warships - on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and on the Hawaiian Islands. America, of course, will pay Russia for this in the amount agreed by the parties for each five-year period - at first it will be about \$150 billion a year. Note that this is four times less than what you spend on defense today.” Gavriil went on to say that US paramilitaries—police, intelligence agencies, and the national guard—would be banned from carrying weapons heavier than machine guns and bazookas, including on armored vehicles, and the Coast Guard from carrying light guns and missiles. Aviation can only be transport. Research work and industrial production in the military and related fields are prohibited, all relevant laboratories and factories are closed, existing equipment is requisitioned or dismantled. In particular, the entire space program is prohibited, with the exception of the development and production of civilian satellites and launch vehicles for their launch. All available heavy weapons are taken by Russia as a trophy.

The United States may have diplomatic relations with other countries, but will not have the right to provide financial assistance to other countries (this applies not only to the government, but also to any American entities, including private ones), as well as to accept it from other countries and their subjects. The US can participate in bilateral and multilateral international treaties and organizations, but not in all. The main exception is that joining any kind of union or bloc, as well as any agreement on the creation of a confederation with one or more countries or complete unification with them is allowed only with the consent of Russia - and Russia has the final say in whether a particular agreement is an alliance or not. Finally, the United States will pay Russia one trillion dollars at a time, and this is not even an indemnity or reparations, but compensation for Russia’s misappropriated property - Alaska. Indeed, in 1863, Russia did not sell Alaska to America, but leased it out for 99 years. “You kept it for yourself in 1962, when they expired,” Gabriel said, “and you were within your rights to do so, because the Russian Red Empire declared back in 1918 that it was not the legal successor of the First Russian Empire. But after all, in 1995, Russia regained the status of its legal successor, and with your full approval, and, in particular, paid off all debts to holders of state bonds of the First Empire - so on what basis do you continue to consider Alaska yours? Give or pay compensation in the specified amount - it’s your choice.” (As you know, compatriots, the United States has chosen to pay compensation, and Alaska is included in our Federation as part of the State of Pacificia.) That, in fact, is the whole agreement. It was assumed that it would be concluded for 50 years, after which, if the parties do not extend it, it will automatically cease to operate, except for Article 1 - on the diplomatic recognition of the second party and its possible successors and on being at peace with it. By mutual agreement, some of its provisions may be reviewed, including the provisions of a military treaty, but not more than once every five years. “How you will decide on the adoption of this treaty and possible amendments to it in the future,” said Gabriel, “decide for yourself - it is enough for us that your president sign it, having received the approval of both houses of Congress. But if you want, you can pass it as a constitutional amendment, that is, in the legislatures of two-thirds of the states.”

“This is the formal part,” Gabriel said further, “now I will explain how it happened in general, that it came to what it came to. You Americans, or rather, your ancestors really tried to build a beautiful new world in the New World, free from the shortcomings of the old, as if an embodied utopia, and succeeded

in many ways. Even when you were the British colonies, and even more so in the 19th century, you could say anything about life in the North American states - just not that it is similar to life in Europe. You and the Civil War began not for economic reasons or because slavery flourished in the southern states - these were important, but partial manifestations of the true cause - but because life in the South began to look very much like European, from which your founding fathers and all subsequent generations of immigrants fled. And they fled, first of all, not to wealth - no one in America guaranteed it to them, and without guarantees it was quite possible to get rich in Europe - but to the freedom to build their own life, without the oppressive circumstances of the old world. But to freedom not only from the oppression of the internal circumstances of their old countries - class, national, religious - but also from neighboring countries, with their kings, wars and other big European politics, absolutely unnecessary for an ordinary person. No, they were not cowards, your ancestors, they were not afraid of blood and death - when bandits attacked their homes or wagons, they took up arms and defended themselves and their loved ones, not sparing their lives. But they did not understand why they should give this life in an incomprehensible war with a neighboring kingdom for the annexation of some duchy unknown to them. Therefore, America's attitude towards the outside world was extremely simple: leave us alone, what do we care about you, and you about us? And the Lord favored you. And personally, this America also causes sympathy for me. But then, at the beginning of the 20th century, the situation changed - for some reason America got into the European massacre of the First World War, which didn't make much sense for Europeans, and even more so for Americans. Why this turnaround took place, what forces, how and why managed to distort the original American values from within in such a way, we do not know, although we hope to find out from the secret archives confiscated from you, as well as by any other means. (You all know from the school course on the history of the motherland, dear compatriots, what a shock for everyone was the publication in 2022-2023 of the materials of the Russian investigation about the so-called order of initiates, which actually secretly ruled the United States, and to a large extent the rest of the world, for more than a hundred and fifty years, and its centuries-long program to build the so-called kingdom of light.) The Lord sent you the Great Depression - yes, yes, that's right, the Lord sent, despite all its troubles - to switch your will back to yourself and your problems and thus turn you away from this pernicious turn. As a result, you really didn't want to get involved in World War II. But the devil, who decided to make you his instrument, did not sleep either - Japan attacked you, and you were forced to enter the war. But even after the victory, you could leave Europe, leaving it alone to deal with Joseph the Great - even if he captured it all, what do you care about overseas? But you are not Christ in the wilderness, the temptation of power over the world turned out to be irresistible for you - and from the middle of the 20th century you became a different America, which gradually turned into such oppression for the rest of the world, which the countries of the Old World from which your ancestors fled never were.

Do not say now that you, they say, brought democracy to the world - not a sword, so to speak, but a vine, for its own good. The same was said, by the way, by those who persecuted your Puritan ancestors for religious reasons. All this is nothing more than an excuse to seek power over others - because democracy, like any other form of government and anything else, is the free choice of every people; and who made you judge and teacher over the rest of the world? However, this question is rhetorical, only one gives power over the world - the devil, and only one - the Antichrist - pushes to globalize the whole world, making it the same, making it the same. Moreover, if you carried your values to other peoples, that is, money and democracy, by including more and more new countries in America itself, albeit by force, as the First Rome did, then at least the fruits of what you imposed on them would be reaped by you. But no, you did not want to bear any responsibility for your actions. So, apparently, the Lord chose us to give you short; and since He has long favored you and has not forgotten this, He sent us - conquerors who are not cruel, who do not cut you or rob you. That is, we, of course, stood up against you and defeated you only so that you would fall behind us, we are not at all defenders of the rest of the world and are not avengers for it - if we perceived ourselves this way, we would not differ from you. But the fact that it was the Lord

who made us His instrument is evident from everything that has happened.

Now about what this means for everyone. You will no longer teach people how to live. If you want to have democracy in your country - have it in good health, but no one will allow you to carry it to others. For those for whom this was internally very important and who will be very worried that this will not happen again, I have nothing to console - but there is no need either, because they are all surrendered to the devil, voluntarily or involuntarily. But for the true descendants in the spirit of your founding fathers, for those who care about their own lives, and not life in overseas countries, and who strive for their own goals, whether material or spiritual, and are not interested in strangers, I have good news. You will remain a great power, a rich and free country, where you are the masters of yourself and your life. In the hour of our weakness, and your strength, you tried to prevent us from remaining a great power - but we are not vindictive, we will not do the same and are not going to take away from you what is your conscience. You will no longer be a superpower - if you mean by that one who constantly rapes the rest of the world - but I assure you that no one will be, including ourselves. Even now we are not raping you, we are not trying to impose on you our ideas about the state structure and way of life, we simply do not allow you to torment others. Economically, you will most likely win at all, because the rejection of the concept of globalization - and why do you need it if you do not control the whole world? - will lead to the normalization of your foreign trade balance, you will again begin to produce for yourself everything that you now import, earning profit from it yourself, and not giving it to others in the name of illusory political goals. Yes, in recent decades you have turned from a nation of craftsmen and industrial barons into a nation of accountants and financiers - but this is all superficial, the country of Bell and Ford cannot forget how to work best. In addition, you get almost half a trillion a year of savings on military spending, and by compacting the federal government, it's up to you, of course, but why do you need it so big if you refuse messianism? - and even more. So I think that all normal people will only win, and that you have to work for this, you don't need to be taught this."

After this speech, Gabriel left for Russia, leaving Boris Fetisov in charge. By the way, his forecast came true in principle: already in 2022, the North American economy, having significantly reduced the import and export of goods and capital, emerged from stagnation, and now North America is probably the most economically prosperous region in the world - but this is already part of our Federation, which is yet to come. In Russia, Gabriel, of course, met with jubilation, reaching ecstasy: they say that on May 9, when radio and television announced the signing of the surrender - until that moment no one could fully believe it - people knelt down and thanked the Lord how and where they stood, including right on the streets. But this jubilation was mixed with bewilderment, the essence of which can be expressed briefly: why stop? Some said that we should not repeat the mistake of Joseph the Great in 1945 and leave America not crushed to the end. Wouldn't it be better to annex it to Russia or make it a protectorate, and even impose such an indemnity that would not give it the opportunity to revive and again become a source of problems for Russia? Others generally demanded immediately, until an antidote to our strategic shield was found, to establish power over the whole world and thereby forever put an end to wars, hot and cold. "You are, of course, a great man, the supreme ruler Gabriel," voices were heard, "but who gave you the right to let America get off so easily? After all, Russia is not only you, but all of us." Moreover, all this was expressed not only and not so much by the guardsmen, but by the people (in the sense of [*zemstvo*](#)¹² members): it must be understood, compatriots, that although the right to vote on political problems in the sense of participating in voting belongs in Russia only to the service class, the right to vote in the sense of participating in public discussion, including officially announced, belongs to both the clergy and the *zemstvo* and is encouraged in every possible way by the authorities. The answer to this was another famous speech by Gabriel, later called the "last bell speech", since it was delivered on May 25, when the last bell traditionally takes place in Russia, that is, the end of studies in the last grade of high school.

"What are you so excited about? Gabriel addressed his fellow citizens. – After all, back in 2013 we decided that we need to go through three phases before we start building a semblance of the Kingdom of

God: reform ourselves in order to become strong, crush the enemy and build a new world order; So far, we've only gone through two. It is very easy to make a mistake in building a new world order, even if you have already crushed the enemy - isn't the best example the same year 1945 that you all mention here? So you say: crush America with an unbearable contribution - in order, perhaps, to help grow new avengers, and not a hundred or two terrorists, but a whole generation? Yes, the Americans as a nation are now morally crushed and brought to their knees, and this is useful for us, we strove for this - but why did you decide that they would not find the strength to rise from their knees? We found, after the demoralization of the nineties. This is in addition to the fact that a huge indemnity will destroy our, namely our economy - all the conquerors in history, if they took really big booty, they themselves stopped working as a nation. Who will we rob next to support new consumption standards? And if you annex America, then you really need to annex the whole world - because can America in any sense be considered as being inside our natural borders? But who told you that if the whole world is united, there will be no wars? We have been fighting in Chechnya for a long time, and this is not a separate country; so in the united world there will be dozens of such Chechnyas, if not hundreds. And there will not be enough guardsmen to keep this whole world in check - our entire population will be forced to do this, because the world is big. And the Russian people will turn from a nation of craftsmen and scientists, writers and preachers, jokers and merry fellows into a nation of gendarmes: and all this for what, except for the mirage of omnipotence? Not to mention the fact that if we take the whole world, and by force, then we will only have about three years of life in it: that is how long, according to the Scriptures, the kingdom of the Antichrist will last before the end of the world, and only the Antichrist will unite the world. I don't know about you, but I don't want to be the Antichrist and I won't be. So calm down, wait, we will also have territorial acquisitions, we are not at all higher than this, but we don't need dizziness from success - then how will we differ from the Americans, whom we have now defeated?"

All these arguments basically convinced the Russians, especially since on June 12, the Day of Russia, they were waiting for another symbolic spectacle that amuses national pride - the Victory Parade. In contrast to the parade of 1945, it was mostly non-military personnel who were held in front of the audience as prisoners of war, who were represented, in addition to the generals, only by American sailors and soldiers taken prisoner in real battles who participated in the Chicago uprising - they marched through Red Square, brought by plane, arrested specifically for this (and taken back and released the next day) representatives of all US elites: President Bush III and former presidents Bill Clinton, Bush Jr. and Hillary Clinton, current and former cabinet members, congressmen and senators, bankers and industrialists, newspaper columnists and TV presenters, famous lawyers and top models, crooners and Hollywood actresses. All of them walked through Red Square in handcuffs and with a sign with their name around their necks - all except for the captured military men, who walked with full honor. The Russian government made it clear to its citizens, and to the whole world, that Russia fought and defeated not the American army, but American civilization. By the way, on this day another ancient custom was revived in Russia: Russian sailors and soldiers who participated in the battles and arrived to participate in the parade passed through the Triumphal Arch, built in the 19th century at the western entrance to Moscow in honor of the victory over Napoleon. Each marching army or squadron, in addition, carried wagons with boards on which the names of all those who died in battle were engraved through the arch.

Second expansion. Meanwhile, America's NATO allies were waiting: they seemed to be at war with Russia, since not only the US, but the entire bloc declared war on it on April 30th. But after that, the exchange of nuclear strikes took place so quickly that the European countries simply did not have time to do anything, and then they seemed to be forgotten about. They cautiously (because diplomatic relations were interrupted due to the declaration of war) tried to contact the Russian leadership, but to no avail. However, already after the Victory Parade, at the end of June, Gabriel invited the President of France and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Italy and Spain, as the largest NATO countries, to Moscow for a conversation, assuring them of their personal integrity; no one dared to refuse. The German chancellor

was not among them, because on April 30 Germany announced that it did not join the declaration of war on Russia and withdraw from the military organization of the bloc. Moreover, Chancellor Rimnek spoke in such a way that it seemed that he understood and did not condemn Russia. This was an expected consequence of the growth of objective contradictions between German and American interests, as well as the growth of nationalist, including anti-American and anti-Atlantic sentiments in Germany. However, this was also the fruit of Russia's unhurried but consistent policy of rapprochement with Germany and its separation from America, begun by Vladimir II. Russia then immediately responded with a diplomatic note that, they say, she welcomes the decision of Germany and also does not consider that she is at war with her, although she formally remains a member of the bloc; moreover, Russia hopes for a long and mutually beneficial relationship with Germany. On May 2, after America accepted the Russian ultimatum, Germany congratulated Russia on its victory and paid tribute to Russia's commitment to minimizing casualties on the other side. And on May 11, after Gabriel's New York speech, Germany once again paid tribute to the moderation and humanity of the Russian approach to the defeated enemy - so that by the end of June, by the time NATO leaders were invited to Moscow, Germany and Russia were already, as it were, allies, although this had not yet been formalized.

When the leaders of the four European countries mentioned arrived in Moscow, they expressed a common position: they agreed to the same conditions that Russia offered America. But they were in for a very unpleasant surprise. Gavriil said that Russia was not going to offer them such conditions, but offered to surrender - they are at war with Russia - on different conditions. European countries will be annexed and become parts of Russia, with a complete loss of sovereignty, and the parts will not be autonomous or self-governing, but the most ordinary ones. Their population will receive a residence permit, and after eight years of naturalization, in the absence of claims from the police, all will become Russian citizens. The population and commercial enterprises will be subject to a one-time tax in the form of a certain percentage of the value of the property, about one third, which, however, can be paid in installments or shares (for enterprises). All people and businesses will initially be protected by Russian law. "With those of you," Gabriel continued, "who decide not to agree to these supposedly humiliating conditions, we will start a real war, although not a nuclear one - why do we need radiation in Europe, especially in our own future territories? If you manage to defend your freedom, great, but if not, know that your people will receive a residence permit of a different form, according to which the naturalization period will not be counted. All property of individuals and enterprises will be confiscated, and people will not be protected by Russian law, at least until the moment of surrender, and no one will forbid our soldiers to kill them - except that they will not rape and rob them, since this is below the honor of the guardsmen. This is your choice - make it, and let it be made by all the other EU countries with whom you, as leaders, will talk. To the remark of French President Richard that they don't fight like that in Europe, Gabriel replied that the Russians, in fact, are not Europeans, which he, Gabriel, personally read more than once in the French press. When asked by British Prime Minister Ian Perkins why the approach to the EU countries is so different from the understandable European peoples and the completely humane approach to America, Gabriel answered quite clearly: "He who crushes you with his strength can even cause hatred, but despise him. It's my pleasure; but the weak one, who bullies and crap from behind the back of the strong, causes burning contempt and is not worthy of any honor." Thus ended this meeting in Moscow.

European countries began consultations with each other, since Gabriel did not set them hard deadlines, but time worked for Russia. The fact is that almost immediately after the defeat of America, on May 7 (that is, even before the signing of the surrender), an uprising took place in Serbia, where the people overthrew the pro-Western government and brought nationalists to power; the police and secret services, either completely demoralized or sympathizing with the rebels, did nothing to prevent this. The reason for this lies in history: the Serbs, ethnically and religiously very close to the Russian people, became the object of open military aggression by NATO in 1999 (this was one of the most shameful episodes in the history of Western civilization). As a result, Kosovo, the historical region of Serbia, containing its main

shrines, was torn away from it, and the Serbs were subjected to discrimination bordering on genocide. Even earlier, the so-called Serbian republics (krajinas) in Croatia and Bosnia were liquidated, in fact also by Western countries, and the Serbs were expelled from there. Moreover, before that, Serb detachments really killed Croats and Bosnians, including civilians, about which the authorities and the media of Western countries trumpeted around the world, but not a word was said about no less (and possibly greater) crimes against the Serbs, including including after the expulsion of the Serbian detachments and most of the Serbian population. In the early 2000s, Western countries, using a technology worked out to a T, including relying on the local fifth column, brought to power in Serbia a pro-Western government that did not have popular support and lasted in this form until 2019; it is not surprising that the rebels literally tore the members of the cabinet to pieces. On May 11, Russia congratulated Serbia on the termination, as it was written in the note, of the “actual regime of the protectorate of the United States and the European Union” and, on its own initiative, without the request of the Serbs, wished them the speedy return of their “ancestral patrimonies”. The new Serbian government asked Russia to help with weapons, and Russia replied - all this was happening completely publicly! - consent. In the twenties of May, transports with artillery, armored vehicles and ammunition began to arrive, and combat aircraft began to arrive under their own power. Even before that, on May 18, the Serbs attacked the armed forces of the so-called Kosovo Republic, who came to the aid of the Albanian troops: a short, but very bloody war began, which in Russia went down in history under the name of the Serbian national liberation war. By mid-July, the Serbs, having defeated the enemy units, occupied the entire territory of Kosovo and Albania, except for the hard-to-reach mountains; 23 thousand Serbian and 63 thousand Kosovar and Albanian soldiers and militias died - they did not leave the wounded, they did not take prisoners. After that, a massacre began, as a result of which up to half a million Kosovo and Albanian civilians were killed (more than half of the Kosovars were destroyed), and almost a million fled the country on Albanian and Turkish ships, which were not obstructed by Russian warships.

Pope John Paul III issued an appeal (although the Albanians and Kosovars were Muslims) to the Serbs and Russians: “Brothers, remember the words of the Apostle Paul: “Do not avenge yourself, beloved”; remember the words of the Savior himself: “Vengeance is mine, and I will repay.” The Serbs did not respond, but Gabriel publicly answered the Holy See. “They didn’t remember,” he said, “as Paul says further: “... but leave room for the wrath of God” - that’s the wrath of God and appeared through the Serbs; because are they taking revenge for themselves - no, for their ancestors and their shrines. The Lord is not a pagan god, himself shaking with a trident and throwing lightning bolts, He works His will between people through other people. He will send punishing angels, as we know, only at the end of the world. But where was your Church when the Western countries trampled on the Serbs - your co-religionists? When in Kosovo not only Serbian houses were blown up and set on fire, but also Christian churches and monasteries? Or, in your opinion, Orthodox does not mean Christian - then why are you addressing us now? No, the Roman Catholic Church approved or remained silent - of course, this does not give the Serbs the moral right to take revenge, but it deprives you of the moral right to now preach.”

In the meantime, the Serbs, who had accumulated enormous energy of many years of national humiliation (in some regions of the country there were no men left at all - everyone voluntarily went into the militia), even before the end of the Albanian-Kosovo operation, attacked Croatia and Bosnia simultaneously, and Croatia was a member of NATO, but this no one cared anymore. In addition to their own rage and fearlessness, as well as the material and moral assistance of the Russians, the complete demoralization of these countries after the fall of America and the inevitable fall of the European Union played in favor of the Serbs. The fighting in Croatia and Bosnia continued until December, and 58,000 Serbs and 96,000 Croats and Bosniaks died; Russia already did not allow the massacre of the civilian population, and even without resorting to force: its authority among the Serbs (especially after the words of Gabriel “Forgive us, Serbs, that it took us so long to come to your rescue”) was by this time beyond.

But let us return to the situation between Russia and the European Union. On July 12, Gabriel addressed

his people with the third famous speech of 2019, the so-called Peter and Paul speech (July 12, according to the Orthodox calendar, is the Day of the Apostles Peter and Paul). “I told you,” he said, “that for building a new world order, it is not suitable for us to annex America to ourselves, much less the whole world. But this does not mean that we will leave everything as it is. When I told you that we would get many new Chechnyas, I did not say that not every nation is capable of becoming Chechnya at all: our Chechens do not take courage, fearlessness and readiness to lay down their lives for their people and their faith - but not all of them are. During the Second World War, the Germans occupied all of Europe, but the French or Czechs endured, and the Serbs went to the mountains and fought (I’m not talking about ours). Are there many people like Serbs or Russians in the modern world? Americans, I think, are like that, and that’s one of the reasons why we let them get off lightly. Muslims are all like that, the Chinese too, but there are no more such people in Europe. This is a dying civilization, in which there is no vitality left neither to fight, nor even to give birth and multiply, only to drag out their senseless, well-fed existence. And these wretched ones dared to spread rot and teach us for many years! And I also told you that you can’t say that America is entering our natural borders - but Europe is entering. We are a Eurasian power, the heirs of the great Eurasian empires - the Roman, Byzantine, Mongolian and Russian-Soviet ones, and we must complete the centuries-old Eurasian cause - to unite in one empire all of northern Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. I told Americans in New York that until the beginning of the twentieth century, America did not touch anyone and did not interfere anywhere, and only then, under duress by someone - we will find out who exactly - turned off this right path. But Europe has tried to destroy us, conquer or weaken us many times in all ages! We must never again be threatened by the West! And therefore the first half of the task of building a new world order for us is this: all of Europe must enter the Russian Empire from ocean to ocean; this is both our historic mission and our security imperative. Whoever surrenders like this is good, who wants to fight - please, it’s even better, because, as the poet wrote, “a matter is strong when blood flows under it.” Yes, and guardsmen need hardening. Well, with our new allies, we will somehow agree, with all the honor due to them.

In addition to Serbia, with which allied relations were proclaimed on June 6, Gabriel had in mind Germany, with which they were proclaimed even earlier, on May 30. Having honestly explained its goals to them, Russia actually agreed with them that they would become part of Russia with the loss of sovereignty, but, of course, on completely different conditions than even those European countries that would prefer to surrender. All Germans and Serbs from the first moment became full-fledged Russian citizens, moreover, these peoples received a temporary constitutional status of allied peoples of the Russian people (the trial period for the transition of this status to a permanent one is twenty years under the Constitution). Naturally, no one-time tax was taken from them, they were equated in taxation with Russian citizens (which was many times less than in the European Union). This is how Russia’s goals in Europe were formulated, and this is how everything turned out as a result.

The European countries were still consulting when the Albanian massacre took place; although it was not the Russians who did it, but the Serbs, the Europeans were able to see firsthand what might await them, and most of the countries decided to accept the conditions of the Russians. At this time, in the third decade of July, all NATO countries finally received from Russia an official offer to surrender, with a formal description of the conditions - all except three countries - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - formerly part of the Red Empire (and before that, in the First Empire); they will be discussed below. The President of France, on behalf of all others, tried to bargain more favorable terms from Russia, but he was told that bargaining was inappropriate here. As a result, in early August, all countries that accepted Russia’s conditions informed her of this, and the signing of capitulations took place in Moscow on August 9, but at the same time, Russia demanded that a referendum be held in each country, in which the act of surrender would be approved by the population. “It is necessary that in one or two generations they do not say,” said the Russian Foreign Minister, “that their governments betrayed their peoples against their will.”

But not everyone signed the surrender: Great Britain, Ireland, Poland, Ukraine and Turkey declared their

rejection of Russian conditions and their readiness to fight. The reasons for this were different: Poland and a very Polonized Ukraine (as you remember, its eastern and southern parts were ceded to Russia during the period of the first expansion), as well as Turkey, considered themselves - and really were! – centuries-old enemies of Russia, and for them (at least for their national elites) death was preferable to capitulation. In addition, no one has seen the Russian army in a land war since the Afghan and Chechen wars, which were not the most successful for Russia - this created the illusion that the Russians were just lucky. Yes, they invented a strategic shield, but in a conventional war, especially with an enemy ready to die for their homeland, they will definitely do it. England, on the other hand, never in its entire state history waged wars on its territory, neither Napoleon nor Hitler could capture it; therefore, the feeling that they are in their own country as in an impregnable fortress became the flesh and blood of the British.

Commenting on the refusal of these countries to sign the surrender, the Russian Foreign Minister said: “Of course, having Dudayev Street in Warsaw, Dudayev Square in Kyiv, and Basaev Avenue in Lvov (these were prominent figures of Chechen separatism, mortal enemies of Russia), Poland and Ukraine understand that that they will not be spared. Well, we have been at enmity for five hundred years, it’s time to put an end to it. And we are at enmity with the Turks as much, we have not forgotten who else helped the Crimean Khanate to raid Moscow and Russia. And the British spoiled us tirelessly, even when not only the United States did not exist, but the first settlements in America did not appear. So it’s good that everything turns out this way, it’s good that they are ready to shed their blood, just not to be under us - and it’s not worth it for us to be afraid to shed our own. And a major Russian newspaper published an interview with Confessor Gabriel, in which he said that, while still deciding to run for president in 2012, Gabriel made a vow to erect an Orthodox cross over Hagia Sophia.

Thus began the wars of expansion, the first of which was the Russian-Polish-Ukrainian war. It began on August 18, 2019 with the offensive of Russian troops simultaneously in four directions: to Warsaw from Grodno, to Rivne-Lvov from Mogilev and to Kyiv from Dnepropetrovsk and Kursk. In all directions, the offensive was carried out by highly mobile units in a purely attacking order: tank brigades marched in front with the support of combat helicopters, behind them were the main forces on high-speed transporters, and behind them divisions of self-propelled heavy guns and mortars, which created a barrage of fire 40-50 kilometers ahead of them, then there are 15-20 kilometers ahead of the tanks. In contact with serious enemy forces, the rati, the main striking power of the Russian ground forces, came forward and dispersed to strike (for more details on the tactics of the Russian army, see the chapter “[Army](#)”). At the same time, on August 20, twelve thousandth amphibious assault was landed in Gdansk, and parts of the German Bundeswehr launched an offensive against Poland from the west. In the second echelon, with a delay of several days, there were a few garrison forces, as well as police units. Before their approach, no law was in force in the occupied territories, and after that only the Russian “law of war” was in effect. According to it, law enforcement agencies protect Russians from local residents, sometimes - some local residents from others, but not local residents from Russian guardsmen. The Polish-Ukrainian forces were literally crushed, in addition, the Russian troops were tasked with destroying the maximum amount of manpower, buildings and structures. As a result, by October 5 - this is the date of the end of the Russian-Polish-Ukrainian war - more than 600 thousand people were killed, of which more than two-thirds were civilians, while Russian losses amounted to no more than 11 thousand. Such ancient cities as Warsaw and Krakow, and many others, were heavily destroyed, and Lvov was literally wiped off the face of the earth, and, apparently, quite deliberately. The Germans, who, as it turned out, despite the European Union rhetoric of the last twenty-five years, also did not like the Poles very much (whom they considered guilty of tearing away her ancestral lands from Germany), offered Russia to take over the function of occupation and administration on the territory of Poland and Ukraine; Russia agreed and expressed its satisfaction. It’s amazing, dear compatriots, what somersaults history sometimes makes: Poles and Ukrainians during the Second World War groaned under the yoke of German garrisons, from which they were liberated by the Russians. And instead of being grateful to them, they did everything in their power to humiliate and

destroy the Russians, and voluntarily lie under the Europeans, including the Germans, and as a result they got back the German garrisons, but with the blessing of the Russians.

November 16 began the Russian-Turkish war; it initially developed differently, was much more protracted and persistent. Unlike the Russian-Turkish war of the 19th century, the Russians did not transfer troops to Bulgaria and Greece and attack Turkey from the west - they preferred to invade from the east. Tanks were used to a limited extent due to the mountainous terrain, the offensive through the Georgian-Turkish and Armenian-Turkish borders immediately began the rati of the main forces on foot; the first major battle took place for the city of Kars and lasted 18 days. The next, main line of defense of the Turkish army was the city of Erzurum, where the Russian troops were stuck for two and a half months; it was the biggest battle of the Russian-Turkish war and expansion wars in general, the total losses of the parties there amounted to 160 thousand people. At this time, at the end of December, after the end of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia, the European part of Turkey was attacked from the west by the Serbian army and, having captured it, crossed the Dardanelles, after which it began to advance inland. The Serbs did not attack Istanbul, defended by a group of 80,000, but instead developed an offensive in the direction of Izmir-Antalya-Gaziantep in order to cut off the Turks' access to the Mediterranean coast and the Syrian border. Fierce fighting continued for six months, until mid-April 2020, when Ankara fell, taken in pincers from two sides - by the main Russian troops breaking through from Erzurum and the 30,000-strong Russian amphibious assault, landed in February near the city of Samsun and developed an offensive against the capital (it was commanded by Boris Fetisov, who for this purpose left the post of commander of the occupation corps in America at the end of October).

After the fall of Ankara, the Turkish command brought to the attention of the Russian side that Turkey was ready to capitulate if the conditions were the same as for countries that surrendered without a war, and also if the occupation was not carried out by the Serbs, otherwise the Turks would fight to the last soldier. Mikhail Velichko, the chief voivode of the Turkish army of the Russian troops (that is, the commander of the Turkish front) and in the future the head of the Imperial Military Administration (that is, the Minister of Defense), and then Emperor Michael III (2030-2040), replied that the Russian guardsmen were not afraid to fight until the last soldier: it is what they exist for. But they know how to appreciate the courage of the enemy, they pay tribute to the Turks and are ready to meet them even further than they ask. "The Turkish soldiers and officers did not spare themselves," Velichko said, "and it is not their fault that the Russians turned out to be stronger. We have been moving towards this for many years, and God is with us. It is not good for this selflessness to bear the same fruits as the cowardice of those who preferred to surrender at once; therefore, not only will the "law of war" not operate in Turkey, and the Turks will receive a residence permit with a naturalization countdown, but there will also be no one-time tax on the Turks. And we were not going to use the Serbs for the occupation, the Germans under the command of the Russians will do this. This unexpected decision greatly contributed to the normalization of the attitude of ordinary Turkish residents towards Russia, and in the future the Turks did not have conflicts with the Russians - perhaps also because the Russians had no hostility towards the Turks at the household level (as well as vice versa), not at all like Europeans. To this day, many Turks join the Russian guardsmen, while being baptized (this is a requirement of the law, see the chapter "[Estate Structure](#)"), and the bulk of them generally become Russians through the procedure of twinning (see the chapter "[National self-identification](#)"). Those who want to become guardsmen, but are not ready to give up their Turkic national roots, are usually recorded as Tatars, since this people, ethnically and linguistically close to the Turks, has the status of an allied one. In total, 82 thousand Russians and 180 thousand Turks died in the Turkish war.

The Russo-Anglo-Irish War, which began on February 14, 2020, was completely different. After the Russian-Polish-Ukrainian and a significant part of the Turkish war with their bitterness and losses, the British authorities made it clear to Russia that they were ready to change their decision to fight - but Russia replied that they should have thought earlier. Such changes in the positions of both sides were due

to the fact that England had already become very accustomed for 70 years to feel behind America's back, and Russia really did not like England very much, unlike, for example, Turkey - with the fall of America, all the centuries-old dislike of Russians was concentrated in it, to the West (Russians, according to their mentality, are not capable of hatred towards an already defeated enemy). The fighting began with a week-long massive artillery preparation in British concentration centers and cities, carried out from the French coast and from warships with missiles and long-range active-rockets and mines with CTB (pure thermonuclear munition, the basis of the strike power of Russian heavy artillery) with a capacity of up to 10,000 tons of TNT equivalent. Simultaneously, shells and unmanned aerial vehicles of the naval forces made mine-free passages in the English Channel and other coastal waters, after which, under the cover of Russian aircraft carriers and cruisers, amphibious assaults were landed in the west of Britain - in Cardiff, Bristol and Liverpool and in the east in Middlesbrough and Ipswich. At the same time, the Russians first used the so-called rocket landings at Stafford and Cambridge. All these landings had a strength of several thousand people (up to 11 thousand - the Bristol landing), but even during a week-long bombardment in sparsely populated areas of the western and eastern coasts, small groups of twenty to thirty people were landed from submarines, who began to move towards London, as well as meeting points with the main landing forces, using vehicles seized on the spot. Given the enormous individual firepower of the *oprichniks* (see the [Army](#) chapter), one can imagine the havoc they created behind British lines. By the beginning of April, London was taken, and with great destruction, which the guardsmen staged without any military necessity. In total, 6,000 Russians and 72,000 British died. After the fall of London, two landing ships approached the coast of Ireland. The Russian command offered the Irish not to fool their heads and lay down their arms in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, which was immediately executed. Thus ended the last of the wars of expansion.

Establishment of the Third Empire. So, by the end of April, the flag of the Russian Union was raised over Canada and throughout Europe, except for Switzerland, as well as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; they seemed to have been forgotten about (let me remind you that they were not even sent an offer of surrender), but everyone understood that not for long. Without a declaration of war (since they were not part of NATO), by way of an ultimatum, the former parts of the First and Second Russian Empires - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were also annexed. Throughout the end of April and the beginning of May, all participants in the battles, who arrived in Moscow without military equipment, passed through the Triumphal Arch; each legion, moreover, carried carts through the arch with boards on which the names of all those who died in battle were engraved. On May 9, a grandiose parade took place - it was both the first anniversary of the victory over America, and the 75th anniversary of the victory over Germany. There were no prisoners or arrested, even from warring countries, but on the other hand, Gabriel the Great, for the first and last time in his life, spoke directly from the Mausoleum (this is the name of the main government place on Red Square in Moscow, where the mummies of the founders of the Second Empire, Vladimir Judas, once lay and Joseph the Great; Joseph was reburied in 1956, and Vladimir in 2013). "When Vladimir II began to revive great Russia fifteen years ago," he said, "everyone had already written us off, both our own and others', all except a handful of those for whom the greatness of the country was more important than their miserable existence. "Miserable losers, an eternal second-class state, manure under the feet of Western civilization," some said. "Yes, in the past they were mighty with blunt force, but now they are "downed pilots" and impotent, an arena for competition from foreign countries and corporations," said others. "It's a pity, of course, but what can you do, there is no value in scrap," said still others. Yes, citizens, you were with us in spirit, otherwise you would not have voted for Vladimir in 2004 and 2008, and for me in 2012. But how many of you, and even more so among foreigners, unconditionally believed in success, how many could, echoing us, say: God is with us, our cause is just, we will win? But we did it - and the pilgrims with their prayer, and the guardsmen with their strength, and all the people with their work and trust. And where is this great West now? It doesn't exist and never will again. New enemies of Russia will be born, but this enemy will no longer exist. Look how many generations of Russians fought with varying success for access to the Black and then the Baltic

Seas - and now they are not even seas at all, but inland lakes of Russia, albeit salty. How many people, from the very birth of our statehood, dreamed of Constantinople - and now, look, the city of Constantine Equal to the Apostles is ours, and a cross will soon be raised over Hagia Sophia, for the first time in six centuries. Think about what we all did together: Western civilization, the eternal and main enemy of the Orthodox faith and the Russian state, has not been stopped, not humiliated, not defeated - it has been completely eliminated, swept away from the face of the Earth, moreover, without ungodly genocide; it was a great mission of generations, and it has been fulfilled. Not in vain, like ants, our ancestors built the Russian state for many centuries, not in vain then they rejected it in order to make the last spurt and catch up with the West in the terrible hardships and cruelties of the Red Empire. It was not in vain that they endured, with clenched teeth, the decomposition of the second Time of Troubles, it was not in vain that they found the strength to rise from their knees in order to make a third attempt. Even Sergius of Radonezh said: there is no sin in falling - there is in not rising. It was a success, the third attempt, but it was prepared by the entire history of the Russian state, it has the merit of all generations. And I now proclaim the Third Russian Empire - the third both because it was preceded by tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, and because it was preceded by the great Eurasian empires of the past, Roman and Byzantine. We are the Third Rome, and there will be no fourth! We deserve to be a great empire, because truly great is not the one who reaches the heights, but the one who rises from the earth and wins, already being defeated and crushed. And we can now build a great empire freely and unhindered - because the second half of the task of building a new world order we will complete within a year, do not hesitate. So this day, May 9, became not only the Victory Day, but also the Day of the Empire. Despite the feeling of pride and elation, people did not have such jubilation as a year before: everyone walked around as if slightly bruised, clearly feeling how the earth was shaking from the history that was being created before our eyes. Not the story that you feel during a great victory that happens two or three times in a century, but the one that happens once in a millennium. The coat of arms and the flag of Russia were changed - they became the same as they are now; elections were scheduled for December (naturally, only by guardsmen) of the first emperor - but since Gabriel announced that he would run, no one doubted the outcome. Meanwhile, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nurzhan Aliev - by this point he was already called the head of the Imperial Foreign Policy Directorate of Russia - explained the plans for the Baltic states in a televised speech. "All Western countries were hostile towards us," he said, "but at least they were full-fledged ancient nations and acted primarily not against us, but simply following their own interests. The so-called Baltic states are not any ancient nations, they are the wild and backward outskirts of our state that have imagined themselves, inhabited by peoples famous for their stupidity and ingratitude. Have they ever been independent, except for the long and short period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - which, however, had a very distant relation to present-day Lithuania and rather corresponded to Belarus? Yes, we conquered them in the 16th-18th centuries, but was it then considered wrong, wasn't it how all states, including European ones, were formed? And in the 20th century, when they allegedly won independence twice, did anyone interfere with this, did they shed at least a drop of their blood? In 1940, we simply reclaimed what was ours - what Vladimir Judas gave, who did not care about anything but the world revolution. And the fact that we sent many Balts to camps, so look what happened next. In 1941, already by July, even before the complete occupation by German troops, they destroyed almost all of their Jews, and without even having troops, they beat them with their hands - what did their Jews do to them? And further, throughout the war, they were distinguished by cruelty, even by German standards. So it was really in vain that we exiled many of them to Siberia - it was necessary not to exile, but to shoot, and not many, but all.

And then, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, did at least someone prevent them from separating, did they threaten at least something? And that in gratitude - apartheid in relation to the Russians living there, despite the fact that there is no infringement of the Balts living in Russia to this day. This has already happened - when the German soldiers defended Latvia from the Bolshevik troops in 1918, and the Latvians expelled the Germans in gratitude two years later, from whom, by the way, they even received

written language at one time. These so-called states, more precisely, ungodly half-witted people, have made hatred of Russia and everything Russian the core, the basis not only of their domestic and foreign policy, but also the main reason for their existence. But the Scripture says: measure for measure. Therefore, they not only do not deserve to be preserved as states - there will be no separate states even for those whose little finger is not worth the Balts, for example, the Germans and Serbs - but also to be preserved as a nation. Therefore, having started the invasion, we will kill and destroy as much as we can, because there is no honor for the Balts. But the main thing will start later: all Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian cities and towns, streets and rivers will be renamed with Russian names. The very words "Latvia", "Lithuania" and "Estonia" will be banned from public use throughout the entire territory of the Russian Empire, except in historical research. Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian [languages] will also be banned from public use. Lithuanians, as distinguished less than others in Russophobia, will retain the right to live in the territory of present-day Lithuania, although all movable and immovable property will be confiscated from them, like from Latvians and Estonians; but those, in addition to everything, will also be evicted from the Baltic states, with an indefinite deprivation of the right to live there. And it will be the same with the Russian-speaking residents of these countries, only with deprivation for five years - we also do not have much love for them: there was nothing to endure humiliation, you became their accomplices. Let it be with these countries, as with Sodom and Gomorrah, because their very existence offends us."

The next day, Russian troops invaded the Baltic, and everything happened as promised; not so many people were killed - after all, as the Russians say, the heart is not a stone, blood is not water - but really everyone was evicted. The cities of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius became Ivangorod, Alekseevsky and Alexandria (in honor of Ivan III the Great, Alexei I the Quietest and Alexander I the Righteous). Estonians tried to settle in their ethnically related Finland, or at least in other Scandinavian countries, and Latvians in Germany, but they were not allowed to do this, giving the right to settle only in Eastern Siberia, Northern Kazakhstan, Central Asia or Turkey. As a result, by 2022, the vast majority of Latvians and Estonians, about two million people, emigrated to North America, where the United States (by that time already the American Federation) accepted them with the consent of the Russian Empire. It was one of the most brutal, though not the bloodiest, episodes in the 2019-2021 wars. And although I am not a judge, dear compatriots, it seems to me that the Russians did not behave in a Christian way (unlike their behavior towards the Americans) - after all, all peoples were created by God, and it is not for people to decide which of them to be and what not. The Russians, on the other hand, answered me that, in principle, they think the same, but the Balts, by their behavior for thirty years, tried very hard to dissuade them from this and succeeded in this. Thus ended the second expansion of Russia.

Period of Assimilation. The assimilation of the annexed territories and the real transformation of the Russian Empire into one country, albeit heterogeneous, and not into an artificial conglomerate of different countries, were declared by Gabriel one of the three most important tasks of the ten-year reign (2020-2030), to which he was elected (according to the change to the constitution of 2020, the emperor is elected for ten years, without the right to re-election). An imperial decree "On measures for the assimilation of new territories" was issued, regulating this process in stages. According to this decree, in particular, a schedule was set for the introduction of the Russian language into public life: signs with the names of settlements, main streets and avenues in cities, signs on major highways should appear in Russian within six months, all others, including signs on cafes, stores, etc., - per year; all price tags, menus, posters, etc. - in a year and a half; all TV and radio programs - also in a year and a half; official business - and legal proceedings - in a two-year period (in the same period, local officials must learn to own it); pre-school children's institutions, including private ones, as well as all films - also in the biennium; schools and higher educational institutions - in a three-year period; scientific publications and conferences, as well as medical institutions - in a four-year period. Naturally, bilingualism was meant - the Russian Empire did not in any way restrict the use of their languages by the inhabitants of the former European Union, but demanded that Russian be used as the main one in all the areas mentioned, and the

presence of a second (third, etc.) text or report (or simultaneous translation) left outside the state regulation. This is more stringent legislation than in relation to the languages of the peoples within historical Russia, where the principle of bilingualism does not require that the Russian language be the first - it was a conscious policy of forced assimilation. By the way, in many respects it was temporary - the decree immediately announced that the ban on television and radio programs in local languages is valid for five years, the requirement for films to be in Russian, but only subtitles in local, and not vice versa - also by five, the use of Russian in preschool children's institutions - by ten, the study of Russian as a first, and not a foreign language in schools - by fifteen. For the allied peoples, that is, the Germans and Serbs, of course, everything was different: there is no requirement for them to have Russian as the first in bilingualism, and they were asked to determine the timing of the transition to bilingualism at their own discretion (in reality, the introduction of Russian as the second there happened faster, but for voluntary reasons). In addition, German and Serbian are studied in many Russian schools (optional - in the vast majority). In addition to the language, the deadlines for the transition to new curricula in schools (two years) and institutes (three years), as well as to new standards in technology (five years) and healthcare (three years) were determined. Within a year, Russian courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts of the interregional district level (appellate instance) should be created, and within three - the lower level. Immediately after the accession, the circulation of the euro was stopped and they were exchanged for rubles - at the rate that by May 2019 was considered real (a little less than two euros per ruble). A one and a half year period was set for the transition to the Russian tax system, but at the same time the tax rates themselves remained higher than in Russia (although significantly lower than they were in the European Union): for people - for five years, for enterprises - for ten.

Civil rights, as was agreed upon when signing the acts of surrender, the population received after eight years of naturalization, in the absence of one serious crime or three less serious ones during this time. But this, of course, did not apply to England, Ireland, Poland and Ukraine (in fact, Ukraine, except for Galicia, received citizenship in 2031, and England, Ireland and Poland - in 2035), as well as Germany and Serbia - they became citizens straightaway. According to Russian laws, this meant that local self-government bodies (in Russian, communities - there, according to the Russian Constitution, a very significant part of the power is concentrated there, as we have in the northern states) will be elected only after eight years, and before that they will be appointed. But the edict determined that from the fourth year polls would be held (the same elections, but having a recommendatory character for the imperial authorities and not legally binding), and appointments until the end of the eight-year period would be made on the basis of them. In the elections to the Zemsky Duma of the Russian Empire in 2020 and 2025, the population of the former European Union did not participate in any form (except for Germans and Serbs), and there was a reason for this. After all, the main subject of the Duma's activities are taxes and social spending, and until 2030 they were different for these than for the population of the former Russian Union; by the 2030 elections, it already had full civil rights. By the way, this all concerns civil rights in the Russian, in our opinion, rather limited understanding - only guardsmen have political rights in Russia. So, the admission of those wishing to become guardsmen has been carried out since 2020 without any restrictions, including the British, Irish, Poles and Ukrainians, and even the Balts. In general, there are no a priori requirements for enrolling in guardsmen: even I, who was in Russia on a tourist visa, a citizen of the American Federation, a Brazilian by nationality and a Catholic, if I came to the point and submitted an application, I would be accepted - if, of course, the techno-interrogation confirmed the sincerity my motivations.

As part of the policy of assimilation, Russia widely used lustrations, that is, the loss of rights for certain categories of the population, which are not criminal penalties. The intensity of their use varied greatly by territory: they were not at all, of course, in Germany and Serbia, relatively few in Turkey, Italy, Spain and Portugal, many in France, Belgium and Holland, and most of all in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Of course, they could not be in England, Ireland,

Poland and Ukraine - there the entire population was deprived of all rights and the near prospect of obtaining them. The defeats included the extension of the period of naturalization (including for an indefinite period), restrictions on membership and work in any public organizations, and basically bans on professions: in the state and municipal service, including auxiliary positions in the police (the main ones are filled everywhere in the Empire only by guardsmen), to work in the field of education (in preschool institutions, schools and universities), to work in the media and in general for public statements. All former public politicians and civil servants above a certain rank (unconditionally) fell under the lustration, as well as individually those of the other officials, journalists and intellectuals who were listed for systematic actions and public statements that were anti-Russian, anti-Christian, as well as ultra-liberal, including globalization. Proceedings were initiated by employees of the Imperial Supervision Department attached to the European Order (the so-called public administration body, temporarily - for 20 years - created for the specific task of assimilation), partly based on the results of their own analysis, more often - on the denunciations of colleagues. Individual decisions on disenfranchisement were often delayed until the first infringement. In some places, lustrations had significant consequences: in France, for example, as a result of them, the journalistic, university (humanitarian, of course) and, in general, intellectual elite were almost completely replaced.

From all this it can be seen that Russia used a combined policy for forced assimilation, combining unrelenting, but not particularly severe pressure on the population towards partial Russification, with a clearly marked "light at the end of the tunnel" in time. There were also understandable "social lifts" in the form of an unhindered opportunity to join the service class, as well as private entrepreneurship, in which the inhabitants of the new territories were not limited. It was not a reactive policy, but a conscious and thoughtful one, and I am sure that all the tough decisions that Russia made were the requirements of this policy, and not at all the result of heartlessness or even more hatred for a defeated enemy (except perhaps the Baltic states). As proof of this, I can cite such an example, which is very typical: as I already said, back in 2019, in the official offer to surrender, which all NATO countries received from Russia, it was said that those who decide to fight, after surrender, will receive, among other things, the complete confiscation of all property of citizens and enterprises. This is what happened for the British, Irish, Poles and Ukrainians, and it was widely publicized. But what is much less known is that, without any fanfare, already in January 2021, the European Order was issued stating that all former owners of residential buildings and apartments living in them have an unconditional right to rent them from the state in whose ownership they passed, at special prices equal to about one-fifth of the market price. That is, there was a threat of punishment, necessary to reduce the number of countries that are going to resist, that is, ultimately to reduce the amount of blood. Further, the punishment itself took place, which was necessary so that in the future the threats of the Empire were not perceived as empty. But when both these goals were achieved and there was no longer any need for further hardening of life for the vanquished, the aforementioned decision to ease appeared. And when the respective peoples received civil rights, decisions of the European Order on the free return of home ownership to the tenants - the former owners or their heirs - followed. But what I am trying to prove most clearly manifested itself in the fact that when the Serbs - allies and ethnically close relatives of the Russians - demanded in January 2020 a tribunal for crimes against Serbia in 1995-2019 and the conviction of US and EU officials and NATO of that time - quite, in my opinion, a fair demand - Russia refused. "We suffered even more from them," said Vasily Malinin, the head of the Imperial Supervision Department (in our opinion, the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General), the future Emperor Vasily V, "but we will not arrange a tribunal even for crimes against Russia. Let's leave them to God, brethren. We did not stop you from taking revenge - let's call a spade a spade - Albanians and Kosovars, Croats and Bosnians, because we understood that the cup of patience is not unlimited; and we ourselves took revenge on the Balts, sinful. But let's not take revenge beyond measure, since this is not a charitable cause - all the more so since there can be no greater revenge on Western countries than the one they have already received. In the same speech, Malinin for the first time made a completely new assessment of the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945: "Let's not repeat, brothers,

the disgrace of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The winner has the right to capture, ruin and rob the vanquished, especially if they attacked first, he can also execute their leaders. But to pretend to be saints and teachers of the peoples only because you turned out to be stronger is ungodly hypocrisy, so beloved by the West - and we are very sorry that our country participated in this farce. There are many other examples of the fact that the Third Russian Empire, unlike its two predecessors, does not consider cruelty an integral part of power and therefore does not use force and harshness beyond extreme necessity.

Since we are talking about the European Order, we should tell how it solved the problem of Switzerland. The problem itself was that by the summer of 2020, all of Europe had become the territory of the Russian Empire - except for Switzerland, which turned out to be an enclave. Russia had no moral right to use force or the threat of force against it, because Switzerland was not a member of NATO and, accordingly, did not participate in any way, at least formally, in all foreign policy affairs of the West, including in declaring war on Russia. On the other hand, the Russians did not like Switzerland - they did not forget how the Swiss initiated criminal cases against Russian officials. In general, the enclave looked to them, as one of the participants in the events of those days put it in a conversation with me, "somehow sloppy." In addition, in the last weeks before the Russian occupation, a huge amount of material assets belonging to both people and corporations was transported to Switzerland. Naturally, this is not about money - after joining Russia, the euro turned into empty pieces of paper or into empty bytes of information in computers - but about precious metals and stones, works of art, confidential technical documentation, etc., as well as about the entirety of a number of secret archives. In March 2021, the European Order, which since its inception in June 2020 was led by the aforementioned Vasily Malinin, reported to the emperor and the government that he was ready to solve this problem on his own, and he did not need any resources and powers for this. By the Order, a fee was introduced for visas for Swiss in the amount of 5,000 rubles for one trip for a period of not more than 5 days, as well as for crossing the border into Switzerland for Russian residents in the same amount; the duty for goods crossing the Russian-Swiss border in any direction was introduced in the amount of 300% of the real value of the goods, but not less than 10 rubles per kilogram. A fee was also introduced for the transit flight of aircraft to and from Switzerland through Russian airspace in the amount of 1,500 rubles for a nominal passenger seat (but not less than 250,000 per aircraft) and 10,000 rubles per nominal ton of carrying capacity (but not less than 250,000 per aircraft). Moreover, all these fees were supposed to be paid only in rubles - they were not accepted in Swiss francs or any other currency. Finally, a ban on any cross-border financial transactions with Switzerland was announced - however, this was already a psychological measure, because such transactions are generally prohibited in Russia (and technically impossible due to the lack of free convertibility of the ruble). Thus, the Swiss were cut off from imports and exports, and their economy was not designed for self-sufficiency at all. After half a year of agony, Switzerland turned to Russia with a formal proposal to join the Empire; the agreement was signed in the fall of 2021, according to which the Swiss received all civil rights and retained all property. However, immediately after the entry into force of the agreement, the European Order began a deep due diligence of all Swiss financial institutions - more precisely, it initiated it and coordinated the work of the imperial departments of finance, supervision and security. In response to a complaint from Swiss banks that this was contrary to the spirit and letter of the agreement, the Order replied that all of them were now Russian entities and should not be indignant - the Order does not do anything beyond the framework adopted for similar Russian entities. Considering that, according to Russian laws, during the course of a comprehensive check, authorization was repeatedly requested and given to conduct techno-interrogations, there was no chance to hide anything; a lot of very interesting things were revealed, including those relating to long-forgotten days, starting from pre-Napoleonic times. So without a single shot and arrest - although to say that it was done in a spirit of friendliness, the language does not turn - the problem of Switzerland was solved.

Chapter 4

New World Order

Creation of the Celestial Republic. After the proclamation of the Empire in May 2020, it remained unclear what Gabriel meant by the second half of the task of establishing a new world order (let me remind you that he called the defeat and accession of the European Union the fulfillment of the first half), but he did not comment on this. During the summer, however, events occurred that at first no one connected with Gabriel's statement, but they were precisely the prelude to the completion of the second half of the task. At the end of May, a very representative delegation of the People's Republic of China arrived in Moscow on an official visit - almost all the really significant figures of the first rank, headed by Chairman Liu Bang, who replaced Hu Jintao in this post a year earlier. During the visit, the core of the delegation twice for a long time stayed eye to eye (if I can say so about a large group of people) with Gabriel and the heads of the Military and Foreign Policy imperial departments of Russia. What was discussed was not reported, but no one was particularly interested - everyone already roughly understood what: about guarantees of non-aggression on China, and also about how China now trades with Europe, which has become part of Russia, and with America: sovereign, but in some way dependent on Russia. In fact, the conversation was mainly about something completely different. As a result, in early July, a month and a half later, the 120,000th Chinese expeditionary force, with tanks, artillery and aircraft, landed without warning on the northeast coast of Australia, south of the city of Mackay, and moved south to Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide. Already after the landing of troops (which continued to arrive), Beijing declared war on Australia; the war, however, was limited to one battle near Sydney, after which Australia capitulated - there could be no other outcome for a country with a population of 19 million people and a ground force of 30 thousand. On July 30, the PRC announced the annexation of Australia - thus, its territory increased by 80%, and for the most part at the expense of uninhabited or sparsely populated lands.

On [August 6²⁵](#), the PRC formally approached Japan; the note said that the fall of America and Europe and the creation of the gigantic Russian Empire creates a new situation in the world, with new and not fully understood challenges, and that the Pacific civilization (this concept was first officially used in this document) should meet them together so as not to fall apart. Since China is much larger than the rest, no less respected nations of this civilization, it was said further, both in terms of population, and in territory (especially after the annexation of Australia), and in terms of economy, and military power, it seems reasonable to unite by joining all these nations into PRC, with guarantees of taking into account their interests and preserving their originality. After the takeover of Australia, this looked like a poorly disguised ultimatum, although the experience of Hong Kong's existence as part of the PRC after 1997 confirmed that these guarantees were not empty. Negotiations with Japan lasted almost two months and ended on September 30 with the signing of an unification agreement, the core of which was a modification of the same "Hong Kong" principle - one country, two systems; in this case, it was designated as one empire - two countries. After that, the same proposals, now not alternately, but simultaneously, were received by Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines. On November 2, a multilateral agreement was signed, and later, in 2021, it included New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the island states of Oceania. The lack of resistance, for example, from Japan and Vietnam, which had a long and successful experience of wars with China, was the reason not only and not so much for the outcome of a military clash with the Chinese giant - the mentality of these nations is just inclined to fight and die not for the sake of victory only, but for the sake of duty and honor - but the fact that everyone saw that the world was changing irresistibly and rapidly, and did not find any other place in it than what was offered by China. In this sense, the Chinese phrase "So as not to perish one by one" was not Oriental flamboyance, but a precise and resonant formulation. On November 7, 2020, in Beijing, in the presence of the leadership of all the above-mentioned countries, the Celestial Republic, which still exists today, was proclaimed - our western neighbor with you, compatriots.

Creation of the American Federation. The Russian Empire congratulated China and all the other countries participating in the agreement and expressed its full satisfaction that everything happened in this way and not otherwise. A Russian delegation headed by Gabriel was present in Beijing for the ceremony. But before that, after the capture of Australia and the sending of a note to Japan, everyone expected a tough reaction from Moscow; they reasoned like this: well, Australia, of course, Russia doesn't care much about where Russia is and where Australia is, although the strengthening of China in Russia in any case is useless. But unification with the Far Eastern countries, especially with the economic giant Japan, the creation of a huge empire on its eastern borders - Russia will clearly not allow this; and in May, probably, the Chinese then went to Moscow to explain their plans and assure Russia of their loyalty - but they were unlikely to succeed. However, in reality, everything was exactly the opposite: Russia not only was not opposed, but acted as the main locomotive and even the initiator of this process. I was told by many participants in those events that in Moscow, where the Chinese arrived at the Russian invitation, and not at all on their own initiative, Gabriel and his associates persuaded them for a long time to create this empire, otherwise they even threatened to annex Japan to the Russian Empire. And everyone thought the opposite, because no one understood the logic of the Russian leadership - no one except my great-uncle, then President of Brazil Alvaro Branco, who was the first to understand what was happening and saw in this a window of opportunity for us. He understood, without yet knowing the details and reasons, that for some reason Russia wants the world to consist of a small number of huge countries, and is ready for a lot for this. And he spent all of August, September, October and November persuading the leaders and elites of all Latin American countries (including his own Brazil) to unite in the same way. In what ways, with what arguments he managed to do this, it is even difficult to imagine, knowing the then mutual hostility of our peoples and the complete absence of a sense of all-American solidarity. The only thing that helped him was a close friendship with the President of Mexico, the future third president of our Federation, Jorge Portillo (they were married to cousins). Nevertheless, on December 6, 2020, a pact was signed by twelve South American, seven Central and North American and four (not counting very small) Caribbean countries to create the American Federation and eliminate them all as separate sovereign states. My grandfather, who saw further than the rest, insisted on such a name, although it was puzzling - most suggested calling it the Latin American or South American Federation. Despite the fact of signing, the whole structure was very loose, it was not possible to agree on either the capital or the division into states; but Alvaro Branco was not embarrassed by this, for him it was only the first step of a three-mover, necessary for making the second step. In December, he, as chairman of the organizing committee of the Federation, went to Moscow, but not only and not so much to receive congratulations (he received them, however), but in order to present Russia with an absurd and seemingly unsupported demand - give the Federation Canada, which was annexed by Russia as a member of NATO in November 2019. However, as it turned out, this requirement was based on an accurate and non-trivial understanding of the situation. As a result, Canada was transferred to the Federation, and not as a country - it had not been one for a year already - but simply as a piece of Russian territory. There is no need to talk about the furor that this created when Branco returned home; everyone suddenly realized that this was not a joke, but the Great Game. But the main thing, for the sake of which he started all this, was that the President of the United States (as it turned out, the last one) Teddy Parker urgently asked for a meeting with him. The result of this meeting and several more that followed, in which all the overt and shadow arbiters of the fate of the United States participated, was Branco's second trip to Russia in February 2021.

At the second meeting with Emperor Gabriel, already as an old acquaintance and like-minded person, he said: "It is written in your peace treaty with the United States that they cannot enter into any alliances and associations except with your consent. And early, before the expiration of fifty years, termination of the military defense treaty and, accordingly, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the United States can also be only with your consent - so let them go to the American Federation and terminate the military treaty ahead of schedule, because the Federation will be able to defend itself. "And how can we be sure that they will not begin to accumulate scientific-industrial and military forces for revenge?" Gabriel asked. "Who is

'they'? Branco replied. "The Constitution of the Federation does not provide for the existence of separate states in it." "Well, what is now called the USA will be called a state or province within your Federation," said Gabriel, "and will be governed independently – at least enough to become a problem for us again; you have not yet decided on the division into states, even without taking into account the United States. "No," Branco replied, "here is the memorandum signed by the leaders of all the countries of the New World before my departure: here is the agreed Constitution, including the division into states, as well as the capital."

It must be said that this dialogue between Alvarado Branco and Gabriel the Great, which lasted several days, took place in the main part quite publicly, and all the inhabitants of both Americas watched it every day with bated breath. The Latinos and the Brazilians, who had never been sympathetic to the Yankees, wished with all their might that they would succeed in their negotiations and end the foreign occupation. It was during these days, I am sure, that that sense of community was born, that feeling that we are all Americans, the founders and builders of the New World, which made the existence of our state possible in the future. "So be it," said Gabriel, "but what will prevent the Americans—I mean the Yankees—from coming to power in the entire Federation?" "The federation is being created as a democratic state, with universal equal suffrage, and the Yankees will make up 340 million out of 920 together with Canadians," Branco replied. "So a Yankee president can only be elected by the votes of both Hispanic and Portuguese-speaking voters, and for this he will need to convince them of the correctness of his plans. And how to convince us of the need for revenge, who have not lost anything, have never been at enmity with Russia and have nothing against it? "I don't know," Gabriel said. "We have gone to great lengths to achieve the near-impossible and crush Western civilization—and now resurrect it with our own hands?" "Well, do you dare to call the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking cultures of Latin America part of Western civilization? Branco replied. - And even more so when they merge not even with the entire Western civilization, but only with its most healthy part, without rotten Europe? I assure you, something completely different will turn out - after all, synthesis always gives birth to a new one. "But your Federation will be the spiritual successor of the United States," Gabriel the Great asked, "is this not evident from the text of your constitution?" "Well, you are the spiritual heir of Byzantium," answered Branco, "you even include this in the ritual "header" of the text of any imperial decree - does this mean that you are at least somewhat similar to it in terms of practical politics?" Seeing Gabriel's doubt, Branco rolled out his last trump card. "We are two steps away from an orderly world," he said, "and the first of these steps depends on you. Because if the American Federation is formed as part of the entire New World, then only the Islamic world and Africa will remain in the form of dozens of separate heterogeneous states, but judging by what is happening there, everything will work out for them. And if you refuse, then maybe you will have a stronger sense of security - but this security is temporary, tactical, because then our Federation will not really exist, and we will again become a source of chaos, since the world, consisting of many separate, there can be no small and heterogeneous states." "Ordered world?" Gabriel said. "Yes, you are right, it is an ordered world – I could not say better." (It was then, dear compatriots, that this phrase was first uttered - and now, as you know, the entire era in which we live is called the era of an orderly world, and all five states are united in this.)

The Russian government deliberated for two days, we waited for a decision for two days and learned it on the third day: the proposal of the Federation is accepted, Russia agrees to the US joining the Federation, provided that the submitted memorandum on its structure remains unchanged. The military treaty will be valid until the end of 2024, because it can be reviewed no more than once every five years, after which it will be terminated, and the withdrawal of Russian legions will end by January 1, 2025. The payment under the agreement for the remaining three years is preserved, but Russia will transfer a third of it to the budget of the Federation. After the completion of the procedures for creating the Federation and the liquidation of all individual American states, the 2019 peace treaty between Russia and the United States becomes invalid and is replaced by an agreement on peace and friendship between the Russian Empire

and the American Federation (the same was signed shortly before by Russia with the Celestial Republic). Branco returned triumphant, a hero to South Americans and North Americans alike, and no one doubted who would be elected as the first President of the Federation (and so it happened). In accordance with the memorandum, 18 states were formed - the state of Canada, five states in the place of the United States (New England, Dixieland, Midwestland, Plainsland and Pacifica), two in the place of Mexico, the state of Mesoamerica in the place of the isthmus states, the state of the Caribbean and eight South American ones, including including three in the place of Brazil, as well as the capital separate federal district of Jamaica with the site of the Federation Capitol - in 2043, after the death of Alvaredo Branco, it was renamed Alvareda. Thus, without a single drop of blood, by the power of persuasion, and not by persuasion by force, our state arose.

Establishment of Islamic Caliphate and Indian Confederation. Back in 2017, in Afghanistan, a certain military-religious leader declared himself the Mahdi, that is, the messiah (in Islam, as in Judaism, unlike Christianity, this figure, although mystical, is still a person); his name was Mullah Omar. He has been known for his uncompromising struggle for Islamic fundamentalism since the Russo-Afghan war of 1980-1988, led the fundamentalist Taliban regime in the 1990s, helped bin Laden organize terrorist attacks on America and Europe in the 2000s, and in the 2010s, after numerous official announcements by the Americans about his death, he became one of the leaders of the US-Afghan war. He said that he had come to show his fellow believers the right path (“mahdi” literally means “walking the right path”). This path is to make the ummah (that is, the world community) of all Muslims united, for this, having expelled from all Islamic countries both foreigners and local rulers vile to Allah, to recreate the Caliphate, without fail with the capital in Medina, to return to the norms of Sharia (Islamic law), cleanse both worldly life and Islam itself from everything superficial and ungodly and, having thus become pleasing to Allah and worthy of doing His will, await His command to spread Islam to the whole world, and if necessary, to other worlds. He also said that it was revealed to him that the Pashtuns (the main ethnic group of Afghanistan, to which he himself belonged - black-haired, white-skinned and gray-eyed people) are the most militant and most beloved by Allah of the tribes of the sons of Israel (that is, biblical Jews), a tribe Ephraim, who was always at enmity with the rest of the Jews, who, by the will of the Almighty, escaped from Assyrian captivity and, having reached Afghanistan, converted to Islam. (By the way, dear compatriots, so do many of our scientists [believe].) Therefore, it is the Pashtuns who should become the spearhead of this campaign, and after its victorious completion, as a reward from the Almighty, the Pashto language should become the second sacred language of the Caliphate. By April 2019, before the start of the Twelve Day War, he was blockaded in a small town in Afghanistan with about 12 thousand remaining followers, and only a few days remained for him and the Mahdi army; but then something happened in which the providence of God is clearly visible (although unbelievers call this a coincidence). Coming out of the local mosque, from where he did not appear for several days, Mullah Omar said that the holy spirit Jibril had appeared to him and conveyed to him the words of the Prophet Muhammad himself, who was in heaven. “Tell the Faithful (i.e. Muslims),” He said to Mullah Omar, “that the holy month of Ramadan will not end yet (it ended on May 12 that year), as your main enemy, the servant of Iblis from across the ocean, will be defeated. For Allah will give the ruler from the north with snow-white hair impenetrable armor, and he will strike the servant of Iblis with a fiery sword, while he himself will be invulnerable to a fiery sword. Then you go and do what is right, and do not spare yourself if you want to go to heaven. And why Allah will choose the unfaithful to crush another unfaithful - only Allah, the All-Knowing, the Wise, knows about this.” This speech, compatriots, definitely took place - there is not only the evidence of more than thirty thousand (with women and children) Muslims about this, but also an audio and video recording made by several captured Western hostage journalists. The followers of the Mahdi wondered what all this meant, especially considering that there was no ruler with white hair who could challenge America in the north - theoretically only the ruler of Russia Gabriel could be, but his hair was brown. But then came the beginning of the Twelve Day War, then the announcement of the surrender of America, and everyone froze; and when on satellite television everyone saw Gabriel addressing his

compatriots with the news of victory (for May 1, while he was waiting for America's answer, Gabriel turned completely gray, and it was visible), the Mahdi army was literally distraught - if Omar had ordered at that moment his followers to do hara-kiri, everyone would have done.

Thus began the victorious movement of the Mahdi army. In some countries, primarily in Pakistan, the population itself tore apart the authorities and joined the Mahdi army. In others, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, although these countries were themselves fundamentalist, there were long and bloody battles - in Iran because it is a country of Shiite Muslims (as opposed to Pashtuns), and in Saudi Arabia because the Saudis used to consider themselves, living in the land of the prophet, and not others, the most privileged Islamic nation. Mullah Omar, meanwhile, said that it was open to him: the whole south is yours, and your east, and all three oceans should wash the Caliphate, because it was for this that Allah created them; and the land of Israel is yours - as long as it is part of the earthly firmament, it is part of the Caliphate. In a practical sense, this meant: forward, to Africa and India, and then to Israel.

The Mahdi army took over Africa after almost a year and a half of heavy fighting - the battles in Nigeria and the Republic of South Africa were especially fierce; almost two million people died. But on the Indian front, everything turned out differently: after the first two months of fighting, in February 2021, it's already impossible to determine whose fault it is, the parties launched massive nuclear strikes against each other's positions, followed by new ones. Of course, these were not heavy thermonuclear charges, like those of the great powers - both India and Pakistan did not have nuclear warheads more powerful than 100 kilotons; and yet it was the first real nuclear war in history - the bombing of Japan and the Twelve Day War cannot be called that, because both there and there, only one side had real nuclear weapons (that is, the ability to deliver a nuclear strike). It is not my goal here to cover in detail the history of India or the Caliphate - I will only say that at the end of 2021 a truce was signed, and then a peace treaty between them. It is the signing of this treaty that is considered the date of the creation of the Islamic Caliphate and the Indian Confederation (which, in addition to the Indian Republic itself, included Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma captured by it). The theological justification for this was the decision of the Ulema Council of the Caliphate, which ruled that the command to conquer India was the result of an incorrect interpretation of the message of heaven: after the capture of Africa, the Caliphate is already washed by three oceans - the Pacific in Indonesia, the Indian in East Africa, Arabia and Pakistan and the Atlantic in Western Africa. A somewhat similar situation, as you will now see, has developed with Israel.

When the exchange of nuclear strikes began on the Indo-Pakistani front, the Israeli leadership realized that it could not rely on the nuclear deterrence factor, because the Mahdi army was not afraid of it. In general, Israel was in a very difficult position, which was to a large extent the fruit of its own policies. The fact is that immediately after the creation of the state of Israel, it became the object of complete rejection and, as a result, repeated aggressions from much larger neighboring Arab countries, which, moreover, soon began to be supported by the Second Russian Empire. They did not understand why the Jews should be compensated for the crimes of the Europeans at the expense of the Arabs, who did nothing to the Jews; but whether they were right or not, their position was an objective reality for Israel. It is obvious, from the point of view of the many thousands of years of experience of mankind, that in such a situation there are only two ways out: the first is to try in some way to make peace with the neighbors. And the second is to become a state commensurate with them, having conquered a large enough territory from them for this, and either assimilate the local population (if it is assimilated), or expel it and populate the territory with someone else. I am not discussing the practical feasibility of these options here, I am only saying that there is no third option: the third option is to lose and disappear. Israel has chosen the worst line for itself - it has constantly been at war with its neighbors, often starting first, and seizing territories from them large enough to embitter them completely (especially since the United States has always helped it a lot), but not large enough to itself become a major country strategically capable of confronting the Arabs. However, at the same time, Israel still maintained a quantitatively and qualitatively significant military power - but since the 1990s, it began to neglect even this, completely relying on its

guarantor, the United States; I forgot, apparently, that any guarantor is bad because he himself may have problems. As a result of the disappearance of the United States as an international power, by the beginning of 2021 Israel found itself face to face with the Mahdi army, that is, in a catastrophic situation. Naturally, Israel undertook the only thing left for it to do - turned to Russia with a request to accept it into the Empire. Russia did not need this at all - neither in the geopolitical, nor in the economic, nor in the civilizational sense (for the Orthodox, unlike the Catholics, the issue of physical possession of the Holy Land is of little importance); on the other hand, this was guaranteed to threaten a protracted military conflict with the Caliphate and the revival of the Jewish question in Russia. In addition, in Russia, Jews have traditionally been disliked.

Almost everyone in the Empire was opposed to this territorial acquisition, but Gabriel, after many closed-door meetings, nevertheless decided to accept Israel's offer. Everyone with whom I spoke claimed that the real reason for this was one, and rather paradoxical: Gabriel wanted to guarantee constant enmity and regular military clashes with the Caliphate for Russia for many years to come. Firstly, he believed that there would still be big wars, and not just one, and guardsmen should always be in perfect combat readiness - and where can one get it without the experience of real battles? And secondly, he believed that a society of the type that he built, with the service class and militaristic ethics at the head, needs constant wars of a low level of intensity for self-preservation - something like our [American] Indians before the arrival of Europeans. Gabriel's successor Michael III articulated this clearly: "A great war is evil, but complete peace is not much less evil."

The fighting in Israel (more precisely, mainly around it - in Jordan, Syria and Egypt) between the Russian troops, who were assisted by the Israelis as auxiliary, and the Mahdi army lasted from March to November 2021, and 47 thousand Russians died in their course, 22 thousands of Israeli and 187 thousand Caliphate soldiers. The confrontation ended with the fact that the Russian troops, having captured almost the entire territory of Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula, laid nuclear landmines in a special way along the entire front and blew them up, obtaining a cyclopean moat several kilometers wide, connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea - Israel with Sinai and Jordan turned into huge island. The same council of ulema of the Caliphate, which decided and substantiated reconciliation with India, saw in this a clear intervention of Allah, because the prophecy said: "As long as Israel is part of the earthly firmament" - and now it was not. Therefore, in January 2022, a peace agreement between the Caliphate and the Russian Empire was signed, according to which the island of Israel was recognized as part of the Empire, in return for which the Caliphate received from Russia Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (without Karakalpakstan - a small northern autonomy), as well as the right to freely dismantle and remove the Al-Aksa and other Islamic shrines in Jerusalem. Interestingly, Israel's fundamentalist Jewish leaders - led by Yigal Amir, who assassinated Prime Minister Rabin in 1997 for betraying national interests and was released from prison only after the fall of America - also considered this the fulfillment of an ancient prophecy, since the Old Testament speaks of a future the land of Israel: from the river of Egypt (that is, as it were from the Nile) to the great river, the river Euphrates. The Euphrates really became visible from the eastern coast of the island, and the "river of Egypt", as it turned out, should have been more accurately translated from Hebrew as "the Egyptian stream" - and as such it was quite possible to interpret the Suez Canal, which was visible from the western coast of the island. The island of Israel was the last major territorial acquisition of Russia.

The era of the orderly world. In May 2022, at the invitation of the Russian Empire, a meeting of the leaders of all five countries, of which the whole world now consisted, took place. This happened on the island of St. Helena in the South Atlantic, which belonged to the Russian Empire. The American Federation was represented by President Alvarado Branco, the Indian Confederation by Prime Minister Purun Dass, the Islamic Caliphate by Caliph Mahdi Omar III, the Celestial Republic by Chairman Liu Bang, and the Russian Empire by Emperor Gabriel I. Not a single inhabited territory, even a small island, outside these five states in the world no longer existed.

Before the meeting, some relatively minor territorial issues remaining between the countries were completed and put in order, namely: the Russian Empire gave the American Federation the island of Aruba, French Guiana and the Malvinas Islands in exchange for those of the Lesser Antilles (except Trinidad) that were not as of 2019, the possessions of Great Britain and France - they already belonged to Russia as their inheritance. The Celestial Republic transferred to the Russian Empire for monetary compensation a strip of mountainous territory 100-200 kilometers wide connecting Russia in the region of Kyrgyzstan with India - the Celestial Empire did not want to border the Caliphate in the region of Pakistan, and Russia wanted to have a border with India; and the Caliphate handed over to the Celestial Empire, also for compensation, a number of disputed islands in the South China and Celebes Seas. All this was done in a hurry, because the first item on the agenda of the parties was proclaiming the era of an orderly world (as you remember, this term was coined by my grandfather President Branco) and with all their signatures they approved peace in the composition of five countries within the borders that had developed at that time and basically the same as the current ones. By the second point, the parties divided the World Ocean and determined the boundaries of the water possessions of each of the five countries, so that the concept of neutral waters no longer remained, as well as the procedure for transit navigation - the passage of the country's ships from one part of their water possessions to another, if these two parts are separated by oceanic possessions another country. By the third point, the parties divided Antarctica - more precisely, all parties except Russia, since it does not have access to the Southern Hemisphere (but it owns most of the Arctic). In the fourth paragraph, the parties determined the procedure for declaring territories on the Moon and Mars as their property (further on, the same principle, with modifications, was extended to all other celestial bodies). Finally, in the fifth paragraph, the parties agreed on the procedure for convening similar meetings in the future and determined for this the island of St. Helena, which Russia provided for these purposes and which housed small representations (with diplomatic personnel, a thousand soldiers and one warship) of each of the parties. These meetings, as you know, are now called the World Forum of the Five Powers of St. Helena and take place on a scheduled basis once every three years, and can also be convened unscheduled at the initiative of any of the countries under some emergency circumstances. They adopt agreements on issues in which all five states are vitally interested and, at the same time, clearly cannot decide them on their own (for example, everything related to the global climate); but the range of such questions is now much narrower than in the era of nation-states. In particular, they do not include any trade and economic issues - this is clearly the subject of bilateral relations. And it is absolutely impossible to imagine today international organizations such as UNESCO, the WTO or the ILO, which formed the backbone of the world order in former times.

After that, the participants, who did not have any warm feelings for each other (perhaps, with the exception of Gabriel and Branco), dispersed. No global bodies, even advisory ones, were created, no issues other than those mentioned were discussed and were not going to be discussed - the principle "what do I care about you and you about me" triumphed. Each state is so large and so radically different from others as a civilization that it is self-sufficient and so strong that no one wants to get involved with anyone, and there is no need to - this is the main principle of an ordered world, in contrast to the era of disunity, when one state became an arena for a clash of interests of the second and third. This is what Gabriel meant when he spoke about the second part of the task of creating a new world order - and Russia fulfilled it.

The last event that brought the world to its current state (it is especially important for you and me, dear compatriots) was the Exodus of the Roman Catholic Church. When most of Europe, including Italy and, accordingly, the Vatican, became part of Russia in 2019, according to Russian laws, the status of the Catholic Church should have been dramatically upgraded. The fact is that in Russia the status of different religions, mainly in terms of the rights to public preaching and proselytism, differs according to two criteria: since 1998, in terms of how traditional a religion is for Russia, and since 2013, in terms of where it's organizational and spiritual center is located - in Russia or in another country. Naturally, Catholicism

in Russia infringed on both criteria, especially on the second one - but when the Vatican and the Catholic countries of Europe became part of Russia, the grounds for discrimination on both criteria disappeared. Even if the Russian authorities declared the first criterion applicable to the new lands only after they acquired civil rights - what is it for the Vatican to wait eight years? But these rosy expectations were greatly complicated by the fact that Russia refused to consider the Vatican at all (like all other microstates of Europe) as a separate country and was not going to sign any agreement, even surrender, with it (as well as with Monaco, Liechtenstein and others). Moreover, on the very first day of the entry of troops into Italy, Russian guards (in fact, guards) were posted in all the buildings of the Vatican, and all employees, up to the cardinals, were obliged to give a subscription that not a single document or object in general would be hidden from Russian authorities or destroyed. As with America, Russia made it a top priority to find secret documents indicative of a secret conspiracy against her; for a number of years thereafter, such documents were published by official authorities. (Although one very close associate of Gabriel told me that in fact, Gabriel was not looking for this in the first place, but for traces of real connections with the devil, whom he considered, as the ruler of the Middle Ages, an absolute reality and his personal enemy.) All these bitter pills were sharpened by the change in the status of Catholicism in Russia - firstly, because it was only an increase to the second stage after official Orthodoxy, and secondly, because it was an increase for Russia, and for Europe - a decrease. Being on a spiritual upsurge (and even more organizationally) Orthodoxy began a wide preaching in Europe, and many began to move to it, including those who had not previously been churchd at all; no one interfered, unlike in the old days, with the proselytism of Catholicism in Russia, including in its historical part, but in the current situation it could not be successful. At the beginning of 2023, Paul VII became Pope, who believed that the Church was in a critical condition, which could be cured only by radical means, as during the Reformation under Paul III - he considered himself his spiritual successor. And in 2024, at the 5th Vatican Council he convened, Paul VII said: "It fell to us to live at our own funeral, brothers, among gloating gravediggers and indifferent spectators; and it's not about us and not about our experiences, but about what we will answer at the Judgment to the first Bishop of Rome, St. Peter, when he testifies before Christ himself that we could not continue what he started; how do we justify? But there is a place where not only there are many of us and we are not persecuted and our Catholic brothers are in worldly power, but where there are more and more of us, and not for the sake of earthly goods, but for the sake of eternal life; so forward, brethren, across the ocean, for the Church is not where Saint Peter walked, but where Christ is, and He is where two and three are in His name."

Indeed, the defeat of the United States and the formation of the Federation led not only to a sharp increase in the faith of Christ in the already quite zealous Catholic countries of Latin America, but also to a massive conversion to Catholicism of Protestants and atheists in North America. And in 2025, the Vatican moved to the New Vatican, to the island of Aruba, which became known as Nuevo Roma. The fact that this island was taken by the Federation from the Empire at the last moment was considered the Providence of God (this is the event we celebrate every year on the feast of the Triumph of Catholicism). Russia was unconcealedly pleased with this, among other reasons, because Catholicism was again becoming a religion centered abroad; and joyfully agreed to the export of almost all the treasures of the Roman Catholic Church (with the exception of only a few, for example, the relics of St. Nicholas in Bari), including the entire complex of buildings of St. Peter's Cathedral, in which (already in the New Vatican) many of us have been - however, a replica was recreated by the Russians in the same place as a cultural and historical value. As a result, there was a further weakening of Catholicism in Russia and its strengthening in our country; this is how the final division of the two Christian civilizations took place - into the Orthodox Russian and the Catholic American, which gave harmony and completeness to the structure of an ordered world.

Chapter 5

Recent History of Russia

Death of Gabriel the Great. After the election of a new emperor at the end of 2030 (Gabriel himself refused to even discuss the possibility of continuing his reign, as well as his opinion about a successor), Gabriel completely retired from business and lived in seclusion (by that time he had been widowed) in his country house. In July 2032, when he was 70 years old, he gave a television interview - the last of the very few interviews that he gave in his entire life (those of his famous speeches, which I described above, the list of his public appearances was almost exhausted). “We know your dislike for interviews and are very grateful to you for meeting the needs of hundreds of millions of viewers,” the host began the conversation. “I’m not going to meet anyone, I just want to sum up this life of mine before I die,” Gabriel answered. (The Christian faith of the guardsmen, to whom Gabriel also belonged, has one peculiarity compared to other believers - they believe in the multiple return of the soul for the next lives in new bodies; I will write in the chapter on [religion](#), as this correlates with Orthodox dogmas.) “Like “before death”? - the host was taken aback. “Why are you dying?” “What am I supposed to do, hang around here forever? Gabriel was surprised. - The Scripture says: three score and ten years are allotted to a person - I lived them and did everything that I had to, and I have nothing more to do here, I want to go home, to my own. (When Gabriel said “home to his own”, he clearly meant the obvious thing for any Christian, that God created man for Heaven, and that is where his true home is, where his deceased loved ones are waiting for him - but you understood this phrase, as you will soon understand, in a completely different way.) In addition, I created the *oprichnina*,” Gabriel continued, “this is my favorite brainchild, and I want to live my next life as an *oprichnik*.” What does “nothing to do” mean? Can’t you rest after such labors and achievements, just live? And what does it mean to “live as an *oprichnik*” - aren’t you an *oprichnik*?” “I just lived for more than a year and a half,” said Gabriel, “how long can I? And what kind of *oprichnik* am I? I have never served in the army, I am not a perfect combat machine, I have property, albeit from the old days - at least this house; I’m even sort of retired, where you recommend me to stay a little longer, but the guardsmen serve to death, they don’t have a pension. Yes, I took my vows and became a guardsman along with the first issue, otherwise, according to the Constitution I created, I could not continue to be a ruler, and no one objected, because I invented and introduced all this - but I want to live my next life as real *oprichnik*. Spend your childhood feeling like a stranger among your peers, knowing that you are different; wait for the fifteenth birthday and, without delaying a day and without warning relatives, go to the point; serve and make vows; and live without being bound by society, family, or property, like a wolfhound among a flock of sheep, until you lay down your head for your country. “But how can you commit suicide, you are a believer, but for an Orthodox it is a mortal sin?” the presenter asked. “Who said I want to commit suicide? was the answer. “After the end of our conversation, my mission will be completed, and the Lord Himself will take me.” “What is so important about this interview of ours? You want to sum up life, but is there even one person in our country or in general in the world who does not know and does not understand what you have done? “You all don’t understand what we’ve done together,” said Gabriel. – “Remember, in the early 2000s, many elders, who clearly had a prophetic gift from God, predicted that the last times were coming and a few years remained before the coming of the Antichrist and the end of the world, and now no one talks about it - well, they were all wrong? And if so, how then explain that the Savior during His earthly life told His disciples that many of them would see the Kingdom of Heaven in this earthly life - could He also be mistaken? Especially when you consider that Daniel, just a prophet of God, and not the incarnate Son of God, predicted six centuries in advance the year of the destruction of the second temple in Jerusalem, which in his time had not yet begun to be built? “And do you know the explanation?” the journalist asked. “Yes, I know,” Gabriel replied. – “God gave people free will, and therefore there is no future, there are only variants of it – it does not even exist for God. It costs nothing for Him to make any of these options come true, but He did not create the Earth with people in such a way and not for that. The Jews basically did not accept Christ -

and what Daniel prophesied came true. And if they had accepted, then the prophecy would not have been fulfilled and the temple would have stood to this day, it was in their power. And on the other hand, after all, many Jews accepted the Savior, even though they did not see Him - is not the best example of this the holy Apostle Paul; and even many pagans accepted, which no one expected. The Savior saw that the people for whom He came to suffer were unworthy; but they found the strength in themselves to show that they were not so unworthy, and therefore the end of the world did not come in the first century. "What about prophecy then?" the presenter asked. "The prophet sees from God only the most probable option," Gabriel answered, "which should be, but people can always, by exerting all their strength, go off the path of probability and cancel what was prophesied. It's like with prayer: everyone knows that the prayer of the righteous saves people and nations; it means that if this prayer had not been, they would not have been saved - such was the providence for them, if the prayer had not intervened. So, by now, the end of the world should have already come, Western globalizers confidently led the world to the coming of the Antichrist, and the liberal-humanistic worldview that abolished the faith of Christ deprived mankind of protection from this. But we went down on our own, and turned the world off this path, and managed to cancel what was destined - because we turned out to be more worthy than we should have been. Think about it, we didn't just change world history - we brought it back to the world: we pushed back the end of the world! And let it fill you and your descendants with pride and let it set the guidelines for who you can and should be - it does not behoove you and your descendants to be villains or jesters. And do not think that I did it, do not create an idol for yourself - we all did it; do not try to canonize me under pain of my curse, because it is necessary to canonize martyrs and the righteous, and not rulers, even successful ones. If you name streets or cities in my memory, it's better not to, but you will anyway, so at least don't rename those who have ancient names, because it's a sin." This ended the conversation, and the next morning Gabriel was found dead in his bed with no apparent cause of death.

This is how this greatest man of our century died, who showed all of us - not only Russians - what true Power can and should be, that which is from God, power without fear and doubt, but also without malice and cruelty. If you can say about someone in history that he came to Earth with a mission, and the mission is not preaching or sacrifice, but strength and power, then this is about him. He was like a shot arrow flying towards the target: what should the arrow do after the target is hit? In his memory, the eastern capital of Russia was renamed from Krasnoyarsk to Gavrilovsk, and the small town in the Volga region, where he was born, was renamed Gavrigrad. At the congress of the German people convened specifically for this, it was decided, against the will of the deceased, to rename Koenigsberg to Gabrielsberg, and at the same congress of the Serbian people - to rename the city of Novy Sad to Gavrilov, and a year later the inhabitants of Crimea achieved the renaming of the city of Simferopol to Gavrilopol. And in 2037, the first Russian urban-type settlement on Mars was named Gavrilovsky, so now there are two Gavrilovskis in the Russian Empire, though on different planets. By the imperial decree of Michael III, Gabriel was ordered to be called the Great, under which name we now know him, and also to introduce a platinum coin of the highest denomination with his portrait (see the chapter "[Economy](#)"). The highest order, awarded for special services to the Empire, was introduced - the Order of Gabriel the Great, as well as the highest creative award of the Empire for special achievements in the sciences and arts - Gavrilovskaya (see the chapter "[Culture](#)"). His birthday on July 26, which is also the day of the Cathedral of the Archangel Gabriel (according to the current Julian calendar, July 13), became a national holiday - Gabriel's Day. And the streets and squares, ships and planets named after him, can not be counted at all. He was not canonized, not because such was his testament - he would certainly have been violated - but because after his dying interview, more than 80% of Russians were sure and still are sure that it was the Archangel Gabriel himself who incarnated on Earth with a mission from God; and everyone said that it was understandable, they say, why he ordered not to canonize himself: how can an archangel be canonized? It is interesting that Muslims - both Russian and many of the caliphates - also consider him the holy spirit Jibril - and this is precisely what explains why Allah instructed him, and not a Muslim, to overthrow the United States.

Even among the Jews, a current was formed and gained strength (albeit declared heresy by many rabbis), whose followers saw in Gabriel the Mashiach, that is, the messiah who fulfilled much of what God promised - and the rest will be fulfilled before the universal Sabbath (end of the world). And the fact that he is not from the family of David and not a Jew at all does not contradict the prophecies, precisely because he is not a man at all, but Malach (that is, an angel) Gabriel, “the power of God.” So it’s all or not, it’s not for us to judge, but the fact that this was not an ordinary, even a very gifted and successful person, is quite obvious.

The reign of Michael III. Emperor Michael III (2030-2040) - the same name was given to the Tsar of Moscow and All Russia Mikhail I the Meek (1613-1645) and the President of the USSR Mikhail II [Marked](#) (1985-1991), - born Mikhail Velichko, in 1985 in the city of Sevastopol, in the family of a military sailor. By nationality, he was Ukrainian, but, as I have already noted, in accordance with the Constitution of 2013, the Ukrainian people are considered part of the Russian, and, accordingly, there is no longer a “Ukrainian” nationality - it is Russian. In 1991, his father refused to take the Ukrainian oath and soon died under strange circumstances. Until the end of his life, Michael III was sure (the truth cannot be known for a long time) that he was killed by Ukrainian nationalists. Naturally, he hated them, as well as the independent Ukrainian state as a whole, with every fiber of his soul, and already in 2005 he joined the anti-Ukrainian underground in Crimea. He actively participated in the preparation of the 2008 uprising, was arrested twice by the Security Service of Ukraine and fled twice. During the uprising, the detachment under his command repeatedly entered into firefights. By March 2008, he had moved to Donetsk and soon joined the incoming Russian army. He already participated in the Lenten confrontation as a sergeant of the Russian armed forces. Then he participated in many episodes of the first expansion, and also fought in Chechnya with the separatists. In 2013, when the *oprichnina* was introduced, he turned 28 and was a captain - he graduated from a military school externally. However, without hesitating for a second, he enrolled with the guardsmen and meekly served again for five years together with the newcomers, graduating from the corps of soldiers. He was the commander of the squad (battalion, in our opinion) in the legion that entered the battle in Chicago in May 2019. After signing a peace treaty with the United States, he asked to be transferred back to the Old World, closer to the planned wars. In the Russian-Polish-Ukrainian war, he commanded a regiment and was the first to break into Lvov, and later into Krakow; he began the Russian-Turkish war as a commander of the rati. Having distinguished himself in the battle for Kars, he replaced the slain corps commander near Erzerum, and met the end of the war as the commander of the entire Turkish army, showing himself not only as a daring warrior (although this is extremely appreciated by the guardsmen), but also a far-sighted politician. In 2021, he commanded the East Israeli army in the war for the island of Israel, and after the end of the war he became the head of the Imperial Military Administration. In 2026, after eight years of military service, he was, as expected (now this period is ten years), transferred to another sphere and became authorized by the Imperial Security Directorate in Galicia; two years later he was transferred to England. During the 2029 election campaign, he was not considered a favorite, much behind Boris Fetisov, but after he [Fetisov] withdrew his candidacy, 76.7% of those who had the right to vote elected Mikhail.

While Gabriel ruled, the conquered peoples of Europe, and even more so the peoples of historical Russia, did not rebel - he acted on them like a boa constrictor on a rabbit; but as soon as he died, a Polish-English uprising began in 2033. Its complete suppression (including subsequent cleansings) took more than a year and a half. In these circumstances, Michael III was the best ruler from the point of view of Russian interests - both because of his inexorability and personal hatred of Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, and because of his personal knowledge of these territories. Without hesitation, Michael evicted the entire population from Galicia (with the exception of Orthodox Russians), settling them in small portions throughout Turkey, Serbia and Germany (I use the old names for these territories); however, in relation to other rebellious territories, he acted quite differently, using the principles of “carrot and stick” and “divide and rule.” In 2035, soon after the purges were over, the people of England and Poland (and along with

Ireland) were granted civil rights - although there was no talk of this even before the uprising began. Mikhail believed that after the suppression of the uprising (and the wars of 2019-2020), they no longer needed to be frightened, and the decree he adopted would remove the feeling of futility of existence from the reconciled peoples. The population of Central Ukraine (the so-called Little Russia) was granted civil rights as early as 2031. In 2037, the deported Galicians, as well as Lithuanians, received them - thus, under Michael, the entire population of the Empire, except for those who were individually deprived of their rights by a court decision, became citizens. In 2034, an uprising also broke out on the territory of historical Chechnya and Dagestan, which turned into the third Caucasian war (the first took place in the middle of the 19th, and the second - at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century); it continued until 2036, leading to a huge number of civilian casualties (not only Caucasians, but also those killed in terrorist attacks in Russian cities), and although there were no evictions as a result, martial law was introduced in most of the Caucasus, canceled only at the end of 2039. There have been no more national uprisings in Russia to this day, but in 2037 a wave of riots and civil disobedience swept across historical Russia with demands for liberalization of the regime, which practically grew into a revolution. Michael III refused even to talk to representatives of the rebels and brutally suppressed the protests by force. Nearly 20,000 people died, and another 47,000 were arrested and subjected to various punishments. For better or worse, there have been no more performances in the past 16 years. In 2038, the Caliphate attacked Russia in the area of the island of Israel - the second Russian-Caliphate war began (2038-2039), which lasted almost a year and did not bring any results to the attackers (except for almost 100 thousand dead). As a result, Michael III, by the nature of his reign, was nicknamed the Suppressor.

An important result of the reign of Michael III was the beginning of the real expansion of the Russian Empire into space. As you know, Russia was the first to land people on Mars back in 2016 - but it was a demonstrative and to some extent scientific expedition, like the landing of Americans on the Moon in 1969. And in the mid-2020s, work began on the creation of large nuclear-powered spacecraft with a carrying capacity of 10,000 tons and a cruising speed of 200 kilometers per second - the Russians planned to make them the main tool for the development of the inner planets of the solar system. Under Mikhail, these works were accelerated, and in 2034 the first two ships began test flights, and in 2035 they went to Mars in order to create the first real settlement (to accomplish this task, they had to fly there constantly in shuttle mode). As a result, Gavrillovsk, the first city on Mars and generally outside the Earth, was rebuilt by 2037 and became not only a breakthrough in the Mars exploration program, but also in the solar system as a whole.

The reign of Vasily V. Emperor Vasily V (2040-2050) - the same name was given to the three Grand Dukes of Moscow and the Tsar of Moscow and All Russia Vasily IV Shuisky (1606-1610), - born Vasily Malinin, was born in 1983 in the city of St. Petersburg, in the family of an industrial leader (later - a major businessman). In 2004, he graduated from the law faculty of St. Petersburg University and, against the advice of his father, went to work in the prosecutor's office. There he distinguished himself so much in investigating a number of corruption-related cases, and, in particular, he proved himself to be a person so incorruptible that in 2006, after the start of the reforms of Vladimir II, he was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office in Moscow. Here he participated in many cases of the period of the struggle against the oligarchs and, already as an investigator for especially important cases, carried out investigations in Eastern Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Abkhazia in 2007-2009. In 2013, when the *oprichnina* was introduced, he was 30 years old and served as head of the main department in the Russian Prosecutor General's Office - however, a few weeks after its official introduction, he enrolled in the *oprichnina* and graduated from the corps of rulers in 2018. He was the head of the Russian (since 2020 - Imperial) Supervision Department (that is, the Prosecutor General) and in this capacity participated in the second expansion; however, in the summer of 2020, at his own request, he was transferred to the position of head of the European Order. In 2028, he moved to the position of the head of the Imperial Department of Economy, and in 2035, the head of the Imperial Department of Infrastructure. He successfully developed

and carried out a set of measures aimed at changing the territorial distribution of economic and financial centers in the Empire, including a program for the accelerated development of a number of megacities, and also launched a program of so-called warming, which he fully implemented already as emperor (elected in 2039).

It was this program that was the main result of the reign of Vasily V, for which he received the nickname the Builder. It was fundamentally developed back in the 2010s and provided for the deepening of the bottom of the northern Russian seas, from the Barents to the East Siberian, in a strip up to 800 kilometers wide - in fact, this meant the creation of a huge "ravine" at the bottom of these seas. It was assumed that the warm current of the Gulf Stream, enveloping Scandinavia, would not go to the North Pole, as was the case, since it could not pass through the shallow waters of these seas, but along the formed "ravine" and, thus, would separate Siberia from the Arctic Ocean with a thermal curtain. Vasily spent almost fifteen years on the implementation of this project, but by the end of his reign it was completed - now the only question being discussed is whether to extend the "ravine" to Chukotka. As a result, the climate of Siberia has radically improved, and now it is in the vast majority of areas suitable for settlement. It must be assumed that today this is the most outstanding construction achievement of mankind in its entire history - even our Trans-Caribbean underwater tunnel fades before it, connecting the state of Dixieland and the northern part of the country with the state of Venezuela and the southern part, as well as with the islands of the Caribbean state and the federal capital district of Jamaica. Under Basil, a dozen and a half settlements were also created on Mars, the Moon and the satellites of Jupiter - the development of the solar system became part of a large economy. Under him, the aggression of the Caliphate took place and, as a result, the third Russian-Caliphate war (2044-2045), which took place on four fronts at once - Israeli, Turkish, Azerbaijani and Kazakh; despite the heavy fighting and the large number of victims - 110 thousand Russians and 400 thousand Islamists - it ended in nothing, which, however, was in favor of the Russians: they did not need anything from the Caliphate. Under him, right after the end of the war, there was a grand multi-day celebration on May 9 - both the 100th anniversary of the victory over Germany and the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Third Empire.

The reign of Vladimir III. Emperor Vladimir III (2050 - present) - the same name was given to the ruler of the USSR Vladimir I Judas (1917-1923) and the President of the Russian Federation and the Russian Union Vladimir II Restorer (2000-2012) - born Waldemar Schwanke in 2008 in the city of Hamburg, in the family of a dentist. At the time when America began the Twelve Day War against Russia, and Germany refused to participate in it and soon became an ally of Russia, he was 11 years old, and during the wars of the second expansion and the establishment of the Third Empire, he was 12. He raved about Russia and learned Russian even before it began to be taught as part of the assimilation program. In 2023, when he was 15 years old, right on his birthday, without even coming to the festive table prepared for him, he left for the nearest point in the city of Bremen and signed up with the guardsmen. He was baptized into the Orthodox faith and became Russian, having undergone the procedure of interbreeding, although as a German he could not have done this. In 2031, he graduated from the guard corps, after which he participated as a secret agent in the suppression of the Polish-English uprising, in the second and third Russian-caliphate wars. In 2045, he organized and himself led a raid in Aleppo, where the Islamists stored antimatter warheads they had acquired from the Celestial Empire, which were not neutralized by the "Russian shield". The warheads were detonated and the city was razed to the ground. During the operation, Vladimir was captured and was brought to Islamabad for public execution, but managed to escape, destroying more than 700 enemy soldiers along with four friends. For four months he made his way to Russia through the Caliphate, leaving behind a bloody trail, and reached the border after the victory. As a result, he turned out to be the only person in the history of the *oprichnina* who passed through the Triumphal Arch twice in one war: both alive - after his return, and dead - at the parade on the occasion of the end of the war as missing. In 2045, he became the head of the counterintelligence service of the Imperial Security Bureau, and in 2048 he became the head of this department. In these positions, he

uncovered and neutralized several large spy networks of the Caliphate and the Celestial Empire and prevented a gigantic terrorist act in St. Petersburg. In 2049 he was elected emperor. Regarding his activities as emperor, I will not write, since he now rules and will do for another six years, and I would not like to put our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an awkward position; besides, as the Russians say, “they count chickens in the fall” – now you can’t say anything. Especially since the part of the book that you are now finishing reading, dear compatriots, is called “History of Russia” - and what is happening now is not history yet.

* * *

What conclusions can be drawn, looking from our days, from a bird’s eye view of the history of Russia? Not exhaustive, of course - a thick volume can be written about this, and it will only be an introduction to the topic - but the main ones. Everyone is most interested in how, at the beginning of the century, Russia, which had already lost the world Great Game and was completely demoralized, could be reborn as a great and self-sufficient power in such a short time? There were, of course, such cases before - for example, the ancient Babylonian kingdom was revived by the New Babylonian kingdom after three hundred years of enslavement by the Assyrians. But still, in the case of Russia, this is very strange. I read from one ancient Roman author such an apology for slavery: if a slave had previously been free, then, of course, he did not differ in any way from another free one; but having been a slave, he loses the ability to be free, even if he was not particularly tormented. The same, probably, with entire nations, and the Russian people clearly lost their freedom in the 1990s - so how did they find the strength to become free, first of all internally? It can be said that Russia was amazingly lucky with Vladimir the Restorer and Gabriel the Great - yes, this is indisputable; but why was she not lucky before that, when at the head of the country nonentities or traitors replaced one another? There is a feeling that the time has just come - and it arises not only according to the assessments of the events of recent decades. I clearly see that the waves of Russian history unequivocally correlate with the change of periods of will by periods of nationwide lack of will. We observed the last such change quite recently, when the complete paralysis of the will of 1988-2005 gave way to the triumph of the will of 2006-2022. Why it happens this way, I don’t know, but the fact that will has a special significance in Russia is a fact - it’s no coincidence that in Russian the word “will” means both “determination” and “freedom” (that is, our will and freedom in Russian - one word). And I give advice to my future readers, if there are any: quarrel with Russia only in the period of her lack of will.

PART II RUSSIA TODAY

I. FOUNDATIONS OF STATEHOOD

Chapter 1 Geography and Population

Territory. The Russian Empire is a medium-sized country with a relatively small population compared to other powers. The area of its land territory is about 30 million square kilometers, that is, slightly more than a fifth of the earth’s land; this is much inferior to our Federation and the Caliphate (about 43 million sq. km), but significantly exceeds the Celestial Empire (about 24 million sq. km) and especially India (8 million sq. km) (all areas are given without territories outside the Earth, but including Antarctica). The Russian Empire occupies most of the Eurasian continent, namely its western, northern, eastern and central parts - everything except the southwest (part of the Caliphate), south (India) and southeast (part of the

[Middle Kingdom¹⁴](#)). From the west (in Russia it is customary to list from west to east or from west in a counterclockwise circle) Russia is washed by the Atlantic Ocean. In it, her dominions extend westward to the meridian 37° west longitude (water border with our Federation) and south to the 36th parallel (water border with the Caliphate); the border along the 37th meridian goes around Greenland from the west, so that the Greenland Sea belongs to Russia. In the south-west-west, there is a complex water border with the Caliphate along the Mediterranean and Red Seas - along the Straits of Gibraltar, Tunisian (around the island of Sicily) and Man-Made (around the island of Israel); in the southwest - the land border with the Caliphate along the southern edge of the Constantinople and Transcaucasian metropolises (since there are no states or provinces in Russia, parts of the country are designated by Orthodox metropolitanates). In the south, the border with the Caliphate runs along the southern part of the Caspian Sea and further along the southern edge of the Caspian-Aral and Kazakh metropolises. Then there is a small section of the land border with India along the Kashgar corridor, then in the southeast - the land border with the Celestial Empire along the eastern edge of the Kazakh and southern edges of the Siberian, Transbaikal and Primorsky metropolises and the sea border with it - along the straits separating the Russian islands of Sakhalin and Kunashir from the heavenly islands of Hokkaido, Shikotan and Habomai. From the east, Russia is washed by the Pacific Ocean, its possessions in it are north of the 43rd parallel (the water border with the Middle Kingdom) and east from the coast to meridian 168° western longitude (water border with us). From the north, Russia is washed by the Arctic Ocean, which for the most part belongs to it (in a larger arc between 37° west longitude and 168° west longitude). According to the Antarctic Treaty of 2022, Russia does not have possessions in Antarctica, since it does not have possessions in the adjacent part of any of the oceans. Thus, on the globe, Russia looks like a sector with a peak at the North Pole, occupying a significant part of the Northern Hemisphere; as sung in a famous Russian song, “from Moscow to the very outskirts, / from Norwegian to Israeli latitudes.” The westernmost point of the continental part is Cape Roca (where the city of Lisbon is located), the southernmost is Cape Marroki, also on the Iberian Peninsula, the easternmost is Cape Dezhnev in Chukotka and the northernmost is Cape Chelyuskin in Taimyr. The difference in time zones between the extreme points in the continental part is 13 hours, and taking into account the water - even more. Due to the elongation in the latitudinal direction, the sun truly never sets over the Russian Empire - and, unlike the former British Empire, even over the continental part, without taking into account overseas possessions. Such possessions, namely islands, in addition to being within their own oceanic borders, Russia has in the oceanic possessions of other countries - they belonged to the conquered countries of the European Union or were traded. The overseas territories of Russia at the present moment are as follows: Windward Antilles (except Trinidad) - in our possessions; the islands of Madeira, Canaries and Mascarenes (Reunion and Mauritius) - in the possession of the Caliphate; New Caledonia and French Polynesia - in the possession of the Middle Kingdom. By the way, these small territories play a rather important role - they are located in the tropics, and therefore those who can afford it go there to relax at sea in winter and spring, without leaving Russia (in summer and early autumn they go to the sea in Russia to the Black Sea and Mediterranean coast, and in late autumn - to the Red Sea); for an autarkic economy and the same general ideology of Russians, this is essential.

Mountains and islands. There are many mountains in Russia, and they are surprisingly well located: almost all of them are located on the edges of the Empire, and the main part of the country is a giant Eurasian plain. The main mountain ranges are as follows: the Pyrenees in the Iberian metropolis, the Scandinavian mountains - in the Baltic, the Alps - in Central Europe, Latin and Bavarian-Baden, the Asia Minor Highlands - in Constantinople and Transcaucasia, the Caucasus - in Alan, Tien Shan, Pamir and Dzhungars- some Alatau - in the Kazakh, Altai and Sayan - in the Siberian, Aldan-Stanovoi massif - in the Trans-Baikal and Chersko-Verkhoyansky ridge - in Magadanskaya. On the Samui of the Eurasian Plain there are only the Carpathians, the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau, but these mountainous regions are low, especially the last two, so that the traveler, finding himself there, will not immediately understand that he is in the mountains.

After the implementation of the “warming” program under Emperor Basil V, this entire plain turned out to be suitable for normal life (climatic conditions on the entire coast of the Arctic Ocean are approximately the same as we have in the north of Plainsland or in the south of Canada, maybe a little colder). At the same time, most of it, stretching for more than 6,000 kilometers from west to east and more than 2,000 from north to south, is still very sparsely populated. This is probably the last such place on Earth - except that as a result of global or artificial climate change, the central and northern parts of our state of Canada will become warmer or the African deserts in the Caliphate will become wetter.

The largest island in Russia is Greenland (it is also the largest in the world), its area is 2130 thousand square km; it is almost never used in economic life, just like our Baffin Island and other large Arctic islands, but as the climate warms, its role will clearly increase - in this sense, it compensates Russia for the lack of a share in the territory of Antarctica. In addition to Greenland, the largest islands of Russia, with an area of over 20 thousand square km, the following: Britain (230 thousand), Israel (148 thousand), Iceland (103 thousand), Ireland (84 thousand), Novaya Zemlya (83 thousand), Sakhalin (77 thousand), Svalbard (62 thousand), New Siberian Islands (38 thousand), Severnaya Zemlya (37 thousand), Sicily (25 thousand) and Sardinia (24 thousand).

Reservoirs. There are many rivers in Russia, and although there are no rivers like our Amazon among them, there are quite comparable in size to the Mississippi or Orinoco. The largest rivers are: Rhine, Danube, Dnieper, Don, Volga, Ural, Pechora, Ob, Irtysh, Yenisei, Olenek, Lena and Kolyma; as sung in the Russian hit, “Russia, which we all love / from the Rhine to the Kolyma.” The Amur River is very large, but it cannot be considered purely Russian - the border with the Middle Kingdom runs in its middle. The largest lakes in Russia: Venern in the Baltic metropolis, Chudskoye, Ladoga and Onega - in St. Petersburg, Van - in Anatolian, the Aral Sea - in the Caspian-Aral, Balkhash and Issyk-Kul - in Kazakh and Baikal - in Transbaikal. The largest lake in the world, the Caspian Sea, belongs to Russia by more than 80%.

The history of the Aral Sea is interesting: it belonged to Russia during the First and Second Empires, until 1991; did not belong to it between 1991 and 2007, between the second Time of Troubles and the first expansion (then belonged to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan); and from 2007 to 2020, it owned only the northern, Kazakh, part. Full possession of it by Russia was enshrined in the Russian-caliphate agreement of 2022, according to which the northern tip of Uzbekistan, Karakalpakstan, which occupies the southern coast of the Aral Sea, went to Russia. So, back at the end of the Second Empire, and especially between 1991 and 2020, this sea suffered a terrible ecological disaster, little known to us: due to a sharp reduction in the flow of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers (all the water was taken for irrigation), it almost dried up - the level dropped by many meters, the coast receded tens of kilometers, the water became too salty and unsuitable for life. In 2026, the Imperial Administration of Territories approved and in 2027-2033 the Aral resuscitation program was implemented - the Russians dug the Irtysh-Aral canal and turned part of the flow of this river to the south, and also connected the Aral with a channel with the Caspian Sea; as a result, now the Aral Sea - I was there and I can testify - has become a piece of paradise.

Returning to the lakes of Russia: it would be correct to consider the two seas, the Baltic and the Black (the latter together with the Sea of Azov), as salty lakes, since they are completely inside the Russian lands and are connected to the ocean only by narrow straits, the Kattegat and the Bosphorus - but our [Lake] Ontario enters the ocean via the St. Lawrence River and is nevertheless considered a lake.

The seas (except those that are lakes) washing Russia and separating it from the open ocean are as follows: the Bay of Biscay, the Mediterranean with its bays (Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Ionian), Red in the south of the island of Israel, Japanese, Okhotsk, Bering, Chukchi , East Siberian, Laptev, Kara, Barents, White, Norwegian and Northern; The island of Greenland is washed by the Greenland Sea. The Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic in general are connected to the Mediterranean Sea by a giant (more than 2 km wide) Garonne Canal, built in 2031 specifically to enable the transfer of naval forces between the Atlantic

and Mediterranean theaters of military operations, in case of blocking the Strait of Gibraltar.

Cities. Russia is a fairly urbanized country, it has many large cities, although there are no such giants as Sao Paulo or Mexico City (in which, compatriots, one can only envy). Interestingly, the largest city in Russia is its capital, Moscow (12 million people); this distinguishes it both from the Middle Kingdom and India, where the capitals of Beijing and Delhi are large, but not the largest cities of these countries (the largest are Shanghai and Mumbai), and from us and the Caliphate, where the capitals, the cities of Alvarado and Medina, do not even belong to large. Other Russian cities with a population of over 3 million are: Constantinople (11 million), St. Petersburg (8 million), Berlin (6 million), London (5.5 million), Alma-Ata (4 million), Ankara (4 million), Kyiv (4 million), Novosibirsk (4 million), Vladivostok (4 million), Kazan (3.5 million), Samara (3.5 million), Nizhny Novgorod (3 million), Yekaterinburg (3 million) and Khabarovsk (3 million). There are five capitals in the Russian Empire: the central capital Moscow, the northern capital St. Petersburg, the western capital Berlin, the southern capital Alma-Ata and the eastern capital Gavrilovsk (former Krasnoyarsk - its population is 1.8 million). In reality, this means, firstly, that part of the imperial departments (ministries, in our opinion) are constantly located in them, and not in Moscow, namely: the Imperial Department of Finance and the Imperial Department of Culture, as well as the Central Bank and the Zemskaya Duma - in the northern the capital, the Imperial Military Administration and the Imperial Administration of Economy, as well as the Supreme Imperial Court - in the western, the Imperial Foreign Policy Administration and the Imperial Border Administration, as well as the Constitutional Court - in the south, the Imperial Administration of Territories and the Imperial Administration of Infrastructure, as well as the Supreme Zemsky Court - in eastern; the Imperial Directorate of Security, the Imperial Directorate of Control, the Imperial Directorate of Education, the Imperial Directorate of Justice and the General Imperial Chancellery are permanently located in Moscow. Secondly, the emperor with his administration, as well as the government with the prime minister and apparatus, alternately spend several months in different capitals (in Moscow, of course, more than in others): the hottest time is mainly in the eastern and northern, and the most cold - in the southern and western. Naturally, this would not have been possible without a special system of transport between these cities, and a duplicate one at that: shuttle flights fly every half an hour, and on all routes except Moscow - St. Petersburg, they are supersonic, so that a flight from any capital to another does not take more than one and a half hours, and from the airports to the government centers of the capitals, shuttle passengers are delivered by helicopters or antigravs in 15-20 minutes. There is, besides this, of course, a message by high-speed trains and screen planes, but this is mainly for tourists or all kinds of business people, because such trips between Moscow, St. Petersburg and Berlin take 2-3 hours, and to Alma-Ata and Gavrilovska - 6-8 hours; but there is a completely different level of comfort.

In Russia, there is the concept of "imperial cities" - these are usually megacities, but not all megacities are imperial cities. The status of an imperial city means that on issues of the general architecture and planning of the city, as well as a number of other decisions, decisions are made not only by the authorities of the metropolis (urban *zemstvo*, in Russian terms, see below), but also by a representative of the Empire (he is called an imperial inspector), and his word is decisive. In practice, this leads to the fact that in the centers of these cities there appear (or are preserved and enhanced) grandiose-pompous elements, which in architecture are usually called the imperial style. These are huge buildings that do not carry commercial functions (museums of the Empire, halls of fame, etc.), and not that they are very large (Pan American Plaza in Houston, for example, is many times larger), but designed in such a way to make an overwhelming impression on people; huge monuments of patriotic or militaristic content; gigantic empty squares with huge steps, columns and other things of the same vein, from which straight and unnaturally wide avenues extend. There are two such squares in Moscow - one is located next to the historical Kremlin and Red Square and is called Manezhnaya after a building with 16-meter ceilings located on one side of it, the so-called Manezh, in which the Hall of Glory of Russia is located - and on the other it is very limited the beautiful old building of the Metropol Hotel, where I lived; on it stands a number of huge

monuments, called the Street of the Rulers of Russia. And Bersenevskaya Square, across the river from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (which itself is an example of the imperial style), made in the form of an ancient Roman forum with a colonnade and a cyclopean building of the Museum of the Empire, where the huge stele of Victories is located, from which the wide Yakimansky Avenue departs. Structures in a similar spirit are found in all imperial cities; there and only there are military parades, solemn processions, etc., and every time after another victory, when the troops pass through the Triumphal Arch in Moscow, they then pass through the Triumphal Arch in many imperial cities. The highest officials of the Empire, including the emperor, come and speak there disproportionately more often, it is there that state universities are located, and also in general it is there that the bulk of all-Russian events are held (meaning state ones). In exchange for the limitation of municipal power and other inconveniences (for example, it is in these cities or near them that the places of permanent deployment of legions, except for the advanced ones) are located, the Empire gives the budgets of these cities significant subventions, as well as full priority in placing state orders and investments - for example, with construction of new research institutes or clinical centers; therefore, most large cities dream of becoming imperial (this status is obtained exclusively voluntarily, with the mutual consent of the imperial and *zemstvo* authorities). Imperial cities are, in addition to the capitals: Hamburg, Munich, Vienna, Belgrade, Minsk, Kyiv, Donetsk, Voronezh, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Rostov, Kazan, Ufa, Yekaterinburg, Astana, Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk.

There are also so-called *oprichnina* cities in Russia, essentially a smaller version of the imperial cities: these cities are not necessarily large, but their population, for one reason or another, has a pronounced imperial spirit, usually due to the long-standing location of the military or military industry there. I myself was in one such city, called Severodvinsk. These include, among others, most of the large cities of historical Russia (the former Russian Federation).

Demography. The population of the Russian Empire is 922 million people - according to this indicator, Russia is inferior to us (1.011 billion), and even more so to India (1.67 billion), the Celestial Empire (1.94 billion) and the Caliphate (2.033 billion). The net growth of the population of Russia (that is, excluding immigrants) in 2007-2020 was about 1% per year, and sociological studies show that it remained almost the same among the Russian people (excluding its increase due to relatives) even after the establishment of the Third Empire, like other peoples of the former Russian Union. For European peoples, in the EU countries, the growth at that time was 0.2-0.7%, but even then only due to migrants from the third world - the net growth was zero or slightly negative (after the Great Crisis of 2010-2014, it became purely negative), and after the entry of all EU countries into the Russian Empire, it decreased even more. Apparently, the reason for this was national demoralization, because the two European nations that became allied nations, the Germans and Serbs, who used to have exactly the same demographics, have sharply increased in growth rates and approximately correspond to the Russian people in this indicator. Of the other peoples of Europe with a significantly positive increase, the Turks should be noted. As a result of the superimposition of these multidirectional processes in different peoples, as well as the fact that mortality from old age after the advent of anti-aging therapy fell to zero and will remain so for another fifteen years, the total population growth of the Russian Empire, excluding immigration, is now about 1%, and with taking it into account - 1.1% per year.

Unlike our Federation, where there are only three main national groups - Latinos, Brazilians and Yankees (moreover, the first two do not differ much in culture from the third, and almost do not differ from each other at all), - Russia is a very multinational country, and the peoples inhabiting it are very different from each other. Of course, we also have, for example, Italians - both in the Brazilian states and in North America - but this is their origin, and by nationality (and, as a result, by culture), they are Brazilians or Yankees, respectively, and feel themselves as such. In Russia, however, the various peoples largely remain unassimilated, and it is not known whether they will ever merge at all. Some serious thinkers (first of all, the neo-Eurasian school, founded at the beginning of the century by the famous Russian

philosopher Dugin) believe that it would be better if this did not happen at all, because diversity within unity is the source of development. Most of all, of course, there are Russians in the Russian Empire - according to the latest census, there are 409 million of them, that is, slightly less than half of the population (44.3%). I read a very interesting doctoral thesis, where the author was able to analyze how many of them are Russians by blood (264 million) and how many are “related” and their descendants (145 million). (The difficulty of such an analysis is that official statistics not only do not keep such records, but the imperial law directly prohibits, under the threat of severe punishment, to distinguish in any way between “natural” and “kindred” Russians - this, of course, does not apply to scientific research.) According to Russian law, any citizen, at his request, can have in his passport not only nationality (this is a mandatory column), but also the so-called origin - in the sense of not the place of birth, but the nationality within the nation; for Russians, it can be: Little Russians, Belarusians, and so on, including Cossacks - it is worth dwelling on the latter in more detail. Initially, the Cossacks were outlaws who lived in no man’s land on the borders of the state, that is, a synonym for the word “robbers” (there is even an old children’s game “Cossack robbers”); later - a specific class in the First Empire, bearing military and police service in exchange for a number of class privileges. During the period of the Second Empire, they were the objects of persecution, especially at the beginning, under Vladimir Judas, because they did not accept the satanic state and fought with weapons in their hands. Starting from the second Time of Troubles, their revival began, but in a strange form, since it was not clear that this was a nationality (but such a nationality did not exist in the official list), estate (but there were no estates in those days), occupation (what?) or something else? The point was put by the Imperial Law of 2024 “On Nationalities”, which, in particular, said: the Cossacks are the origin, that is, a subsection of nationality, within the Russian people, which was reflected in the order described above. For the Cossacks it is allowed, also purely at will, to indicate the origin in more detail; thus, if a person wants, the “nationality” column in his passport can look, for example, like this: Russian (from the Terek Cossacks).

The second largest and most important people of the Empire are the Germans, there are 91 million of them (including the Austrians); this is an ally people, that is, among other things, its members can join the guardsmen, if they want, without the procedure of twinning. The Germans, therefore, can hold any posts in the state, including the imperial one, without intermarriage, although the current emperor Vladimir III, a German by blood, in his youth preferred to go through this procedure and become Russian. There are many Germans among the guardsmen, about 19%, while among the population as a whole they are only 9.9%; in addition, there are a lot of them among the civil administration and the police (not guardsmen), among industrialists of all categories - engineers, managers and entrepreneurs, among scientists, as well as among leading writers and playwrights - both German and Russian speakers. The significance of the German people is not limited, however, to the Germans themselves and their contribution to all spheres of life: German is the main language of interethnic communication west of the former Poland and the Czech Republic, that is, in all of Central and Western Europe - and a third of the population of the Empire lives there. This is due to the fact that the peoples historically living there have languages built on Latin script, like German, and generally belong to the same group with it - it is easier for them to communicate in German. In practice, all the inscriptions, from street names to menu texts, are not in two, but in three languages, and the local population, although with sin in half [?], can speak to you in Russian, but in German they will do it much faster.

Germans are 76% Orthodox, 19% Lutheran, and only less than 5% Catholic, although until 2020 they were one-third Catholic and two-thirds Lutheran. Their historical homeland is the German Exarchate (this is a manifestation of respect for the ally people - in addition to the German, there is only the Serbian Exarchate), which includes the metropolises of the Rhineland (which includes the former Holland), Prussia and Baden-Bavaria. The Germans, however, live not only on the territory of the German Exarchate - in fact, no more than 60 million of them live there, and the rest live throughout the Empire, but especially in Russia (meaning historical): in the Volga region, in the Urals, in Siberia and , of course,

in all capitals and imperial cities. At the same time, unlike many other peoples, they rarely settle in settlements, but live freely among Russians. This is due to the fact that the attitude of Germans and Russians towards each other at the everyday level is very friendly: for example, among Russians it is considered fashionable to insert German words into a conversation, and among Germans, especially in the German Exarchate itself, to wear armbands or badges with runic letters DRR - Dritte Russische Imperial, Third Russian Empire. Many Germans like to decipher this abbreviation as Deutsche-Russische Imperial instead, that is, the German-Russian Empire, and the authorities do not fight this.

This is not trivial, given all the cruelties of the Great Patriotic War - but the Russians are not vindictive, and the Germans, as a nation, are completely repentant of their deed. At the level of ordinary people, it looks like this: if a Russian and a German are sitting next to each other at the table (see below), and their conversation over beer and vodka will be about politics, then the Russian will most likely say this about Hitler's times: "Everything you did was the right thing then - you united the nation, and rose up against the musty spirit of the pan-European supermarket - only they climbed on us in vain: about us, brother, whoever wants to break their teeth! And why were the Jews killed, and the gypsies, and the crippled - are you not afraid of God? And so they would have gone together to Europe - and you see, they would have crushed them a hundred years earlier." And the German, most likely, will agree. In general, there is some commonality between Russians and Germans, which I find it difficult to formulate precisely, although they are very different in national character and temperament. It is no coincidence that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Imperial, Ribbentrop, after a visit to the USSR in 1939, when the Russians and Germans were not yet enemies, wrote: "During the whole time in the Kremlin, I had the feeling that I was at home, in the circle of old party comrades". It is impossible to explain this only by the similarity of the regimes - especially since they were not at all so similar. In general, it was clearly not by chance that the Russians became the closest allies and friends with the Germans: most likely, the matter is in the same attitude of Russians and Germans to the idea of an empire - not the Russian Empire, but an empire as such. Both of them treat the empire as something, without which life - both public and, to a large extent, individual - loses its meaning. This attitude cannot even be called positive in the usual sense of the word: you can't say that people have a positive attitude towards air - there is simply no life without it. And as it turned out, it didn't matter to the Germans that this empire was not German, but Russian - the empire differs from the national state in that ethnicity quickly ceases to play a significant role in it, as it happened, using Russian terminology, in First and Second Rome. Understanding how this relates to the constitutional doctrine of Russian nationalism (there really is no contradiction here) means taking a huge step towards understanding the essence of Russia.

The third largest nation in Russia is the Turks, there are 78 million of them; there will be 87 million of them if the negotiations between the Turks and the Azerbaijanis, which have been going on for about nine years, on recognizing both as one people (the Azerbaijanis are extremely close to the Turks in ethnic and linguistic terms, but religiously, unlike the Turks, have always been Shiites - but now the majority of Muslims in both countries refers to the [Ravilites](#)). The Turks are quite widely settled throughout the Empire - outside the Metropolis of Constantinople (that is, historical Turkey), more than 20 million people live permanently (about 18 million non-Turks from other parts of Russia live in the Constantinople Metropolis itself). The Turks are good entrepreneurs, they are very widely represented in various businesses throughout the Empire, including large ones; at the same time, they dominate in construction, light industry and many branches of trade. The remaining peoples, with a population of over 5 million, are as follows: French, including the Walloons of the former Belgium (39 million), Italians (30 million), English (28.6 million), Poles (27.4 million), Spaniards (24.9 million), Hindus - the generalized name of all immigrants from India (24.3 million), Romanians - together with the Moldovans, with whom they united at the Bucharest congress in 2034 (18.1 million), Flemings of the former Holland and Belgium (15, 2 million), Serbs (13.8 million), Chinese (10.3 million), Jews (9.3 million), Azerbaijanis (8.9 million), Kazakhs (8.7 million), Tatars (8.6 million), Swedes (7.5 million), Hungarians (7.2 million), Galicians

(7.1 million), Portuguese (7 million), Kyrgyz (6.9 million), Greeks (6.6 million), Czechs (5.7 million) and the Swiss (5 million).

Serbs, being an ally people, make up a significant part of the service (4.1%) and especially the clergy (9.7%) - despite the fact that their share in the population as a whole is only 1.4%. In addition, like the Germans, they are very noticeable in Russian-language literature and cinema. At least a third of their total number live outside of Serbia. Jews are very noticeable in business, in particular in financial, jewelry and trade (especially in trade with our Federation - they dominate there), as well as in show business, music, medicine and science; outside the island of Israel, about 3.3 million out of 9.3 million live throughout Russia. The Kazakhs, an ally people, are known as talented organizers: despite the fact that among the guardsmen as a whole they are only 1.4% (with 0.93% of the population), in the oprichniki corps of rulers involved in civil administration, they are about 6%. In addition, there are many of them throughout the Empire in the field of large-scale industry, especially raw materials and semi-finished products, as well as in finance, both as owners and as managers. Another ally people, the Tatars, the oldest of them (they lived with the Russians in the same state for about 500 years), are very strongly represented in the service class, and not only quantitatively (there are 5.1% of them with 0.93% of the population) , but also qualitatively - many heroes and major leaders from the guardsmen are Tatars by nationality. In addition, Kazan is the all-Russian center of Ravilite Islam, and Ravil Idiatullin himself was a Tatar.

Of the peoples with a population of less than 5 million, a significant role is played by the other two allied peoples, the Bashkorts (2.1 million) and the Alans, otherwise called Ossetians (1.1 million) - their representatives are many among the elites, in both politics and business, Georgians (4.9 million), who are prominent in literature and especially cinema, and Armenians (4.2 million) are numerous in all types of business and trade. The rest of the peoples listed above - may my compatriots forgive me for the lack of political correctness - are extremely little noticeable in the life of the Russian Empire; that is, they do not occupy particularly significant positions in the economic, socio-political or spiritual life of Russia as a whole and are hardly noticeable outside their traditional places of residence (as a rule, they do not settle there at all). Of course, this does not mean that these places do not provide leading firms in certain sectors of the economy and that there are no large entrepreneurs among the representatives of these peoples - that's all there is. Equally, this does not mean that Belgian plastics or French clothing, Czech beer or Italian equipment have ceased to be the best in the Empire. But when you pass through these places, then, despite the visible prosperity, the feeling that you are in a deep province does not leave you - especially in comparison with Russian, German or some Turkic regions. And the feeling is that the farther, the stronger it is - because the share of Russians and allied peoples in the total population of the Empire is growing, and quite quickly (both their growth and the decline of the rest leads to this), and the same applies to their weight and visibility in public life. You can extrapolate yourself.

Beliefs. According to the Constitution, Russia is an Orthodox country, and in accordance with the constitutional doctrine of nationalism (see below), this provision does not depend on what part of the population are Russians or Orthodox in general. And this is not an abstraction: in 2020, after the establishment of the Empire and the adoption of the final form of the Constitution, there were about 190 million Russians (including Little Russians and Belarusians) out of 832 million inhabiting the Empire, that is, about 23%. Other Orthodox nations - Serbs, Romanians, Moldavians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Georgians - were another 65 million; that is, traditionally Orthodox peoples were only about 31% of the total population of the Empire. Over the past 34 years, however, the situation has changed as a result of three processes: firstly, the number of Russians (by blood) is growing, while the number of almost all other peoples has decreased and continues to decrease. Secondly, a significant number of people went through the procedure of twinning and thus became Russians (and the adoption of Orthodoxy is a necessary element of twinning). And thirdly, many converted to Orthodoxy without converting to the Russian nation - especially Catholics after the exodus of the Vatican to the American Federation and Muslim Turks after Russia's victories in the three Russian-caliphate wars, as well as allied peoples,

primarily Germans and Kazakhs. As a result, now there are slightly more than 590 million Orthodox (baptized in Orthodoxy, and not just belonging to the corresponding nation) in the Empire, that is, about 64% of the total population. How many of them are really churched (according to the Orthodox canon, this means confessing and taking communion at least once a year), is not known exactly, but the Russian Orthodox Church estimates 30% of the number of baptized, which is quite a lot for our days - I don't think that there are so many active church people in the Federation. From the point of view of illustrating the dynamics of demographic and religious processes, the current share of traditionally Orthodox peoples in the total population of Russia (including the share of Orthodox among Germans) is interesting: it now stands at 56.7% - compare it with the above figure of 31% for 2020.

It is believed that the second largest religion in Russia is Catholicism. Traditionally Catholic peoples, including Greek Catholics, in the Empire number 187 million people (20%). In addition, 4 million Germans and 2 million Swiss consider themselves Catholics - but at least 50 million people from these peoples have become Orthodox, and there are not so many churched among Catholics; so 14% is more realistic.

The third Christian religion is Protestantism (in Russia all Protestants are called "Lutherans"): the total number of peoples who remained mostly Protestant is about 64 million (English, Flemings, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians and Finns), and there are few Orthodox among them. 12 million Germans and 2 million Swiss, as well as 2 million Russians, also call themselves Protestants - thus, the total number of Protestants in the Empire is about 80 million people (about 8.7% of the population), but it is impossible to say how many of them are really churched (Protestant churches are not even entirely clear what is generally understood by this).

Another Christian religion is Monophysitism, represented by the Armenian Gregorian Church. It includes only Armenians (just over 4 million people - 0.45% of the population).

There are 121 million Islamic peoples in Russia, but at least 15 million of them are Orthodox (including 9 million Turks, 4 million Kazakhs and 1 million Tatars and Kirghiz each) - thus, the upper bar for the number of Muslims can be considered equal to 106 million (11,4%). There could be many more Muslims in Russia, and the Islamic factor could turn out to be much more significant, since as of 2020, in addition to the Turks, 24 million Muslims lived in Europe, mostly Arabs and Pakistanis (not counting 7 million on the territory of the current island of Israel), and this community was distinguished by a penchant for Islamic fundamentalism and a high population growth rate. However, in 2023, an imperial decree "On the expulsion of a number of peoples" was issued, according to which many non-indigenous peoples of Europe and Israel were forcibly deported to the Caliphate. This was done in relation to Muslims, and not all of them - therefore, no one touched, for example, immigrants from the West Indies and even Muslim Indians, who were distinguished by calmness and loyalty to their new homeland (or Druze Muslims in Israel). At the same time, the Russian authorities tried to observe a certain humanity - each deportee, including children, received 200 grams of gold (about 4,000 our dollars) as compensation, a third of which could be taken out, and with the rest, goods could be purchased and taken out. As an alternative, they were allowed to stay in the Empire, having gone through the procedure of kinship (that is, becoming Russian), but with a test of sincerity through techno-interrogation, which is usually not done - and if insincerity was revealed, the person not only did not stay in Russia, but also lost the right to compensation. But in general, it was a rather cruel step, which gave rise to a lot of human tragedies, since many Arabs and Pakistanis lived in Europe not even in the second, but in the third generation - and the Palestinians in Israel have been so simple since time immemorial. However, it must be admitted that from a position of calm in the Empire, he fully justified himself, and the Russians did not have to be hypocritical, since such actions do not contradict their nationalist ideology (unlike the cosmopolitan-liberal European one).

The fifth religion in Russia is Buddhism, practiced by about 30 million people (3.3%), this community is

represented by about half of the Chinese immigrants living in Russia, half of the Hindu immigrants, Buryats, Kalmyks, as well as individual people from Russians and Europeans.

The sixth confession - Judaism - is represented by approximately 9.3 million Jews (1% of the total population); almost all ethnic Jews of the Empire are of the Jewish faith. This is due to the fact that almost all Jews who convert to Orthodoxy prefer to undergo twinning and, thus, begin to be considered Russian.

Other religions do not fall under the Russian criteria of “traditionality” and, as a result, do not seem to exist for the state, although they are not prohibited.

Chapter 2

Estate Structure

The main element of the social structure of the Russian Empire, without which it is impossible to imagine, one of the cornerstones of the constitutional reform of Gabriel the Great in 2013, is estate. Despite the fact that the very word “estate” is unlikely to seem to any of you, dear compatriots, completely unfamiliar, it is very difficult to define what it is. We, in our social structure, have no equivalent to this concept - no property, social or professional groups in the American Federation are estates. In no way are estates synonymous with Marxist classes, since they do not belong to the sphere of social production and the economy in general. The Russian estates are not a direct analogue of the feudal estates, and not only because they are not hereditary (more on the comparison of Russian estates with feudal estates will be discussed below). It is tempting to say that these are groups that the law treats differently; but this is not entirely true, or rather, not at all, and this will be discussed in the chapter “Conclusion”. Probably, I cannot give a better definition than the following: estates in Russia are groups with a fundamentally different constitutional position. I hope you will understand what I am talking about after reading this entire section.

There are three estates in the Russian Empire: the first, called the **spiritual estate, or clergy; the second, called the service class, or guardsmen; and the third, called the taxable estate, or zemstvo**, in common parlance - just the people (the name should not be misleading - it includes people from a beggar to a billionaire). Against logic, I will start with the second, because it will become clearer what the estates are in Russia.

Guardsman class

How do they become guardsmen. Upon reaching the age of fifteen, any resident of Russia - not necessarily even a citizen - regardless of gender, religion and nationality, as well as any disability, can come to a special point and apply that he (or she) wants to become an guardsman. The upper age limit for enlisting in guardsmen used to be forty years old, and nine years ago, in connection with the spread of anti-aging therapy, it was increased to fifty years and will probably soon rise to sixty. Next, you will understand what it depends on. The only known contraindication is the decision of the medical commission on physical unfitness, but with the current level of genetic and regeneration therapy, such cases are extremely rare. When I say “come and apply,” I mean to physically come to special points - there are about three hundred of them in Russia, and they are located more or less evenly throughout the country. There are places in the Empire where it is not so easy to get to the nearest point, but the guardsmen say: if you want, you will get there.

When a person appears at such a point and submits an application, he is sent to a special room (such as a closed hotel room for several people) and left there for reflection for three days. During this time, he is fed and generally treated normally, but contact with the outside world is completely prohibited - from the phone and computer to face-to-face meetings with someone; communication within the point with similar

applicants and guardsmen is allowed without any restrictions. Accordingly, those who want to talk to him cannot do this: this applies to anyone, from parents or spouses to policemen with a court order for his arrest. When three days pass, the person is invited to apply again, explaining that it is possible not to apply - that is, in fact, they ask if he has changed his mind. If he changes his mind, they say goodbye to him (and without any malice) and send him out on all four sides. If not, the applicant is subjected to techno interrogation; such interrogations, in which a person tells the whole truth and only the truth, as I wrote above and will describe in detail further, are very common in the Russian Empire and form an important part of its life. But if *zemstvo* interrogations are carried out by court decision (all this is regulated in great detail by law), and the clergy are not subjected to them at all, then guardsmen - including candidates for guardsmen - are subjected to them only voluntarily. In practice, this means that they are held in the cases stipulated by the *oprichnina* charter, including once a year, regardless of anything, and the refusal of this procedure - which happens extremely rarely - is a violation not of the law, but of the charter and does not lead to criminal punishment, but to exclusion from the class.

But let us return to the first interrogation of the applicant - during it, in essence, one question is clarified: what are the motives of the candidate, that is, does he really want to become and live the rest of his life as a guardsman, or do any other motives dominate. If this motive is really the main one, then all the others are of little importance. For example, if it turns out that a person is hiding from justice, but in fact he decided to become a guardsman a long time ago, and the indicated circumstances simply affected the time of his arrival at the point, then this is acceptable; but if getting away from punishment is the main motive, then they won't take him. Special attention is drawn to the fact that the true motive is not a love of violence as such - this is considered unacceptable. If everything is fine with the motives, then the applicant passes the medical examination already mentioned and receives a conclusion on suitability, which is the third document of the candidate (and there are five in total), after the application and protocol of the techno-interrogation. The fourth document is a certificate that the candidate is Russian and Orthodox - a non-Russian or non-Orthodox cannot be an *oprichnik* and even a cadet (this is how *oprichniks* are called during the period of initial military service - see below). This principle, which seems to us, compatriots, to be absolutely wild and outrageously discriminatory, in Russia lies completely in line with the general principles of the constitutional system. However, being discriminatory, it is not racist: Russian, but not Orthodox, if he wants to become an *oprichnik*, he simply gets baptized in the nearest church, and a non-Russian also goes through the procedure of kinship, officially becoming Russian. The readiness to do this should be written in the application, otherwise it will not be accepted, and that is why I wrote above that any resident of Russia, regardless of nationality and religion, can become a guardsman. But this does not apply to allied peoples - a German or Kazakh, for example, if they want, can absolutely formally remain belonging to the people of their fathers; but they should be Orthodox all the same - religious pluralism in the service class is not allowed. The fifth document is the cadet's oath, which is taken in the presence of four previous documents; this is not the oath of the guardsman yet - they do not have an oath at all, and vows take its place (see below).

Initial military service. On the fifth or sixth day after a person has arrived at the point, he, having already become a cadet, goes to the so-called initial military service. However, it can be called military only conditionally, since there they train cadets not as soldiers or officers, but as guardsmen generally. Nevertheless, among the Russians it is called military - it is called initial because the *oprichnik* serves all his life. In fact, this is not a service at all, but something like our military or police academy, only eight years old and with special specifics, which I will now talk about. There, cadets are taught general physical training, with an emphasis on endurance (at the level of our commandos); hand-to-hand combat, handling of all types of weapons, including basic military equipment (at the level of our commandos); special physical training such as pain relief, mobilization of all the resources of the body, the ability to slow down or, conversely, enhance its functions (at the level of the most elite commando units); mental techniques, such as suggestion and resistance to someone else's suggestion, the feeling of a person at a

distance, a premonition of danger (at the level I don't even know who we have - maybe some kind of secret agents). In general, all the cadets - and in some years up to seven hundred thousand of them a year - turn into perfect combat vehicles, clearly superior to our commandos (I'm not talking about ordinary soldiers) and not inferior to the fighters of the best elite units, but in some ways superior to them. So that you understand, compatriots, the physical capabilities of the Russian guardsmen, I will give one example: in the army in the so-called main forces (I will write about the Russian military organization in the corresponding chapter), the full combat equipment of the guardsman - including women! - is more than eighty kilograms, and lightweight - about fifty; in it, the *oprichnik* runs up to fifteen kilometers, even without the use of speed walkers or anti-grav, after which he must be ready to engage in battle without rest. The need to meet such physical requirements is associated with an upper age limit, which is raised as anti-aging therapy improves.

In addition to physical and combat training, the cadets receive a general education, approximately the volume of a good college. The natural sciences and the humanities receive roughly equal attention. Paramount importance is attached to psychological preparation - at the level of Eastern monasteries: it includes both general things (increasing memory, ability to concentrate, psychological stability in standard situations), and very specific ones. Therefore, the guardsmen are not afraid of, for example, captivity and prison - they will simply turn off the pain and plunge into prolonged meditation, and in an extreme situation they will stop their heart and die (if this is done for the sake of the state, the Church does not consider it suicide).

A very significant place in the training of cadets is occupied by religious education, in connection with which it would be more correct to liken their education not to our usual college, but to the Catholic one. They, however, have another line of preparation - ideological, which takes at least an hour a day. In ideological studies, they are hammered into it - I can't find another word, and the guardsmen themselves do not object to its use - all their class principles and attitudes: attitude towards their country and other countries, towards their own and other peoples, towards each other and towards others estates, etc. All this constitutes the content of their education (or, in their terminology, service) for the first five years. You have the right to ask: how do they manage to do both? The answer is simple: they have no free time at all. Classes continue six days a week for eleven hours a day, from 8 am to 9 pm, with one hour breaks for lunch and dinner; at 9 pm prayer, at 11 lights out. And only on Sunday, after the liturgy and dinner, they have "only" three hours of physical training, and from 5 pm they are free. At 7 p.m., the festive Sunday dinner begins, at which they get drunk - and this ends the Sunday rest.

It is impossible to leave the camp where they serve for the first three years at all, in the next five years it is possible, but quite rarely; the same applies to visiting relatives and acquaintances. Going online to see movies or video, and generally staying online, except on educational sites, is also not allowed (this does not apply to paper books, reading, on the contrary, is encouraged). Of course, a cadet can do this without permission, but this does not happen, as well as violations of discipline in general: after all, they are there purely voluntarily.

Cadets under the age of 25 and those older serve separately for the first three years, but this is not due to some kind of friction or even different physical abilities, but primarily to the comfort of adaptation. In addition, for those who have already graduated from school, the curriculum is somewhat different from that intended for those who do not have a school education. By the way, speaking about physical abilities, the training of cadets is absolutely not competitive: they, unlike any of our academies, not only do not have a rating of the best, but even the competitive element has been completely removed from the training process itself. This is a tough position of their class: guardsmen do not compete with each other, they have no ranks or titles, they are simply guardsmen, "watch", as they call themselves. And even the wages they call salaries, like any other provision, are the same for any of them, from an ordinary soldier to an emperor. If someone is doing worse in some part of the preparation, the rest are asked to help him;

this is not considered offensive, since due to the abundance of disciplines, he is probably strong in something else. Not to offend at all is an important and imperative requirement of cadet training. The class charter requires absolute (in our opinion, even somewhat ridiculous) respect for the cadet (especially for the guardsman); for example, all teachers and bosses call a cadet only “you”. Thus, the traditional type of a sergeant-beast, well-known in our films and online, who is fair in principle, but yells at novice soldiers and humiliates them, is absolutely impossible in modern Russia. The cadet will simply kill him at the first insult and will not only be considered acting in his own right, but also rewarded for his attention to honor.

But let us return to the way of life of the Cadets. Men and women serve together (with different physical training programs, but not much), unlike, by the way, Russian schools, where education is separate. One guardsman explained to me the deep meaning of this state of affairs: for *zemstvo* residents, especially young people, a being of the opposite sex is always a potential sexual partner, or even a marriage partner in general, and there must be some secret in the partner, otherwise sex turns either into mechanics or on the contrary, exclusively in the joint management of the economy. And for the guardsmen, a creature of the opposite sex (as well as one’s own, by the way) is a comrade-in-arms, and for this very reason there should in no case be any secret in it. In general, the organization of the sexual life of the cadets is not surprising: it mainly boils down to the fact that on certain days sex workers of both sexes are brought to the camp, with whom they arrange drunken or drug orgies; most often this happens at the end of Sunday dinner. If this is not enough for any cadet, he tells the curator, and he or she is brought a sex worker personally, if necessary, regularly. But this is not very common, much more characteristic of both cadets and guardsmen is such an attitude towards sex (and in general to carnal pleasures), which was the custom among sailors in the days of the sailing fleet, that is, not as part of everyday life, but as something that happens occasionally after hard work and, as a rule, in a wild way. Relationships between cadets of different sexes are not regulated in any way - neither forbidden nor encouraged - and they are not rare, but, as a rule, take place only in the presence of a serious relationship. Given the kind of attitude towards sex and sexual partners that I have just described - I would call it semi-contemptuous - this is not surprising, because the cadets respect each other. (In combat conditions, everything is different - there, opposite-sex guardsmen may well enter into sexual relations out of friendly feelings for each other.) As for same-sex relationships, the future male cadet must also write in the application that he does not have a homosexual orientation (this is a requirement) , and is responsible for its veracity. Women do not write anything, but since lesbianism is categorically condemned by the Church, and all guardsmen are churchmen, this is also unnecessary.

Such service lasts five years, and then the cadets choose specialization for the remaining three years, continuing their service, that is, training, in one of the three so-called *oprichnina* corps: the corps of soldiers, the corps of guards or the corps of rulers. The corps are a type of education and training rather than parts of the *oprichnina* class; at least, the *oprichnik*’s belonging to one of them is not indicated in any way, even at an informal level. The corps of warriors prepares the army, the corps of guards prepares the police, and the corps of rulers prepares the civil administration. However, the difference in training is not critical, and subsequently guardsmen, as a rule, undergo repeated retraining, so, for example, a 40-year-old guardsman (if he came to serve at the age of 15-20) most likely received full training in all three disciplines.

In the last three years of their study and service, the cadets are already actively involved in the relevant work, and therefore, although they mainly continue to live in the camp, they regularly move to live in hostels for guardsmen for a working period. By the way, earlier, from 2013, when the *oprichnina* was introduced, and until the establishment of the Third Empire in 2020, the initial service was not eight, but five years: the basic service lasted three years, and the specialized one - two.

At the end of the initial service, the main event in the life of the guardsman takes place - the taking of

three vows, after which he, in fact, becomes a full-fledged guardsman.

Vows. The first vow is the vow of service. Making it, the guardsman swears that serving the Empire and its people (in that order) is the main and highest goal in his life and death; that it is precisely the selfless fulfillment of this goal that is his path to the salvation of the soul and the attainment of eternal life. That under no circumstances - neither out of greed, nor out of cowardice, nor out of lust for power, nor out of vanity - will he deviate from this goal. “Just as our Lord Jesus Christ bequeathed in a parable not to bury his talent given to you by the master,” the guardsmen say the ritual text, “so I will not bury in the ground that determination to defend my country and my people to the end that He gave me”. And further: “We are the watch that guards this land of the Lord; we are the shepherds who guard His sheep on this earth. The good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep, the Lord teaches us, and without doubt and sorrow we will give our lives for the country and people, because the Master of the sheep and pastures entrusted them to us. Otherwise, we will not find eternal life in heaven, and on earth eternal life is not promised to anyone.” By the way, this metaphor - the perception of oneself as shepherds - plays, along with the perception of oneself as a patrol, an important role in the mythology of the guardsmen: their class emblem has just such a meaning, although in fact it is a transformed meaning. The fact is that the very concept of “*oprichniki*” arose in the 16th century, under Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible, and they left a not good memory at all, being an all-Russian punitive detachment. Their emblem was a dog’s head and a broom, which meant “gnaw like dogs, clean like a broom” (in the sense of the king’s enemies). The current guardsmen (why they were called that - see part I, “History of Russia”) have a dog’s head like a shepherd’s, and the broom has turned into a shepherd’s crook, so the emblem now means “shepherd and protect”. Therefore, by the way, the dog is considered by the guardsmen to be a sacred class animal. They introduced the Imperial Law “On Dogs”, which established a very special status for dogs in the Russian Empire (like the status of cows in the Indian Confederation), prohibiting their killing, experiments on them, etc.; and if the guardsman sees someone on the street torturing a dog, he can kill him on the spot (this is part of the third vow, see below).

But back to the first vow. The *oprichnik* promises to protect not only the country and people, but also the faith and the Church: “The Church is the body of Christ, but I am a bodyguard. The Lord protects us, but we are obliged to defend His cause on earth.” Moreover, this is interconnected in the vow: the Empire is presented in it not as a place where the people entrusted to the guardsmen by the Lord himself live (or rather, not just as such a place), but as a religious value that has a truly cosmic significance. “The kingdom of the devil is anarchy and tyranny,” there are words in the vow, “and only a thin chain of our watch separates law, order and justice from this kingdom. If we don’t exist, there won’t be an Orthodox Empire pleasing to God.” It is important to understand here that each guardsman (and this is reflected in the first vow) is aware of himself as an autonomous and self-sufficient formidable combat unit: the point here is not so much that one guardsman in full combat gear (and it is stored at the place of residence of any guardsman - I will write about this in the chapter “Army”) has tremendous firepower, and in the fact that even without weapons and armor he is almost the same formidable force, because wherever there is civilization, he will take possession of the necessary weapon or he will make it - and where civilization is low, he does not need it. “My strength is in my comrades,” says the guardsman, “but the absence of living comrades will not stop me in my duty. As long as I live, the Empire stands, even if I am the last one left alive. In this feeling, the guardsmen fancifully intertwine extreme collectivism with extreme individualism, stoicism and fatalism with cosmic self-perception. Obviously, not only Orthodoxy contributes to this, but also the worldview of the distant pagan ancestors of the Russians, the Varangians, whose heirs the guardsmen consider themselves to be. The Vikings believed that in the last battle of the gods, Ragnarok, the gods and people would be defeated, and this could not be changed - but you still had to fight to the last. “I serve for the sake of service,” says the guardsman, “and not for the sake of victory.” And finally, the theme of selfless service occupies a very important place in the first vow: “I was not assigned to feed the flock, but for protection. The people were not created for my convenience, but I was

created to serve them, for this is the will of God.”

The second vow is the vow of moderation. In colloquial language, among the people, it is called a vow of poverty, but, as you will see from the following, the official name more accurately conveys its meaning. Interestingly, the vow of non-acquisitiveness that our Catholic monks take is, in terms of meaning, only a part of this vow. The essence of this vow is contempt for everything material: money, possessions, comforts and pleasures. The *oprichnik* swears not to accumulate money and not to think about it, not to acquire and not to have property at all, except for the most necessary for life and fulfillment of duty, and not to hold on to that and not be upset when it is lost. “Do not accumulate treasures for yourself on earth, for then your heart will be on earth, the Lord taught us,” says the guardsman, “and I promise to strictly follow this.” Moreover, everything is arranged in such a way that he may not think about money, because, becoming a guardsman, a person begins to receive a salary, which, as he knows, will not change until the end of his life (except for possible indexation). Its size - now it is 1,216 rubles a month, that is, about 5,000 of our dollars - is quite sufficient for a normal, although not rich, life, but the guardsmen, on the contrary, almost always have it, because they buy practically nothing from things and pay little for what. Judge for yourself: guardsmen do not buy apartments and houses - it is believed that this is prohibited by the second vow; they either live in dormitories, which I will talk about a little later, and do not pay anything for it, or they rent an apartment, which is paid for by the accounting department of their base. An *oprichnik* is not forbidden to rent a more expensive apartment than provided by the accounting department and pay the difference himself, but none of them could remember such cases (because, in their understanding, they do not need a comfortable apartment). They all use the same cars for free, which are called “Chestnut Impulse Station Wagon” and are a rather ugly, but large and powerful military off-road vehicle with a turbine; they are issued specifically for the army and the police, and their sale to anyone other than guardsmen, including legal entities, is prohibited. Although cars are considered common property (government property, as the Russians say), the guardsman can take a car for his own use and keep it at his place of residence. This happens not infrequently, but not too often, because guardsmen like to use public transport or walk the streets, considering this additional patrolling. Of clothes and shoes, they mostly wear civilian uniforms (see below), which are all free of charge, and other clothes are mainly used for “free search”, that is, covert patrols, and for this reason they are the most nondescript and cheap. Their medical care, of course, is free, since it is free in Russia for everyone, and if they have children, they don’t really worry about them either, because for every child who has at least one parent, an *oprichnik*, up to fifteen years old is issued allowance, now equal to 350 rubles per month; besides, secondary education in Russia is free, and higher education is largely free.

The usual entertainments of the *zemstvo*, such as cinema, video, sports competitions, casinos, discos, etc., are despised by the guardsmen, considering them decadence (they especially despise sports, considering it a parody of military skills); in fact, they spend money only on food, drink or drugs and on sex services. But in this they prefer everything simple and inexpensive, and this is not connected with money, but reflects their firm conviction that all expensive, perfect things and services are not just useless, but vile. Figuratively speaking, they believe that the exclusive twenty-year-old red wine is not just no better than cheap port, but worse. This is due to their idea that comfort and pleasure make a person dependent, that is, they enslave, and thus suck out of him the power, which for the guardsmen is a cult (on their class emblem, under a dog’s head and staff, the word “POWER” is written in large letters on the pennant). The vow contains the words: “I will not allow you to put on the yoke of wealth, which is heavier than the yoke of poverty; I will not let you put yourself in a golden cage, which is stronger than steel. I will not let the pleasures of this world drink strength from me, replacing it with effeminacy.” Now you understand, dear compatriots, why I wrote that the name “vow of moderation” is more accurate than “vow of poverty”: poverty is a characteristic of opportunities, and moderation - desires. It is also clear why this vow does not boil down to non-possessiveness: the absence of property in itself does not at all mean moderation in habits and contempt for comfort - the communist elite of the times of the late Second Empire in Russia

lived very widely, formally having almost no personal property. The same can be said about Russian criminal leaders, the so-called thieves in law. But let's get back to the material side of the guardsmen's life: another reason why they may not think about money is the presence of a system called "common fund". Simply put, the list of what the base pays for them is not closed. Let me explain with an example what this means: once I was talking to the guardsmen at their base, asking them about everything that interested me (by the way, they treated me quite friendly), and I heard a story about how one of them had arranged in what -an institution of a violent party, for which he could not pay. The institution immediately sent an electronic invoice to the base and received payment. To my question about whether he would have to give this money, the guardsmen shrugged their shoulders: if he wants, he will give it back, if he doesn't consider it necessary, no; no one will tell him anything if such excesses do not happen too often (in reality, of course, they will give him back). If he has a real need for large expenses that go beyond his financial capabilities, but not beyond the second vow (for example, plastic surgery or paid higher education for a girlfriend or child), the base will pay for this, even if it is a large amount - in the latter case, a decision on this will be made by their gathering, called the *oprichnina* meeting.

The third vow is the vow of honor. It contains, to summarize, all the essential moral norms and rules of behavior of the service class, which were not included in the first two vows. The *oprichnik* swears allegiance to the estate: "I have neither family nor home. The *oprichnina* is my family, and the Empire is my home." He promises never, voluntarily or involuntarily, not to offend or let down his comrades; to protect the life of another *oprichnik*, including at the cost of his own life, as well as all people of other classes. He vows never, under any circumstances, to raise his hand against another *oprichnik* and not to have enmity with him, and in case of hostility, simply break up with him. And vice versa, if someone kills another *oprichnik* other than in the war, he swears to avenge him and not stop in this until the death of the killers or his own. (The vow of revenge for one's own is very significant - because of it, they are afraid to get involved with guardsmen.) In the event of leaving or being expelled from the service class (although this is very rare, it happens), he swears not to use his strength against the interests of the state or his former class. He also promises to keep the estate and imperial honor before other estates, not to offend (at least defiantly) himself, the *oprichnina* and the Empire: "If someone deliberately insults me, my country or estate, I will not be offended, but I will punish". This "punishment", by the way, can mean the death of the offender in case of strong insult, therefore the people in Russia are very attentive to their words ("filters the bazaar", in colloquial Russian) in the presence of an *oprichnik* or a stranger who may turn out to be one. The guardsmen themselves promise: "I will never stoop to insulting anyone with words - the one who truly deserves it must be punished by action." Then comes the promise of equal treatment for everyone and everything, that is, in fact, non-discrimination on any grounds: to be equally responsible for everyone. And just as the watch cannot guard some places, and give up on others, so I promise not to hold any of the lands of the Empire closer to my heart, but everything is the same. The *oprichnik* also vows not to kill in excess of military or other state necessity: "The Lord commanded: do not kill, and if I kill someone who could not be killed to protect people, the state and faith, then I will be a violator of God's commandment." In general, the third vow is the longest, it contains a promise of intolerance towards any evil encountered, a promise of help to all, especially the vulnerable (the weak and wretched, children, the elderly, as well as dogs sacred to guardsmen), a promise of respect for the enemy who has shown valor, and much more in the same spirit. It is important that the third vow, oddly enough, is the most important, at least taking precedence over the first two; it contains the words: "I will never give up my [?] and common honor either for service or for moderation." But there is nothing surprising here - the Russian worldview is to a large extent characterized by the phrase "Truth is where they act honestly." To dishonor oneself is the most terrible thing one can think of for an *oprichnik*, much more terrible than not coping with some kind of service or even protecting someone, and even more so much more terrible than death, which they are not particularly afraid of; I say with confidence that there is no thing in nature for the sake of which the guardsman will deliberately go to dishonor.

Having made vows - and each of them begins with the words: "I promise before God and people ...", - the guardsman goes through two special Orthodox sacraments: wedding service and anointing. These sacraments have never been performed and are not performed by the Church, at least in this form, over ordinary people, but only over kings - this corresponds to the status of guardsmen as a collective king. The wedding is a symbolic laying on of the crown, the same as at the wedding on marriage, only the connection does not take place with the spouse, but with the country. Anointing is performed for the third time (the first for the Orthodox takes place immediately after baptism, and the second corresponds to our Catholic confirmation and takes place at the age of fifteen) and means the indulgence of the special gifts of the Holy Spirit necessary for the oprichnary service, and ends with the communion of the newly anointed at the altar as the defender of the Church. After that, the guardsman is handed a personal card, personal full combat equipment and two sets of civilian uniforms, and this is where the ceremony ends, at least its solemn part: everyone congratulates the newly-made guardsman and goes to celebrate - the guardsmen call this event "registration", and the feast itself, like any class feast, is called by the Russians "*bratchina*". This is how the service begins (not training, but work, although both of them are called service), which continues until the death of the guardsman: no matter how difficult it may be for us to believe in this, compatriots, Russian guardsmen have neither the concept of a pension nor the concept of disability. For a weakened guardsman - from old age or injury - a suitable job is sought: I myself saw a female guardsman who had no right arm and no legs (the injury occurred long before the introduction of regeneration therapy), and she worked as a remote operator of an unmanned interceptor fighter with the help of interface made especially for her. The rest treated her as an equal comrade, not pretending that they did not notice her injury, but also not concentrating on it - for example, they took to all their drinks, but brought her a glass and a snack; she looked as happy as can be. If the illness or injury of the guardsman is such that for a long time he cannot do any work - until recovery or until death - then he is considered for this time to be simply being cured. Therefore, now, after my personal observations, I consider the guardsmen's favorite phrase: "Service is life, and life is service" - not a metaphor, but a completely literal truth.

Life and service. How do guardsmen live and serve? They prefer to live in hostels, which are something like a cheap hotel or motel, usually with "two rooms - one shared bathroom" blocks. Rooms are for one and for two; a kitchen (which, however, is rarely used) and a dining room - on the floor. On one of the floors there is a common dining room, with a kitchen with cooks - it is often used: guardsmen are drawn to each other, so they like to eat together, for the same reason they relatively rarely rent apartments. There are brotherhoods every Sunday in the dining room; however, once every three weeks, that is, twice, the charter orders each guardsman to come to the brethren to the *zemstvo*. Guardsmen work in the police or special services or in the civil administration. Naturally, only imperial institutions are implied - *zemstvo* employees work in local administrations and law enforcement services, because these are *zemstvo* institutions.

The army men live and serve, as we do, separately, at military bases; however, about once every ten years they are supposed to go to work in another sphere for at least three years - from the army to the police, from the police to the civil service, etc. All this also applies to senior officials: the usual situation is when the guardsman a year ago was a minister, and now a police inspector or a naval sailor, and not because of poor work results, but because of their class conviction: it is more important to be the right guardsman than the best professional. I met with the famous Boris Fetisov, who was a minister four times, twice commander of an expeditionary corps, and twice commander-in-chief of the armed forces; now, at 66, he works as a police investigator in Constantinople, and the following year he is sent as an inspector for the construction of the polar coastal rampart. Of course, those guardsmen who have shown themselves to be capable leaders will basically continue to serve in leadership positions, because they don't scatter their talents, but they will serve in different areas so as not to "sit down". However, even in this case, the responsible service of the guardsman will certainly alternate with ordinary posts from time to time.

Moreover, from two weeks to a month a year, guardsmen work on public works, such as road construction: in addition to replenishing the “*obshchak*¹⁶”, this is designed to help ensure that they are not brought before the people. When I asked the commander of the squad (in our opinion, the battalion) Otto Merkel, why is the feeling of well-deserved superiority over others bad, he briefly answered me: “It sucks strength.”

Once a year for a month and once every three years for three months, the guardsmen go to the camp for retraining, and they are very fond of these camp stints. Guardsmen go to the gym at least twice a week to keep fit. On the rest of the weekdays, guardsmen, as a rule, work a lot, since they usually do not have a family. Then they either communicate with each other in a cafe or in a hostel, or read: the guardsmen love to read and read a lot, and mostly quite smart books, since everyone has received a good education and refreshes it during retraining. They often discuss what they have read among themselves and discuss various topics. If they have nothing to do, then in their room they fall into meditation for many hours, since they are all trained in this - for this reason they are never bored. On weekdays, guardsmen usually do not abuse alcohol. But their favorite entertainment, which is, in essence, a continuation of their work, is the so-called free search. The *oprichnik* wanders around the city, goes into all sorts of places, rides public transport, trying not to attract attention (in Russian, “pretending to be a rag”), and looks out for some kind of disorder - someone insults someone or attacks someone etc. - which, of course, is immediately stopped. The trick here is not to be recognized as an *oprichnik* - with their appearance, this is not easy, even without a uniform.

In appearance, guardsmen, as a rule, differ from other people: simply put, they are larger. They have large muscle mass, capable of running with an eighty-kilogram load of equipment; to avoid imbalances, their height is usually adjusted for weight. *Oprichnik* men usually have a height of 195-210 cm and a weight of 110-140 kg; women, as a rule, are ten centimeters lower and 15-20 kg lighter. There is no need to say that their bodies are pure muscles, without a drop of fat, moreover, they have been developed by complex loads, and not on simulators or sports grounds, and therefore it is more evenly distributed than that of athletes. Now, I hope, it is clear what the creative element of “free search” consists in - it is not so easy for them not to attract attention.

However, the external differences of the guardsmen are not limited to size - they have a peculiar facial expression, so calm that their face seems inactive; they do not have bright and strongly pronounced facial expressions, just as there are no external outbursts of emotions at all. Their gaze is also characteristic - not running and almost not blinking, and therefore seeming to be turned not at the interlocutor, but somewhere in the distance. Such features, apparently, are the result of a certain psychological state, which the guardsmen achieve as a result of both training in special mental techniques and the way of life in general.

The civilian uniform of the guardsmen that they usually wear (except at work, if that requires a uniform, and during the “free search”), is also worthy of mention. Its style is arbitrary, but black is obligatory, and the bottom (trousers, skirts or trousers of overalls) must have silver stripes on the sides, and the top must have silver galloons. Shoes can also be any, but certainly black and with silver heels (usually they are covered with real silver). A special law forbids everyone, except guardsmen, from selling and owning clothes of this color and shoes with silver heels. I must say that the giant of any gender in black and silver clothes and shoes looks spectacular. Therefore, among the *zemstvo* - both men and women - it is considered prestigious (“cool”) to have a mistress or lover-*oprichnik*, either one-time or permanent, and therefore guardsmen, unlike the cadet period of their lives, do not often deal with hired sex workers.

Guardsmen do not often acquire families, although after taking vows this is a personal matter for everyone. Such a circumstance is not the result of a desire for a wild life or an unwillingness to take responsibility - rather, it is an unwillingness to have weaknesses that will reduce your strength. After all, it is much more difficult for a person burdened with a family to go to death - he knows that, leaving loved

ones, becomes a source of grief for them. Yes, and to realize the second vow - to treat the material side of life with disdain - is much more difficult for a family person. So the rejection of the family is for the guardsman a voluntary deprivation of himself of one more joy of life for the sake of his main business and destiny. But even those families that nevertheless arise among the guardsmen are quite rarely formed with the *zemstvo*. I talked for a long time and quite confidentially with one 46-year-old *oprichnik* woman - Svetlana, nicknamed the Fighter, at the time of our conversation - a patrol policeman. Those who like, to put it mildly, large women (Svetlana is 198 cm tall and 102 kg in weight) would call her beautiful. She told me that she still has two children - an 8-year-old son from a guardsman who is now fighting Islamists on the southern borders, and a 13-year-old daughter from a *zemstvo* industrialist. Both children live with her mother in Moscow, but the daughter's father often sees her, and this worries her. I asked Svetlana why he was so unpleasant to her that she was against him seeing his daughter? No, Svetlana answered, she likes him, he is a good guy, and she meets with him at any opportunity. She does not mind at all that he sees his daughter, but she hopes that her daughter will go to the guardsmen at the age of 15, and the father of the *zemstvo* may unwittingly lead her astray. When I asked her, apologizing for possible stupidity, why shouldn't she marry him and live with him and her daughter together (then no one will lead her astray) - or is she fundamentally against this? She was unbelievably surprised. "No, I don't mind having a normal family with someone," she said, recovering herself, "but with a *zemstvo*? .." It was said in such a way that I understood - and you understand, dear compatriots: guardsmen and *zemstvo* - these are practically different biological species, although they are similar in appearance and capable of interbreeding. This is the very essence of the Russian class.

Position in the country. You ask, dear compatriots, what do members of the service class receive as compensation for all the difficulties and restrictions that they voluntarily accept? Many have probably already understood this from the previous text: all power in the Empire belongs to them and only to them - and this is the uniqueness of the Russian political system. The Constitution says: "The highest sovereign of the Russian Empire is the service class. It elects from itself the supreme official of the Russian Empire - the emperor, as well as all other high officials. To occupy all other positions in the state, military and internal service of the Russian Empire, members of the service class (guardsmen) have absolute priority. And besides a special position in the Empire, guardsmen have nothing for their service; this is fundamentally important - as they say themselves: there is no other way to select those who care about the country for the sake of the country and service for the sake of service. And surprisingly, dear compatriots, for the sake of an illusory belonging to the great Empire, for the sake of serving the idea, but in fact, for the sake of the opportunity to lay down their heads after a dreary life in poverty and wandering around the barracks, hundreds of thousands of young and not very young people annually leave their often very prosperous life and go for guardsmen. In the first years after 2013, when the *oprichnina* had just appeared, there were queues at the checkpoints of those for whom ordinary life, apparently, was categorically not suitable for something.

How do other citizens of Russia treat guardsmen? The attitude of the clergy to the service class is clearly good. Many representatives of the Orthodox Church believe that although murders (even if they are enemies of the state), drunkenness and fornication do not color the guardsmen, their religiosity, disinterestedness and firm defense of the faith and the Church, comparable to that of the clergy themselves, cannot but bribe. The rest of the people have a difficult attitude towards the guardsmen; the murmuring "why on earth they rule us" is clearly there, but it is somewhat restrained by the understanding that anyone can enter "they" at any time - this is a matter of choice, and nothing more. There is almost no perception of guardsmen as defenders of life and shelter, because at the moment Russia has no strong obvious enemies - neither internal nor external. It wasn't always like this (and probably won't always be), but who remembers that? Basically, an attitude of aloof and fearful hostility dominates, so that if now, in 2053, the existing Constitution of Russia were to be put to a referendum with the participation of all citizens, not even a quarter would support it. But the fact of the matter is that no

one, except for guardsmen, can participate in referendums (meaning in political referendums - everyone participates on other issues). The *oprichniki* care very little about how the people treat them and constitutional principles, and this, in turn, does not add to the love of the *zemstvos* for them. However, this antipathy is clearly mixed with a vague, barely conscious, but clearly present envy - although there seems to be absolutely nothing to envy. The point, apparently, is that the principles of the service class are consonant with the very deep unconscious archetypes of the Russian people as a whole - in contrast to the articulated generally accepted ideas, which they clearly contradict. On an unconscious level, for so many, guardsmen are the best part of themselves. Therefore, the largest public organization in Russia, ORION (Order of the *oprichnina* People Sharing the Ideals), commonly called "sympathizers", has almost 30 million people. They take only the first and third vows (this has no constitutional significance and is just a game from the point of view of the law). Sympathizers spend a lot of free time (often the main part) with the *oprichniki*, participate in their fraternities and often work together with them, and if not, then they purely voluntarily contribute part of their earnings to the *oprichniki* "common fund"; not very frequent marriages between guardsmen and *zemstvo* occur mainly with sympathizers. *Oprichniki* treat sympathizers well and are happy to take them to work, sometimes quite responsible, in law enforcement or civil administration, although guardsmen have an absolute priority for occupying any position in the public service. Sympathizers get into army structures much less often, mainly because of the big difference in physical condition. On the whole, I am not sure that such a system (I mean the *oprichnina* estate) would have taken root - let alone emerged - anywhere other than Russia: in fact, there is a lot of the deeply Russian in it.

Russian service class in comparison with the medieval. As a historian and sociologist, it was very interesting for me to compare the class system existing in Russia with the feudal one - the point of view that in Russia we see in essence the revenge of feudalism is very common among us. With regret, I must say, colleagues, that this is the fruit of either a poor understanding of the subject, or wishful thinking (the latter - because the authors who adhere to such a position maliciously conclude on its basis that the historical collapse is imminent). Of course, estates are usually associated with feudalism (although in ancient and pre-ancient times it was just as visibly expressed), and its clash and capitulation to emerging capitalism was to a large extent connected precisely with the presence of estates. But the differences between this system in Russia and the feudal system - I believe there are five of them - are, in my opinion, fundamental and lead to directly opposite conclusions about the stability of the Russian political system as a whole. Let's analyze this using the example of the most important and illustrative component - the service class, which I will compare with the same class under feudalism (feudal lords and knights - under the early, service nobility - under the late).

Firstly, unlike feudal lords, they become guardsmen not according to hereditary, but according to a voluntary criterion open to everyone, and this leads to a number of significant differences. Under feudalism, talented, energetic and power-hungry young people from the common people or the third estate basically do not have the opportunity to enter the elite, at least the power-military one, and the potential of many of them is directed to fight against the regime - and in Russia such people have no need to fight the regime, because nothing prevents them from becoming guardsmen. For the same reason, the envy of the people towards the service class, in principle, cannot cross a certain line: do you envy? - join the guardsmen yourself, and there is nothing special to envy there, unlike the times of feudalism. In addition, the hereditary system is not a filter, therefore, in each next generation of nobility and kings, no selection occurs - and therefore, degeneration occurs, which took place; among guardsmen, the selection takes place constantly - both at the level of entry into the estate, and at the level of election of officials.

Secondly, in the Russian service class, for the first time in the recorded history of mankind, power and wealth are separated (an unsuccessful attempt at such separation was made in the same Russia during the Red Empire), and completely, while under feudalism, belonging to the nobility meant concentration of power and wealth at the same time. This is fundamentally important, because power and wealth are

incompatible in their essence - power is from the spirit, and wealth is from the body. Therefore, under feudalism, wealth has always corrupted power (it cannot act on power otherwise), and this does not threaten the *oprichnina* estate. By the way, such a thing as fighting spirit, in a broad sense, is also from the category of power, and wealth affects it in the same way - the guardsmen are not threatened by this either. But the disunity of power and wealth serves another equally important goal - it makes the class system fair in the eyes of the *zemstvo*. Instead of the medieval notion of the nobility “everything is for you, but nothing for us”, in modern Russia the tax-paying estate argues as follows: well, you have power - but we have wealth. That is, it perceives its lack of political rights not as an infringement, but as a division of labor in the state - one thing for one, another for another. It is also important that the rather modest way of life (in the material sense) of the guardsmen does not turn them into a serious burden for the country’s economy, unlike feudalism: the tax burden on the people and business in Russia is relatively small (see the chapter “Economy”).

Thirdly, the absence of a feud and a clan in general in the feudal sense allows members of the service class to experience each other not with suspicion, like among the feudal nobility, but with camaraderie and mutual sympathy. Moreover, because of the rejection of everything material and their attitude to the service, they have nothing to share - and feudalism was ruined by civil strife, which could not be, and the hatred of everyone for everyone and everyone for everyone arising from them.

Fourthly, already under late feudalism, the military power of the nobility was based not so much on knights as on militias, consisting of people of a completely different (moreover, potentially hostile) class, and this predetermined their weakness in the inter-class clash. In the days of early feudalism, there was no need for soldiers, the force was fully provided by the baron with vassals (in the Russian version - by the prince with a retinue), so he was absolutely stable as a system. Judge for yourself what the *oprichniki*, who in themselves make up 100% of the country’s military force, are analogous to.

Fifthly, the feudal lords felt themselves the masters of the country, appointed by God, and when the country (in the sense of the usual order) began to crumble, they could not help but be confused: this is especially clearly seen in the example of the French Revolution. And the guardsmen feel like God-given watch, not masters, and when everything around starts to collapse, it will be for them what they always expect and what they see the meaning of their existence in - there is nothing to be demoralized from, rather the opposite.

So I consider the Russian political system built on estates to be absolutely stable in the foreseeable future, especially since the ability to change while remaining itself is inherent in it. Acting as a separator, it will continue to separate sheep from goats, warriors in spirit from ordinary people, turning potential enemies of the regime into its mainstay; and this separation is such, from the point of view of personality types, that those who have not become guardsmen will not become dangerous enemies of the state. Of course, there will be crises and even uprisings - they, in fact, have already taken place (see the chapter “Recent History of Russia”) - but the guardsmen will drown any riots in blood, and with pleasure, because for them (remember the first vow!) it will be a duel with the devil. I can’t imagine who and what can shake, and even more so sweep away the *oprichnina* power - by the way, contrary to what we think, it’s not at all bloody and not at all repressive.

Before turning to the story about the clergy, dear compatriots, I hope that you understand why I started the story about the estate from the second, service, estate and why I devoted the main part of this story to them.

Clergy

Priests. The clergy, the most revered [class] in the Russian Empire (it, and not the servants, is called the first), which many believers consider the true shield of Russia, includes the clergy only of the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church (EROC). The clergy of other religions, including highly respected ones (for

example, Ravilite Islam), belong to the *zemstvo* by class, and the peculiarities of their status are regulated by separate laws, and not directly by the Constitution, as in the first estate.

The clergy consists of five groups: deacons, presbyters, monks (among them there are also deacons and presbyters, but special ones), bishops, they are also bishops, and church people. Presbyters, who are also priests, are those who themselves perform the sacraments, and the deacons of all three levels (deacons, protodeacons, and archdeacons) serve the priests during the celebration of the sacraments, just as [we¹⁷](#) do. After 2017, as a result of the church reform, women can be deacons without restrictions, who in this case are called deaconesses, and there are quite a lot of them. Both deacons and presbyters can be both from the white clergy (that is, those who do not take monastic vows) or from the black, that is, from monks - in this case they are called hierodeacons and hieromonks. A monk who has been ordained a deacon or priest, or a widowed deacon or priest who has been tonsured a monk, can become such. Priests from the white clergy must be married. An unmarried priest can be - for example, if he is a widower (a second marriage is forbidden to priests) or simply does not want to get married - but in this case he must take a vow of celibacy, as we Catholics do for all priests. All this applies in exactly the same way to deacons and deaconesses. The priestly rank, like the deacons, is also divided into three levels: presbyters, protopresbyters and archpriests. Previously, there were no archpresbyters, but now they are called priests who provide deanery in a number of parishes, usually from 1 to 10% of the diocese (they are referred to as dean, and earlier they were called that), as well as rectors of patriarchal and metropolitan churches.

It should be said that now the priest in the EROC in his main business - the celebration of the sacraments - is completely canonically independent, in contrast to previous times. This means that, although the principle of hierarchy exists and is strictly observed in relation to both divine services and organizational issues of church life, it does not apply to the celebration of the sacraments. The point is not that the sacrament is considered perfect without any approval by the bishop and he cannot cancel it - it has always been so. But now the bishop cannot bless the priest (that is, in fact, order him) to allow such and such a communion if the priest does not wish it, or, conversely, not bless the wedding or baptism of such and such. Of course, the priest is obliged, when performing the sacraments, to be guided by the rules approved by the Patriarchate (or at certain points by the metropolis and even the diocese). For example, in accordance with the decisions of the Archpastoral Council of 2029, he cannot refuse a wedding on the grounds that one of the spouses is married in a state marriage: this does not concern the Church, and if he is not married, he can get married. But these are general rules, for violation of which the priest will be banned from serving, and the specific decision within their framework remains entirely with him. This is a consequence of the conscious course that the Church, then still the Russian Orthodox Church, took to increase the role of presbyters (that is, priests), a course that became inevitable after a sharp increase in its role and significance in the public life of the country in the 10s, and especially in the 20s, years.

Before the VIII Ecumenical Council, and especially after it, a discussion began in the Church about allowing women to be ordained to the priesthood, at least nuns. The Patriarchate treated and treats these discussions very tolerantly, because they are initiated not by the so-called Renovators, who were recognized as heretics at the VIII Council and anathematized (see the chapter "[Religion](#)"), but by completely ecclesiastical, conservative people. The source of doubts of this kind is now not at all a general liberal creed, but a fundamental theological disagreement: the fact is that any priest to a certain extent represents the Savior himself, since he performs the sacraments in His name and unites and resolves with the authority given by Him. This is what has always been the main argument for the fact that a priest cannot be a woman - the Savior became a man; could it be otherwise, we do not know, but the fact is. However, Abbot Roman, a seminary professor at the Alexander Nevsky Lavra, wrote a work back in 2019 in which he questioned this argument. His main thesis was the following: in the Son of God, as is known, two natures are merged in the Chalcedonian style - Divine and human. The masculine gender has human nature - God has no gender, because He is a spirit. But the human body of the Savior (not glorified, that is, before the Resurrection) did not possess any special properties - unlike the pagan gods, it

did not differ in either mighty strength, or indescribable beauty, or special invulnerability. Yes, it could not be otherwise: the Savior came down from heaven and became human not in order to increase His strength, but in order to dilute it with human weakness - otherwise it would not be possible to sacrifice Himself, ours for the sake of salvation. The priest who performs the sacraments does something supernatural and, therefore, represents the Divine, and not the human, nature of the Son. For the Arians, who deny His Divine nature and recognize only the created earthly nature, Abbot Roman wrote, the ban on consecration of women would be quite natural. And we, if we are offended and follow this path, should then ordain exclusively Jews, or at least circumcised ones - after all, by human nature, the Savior was a circumcised Jew.

Since all the followers of Abbot Roman are completely loyal to the Church and did not support the Renovators at the VIII Council in any way – on the contrary, Roman himself was the head of the theological working group that prepared an opinion against them and their teachings – the Patriarchate, as I have already said, considers this discussion not an assault on the foundations, but a normal theological dispute. The current Patriarch of Russia and Ecumenical Nicholas spoke about this topic about eight years ago: “Do you remember, brothers and sisters, how Christ denounced the Pharisees: why do you transgress the commandment of God for the sake of your tradition? And he commemorated Isaiah, who also denied the commandments and customs of men in God’s deeds. That is why to say, like some of us, that, they say, there are traditions, fathers and grandfathers had this way, is worthless. We must look into this, with humility praying to God that He sent down to us to know the truth, and the truth will make us free. Nevertheless, although this question has been around for about thirty years, so far everything remains the same - the Church is still a very conservative organism and should not be otherwise. On the other hand, what is thirty years for the Church? At the same time, it is interesting that the believing women themselves - both deaconesses, and nuns, and laywomen - do not show any activity in this matter and are not at all its driving force. Probably, if it were not so, the attitude to this discussion would not be so benevolent - the Church does not tolerate the upholding of [group interests](#)¹⁸. I think, however, that in our century this question will find its positive solution.

Financially, the clergy live quite modestly. According to statistics for 2052, the average income of a priest was 1,154 rubles per month, including 1,816 rubles for abbots (all this, together with income from performing rites), and 813 rubles for deacons (including deaconesses). And although at the same time they do not pay taxes, they spend a significant part of this income not on themselves, but on church needs, especially abbots. The position of the dioceses in relation to parish priests, except in special cases, is this: almost everything that you earn remains with you - but also make all expenses out of your own. Therefore, the income of rectors indicated in statistical reports is largely uninformative - its disposable part is overestimated. But this is not very significant, because the priests in any case take a vow of non-acquisitiveness, which is now very strict and, in particular, includes the renunciation of any luxury in any part of life, regardless of whose expense it is. That is, the clergy do not live in a monastic way, but quite modestly - both in terms of material possibilities and in accordance with a vow. But the class as a whole believes that this is how it should live - with any other option, a string of people would have reached there, thirsting first of all for comfort and prosperity. That is, the clergy, like the service class, sees in the initially fixed poverty the only guarantee of the purity of the ranks and the guarantee of strength.

Monasticism also underwent certain changes as a result of the church reform: the principle was proclaimed that the main thing in monasticism for the acquisition of the Holy Spirit is not only the rejection of the carnal, but also the departure from the world. This does not mean softening the living conditions for the brethren - no one canceled or softened either monastic vows or monastic charters - but contacts with the outside world were severely limited. Now you will not meet, in contrast to pre-reform times, a hieromonk serving as a priest in a city parish and living in a city apartment - this is considered monasticism not true, but feigned, even if he lives on bread and water. Solitude from the world with its temptations, vanity and earthiness, even in relatively believing Russia, can only give special strength to

monastic prayer, the Orthodox Church believes - and this is one of the pillars on which faith in the country and the country itself stands. Therefore, even those monks who are active in the world by the nature of their activity, including the aforementioned hieromonks (priests and abbots of secular parishes), most often still live in a monastery; this also applies to bishops (see below). An exception is going on a journey for several years - this was practiced with blessing before, but now it has become an obligatory obedience for monks who have no contraindications to this. Now it is believed that it will be useful for the world if monks walk in it, reminding people by their example of salvation and deeds for the glory of God. For this reason, monks are sent on a journey, not just tonsured, but already strengthened in the faith.

Even access to the monasteries of the laity, to shrines or to services, is now limited in most places to certain days; and archimandrites try to profess such laity as married priests living at the monastery or in the district, and not hieromonks. All this is aimed at the same thing - to make the departure from the world more complete for the monks. In general, there are many monasteries in Russia, and their number, as well as the number of monks, is constantly growing, which is surprising for a very prosperous country; moreover, sociological studies clearly show that more often people go to monasteries not out of need or turmoil, but rather the opposite. Someone is seized by remorse and unbearable shame for the former life, someone becomes unbearably disgusted by the petty fuss of the surrounding reality, and someone simply hears the call to a quiet and silent life, which cannot be brushed aside - but obviously very few people, unlike in the Middle Ages, he goes to a monastery to hide behind its walls from hunger and the horrors of worldly life. Maybe that's why monks and nuns are very loved in Russia, many even settle near monasteries to communicate with monks and help them with money and work - they are called monastic lovers (monastic restrictions do not apply to communication with them); often, though by no means always, they are members of the community (see below). Even more common is the so-called labor, when a person or a group of people comes to a monastery for one or two months, lives, works and goes to the service together with the monks. In many universities and institutes, including the most prestigious ones, this is accepted or at least considered good form for all first and second year students during the summer holidays.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of monasteries in the life of the Church and the life of the Empire as a whole. We are accustomed to the fact that monasteries and monastic orders are centers of theology and learning in general; this is probably the case in Russia, but this is far from the most important thing. Russians quite sincerely believe that the country lives not only “not by bread alone”, but also not by strength alone: most of them are sure that only God's good will does not allow Russia to fall. Polls show that 78% of the population of the Empire, including more than 90% among Russians, Germans and other allied peoples, consider the events of 2019-2020 to be a direct manifestation of the Lord's will. More than 60% do not doubt that the Lord sent his Archangel Gabriel to Earth to help Russia, and this is the late Emperor Gabriel the Great. One might think that the reason for this lies in the fact that even though the Russians made enough efforts for their victory, it did not require special sacrifices - but no, polls about the Great Patriotic War show the same thing, where the Russians paid with their blood an unprecedented price. In rating polls, where several reasons can be indicated, 69% name the heroism and sacrifice of the Russian people as the main factor in the Victory, 68% - the leadership of Joseph the Great, and 74% - the intercession of the Virgin. Moreover, it is believed that simple monks begged for this intercession, like St. Seraphim of Vyritsky; and others remained completely unknown to people - well, nothing, God knows. Even guardsmen, who, in theory, should consider themselves the defense of the country, share such views. Emperor Vasily V, a deeply pious man, once said: “We, guardsmen, are the sword of the Empire, but its shield is the cover of the Virgin and the prayer of the righteous.” And that is why monasteries for Russians are, first of all, not theological centers, but a source of such prayer.

Bishops are the ruling part of the clergy, who have the right to the sacrament of ordination of priests and new bishops - the chain of ordination of bishops has not been interrupted since the time of the apostles Peter and Paul. Previously, before the reform, only a monk could be a bishop, that is, the episcopate

belonged to the black clergy; now it can be both a monk and a representative of the white clergy. This point caused, along with the ordination of women, the most heated controversy during the reform; The point here, among other things, is that back in the 1990s and 2000s there was a movement of so-called Renovationists who, in fact, advocated turning the Church into a kind of interest club, like many Protestants. Traditionally minded Orthodox circles absolutely did not accept them, as did the Patriarchate, namely, the Renovationists were the loudest advocates of the transition to a married episcopate. But since the reform was initiated and even more so carried out not by them, but, on the contrary, by the most conservative circles of the Church (St. Cyril was always considered their spiritual leader), but by the moral support of her anti-liberal, including in church matters, Emperor Gabriel the Great - what is one thing worth only the introduction of the constitutional principle of Orthodoxy as a state religion! - then the supporters of the reform managed to dissociate themselves from the Renovationists and convince the rest. The main canonical argument was that this was the case in the early period of the Church's existence (see, for example, the Apostle Paul: "Let the bishop be the husband of one wife," that is, monogamous), and one of the two most revered saints in Russia, Nicholas the miracle worker, Archbishop of Mirliki, was married. The topical argument was that the Church is losing many of the most worthy archpastors, who are not at all of little faith, they would be tonsured with joy - but they are already married, and there is no divorce in Orthodoxy (except in the case of adultery of a spouse). Many prominent hierarchs are known who were married and then tonsured (including St. Alexis, Patriarch of Moscow), divorced or widowed - and if this had not happened? But even more important was the argument that the existing order breeds false monks - many are tonsured to a large extent due to the fact that only tonsure opens the way to the highest levels of the hierarchy; this also explains the fact that for many hierarchs the way of life in housing, food, etc. was far from monastic, and all this weakens the Church. As a result, a compromise solution was adopted: the episcopate does not become a white clergy, but can be either white or black. It was understood that at first, for some indefinite period, it would be possible to make bishops and married priests, but the monks would have priority in this. And so it happened - in fact, as of today, 2054, slightly more than three-quarters of the bishops are monks, and the rest are married. But now all the bishops who are monks are really so - they live in monasteries, and not in special chambers, but in about the same cells as the brethren, they eat the same way, etc. Moreover, this happened naturally, as Patriarch Kirill wanted - it's just that for those who are burdened by a truly monastic life, there is no longer a need to take tonsure in order to become a hierarch.

The hierarchy of bishops, or bishops, became clearer after the reform: the ruling bishop of a diocese is called an archbishop, and the so-called vicar bishops who help him are simply bishops. The ruling bishop of the metropolis, of which there are only twenty-four in the Empire and which usually consist of 10-20 dioceses, is called a metropolitan, in which, in addition to vicar bishops, there is one vicar archbishop. There are two more exarchs, Serbian and German: the first is the ruling bishop of the metropolia (he is the only one in the Serbian exarchate), and the second leads the three metropolitanates that are part of the German exarchate, despite the fact that he himself has the rank of metropolitan (an exarch is a position, not a dignity). The head of the Church is called the Ecumenical Patriarch, with him there is one vicar metropolitan, who is also ex officio manager of the affairs of the Patriarchate, and vicar bishops and archbishops. Large monasteries are also led by bishops - this has been going on since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the combination is not allowed now: the patriarch does not personally rule any metropolis or diocese, the metropolitans do not personally rule any of the dioceses included in the metropolis and do not themselves (like other bishops) head parishes, monasteries or religious educational institutions. Thus, in the divine service now, during the liturgy, the doxologies are pronounced not of two bishops, as before, but of three: "Our primate, Patriarch of the Russian and Ecumenical name, and our lord, metropolitan such and such a name, and our sovereign, archbishop such - then the name follows, may God remember in His Kingdom. In addition to the diocesan councils, there are now also metropolitan councils, which include all the bishops of the metropolitanate, as well as the dean's hierarchs, by rank.

From the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, there have been significant changes in the position of bishops in the Church. Before that, provided that they remained faithful to Orthodoxy and the Patriarchate, in all other respects they were practically uncontrollable. This was expressed in a number of ways: a significant number of them lived in luxury, and often in sin, not at all like a monastic, and turned a blind eye to this; many, without hesitation, unjustly enriched themselves in their dioceses and accumulated considerable fortunes, they also turned a blind eye to this; very often they did not at all act in the spirit of brotherly love and even ordinary justice, but, on the contrary, treated the clergymen subordinate to them in the spirit of despotism and arbitrariness; etc. This did not apply to all archpastors, and even, probably, not to the majority - very many were worthy adornments of the Church - but to a considerable number. Of course, for the Orthodox Church, any modernistic manifestations were unacceptable, and therefore there could be no talk of any form of accountability of the bishop to the flock: the bishop should answer only to God and the patriarch - then it will be good for the flock. But on the other hand, it is well known from secular and ecclesiastical history that unlimited arbitrariness towards inferiors inevitably leads to evil intentions against superiors. Therefore, having become stronger, the rulers always limited their princes (satraps, boyars, etc.), and the church leaders - hierarchs: otherwise disaster cannot be avoided. The story of Vladyka Philaret should have been a wake-up call for the Russian Church, but it didn't. In 1992, the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church dismissed this primate of the Ukrainian Church as part of the Russian Orthodox Church for unworthy behavior damaging the Church, but it was too late - he went into schism and brought great disasters to the Russian Church and the Russian state. But even earlier everyone knew that he lived in luxury with a common-law wife and children and treated the clergy as serfs. It would seem that a simple lesson should be drawn - that archpastors are not all saints, especially since the Orthodox do not have a dogma about the infallibility of even a patriarch (unlike us Catholics), so it seems that it is not difficult to internally accept this; but they didn't extract it, they attributed everything to the specifics of Ukraine. But in the second half of the 2000s and the first half of the 10s, three more ruling hierarchs (two metropolitans and one archbishop) tried to go into schism in Russia itself, though unsuccessfully; and all three before that were distinguished by the same sins. It was already necessary to respond to this, if only for the sake of guaranteeing the preservation of the unity of the Church in the future.

The Patriarchate has taken both organizational and spiritual measures. The first mainly concerned changes in the functioning of the bishops' court. Prior to that, a cleric's complaint against a bishop had invariably and undoubtedly been decided by this court in favor of the bishop, and it would not be easy for the patriarch to force them to decide otherwise - all the members of the court were themselves bishops. Yes, and encouraging clergy to litigate with archpastors is completely inconsistent with the mood of the Orthodox Church - the inequality of its children seems natural and correct, as a result of various gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Patriarchate chose a slightly different path: now if a cleric wrote a complaint against a bishop that did not end with a request to resolve the issue in his, the clergyman's favor, but simply pointing to the bishop's misbehavior (that is, a denunciation), then the question is transferred to the newly created investigative department of the Patriarchate. When he completes the investigation and submits it to the bishops' court (if the facts were confirmed), this is done on behalf of the department, as a rule, even without indicating the name of the complainant - it is much more difficult to ignore. Moreover, the clergy were informed that by filing such complaints against the archpastor (without personal demands), they were doing a good deed for the Church.

But simultaneously with the strengthening of the control and judicial functions, the patriarch personally brought to practically all the bishops: no excesses in food and drink, no luxurious chambers, no representative limousines. Much has been given to you, but much is asked of you, besides, you are monks. At the same time, the patriarch himself set an example, referring the above requirements to his own way of life - by that time the Church had strengthened enough so that the authority of the primate no longer depended on the external tinsel that the people love so much. It was also brought to the attention of

the bishops: the love of power is an even more serious sin than the love of luxury. “Christ washed the feet of His disciples,” said the patriarch, “and you should not treat those whose priest you are differently.” All this did not come immediately, but gave results: today, the ruling bishops in the vast majority are absolute and strict bosses, but loving and not absurd. The strengthening of the role of priests mentioned above could not have happened without this.

Church people. If in the Middle Ages only the priesthood constituted the clergy, then in the modern Russian Empire community members also belong to it: these are the laity, for whom the Church and church life are, however, the main content and center of their life. They either work in their parish church or give it part of their earnings if they work on the side (typically a pyatina, i.e. 20%); but their duties on arrival are not limited to this - they also do any other work in the church, as well as in the framework of charitable activities.

They take a vow, like guardsmen and clergy: about obedience, about strict observance of Christ’s commandments and church institutions, about non-acquisitiveness, about perceiving the suffering of others as their own, about being ready to give all their property and time to help others, etc. In essence, this is monks and nuns in the world, differing from them mainly in the absence of a vow of celibacy. By the way, in their vow, on the contrary, they promise not to limit the number of their children in any way, in fulfillment of the commandment “be fruitful and multiply” (for ordinary Orthodox measures to prevent pregnancy, especially when there are already children, are not considered a sin, unlike abortion). They form a community around their church (hence their name); but if in our country all churchly people who go to this or mainly this church are considered to be a church community, then among Russians this is called a parish, and a community is a much narrower circle. This element of church life has roots in a long tradition - in Russia there has always been a so-called church clergy, which occupied an important place in the Church and even delegated representatives to Local Councils; the current community is, in fact, an expanded clergy.

In the case of the community members, as well as with the guardsmen, the constitutional reform of 2013 did not impose anything on anyone (in terms of class) - its creators knew that there were already many laity in the country for whom faith and the Church were not just a help in life, but the main its part and meaning, and simply constituted them into a separate estate. However, communities are not only such (that is, the inner circles of parishes), but also autonomous: in the last thirty years, the case has become more and more frequent when a group of families decides to leave the city and settle together, building a village relatively far from big cities, and there already build yourself a church and ask for a priest. The state encourages this in every possible way - it allocates land free of charge from its land fund, and also helps with a loan. In fact, this is not trivial, since the state has nothing from them: the first estate does not pay taxes, and there is no conscription in the army in Russia. But it is believed that such communities are the quintessence of the Russian spirit and improve the spiritual and moral atmosphere in the country in comparison with megacities mired in sins. It often happens that autonomous communities spring up next to monasteries if they gather from monastic lovers—I have already written about this. Autonomous communities, as a rule, have their own charter, and quite often they establish even more stringent rules, often bordering on communist principles (exclusively common property, etc.). Autonomous communities are usually engaged in agricultural production, although they often produce small quantities of industrial goods, and even provide sometimes high-tech services. In autonomous communities, there is always a higher birth rate and lower crime (usually none at all), and also, which is statistically confirmed, lower morbidity and longer life expectancy. In general, it must be honestly noted, and with some envy at that, that Russian communities, especially autonomous ones, are very reminiscent of the communities of early Christians. Now there is a discussion in the EROC - whether some of these communities should not be considered a special kind of monasteries where married couples live; it seems exotic, but this was already the case in Byzantium (the so-called concubinate monasteries).

Councils and Synod. In the Orthodox Church, the most important decisions are made quite democratically - at various levels of councils and in other collegiate bodies. The most important issues of church life - dogmatic, canonical and other theological issues, glorification in the face of saints and others - are decided by Local Councils - they take place every five years. The election of a new patriarch also takes place at the Local Council - by lot, as has been practiced in Russia since the days of the Novgorod Republic. All the bishops of the Orthodox Church participate in the lot as candidates, regardless of their status or their own desire - it is useless to seek to help or contradict God's will. By the way, this order that appeared after the reform caused very serious consequences in the Church: now they approach the ordination of bishops not so much more seriously (and used to be taken seriously), but differently - after all, this bishop may well be the next patriarch, and with the same probability as any most honored metropolitan. Similar changes took place in the attitude of already ordained bishops to each other, especially superior to inferior. But the main thing is that the highest hierarchy of the Church by personal example has shown and is showing to all believers that the principle of the clergy "Let us completely rely on the will of God, let us not interfere with it with our will" can and should not be an abstraction, but a real norm of life.

Each community delegates its representatives to Local Councils (like every monastery, plus one priest from the parish), but not parishioners who are not members of the community. Intermediate decisions in importance are made at the Bishops' Councils, which take place once a year - they include everyone who has the rank of bishop (except those who have accepted the great schema). The remaining issues that require collegiate ("cathedral") discussion are decided by the Holy Synod, which meets as needed. It includes *ex officio* the patriarch (he is its chairman), 24 ruling metropolitans, the German exarch and the vicar metropolitan of the patriarch, who is also the manager - a total of 27 people. Appointments, however, in accordance with the Orthodox understanding of the hierarchy, do not relate to collegiate issues: the decision on the elevation to the rank of metropolitan is made solely by the patriarch, on the elevation to the rank of archbishop - by the metropolitan, on ordination to the rank of bishop - by the archbishop. True, both the patriarch and the metropolitan can themselves ordain someone as a bishop and bless the ruling archbishop of the diocese to take him on the staff, but this is not much practiced - in organizational matters, the leadership of the Church, after its transformation into the EROC, has become more formalized and hierarchical. The Holy Synod also has one more function - it is a bishops' court that considers the cases of all bishops and archbishops. The affairs of the metropolitans, who are all members of the Synod themselves, are considered by a troika of the patriarch and two metropolitans, whom the patriarch blesses for this specific case.

Taxable Estate

Before moving on to a comparative analysis of all three estates and a general analysis of the estate as a way of social organization, it is necessary to say a few words about the third estate. However, there is nothing much to say about it, because, unlike the first two, the third estate is formed according to the residual principle. This means that in order to become a member of the clergy or *oprichnina*, a citizen must make a conscious decision and take appropriate actions, and actions associated with significant self-limitations and even hardships. In order to be a member of the third estate, you do not need to do anything - it is automatically any citizen who has reached the age of fifteen and is not included in the first or second estate. It can be said directly that the entire service class is one big clan, and the spiritual one too. Because of this, all guardsmen are quite similar to each other, like all church people - after all, they made the same decision, belong to the same clan and lead a life that is largely similar to each other. The *zemstvos*, on the other hand, do not have such a common element, and therefore they are all different - because of this, there is almost nothing to say about them as a whole.

The third estate is called taxable because it pays taxes, while the spiritual and service estates do not pay taxes. By the way, unlike in the past, this has a largely purely symbolic meaning, because the guardsmen

have no other income than the imperial salary, and whether or not to take tax from it is absolutely indifferent (in the latter case, it will simply be less by the amount of tax). *Zemstvos* have nothing in common other than the obligation to pay taxes - they include entrepreneurs and workers, scientists and writers, artists and engineers, etc. Of course, it is possible and necessary to isolate something that unites the majority of *zemstvo* and distinguishes them from church people and guardsmen, and I did - but this will be discussed in the next section. The only thing that needs to be said here is about the attitude of the *zemstvo* to the cause (in the sense of professional labor). The generally accepted attitude in the taxable class towards the business you are doing is this: do your job well and responsibly, achieve success in it, grow up or even become the best in your profession - all this is seen primarily not as a way to earn money and make a career (this is self-evident), but as a kind of sacred act, the meaning of life, the fulfillment of one's destiny on Earth, given by God. And it doesn't matter who you are and, accordingly, what kind of business you have - even the head of a huge enterprise, even a simple operator of a remote mechanism; "he honestly does his job", "he does not spare himself in his work", and even more so "he is one of the best in his field" - the highest assessment of a person among the *zemstvo*. It was not by chance that I put in a row definitions that testify both to achievements and simply to dedication - the Russian people value the second no less than the first, and often these two things are not particularly distinguished; as the Russian proverb says, "if you suffer for a long time, something will work out." Such an attitude to work among the *zemstvo* borders on a cult: at the funeral they always talk about what a worthy doctor (engineer, financier - whatever) the newly deceased was, what a high professional, and the same thing is often written on tombstones - although, it would seem, what significance for the deceased has everything except what kind of person he was. Labor plays the same role for the *zemstvo* that service to God or the state plays for the first two estates. Actually, work for them (and this word includes entrepreneurship, creativity, and any other meaningful activity that is a priori considered socially useful) is their service to both God and the state.

Due to the above heterogeneity, the *zemstvos* do not and cannot have any estate customs - and on the other hand, any nationwide customs can be considered as such, since the *zemstvos* make up more than 90% of the population. But there are exceptions: one such custom was introduced from above under Gabriel the Great back in 2013, and it deserves to be mentioned in this chapter; it is called "*bratchina*" - this old Russian word meant a communal festive meal. It looks like this in modern Russia: every Sunday afternoon, all communities in the country set up impromptu tables on the street for a common feast; it happens exactly where the community is located - right in the village or in the courtyard of a microdistrict in the city. In winter, this happens in community centers, which are now almost everywhere - the imperial budget covers up to three-quarters of their price. Let me remind you that the community in Russia is about five thousand people; all five thousand are rarely seated at the table at the same time, but one and a half people usually participate in such a feast. They bring whatever they can from food and drink or money to buy them - this process among Russians is always perfectly self-organized. Whoever has nothing, he also does not receive, as they say, "a turn from the gate", but simply instead of this, more than others participate in the work of preparation - this is an unshakable custom. The main thing is that people of different material wealth and social status, if they live in the same community, once a week (in reality, rather, once a month, because not everyone participates every week) spend an evening together. For six days you were someone, and on the seventh day you are just a Russian citizen - you went to church in the morning, and in the evening you feast with your fellow tribesmen.

The fun itself at the brotherhood consists in the joint and at first more or less orderly use of alcohol (usually immoderate), after which some begin to dance to the music from the loudspeakers brought by someone or to the generator of the common video [?], others carry on drunken conversations with each other, and some even sing. Fights are not uncommon, but usually without malice. According to custom, any person who happens to be in the community (someone's guest, for example) or even a passer-by enjoys an inviolable right to join the brotherhood, and he cannot be driven away. Guardsmen often come

to the brotherhoods - they have their own similar brotherhoods, but the charter tells them to participate in the brotherhoods of the *zemstvo* once every three weeks (plus once every three months - in the brotherhoods of church people). A firm tradition has developed: the guardsman approaches those preparing tables or those already seated and asks: "Do you need a guard?" "We can handle it ourselves," they answer in unison. "What, do you really want a drink?" "I want to," the giant *oprichnik* sighs. "Well, sit down," they tell him.

The custom of brotherhood is especially strictly observed by those who are public figures, regardless of class: imperial and *zemstvo* authorities, business captains, movie stars, video and music stars. They spend every Sunday at fraternities in different congregations and they won't be understood if they don't.

The introduction into everyday life, and then into the tradition of the custom of brotherhood, was the first serious test of the imperial service of social arrangement, which was then called the group (a little later - management) of social engineering. And it passed the test - by 2020, that is, in seven years, the custom had already become quite widespread, and now more than 50% of the population of the Empire regularly participate in brotherhoods - despite the fact that no one forces them to. I myself, as a guest, repeatedly participated in brotherhoods and felt their atmosphere from the inside. It must be said that the idea of Gabriel the Great that this custom would make a significant contribution to creating in people the feeling of belonging to the nation as one big family was clearly justified - as well as the fact that thanks to this, people living in the same community all know each other. It is strange, of course, dear compatriots, that in order to create such a sense of unity and belonging, not joint participation in certain financial institutions such as public funds or in common work, for example, improvement, but participation in joint drinking parties was chosen - but who will understand the soul of another people?

Another custom that is very common among the *zemstvo* is fisticuffs. It had already existed in Russia before, before the eighteenth century, and was revived several decades ago. These fights take place on holidays, except for Easter and Christmas, especially on Epiphany. Usually two neighboring villages or micro-districts in the city, which are part of different communities, converge (see below) - fights within the same community are not accepted. Ordinary people participate in them - if a professional athlete-fighter lives in one of the communities, then he does not take part in the battles. There is also a categorical ban on the use of all kinds of bits, [pigs](#)⁷ and the like - a ban on the use of such tools is even prescribed in criminal law. As a rule, first they fight [wall to wall](#)¹⁹, and then (sometimes the next day) the strongest fighters - one on one. Oddly enough, there is no cult of violence here - opponents do not experience anger towards each other, much less joy from inflicting pain or injury. Such a tradition is just a way to show off your valiant prowess, to show off in front of friends and girls, so there is nothing surprising in the fact that people who almost killed each other will, after the battle, participate in a feast together with pleasure and mutual sympathy.

But speaking about the fact that all *zemstvo* residents are different, one cannot fail to notice a certain pattern: the Russian people (if we use this word only of *zemstvo* people, who, however, make up about 95% of the population) are, without a doubt, not one people, but not many either - in reality, these are two peoples, quite different from each other and relating to each other almost more distantly than to foreign peoples. One that can be roughly called "Europeans" (not to be confused with Europeans by blood, such as the French, Spaniards, British, etc.) are people deeply imbued with liberal values, and in this sense they are very similar to us. In their companies I felt completely like among my own, especially since they, as a rule, know our three languages, and speak them with more pleasure than Russian or German. When I talk about liberal values, I don't mean formal personal and property rights of a person: with the exception of political rights, they are protected in Russia, it seems to me, in general, no worse than in our country - in some ways less but in some ways more (although the Russian "Europeans" categorically disagree with this). I mean here liberalism in a deeper, ideological sense: a) the perception of personal happiness as the goal of human life and, accordingly, the state as a tool to ensure maximum happiness for its citizens; b)

complete rejection of a strong state, as well as any strong power in general; c) the complete absence of internal, absolute prohibitions (as opposed to the relative prohibitions imposed by human law) and the rejection of the very idea that they can exist as part of public life; d) rejection of religion as an element of public life, and strong religiosity - even as an element of private life; e) absolute individualism, complete rejection of the primacy of the general, the collective, over the private; f) complete rejection of the national as an essential element, self-identification as “citizens of the world”; and finally, g) belief in the absolute primacy of everything carnal (including, of course, both intellectual and creative, but primarily material), based on the absolutization of the value of earthly life (even if you abstractly believe in the afterlife). In contrast, “Eurasians” (these names are arbitrary - you can instead call them “liberals” and “traditionalists”) perceive as the goal of life not happiness, but duty - in their understanding, not the state a priori owes the citizen, but the citizen owes the state: a) they regard individualism as a defect of man and consider as an inherent value a collective of any kind, as well as a strong power, especially one that is feared by neighbors; b) the national and collective take precedence over the cosmopolitan and the personal; c) the state religion and, as a result, the presence of non-rationalized a priori prohibitions takes precedence over legal prohibitions; and most importantly, d) salvation and eternal life have primacy over earthly things. Of course, this is nothing more than an aspiration - the vast majority of “Eurasians” in real life strive for material goods and carnal pleasures no less than “Europeans”. But very deep in their brain (or soul) is the idea that this is not the main thing, and it can suddenly manifest itself in a variety of life situations.

The difference between these attitudes is truly cosmic: “Europeans” perceive themselves as atoms in a plasma that fly as they please, without being connected with others, like elementary particles, and “Eurasians” perceive themselves as atoms in a molecule or, rather, even in a crystal, like part of the whole, connected with other parts in a strict ensemble. Therefore, it is very funny to me when Russians and Germans, who are basically “Eurasians”, are called people of fire in artistic journalism. On the contrary, despite their propensity for collective irrational frenzy, these nations are clearly people of ice, whose aesthetics gravitate toward the unshakable harmony of crystal rather than the eternal variability of fire. And if we compare not different nations with each other, but “Europeans” and “Eurasians” within the Russian people, we will see the same difference in aesthetics and, as a result, in relation to all aspects of life. “Europeans” do not like the Russian Empire, contemptuously call it Raisa Ivanovna [?] (in capital letters) and “the largest prison on Earth”, and consider [us](#)²⁰ the best country in the world, a role model. (True, the degree of liberalism of our Federation in their view, in comparison with reality, is greatly exaggerated.) “Eurasians” consider their Russian Empire as a model, despite its individual shortcomings, and they treat us quite indifferently, considering us, however, a place where money rules everything. “Eurasians” have a good attitude towards the clergy and guardsmen, and even if they themselves never intended to become them or see their children among them, they regard this simply as “did not have the courage”: not everyone, they say, can be heroes, someone should be behind the counter. The “Europeans” hate guardsmen, and treat the clergy, at best, with complete disdain. By the way, this is also manifested in the general style: “Eurasians”, although they may not serve in the army themselves, as a rule, love everything related to force - TV shows about police operations and military operations, triumphant parades, films and videos about the war, in general masculinity. The “Europeans” despise all this, they call it a game of soldiers, their general style includes pacifism, and it is absolutely impossible to imagine one of the “Europeans” having a lover or mistress from the guardsmen of their own free will. And so in everything.

This observation of mine about the two peoples is not new - many thinkers, both Russian and foreign, wrote about this back in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. And at the beginning of our century, the well-known Russian statesman and public figure of that time, Alfred Koch, rightly wrote that this division has not gone anywhere in the democratic Russian Federation and does not at all correlate with a person’s belonging to the upper or lower classes - either by property or by social status. But it is surprising that

even now, after the triumph of Russia and the complete defeat of Western civilization (and, consequently, liberalism) from it, this is still preserved. Moreover, the point here is not at all the dilution of the Russian people with Western Europeans - among those whom I call "Europeans" here, especially among their active part, there are not so many of them, due to complete historical demoralization, and the Germans are even more "Eurasian" than the Russians. And just like in the time of Koch, there are no unambiguous social correlations - both of them are enough in all strata of society, except that there are more "Europeans" among the so-called creative intelligentsia, that is, in our opinion, bohemians. Their total number, I would designate as eight to twelve percent of the population, no less, despite the fact that there are no more than thirty to forty percent of distinct "Eurasians", and the rest do not have clear views or have intermediate ones. That is, the "Europeans", of course, are a minority, but they are by no means negligible, and their confrontation with the majority is quite sharp, although it does not yet take violent forms; I have no idea when and how this confrontation will end. Although in the course of studying Russian history the thought does not leave me that this confrontation is a manifestation of an inextricable dialectical connection between them and they cannot exist without each other, like yin and yang, nevertheless it seems to me that this is very fraught with social tensions, up to revolution. Such polarization in views may well play in a revolutionary situation the role that polarization in income usually plays (it is just not so great in Russia). The authorities understand this no worse than I do - when I had an audience with the head of the Imperial Security Directorate, the famous Alevtina (nee Alfiya) Itzhakova - according to very many, by the way, the next emperor - she calmly confirmed: "Yes, these are enemies. Not like you, the Chinese or Islamists - those are just opponents - namely, consistent, centuries-old enemies, with whom it is closely on the same planet, especially in the same state. They are the servants of Satan, free and involuntary, whose name is legion. And do not underestimate their danger - their predecessors prepared everything to topple the Russian Empire in 1917, and in 1991 the USSR. Yes, they are weak, but their dark master helps them." "And what are you going to do?" I asked. "We won't let them destroy the Empire a third time, just as we didn't let them in the thirty-seventh year," Itzhakova replied, referring to the rebellion of 2037 suppressed by Mikhail the Suppressor. But on the other hand, what to do with them? Start crushing them on a large scale, and they will immediately acquire the halo of fighters and martyrs, while the rest will have a feeling of general oppression that the country does not need at all. No, it's better the way they do with an abscess - they wait until it ripens, and then they ruthlessly burn it with a red-hot iron. "So you will wait for their performances, or even provoke them, and then you will kill them? I hurried. "But these are your citizens, and there are a lot of them." "When you go out to fight with enemies," Itzhakova chuckled, and at that moment I understood why even her comrades were afraid of this woman, moreover, of rare beauty, "you can't count them. You kill them until they kill you or until they run." Let this conversation serve as a kind of sobering up for those of you, dear compatriots, who, from the previous chapters, have formed a too nicely cloudless picture of Russian life.

Estates in comparison with each other

The three Russian estates are three completely different images of faith, thoughts and actions, which in their synthesis represent the Russian nation as a whole. Moreover, the fact that there are exactly three of them is completely natural, there could not be two or five of them, and it is no coincidence that in all class societies of the past, from ancient India to medieval Europe, the same three estates existed. (The presence of the fourth, respectively Shudras and Servos [sic], was associated with the existence of slavery or semi-slavery - without it they would not differ in any way from the third estate.) This is due to the fact that there are three answers to the main ontological questions of human existence - they distinguish the estates from each other. Let's start with the idea of the main meaning of individual life and the main means of achieving this meaning - that is, with the question of what a person lives for. For the first estate, this is salvation, for the second - power (but remember that for the guardsmen, power is service), and for the third - success. But the main means, the main individual quality necessary for this, for the first estate is

faith, for the second - strength, and for the third, no matter how harsh it sounds, self-love (in all three cases, not counting, of course, personal abilities).

You can put the question in another way: not for what, but for whom does a person live? The clergy live for God, the guardsmen live for the state, and the *zemstvo* live for themselves (or their loved ones - in this context it's all the same for themselves). Perhaps this sounds too simple - after all, people of many professions, say doctors, teachers, social workers, have every right to say that they live for other people - but Russians understand this exactly as I wrote. Your work may benefit other people, as it should be, but this is work for which you are paid, and - the main thing! - in case of your professional success, both the reward and the glory will be yours; it's not called living for others. In a similar vein, it becomes quite clear why the first, second and third are called the spiritual, service and taxable estates, and not vice versa: this follows from the Russian hierarchy of values: God - power - man. And the naturalness of this hierarchy is perfectly illustrated by the way the processes of transition from estate to estate proceed: from the third estate people leave both for the second and for the first, becoming guardsmen or clergy; from the second, guardsmen often go to the first, more often to monks, and almost never to the third; members of the clergy almost never leave their class.

Different attitudes towards money and wealth also follow from different life priorities: for all *zemstvos*, money is an object of desire (with different strengths, but for everyone), for guardsmen it is an object of contempt (due to the opposite ideas of wealth and power), and for the clergy - an object of indifference (as it is sung in a song, beloved in the first estate, composed by hieromonk Roman, "I won't take anything with me, / and therefore I don't need anything"). And the attitude towards colleagues in the estate is different: for church people, all other church people are fellow believers, just as for the guardsman, all the other guardsmen are like-minded people, and this is their wealth. The *zemstvos*, on the other hand, have only friends and partners, who, by definition, cannot have very many, but just other *zemstvos* are nobody for them. It is interesting that even the addresses to each other in different estates are different: in the third estate it is "master" or in a more street version "citizen", in the second estate it is "comrade", and in the first it is "brother". Therefore, in colloquial Russian, estates are called not by numbers or names, but by "brothers", "comrades" and "gentlemen". The estates not only address each other in different ways, but also greet and say goodbye: church people say "God help" and kiss three times, the guardsmen say "be strong" and grab each other's forearms, and the *zemstvo* say "hello" or "be healthy" and shake hands, like ours. All this is part of the Russian attitude to life, and just as in Russian society these three images are represented in the form of three estates, so they are represented - in some proportions - in every person.

Here it is necessary to say a few words about the elites. Here, dear compatriots, they naturally include the brightest representatives of all strata of society, which in Russia would belong to all three classes: the higher clergy, and political leaders, and the military and police elite, and captains of business, and leaders of science, and cultural stars, etc. Not so in Russia: the official ideology (however, clearly shared in this part of the majority of the population) considers only the first two estates to be national elites, and writers and entrepreneurs, TV presenters and scientists and all other famous and influential people belonging to the taxable class, can be as respected and valuable for the country as they like, they are clearly and, accordingly, are considered the "cream of society", but not the elites. The elites are understood not so much as particularly successful people who have wealth and fame as a result, but as leaders; and as the Savior taught, the blind cannot be leaders of the blind. What, according to Russian ideas, makes it possible for the first two estates to be leaders, and what does not even the best people from the third have, so that they are essentially blind? The answer to this is simple and clear - self-sacrifice. The greatness of a man is not in what he achieved, but in what he sacrificed for this. This is a very deep layer of the Russian worldview - even in private life, they feel gratitude for another person not depending on how much he has done for you, but depending on how much he has torn from himself for this. In the 1930s cult Russian film *Road to the Caucasus*, the protagonist, who lives not far from a multimillionaire who has installed an

air conditioner, exclaims: “Yes, I also have constantly good weather now, but why should I be grateful to him - he didn’t do it for me!” Therefore, although there are millionaire magnates and even billionaires in the Empire, and, naturally, many envy them and want to live the same way, there is no generally accepted respect for them and generally a good attitude (although there is no hatred either): well, yes, he created a new branch of the economy, well done, and it is useful to everyone, but he tried for himself. That is, if someone did something that is generally useful, but for the sake of himself, and not for the sake of others (and the criterion here is exclusively self-sacrifice), then the Russians are ready to recognize him as a fine fellow, but do not consider themselves indebted to him. Otherwise, from their point of view, it would be necessary to thank the enemies of Russia, from the West to the Islamists, because those, forcing the Russian nation to unite in the face of danger, objectively always brought it much more benefit than the allies.

Such an attitude towards self-sacrifice determines who in Russia is classified as an elite: the service class renounces normal life, family and in general from everything material for the sake of power and glory in serving the country, the clergy for the sake of saving themselves and everyone refuses even power and glory, right up to the departure from the world (hierarchy does not count, this is not worldly power), and the taxable class does not refuse anything. Such a refusal (only necessarily for the sake of some ideals, and not as a refusal of sweets for the sake of slender hips) is a synonym for striving for something higher. And only one aspiring to the highest, freed from animal instincts, can be a leader, Russians believe - one aspiring to the earthly can only be an idol. Therefore, only the first two estates are leaders; the fact that the clergy do not have the right to vote in secular matters, and in particular do not participate in the election of the emperor, is the position of the Church itself - “there is no power, if not from God.” But the fact that the upper classes consciously make trials and hardships a permanent part of their lives is also purely instrumental for the construction of the centuries-old Empire, since it is known from history that any movements - both political and religious - that have ever come to power, became invincible precisely as a result of trials and hardships. But having gained power, they plunged into luxury and thereby quickly lost their power. This does not threaten the Russian elites.

Those very numerous people who belong to the third estate, but have mixed life motivations (that is, both personal success and the public good, the second often in the first place) and who do not think of themselves outside of serving other people or the state, there is a near-elite. These include many of the doctors, scientists, teachers, explorers of new lands, etc.; therefore, the true elites, that is, the first two estates, do not hang in a vacuum. This applies even to power structures: if from what you read, dear compatriots, you got the impression that only guardsmen serve in the imperial government, or even in its very leadership, then this is not so - there are also *zemstvo* people. They are a minority, and the atmosphere in the “corridors of power” is determined by the guardsmen - but this is exactly what predetermines the absence of bans on entry there for *zemstvo*: why not, if they don’t destroy this atmosphere anyway. True, I don’t quite understand why the *zemstvo* should go to power: neither the righteous nor the unrighteous can gain wealth in the service of the Empire, nor can they gain fame among the *zemstvo* (and the neo-oprichniks hardly need fame among the guardsmen). And if you are not interested in all this, then why not join the guardsmen? Nevertheless, there are such *zemstvos* - mainly those who share the ideas of service and poverty, but are by nature not warriors, but intellectuals. They should not be confused with intellectually developed people - such can be among warriors. This also has nothing to do with pacifism - those of whom I am talking about can be supporters of the toughest decisions. That is, the qualities of the *zemstvo* servicemen described above do not relate to intelligence and not to convictions, but rather to hormonal characteristics: many are simply disgusted by the cult of force, although they have nothing against it in the abstract. The imperial power will never think of pushing them away - it treats people according to the testament of the Savior: “[He who is not against you is for you](#)²¹.” But in the regular public debate about expanding the service class to include those who have taken the three vows but have not served in the army, it has so far consistently opposed these

proposals. At the same time, the opposite: for the guardsman to labor in the *zemstvo* profession, including the intellectual one, for example, in science, is allowed, and although not very often, it occurs in reality. But only warriors should rule, because the ruler and the warrior are one and the same profession, the Russian Empire believes; it has always been so, and so it should be. And others can be assistants and a reserve, and even part of the power elite, but not the power itself - otherwise its tough and harsh spirit will begin to erode.

Estates, however, are carriers not only of completely different images of faith, thoughts and actions, but also of three different ways of perceiving the existence of their country in time - so to speak, images of the connection of times. For the first estate, the absolute reality is the past, with the Ecumenical Councils, the holy fathers, the Orthodox Byzantine, and then the Russian state - they see in it both a source of good and role models. The future for them does not bring anything but darkness - there is the kingdom of the Antichrist, with the onset of which a person is obliged to fight, but which he cannot win, because something else is prophesied. And the present - although they greatly approve of the concrete present that exists in the Russian Empire - is for them only a constantly receding border separating the world from the future. For the second estate, the only reality is the present, just as for any warrior the most important and main battle is the one that must be fought now. The past for them is nothing more than memories, and the future is at best a goal (they imagine the end times differently, see below). For the third estate, reality is the future, since the 19th century, and especially since the Second Empire, Russian society has been dominated by progressive ideas about history, and the future seems to be better than the present, and even more so the past in all senses - both material and social, and spiritual. Clear deviations from this upward vector in history, including recent history, are seen only as bends in a predominantly straight road, insignificant from a bird's eye view. Therefore, they believe, we are not just creating the future - we are responsible to it, since it already exists, as it were.

This is not just a difference in ontological views - these are three different images of the future, and, consequently, three different Russian ideas, since the national idea is precisely embodied in the image of the future. The first estate is the bearer of the eschatological Russian idea: the coming of the Antichrist and the end of the world are ahead, and the main thing is to prepare for this, to purify and strengthen in spirit. Russia and Russians must be at the forefront of this struggle because they are the only ones who profess the true apostolic faith and because they are ready to suffer for others. The main achievement of the Restoration Period and the Third Empire is not in the end of national humiliation, but in the fact that esoteric preachers have disappeared from television screens, half-naked girls have disappeared from billboards, and state leaders and even many corporate leaders now pray before making a responsible decision, and not for show.

The second estate is the carrier of the Russian imperial idea: the main thing is the Empire, it is the bastion of the forces of light in the struggle against the forces of darkness, and therefore it is above all. Empire is the only island of stability in a constantly changing world. With the Empire, we will defeat the Antichrist, and if not, then the Lord will count such a defeat for us as a victory. Russians should be leaders in ensuring that life in their Empire is more dignified, fair and meaningful than anywhere else: in this way they testify before God that all of humanity (and not just Russians) is not hopeless. The main achievement of the 21st century is not the strength and greatness of the state in itself, but the fact that they finally managed to build a thousand-year-old Empire of Good, invulnerable to internal and external enemies and living according to Christ's commandments of justice.

The third estate is the bearer of the Russian idea of progress: society, at least Russian society, is steadily moving forward and upward, and if we ensure this movement (and this is the main reason for our existence), it will solve all problems; if some problems are not solved, it means that progress is still insufficient. Expressed in lines from Russian songs, "we were born to make a fairy tale come true", and "tomorrow will be better than yesterday"; and this is not only technocracy, but also sociocracy - progress

is understood both as material and technical, and as social. The progress of mankind is pleasing to God, it is a manifestation of His will, which must not be resisted, but carried out not out of fear, but out of conscience; and the Russians must be at the head of it, because only they possess collectivism, self-sacrifice, and spiritual independence at the same time, in order to be the first in this. The main achievement of the half-century that has passed since the beginning of the reforms of Vladimir II is the return of Russian technological and social leadership.

All these three Russian ideas are organically fused in one concept of the Third Rome, only “Rome” means different things (at least in the first place) for different estates. For the first estate, this is the First and Second Rome of the apostles, ecumenical teachers and fathers of the Church, the center of Orthodox Christianity. For the second estate, this is the First and Second Rome of generals, emperors and kings, the most powerful unshakable Empire on Earth, opposing the barbarism and chaos of the outside world. And for the third estate - the First and Second Rome of the builders of aqueducts and roads, the creators of Roman law and the inventors of Greek fire, the world center of civilization. These three ideas, being whimsically intertwined with each other, make up the Russian idea as a whole, which I find it difficult to formulate clearly, just as the three estates themselves, in their synthesis, form a single Russian society.

Chapter 3 Government

Officials and symbols. The Russian state is officially called the Russian Empire, this is written in the Constitution; it also states that the name “Russia” is equivalent and can also be used in official documents. In officialdom, these two names are often confused, therefore the highest bodies of state administration are fully called as follows: Imperial administration *of such and such* Russia. In general, the first name is more often used in documents related to national affairs (federal level, in our opinion), and the second - with local or private ones. The name “Third Empire” is not official - it is a historical and journalistic term, and its use in writing usually reflects the author’s claims precisely to scientific and publicistic nature. The phrases widely used in the press and literature, such as the Third Rome, Russia, Holy Russia, New Israel, the Orthodox Empire, the Eurasian Empire, are nothing more than ideological labels of different directions. The official symbolism of Russia opens with the so-called sign (part of the flag and coat of arms, which is a simplified symbol of the country) - in the Second Russian Empire it was a hammer and sickle and a five-pointed star with sharp rays. In our country, as you know, it is a five-pointed star with blunt rays, in the Caliphate - a crescent, etc. So, **the sign of the Russian Empire** is a silver eight-pointed star with blunt rays (two squares superimposed on each other with a rotation of 45°), otherwise known as Bethlehem. It is on the coat of arms and flag, most orders have its form, it crowns the spires of the towers of the Moscow Kremlin and many other religious buildings; like ours, it is depicted on the wings of combat aircraft, on the turrets of tanks, on the hulls of space cruisers. The color of the eight-pointed star is not accidental: in accordance with a very old Orthodox tradition, silver in Russia is considered an angelic metal, and accordingly, the silver color is also considered such.

The motto of the Russian Empire (the same as the famous “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” in the French Republic) is “Justice, Meaningfulness, Dignity”. It is inscribed on all Russian banknotes, many facades of buildings in cities and shields on highways are decorated with it.

The emblem of Russia is a double-headed silver eagle, borrowed at one time from Byzantium (Second Rome), but it is very different from its predecessor from the eras of the First Empire, the Russian Federation and the Russian Union. Firstly, the coat of arms of the city of Moscow disappeared from it (as well as the small coats of arms of a number of other cities) - Gabriel the Great did not like Moscow and repeatedly said that Russia is not Moscow. Now on the breast of the eagle there is an eight-pointed star of red color (otherwise it would have merged with the background; see below for the meaning of the red color). Secondly, the orb and the scepter in the paws of the eagle disappeared - Gabriel, before the

referendum on the constitution, explained it this way: “Look, there are three crowns above the heads of the eagle - a symbol of power, and in its paws the orb and the scepter are also symbols of power. This is already too much, this is the coat of arms of a country obsessed with the idea of power for the sake of power, and this is one of our main civilizational problems.” Now the eagle has an Orthodox cross in its left paw, and a sword in its right paw, and this is indeed much closer to the general spirit of the Third Empire, which considers power mainly as a tool to achieve its true goals. The absolutes behind these goals, symbolized by the cross and the sword, are God and Power. Thirdly, a pennant hangs from the paws of an eagle, on which it is written: “Moscow is the Third Rome, and there will be no fourth.” The crowns (two small and one large in the middle) remained above the heads of the eagle, but acquired a different heraldic meaning: they symbolize present-day Russia as the Third Rome, larger than the previous two, and as the Third Russian Empire, larger than the previous two (therefore, crosses disappeared from small crowns - First Rome and the Second Russian Empire were not Orthodox).

The national flag of Russia is a uniform red cloth with a large silver eight-pointed star in the middle. The red color is not so much a tribute to the memory of the Second Empire as a primordial tradition - it has always been considered the best color in Russia (for example, a red corner is a place for icons). The tricolor flag of the times of the First Empire, the Russian Federation and the Russian Union, Gabriel the Great did not like, like most guardsmen, who considered it emphatically European, and not homegrown. The official flags in Russia are distinguished by a silver border around the entire perimeter, and their use is monopolized by the state and regulated by law; these include the state flag and the flags of the peoples of the Empire. Any flags without such a border, including state ones, can be used by anyone and in any way, and Russians are very fond of hanging them in front of their homes, offices, etc. By the way, coats of arms can also be used privately (on goods, on labels, etc.) only with special permission - it is given, for example, if the manufacturer is an important supplier of the state (such as an arms manufacturer) or for goods where the coat of arms is traditionally present - for example, on glasses. The sign, that is, the Star of Bethlehem, can be used without restrictions; but usually its use means something military, like ours. Public use of the former flags of states that later became part of the Russian Empire is not allowed and is considered a criminal offense.

The anthem of Russia is a church chant based on the book of Isaiah from the service of Great Compline: “Understand, tongues, and submit, as God is with us”; it is set to secular music written by the famous Russian composer Rotfeld.

The state holidays of Russia are, firstly, the two main Orthodox holidays - Easter and Christmas. Easter is celebrated every year at different times, according to Paschalia, between the end of March and the end of April; Christmas is celebrated on December 25, as in our country (only we have January 7 on this day - in Russia the Julian calendar). The New Year is also a public holiday, most loved by all the people, and the entire period from December 25 to January 1 inclusive (Christmas week) is non-working; after the return to the Julian calendar, the ridiculous situation when the New Year fell in Lent disappeared. The main purely public holiday is May 9, the holiday of Victory and Empire; it is celebrated for two working days, the 9th and the 10th. May 1-2 is the Constitution Day, also known as the Day of Russia, so those who can afford it do not work for almost the entire first two weeks of May. October 22-23 (former November 4), also two days, Liberation Day is celebrated - originally it was a holiday of the expulsion of Poles from Moscow in 1612 and was called National Unity Day since its introduction in 2005 (it is not clear why - no unity during those there were no events.) Now, on this day, they celebrate the liberation of Russia not only from the Poles, but from all foreign invaders who have ever come to her land - Mongols, French, Germans. Moreover, all these cases of liberation are now considered just as conditioned by heavenly patronage, as was October 22 (the Church generally calls this holiday the miracle of the icon of the Kazan Mother of God). July 13 is Gabriel's Day - it is both the Orthodox day of the Cathedral of the Archangel Gabriel and the birthday of Emperor Gabriel the Great. Unofficially, now everyone considers the Archangel Gabriel to be the heavenly patron of Russia. Finally, exactly two weeks after Easter, on the

second Sunday after Easter, Women's Day is celebrated - this is an Orthodox holiday of myrrh-bearing women; Since Sunday is already a non-working day, the next day, Monday, is a non-working day. But the Day of the Armed Forces, also known as Defender of the Fatherland Day, which existed both in the Second Empire and during the Restoration Period and was considered a holiday for men, is no longer there. It is clear why - since the *oprichnina* arose, the army has become its internal estate affair, and the *zemstvo* men now have nothing to do with the defense of the fatherland (and the *oprichniki* men are exactly the same as the *oprichniki* women). There are also official holidays of the peoples of the Russian Empire - both secular and religious - many of which are also non-working days for people of the respective nationalities; but there are no separate holidays of the Russian people.

Emperor. The highest power in Russia is the emperor, and he is elected once every ten years, without the right to be elected for a second term in a row. The Russians consider this period to be optimal - long enough for planning and implementing strategic tasks and short enough so that the emperor does not have time to fall into insanity. By the way, it is precisely with this fear, traditional for Russia, that the ban for the second term in a row is connected, and not with the fear of usurpation of power, as we have - Russians do not believe that usurpation can be prevented by written laws. If the current emperor dies (Russians do not have impeachment) before the expiration of half of his term, a new one is elected for less than ten years - for the remaining part of the deceased's term; if he dies in the second half of his term, then the new emperor is elected for ten years plus the remaining part of the old one's term. Thus, regardless of anything, the date of the beginning of the reign of the new emperors - the year ending in zero, that is, the beginning of the decade - does not move. All imperial power in Russia belongs solely to the emperor, but is practically exercised by the government; its head according to the Constitution is the emperor, who has one alternate-deputy, officially called the prime minister. The government is appointed by the emperor and is completely subordinate to him in a disciplinary manner, that is, any of his orders is mandatory for execution, if it does not contradict his other order; therefore the government in Russia is not a separate branch of power. There is no legislative power in Russia: the emperor issues laws, and with whom he consults when developing them, according to the Constitution, this is his personal business.

The procedure for electing the highest power in Russia is the simplest and least bureaucratic of all that I have heard of - there is neither an official election campaign, nor the actual moment of the election. The elections of the new emperor are three-round, they begin two years before the end of the term of the reign of the current emperor with the procedure for nominating candidates. This is happening across the Opryseti, a closed network of guardsmen, where each of them and only they have their own registered call sign, and it happens in exactly the same way - the Russians do not understand the idea of secret voting: if you are afraid or embarrassed, they say, do not participate. To nominate someone, including yourself, it is enough to enter your call sign, go to the "Elections" portal and activate the "Nomination" function, then enter the name of the person being nominated - and that's it; the name appears, if it didn't already exist, in the "Possible" section. Any *oprichnik* can see in this section who how many and who support, and support this or that candidate whenever he wants - the number of votes for the nomination of this candidate is displayed in real time; at this stage, each can support several candidates. The first round lasts four months, after which all those who are supported by 10% or more of the guardsmen (according to the experience of the last three elections of 2029, 2039 and 2049, there are usually 6-10 of them), and if there are less than three of them, then also missing up to three of those who scored less than 10%, but more than the rest. After that, the second round begins (if there are only three nominated, it will be the last) - the actual elections: here everyone can already support only one candidate. This can also be done at any time, not on Election Day like we do (but you can withdraw your already cast vote at any time) and the election process is also reflected in the Candidate Support section in real time. At this stage, the current emperor is obliged to name the one whom he would like to see as successor; if it will be someone other than those who made it to the second round, he participates in it, bypassing the first. Naturally, the candidates post declarations in Opryset about their vision of the situation in the country and the world and

about their political intentions; they are asked questions, they answer individually and in a forum order, both in text format and in general video. In addition, voters discuss candidates in Opryseti and among themselves, in particular, those who know them personally share their opinions - this, in fact, is limited to the election campaign, since face-to-face trips and meetings with voters are not accepted by guardsmen. This round lasts four months (eight if there are only three candidates), after which the three candidates with the most votes at a pre-announced time advance to the next round. Following this, the third round begins, which lasts no more than a year - in fact, the emperor is considered elected when, within ten days, the number of votes cast for him did not fall below 75% of those who took part in the vote, and this can happen at any time (according to the experience of the three previous elections - within two to three months). It is believed that in this way the primordially Russian principle of "sobornost" (another name for the principle of consensus) is manifested: Russians do not want a fateful decision to be made because 50.5% against 49.5% voted for it. If no one gets 75% in a year, then a lot will be cast between all the candidates who have advanced to the second round (the current emperor, according to Russian law, after exactly ten years from the date of election, is considered no longer acting regardless of anything, and to carry out any of his orders there is a violation of a vow for guardsmen, that is, the most terrible crime). Thus, the new emperor is announced 4-14 months before he takes office, most often 12-13, and all this time he is like an understudy for the current emperor, who dedicates him to all the subtleties of current affairs.

However, it is quite possible that this system is living out its last years: now in Russia the transition to choosing the emperor by lot is widely discussed, and it is quite possible that this is how the emperor will be elected already in 2060. Here one can trace the obvious influence of the example of the Church, where the patriarch has long been chosen by lot from among the bishops; but the motivations are nonetheless quite different. In relation to the Church, there is a readiness to completely surrender oneself to the Lord's will, a humble surrender to Him of one's destiny; and for the guardsmen, the appeal to the lot looks more like a desire to get away from the hated competition within their ranks. For guardsmen, who do not have ranks and even a division into soldiers and officers, it is morally extremely unpleasant to participate in elections as one of the candidates and, conversely, vote for one of several: this contradicts their feeling of complete brotherhood among themselves. Naturally, the presence of prequalification is assumed, and not just a lottery among all 20 million guardsmen (in the Church, the role of prequalification is played by the presence of episcopal rank). In the new scheme of emperor elections under discussion, the first round will be the same as now, and among those who have passed it, that is, those who have gained more than 10% (as an option, five or ten candidates who have scored the most), lots will already be thrown. Since the voting in the first round is soft rating, the guardsmen will somehow survive this. Judging by the course of the discussion, the idea has a very high chance of becoming law.

Although only guardsmen vote, it cannot be said that *zemstvo* members do not take any part in the elections - various ideological and scientific groups come up with their analyzes, forecasts and proposals both on the general network and in Opryset, and the guardsmen carefully read them. Even in the discussion just described about the transition to choosing by lot, they participate very actively, although what, it would seem, is the difference - from the position of the taxable class, the emperor in any case becomes a protege of the service class, and is it so important how they define him? But the programs of candidates mean relatively little compared to what they mean in our country, in Russian elections - they are mainly chosen there by personality. This is probably because, although the Russians since the time of Vladimir II and Gabriel the Great have learned, for the third or fourth time in their history, an active, long-term, offensive policy, in their souls they have remained adherents of a reactive policy: the Lord will send a test - then let's work together to figure out how to get through it. If we then have a worthy person at the head, we will endure, but if not, then trouble. Therefore, although guardsmen - both ordinary and leading, including the emperor - seriously read such materials, and in an interactive mode with the authors, these materials do not affect them during the election of the emperor, whom they want to see just

the most worthy. This is due to the fact that the ruler of Russia is the service (*oprichnina*) class as a whole - the emperor is only their plenipotentiary, acting as if by their power of attorney and at the same time remaining flesh of their flesh. Therefore, the Russians consider a ten-year period to be sufficient, although all long-term and many medium-term plans do not fit into it - the service class, which thus plays the role of a dynasty, still remains in power.

Interestingly, the figure of the emperor in the Russian state is not at all sacred - only the Empire itself is sacred. Therefore, he does not wear a crown or special vestments, does not receive a special salary compared to any other guardsman, does not live in a palace, etc. What is much more significant, the emperor does not have a special church status - he does not have the right to enter the altar through the royal gates, like the kings of the First Empire, he is not anointed or crowned king. And this is natural - after all, all guardsmen are anointed and crowned after taking vows, and the emperor is only the first of them. There is no special appeal to him like majesty or highness, the *zemstvo* or the clergy address him by his first name and patronymic (except for the priest at confession and communion - there he is simply a servant of God such and such). And the guardsmen address him by his nickname, as is generally accepted among them, and only at the most solemn moments - "Comrade Commander-in-Chief." Therefore, the emperor in Russia himself rules the country, heading the government, and does not take the position of the highest arbiter - for the sacredness of the head of state, this is deadly, but the Russians do not need this. Therefore, unlike the First Empire, various state bodies and institutions are called not the emperor's, but imperial²². I think that of all the five modern states, the protocol and ceremonial of the supreme power is the least expressed in Russia. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the emperor leaves, he does not have any pension or special maintenance - he simply goes to a lower position, even if it is a private (guardsmen serve until death), and this is considered in the order of things: Emperor Michael III after his term went back to the army, where he began his service, and in 2045 he laid down his life in the third Russian-caliphate war, commanding a raid on Samarkand; his last words were: "How much better it is than in the office." And Vasily V is still working as the prosecutor of the III Northern Imperial District, and all this is completely natural, because the Russian emperor is not a god-king, but a military leader of free warriors, although he also rules a taxable estate in the interests of the state. This state of affairs is fully consistent with the Russian tradition and mentality, since the old Russian term "prince" meant exactly this (the prince ruled the territory and population, but commanded only his squad). And this is one of the main pillars of Russia's stability, because if it were not so, Russia from a paulocratic autocracy (see below) would quickly become a hereditary autocracy, and then a dictatorship.

The emperors themselves do not consider their own personality to be something special, except in a purely official aspect - *oprichnina* education contributes to this. When Gabriel the Great opened the monuments to Ivan the Great and Joseph the Great in Moscow, it did not and could not occur to him to write "From Gabriel I" on them - just as Catherine II did on the Bronze Horseman in St. Petersburg (the famous monument to Peter I): monuments are erected by the state, not by the ruler. The current emperor, Vladimir III, generally lives in an ordinary hostel for guardsmen - to my question, what about security, everyone usually laughed: it's much safer than in an actual fortress, among several hundred soldiers with the firepower of an entire American or Celestial division! And if the emperor is married, then his wife is not considered an empress at all: moreover, when I used the term "first lady of the Empire" in the question about the wife of Vasily V (he is married, unlike Mikhail III and the current Vladimir III), the interlocutors simply did not understand what am I talking about. So the issue of preventing relatives of the head of state from dealing with serious issues seems to have been finally resolved in Russia - which is very non-trivial for the Russian political tradition. After all, even under Tsar Alexander III, during the period of maximum strengthening of the state, the French industrialist wrote: "It is, of course, impossible to give a bribe to the Russian Tsar, but almost any issue can be resolved for money through the royal family, especially through the Grand Dukes."

The most surprising thing about the Russian system of state administration is that when a new emperor

takes office, as a rule, it does not occur to him to replace top government leaders with new ones. (We have such an approach in relation to the so-called career civil servants, as opposed to the so-called political ones, which include first deputy ministers and above - in the Russian Empire, thus, all state leaders are, in our terminology, career ones.) When I spoke about it, the interlocutors simply did not understand the meaning of my questions. "How is the new emperor deprived of the opportunity to put his man?" I asked. "And what does 'his' mean?" they wondered. "Is it possible for the old leader to disobey the emperor's order?" "Well, why not do it?" I said. "The head of state may simply want to see his like-minded subordinates in office." "Are there any important issues," the interlocutors were even more surprised, "in which all the guardsmen are not like-minded? The service class is not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the times of the late Second Empire, unanimity here is guaranteed not by declarations, but by voluntarily taking on the hardships of service and life's hardships - why should those who do not share common ideals do this? Therefore, there is no struggle of political currents or ideological lines. Only a disagreement on technical management issues is possible - but the desire to have a like-minded subordinate in technical matters is simply a whim. How can you remove a worthy person for the sake of your whim, especially since, as a result of the mandatory rotation, he will still leave after a while? "But what if, on the contrary, you think that some of your acquaintances and colleagues are underestimated in a career sense, and then you became an emperor?" I insisted. "It happens, but in general it is not at all necessary to become an emperor for this," they answered me. Indeed, any *oprichnik* can at any time quite openly submit a so-called recommendation to any other in the imperial personnel service with the opinion that it is useful for the country to appoint him there - but, if the latter is promoted after that, the recommenders bear at least moral responsibility; this practice is widespread.

The same approach is used at the lower hierarchical levels of the state machine: a new chief of any rank does not begin his activity by replacing subordinates - candidates for all positions, when the time for rotation comes, are selected by the imperial personnel service. As a result, for a state career in the Empire, "connections" are completely irrelevant - that is, with which of the big people you are well acquainted. This is radically different from what was characteristic of Russia before - both in the First and Second Empires, and in the Restoration Period. In general, today in the civil service of Russia, both in the civil and military, there is a cult of personal abilities and virtues - and they are understood not as acquired professionalism, but as an alloy of will, honor and intelligence. Therefore, cases of lack of demand for someone obviously worthy, if it falls into the field of view, are perceived as an emergency - in a country that has stood alone for a long time against the rest of the world, this is completely natural: defeating a stronger one is possible only through the full mobilization of internal reserves. By the way, this is another reason why in the service class, and therefore in the Empire as a whole, there can be no talk of any hereditary status, and even more so of the monarchy: what if next to someone who inherited something, is there a more worthy person? Should he be pushed aside in favor of a less worthy heir? For guardsmen, such a formulation of the question is unthinkable.

As a result of the foregoing, the continuity of power in Russia is absolute, and perhaps that is why the election of a new emperor is not accompanied by any cataclysms and generally does not cause a particular heat of passion.

Public administration. The Russian government consists of four imperial chancelleries headed by chiefs: the Imperial Chancellery for Foreign Policy, the Imperial Chancellery for Domestic Policy, the Imperial Chancellery for Social Policy, and the Imperial Chancellery for Economic Policy. In addition to them, there is also the so-called General Imperial Chancellery. The heads of the chancelleries, like the prime ministers, are personally appointed by the emperor in accordance with the established procedure. Each office is subordinate to three imperial departments, which are the main bodies of state administration and are headed by chiefs appointed by the heads of the chancelleries. Each imperial administration, in turn, is subject to imperial agencies or services, including supervisory ones - in those matters that fall under the so-called joint jurisdiction (either the Empire and self-government, or authorities in general and the

private sector); the heads of agencies and services are appointed by the heads of the imperial departments. Previously, until 2020, the imperial departments were called ministries and were headed by ministers, while the imperial chancelleries were government departments and were headed by state ministers; therefore, many continue to habitually use these designations. Thus, if, as a result of the administrative reform of 2004, the two-tier management system (government - ministry, and it was already a functional unit) was replaced by a three-tier one (government - ministry - agency or service), then from 2013 to the present day a four-tier system (government - imperial office - imperial administration - imperial agency or service). Six people - the emperor, the prime minister and the heads of the imperial chancelleries - make up the headquarters of the government, 19 people (the same plus 12 heads of the imperial departments and the head of the General Imperial Chancellery) make up the board of the government, and the same plus the heads of the imperial agencies, services and military commands - the extended board. The Russians do not have the concept of “member of the government” or “member of the cabinet” - their government is not a collegial body. The heads of the imperial chancelleries are subordinate to the emperor and the prime minister, the heads of the imperial departments are subordinate to them, and the heads of services and agencies, in turn, are subordinate to them. At the same time, it is not customary to lead “over the head” of the corresponding chief, and the emperor, for example, really works only with the heads of the offices and can call the head of the department only in an exceptional case (except perhaps for a purely introductory conversation). The practice of state administration in Russia in general is such that the top echelon does not duplicate the lower echelon, but coordinates at its level the activities of several lower echelons subordinate to it, just as the regimental commander distributes the combat mission of the regiment between the battalions and ensures their interaction and mutual assistance, and does not deal with the question of how battalion commanders will carry out their battalion tasks. In the same way, the imperial office distributes the general task of a particular policy - foreign, domestic, social or economic - into sub-tasks of the branches implemented by the imperial departments, and ensures their interaction at a level that lies outside each of them and therefore is inaccessible to them. The emperor or ruler acts in exactly the same way in relation to the imperial chancelleries (and, in turn, the head of the imperial administration in relation to the heads of imperial services, etc.)

The Imperial Chancellery for Foreign Policy is subordinated to the Imperial Foreign Office, the Imperial Military Administration and the Imperial Border Administration. The Imperial Foreign Office has the Imperial Diplomatic and Consular Service and the Imperial Strategic Intelligence Service; the latter unites both undercover and technical intelligence, unlike us, where the CIA and the NSA are completely different and often competing departments. The Imperial Military Command has a Strategic Forces Command, a Main Forces Command, a Light Forces Command, and a Fleet Command, as well as an Inspection Service and a War Order Agency. The Imperial Borders Authority has the Imperial Border Guard, the Imperial Customs Service, and the Imperial Immigration Service.

The Imperial Office of Internal Policy is subordinate to the Imperial Security Directorate, the Imperial Control Directorate, and the Imperial Territory Directorate. The Imperial Security Directorate has four services: criminal police, political police (combating subversive political organizations and terrorism), special police (deals with a wide range of scientific and technical dangers - from man-made threats to incomprehensible anomalous phenomena) and state police (counterintelligence); there are also services for the supervision of public order and road safety. The Imperial Office of Control has the Imperial Public Prosecution Service, the Imperial Investigation Service, the Rights Registry Agency, and the Prosecutorial and Accounting (i.e. financial) oversight services. In the Imperial Territory Administration there is the Regional Development Agency, the Agency for Underdeveloped Territories (which everyone calls the Agency for the North, although it deals with territories located not only in the north of the Empire), the Agency for Natural Resources, the rescue service, the national demographic service (dealing with issues of internal migration and resettlement), as well as services for the supervision of imperial and *oprichnina* cities and for nature management and nature protection.

The Imperial Chancellery for Social Policy is subordinate to the Imperial Educational Administration, the Imperial Cultural Administration and the Imperial Justice Administration. But if above, dear compatriots, I did not explain what this or that imperial administration is in general and what this or that imperial department is engaged in - this is clear from the name and structure and is more or less similar to our respective ministries or departments - then here I will already have to give explanations. The Imperial Board of Education is responsible for ensuring that the people of the Empire conform as closely as possible to its ideal of a citizen; in fact, this task is totalitarian, although the methods used are not repressive and not forceful at all. The Agency of Schools solves this problem through school education, the Agency of Higher Schools - through institute education, the Supervision Service for Preschool and Family Education - as its name implies. The service of censorship supervision - by monitoring public organizations and culling those that, according to the Russians, are incompatible with the values of the state (for example, the so-called totalitarian sects), and the same control over the content of textual and other materials in public circulation. In principle, this is the most common censorship (it does not pretend to be anything else, as can be seen from the name), except perhaps the preliminary one, which it was in the First and Second Empires. But the most non-trivial is the Imperial Service of Social Arrangement (I never tire of being amazed at the straightforwardness of the Russian authorities): its main job is to create attitudes in society, if you like, fashion, for certain things. The imperial directorate of culture is called upon to promote the development of all branches of culture (in the broad sense) of the nation; it has agencies for science, literature and the arts, sports, and information networks. The imperial administration of justice deals with what we call social security, in a broad sense - but for Russians, the need for these programs stems not from ideas about the public good, but from ideas about the principles of justice on which society should be built for the sake of higher, that is, religious, goals. It has under its control the Health Agency, the Hospice Agency, the Supervisory Services for Social Welfare, Medicines and Medical Equipment, and Labor Relations.

The Imperial Chancellery for Economic Policy has three Imperial Administrations under its control: the Imperial Administration for Economy, the Imperial Administration for Infrastructures and the Imperial Administration for Finance. The imperial administration of the economy, something like our Ministry of Economics and Trade, has the Anti-Monopoly Service, the State Investment Agency, the Military Industry Agency, the Industry Development Agency, the Mobilization and Reserves Agency, the Patents and Standards Agency, the Agriculture and Food Agency, the State Enterprises Agency (not related to the jurisdiction of other agencies - see the chapter "Economics") and the technical safety supervision service. The Imperial Directorate of Infrastructures has the Agency for Communications (responsible for roads and railways, navigable fairways of rivers, canals, pipelines, etc.), the Agency for Space Exploration, the Agency for Strategic Energy, the Agency for Planetary Objects (engaged in projects such as the "insulation", construction of a 12,000-kilometer polar rampart to protect against rising ocean levels, etc.), telecommunications and delivery and transport supervisory services. The Imperial Finance Administration has a tax office, a budget office, a treasury office, a State Property Agency, a banking agency, and a financial market supervision service. The Imperial Chancellery for Economic Policy is also subordinate to the Central Bank of Russia - the center for issuing and regulating monetary circulation.

There are, in addition to the four imperial offices, some other control centers. The General Imperial Chancellery, in addition to technical support units and services, such as the government apparatus, the Office of Affairs, the Imperial Security Service, the Imperial Government Communications Service, etc., is subordinate to such public services of the authorities as the Imperial Personnel Service, the Imperial Control the audit service (monitors the implementation of all decisions made) and the Imperial Information Service (collects and analyzes any information - from ordinary statistics to the mood of the people). The Imperial Strategic Planning Service is directly subordinate to the Emperor. For a certain period, to solve a time-limited task, Orders are created (like the European Order of the assimilation period of the 20s or the Northern Sea Order of the times of the "warming" program of the 40s). Separately, there

is a judicial system - it consists of two judicial hierarchies: the imperial, considering criminal cases, and the *zemstvo* - for civil cases, as well as the Constitutional Court. The judiciary also includes the Imperial Judicial Department, which has subordinate to it the Imperial Judicial Execution Service and the Imperial Correctional Service.

Territorial administration. Territorial administration in the Russian Empire is very specific due to the fact that there is generally no administrative division of the country's territory into something similar to our [ie American Federation] or Indian states or celestial or caliphate provinces. The origins of such a strange device should be sought in the events of 1991, when all the so-called union republics fell away from the collapsing Second Empire, the USSR, and became independent states. The organizers of the process planned that the largest of them, the Russian Federation (about 50% of the population and 75% of the territory), which under the leadership of Boris the Damned was the leader and instigator in this process, would also shake off the ashes of the USSR. But the Russians stubbornly considered their diminished state a continuation of both the First and Second Empires, and they considered it not only in the formal sense of succession (it goes without saying), but also in a broader sense. Thus, they perceived the status quo not as the fact that they live in a new state that did not exist before (as in other republics), but as the fact that half of their state was taken away and their lands became foreign. This was regarded as a betrayal and traumatized the Russian national identity. In the 1990s, the situation was further aggravated by the fact that, due to the weakness of the central government, the leaders of the national republics, already within the Russian Federation, began to openly declare separatist plans (it is difficult to say now how serious it is, but the example of Chechnya is suggestive). Even the leadership of the Russian regions became, to a large extent, *de facto* separatists, that is, they simply considered themselves entitled to ignore the orders of the federal government if they believed that this was better for their regions. As a natural result, all this aroused among the Russians with a great power and imperialism a feeling of distrust not only in the idea of federalism, but in general in any regionalism. It seemed to them that any legally formalized region with its own power, even if completely subordinate to the central power, is a candidate for separatism - that is, the main prerequisite for separatism was the existence of a legal isolation of the subject within formally fixed administrative boundaries, the "break line". In support of such views in those days, it was customary to argue that if Joseph the Great had not created the national union republics again at the end of the 40s of the twentieth century (before that, the country was simply divided into 144 regions), and he did it because even in a nightmare he could not imagine how much the state would weaken under his successors! - then the tragedy of 1991 would not have happened and the state would have survived, according to the Russian expression, "with sin in half": there would not have been this very "break line", and then somehow everything would have straightened out. For all its controversy, this thesis is confirmed in many episodes of the thousand-year history of Russians. Even the largest empire in world history, the Mongolian (and the Russians like to say: we are not Europeans, we are the [Jochi Ulus](#)²³), almost immediately after the death of Genghis Khan, fell apart into its part-clans strictly along their borders, and without any external reasons.

In line with these sentiments, in 2004, Vladimir II carried out a reform that made the governors of regions and presidents of national republics in the Russian Federation not elected, but appointed by the President of Russia. And in 2008, during the preparation of the Constitution of the Russian Union, the number of regions that were now called territories was reduced by consolidation to 17 (12 in the former Russian Federation, two in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, two in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and one in Belarus) - it was believed that this would strengthen the control and manageability of the regional authorities on the part of the federal. But Gabriel the Great went incomparably further: in 2013, a reform was carried out (as part of the general constitutional reform), according to which the regions were abolished altogether. The argument was as follows: there is a concept of a pyramid (a classic example is the structure of the United States until the end of the twentieth century) - the main part of state power is below, at the community level, less - at the next level, the states, and quite a bit - at the federal level.

There is the concept of an inverted pyramid (this is how the USSR was arranged): very little power at the bottom, a little more in the regions and republics, and the main part of power in the center. Both of them are logical in their own way, but in Russia, according to Gabriel, something completely absurd has developed, like a rhombus: there is little power from below and from above, and almost all of it is in reality concentrated in the middle, at the regional level. But is this level really necessary? Yes, in reality, the main part of internal power functions are carried out by governors, no one was going to reproach them for idleness - but they simply appropriated these powers, partially usurping from the federation, partially taking away from local self-government (more precisely, not allowing it to arise at all). But most of the power functions they performed at that time (primarily in terms of regulating near-commercial issues) should not have belonged to the sphere of state power at all - they clung to them mainly for reasons of corruption. "Look," Gabriel said, "what percentage of commerce in any region is controlled by the relatives and people of the governor? Therefore, let's remove all unnecessary powers from the sphere of state power, transfer everything related to ensuring the life of the territory to local self-government, and the rest will be carried out by the central government. Let Russia become a country of self-governing communities!"

And so it happened - local self-government actually arose, which is part of the structure of *zemstvo* power, which I will discuss below, and the system of territorial administration of imperial power (everything that I wrote above about the state power of Russia refers to imperial power - as opposed to *zemstvo*). Each imperial agency or service, except for foreign policy, has its own division of the country into imperial districts, in which its territorial bodies, called committees, are located. For those agencies and services whose activities take place throughout Russia, the imperial districts are approximately (or even strictly) the same in size, in terms of population - for example, imperial school districts or imperial districts of the criminal police. For other services, the districts differ greatly - for example, why should the service of supervision of imperial and *oprichnina* cities have the same density of territorial committees in Europe, where there are few such cities, as in historical Russia, where there are more than sixty of them? And the Imperial Border Service, for example, generally operates only on the border, and in non-border regions it has nothing to do. But the difference in size is not the only reason why the imperial districts of different services and agencies do not coincide with each other: it is also expressly prohibited by the Constitution. It is believed that if the districts coincide, then sooner or later coordinators of the activities of various departments and similar people and structures will inevitably appear in them, and these districts will de facto take the place of the abolished territories and regions, and there it is not far from the requirements to formalize them, introduce governors, etc. - as the Russians say, "bast [?] on the post, start over." This fear of the return of the regions with their, if not separatism, then certainly independence, does not leave the Russian authorities to this day. In addition, they argue, if regions exist and are at least to some extent self-governed, then inevitably people will live differently in some than in others - what kind of a single country is this then (the concept of "unity in difference" for Russians is absolutely alien)? Therefore, there is no division of the country into provinces, even for the purposes of geography - as I said, this role is played by the Orthodox metropolises, although they vary greatly in size and therefore are not very convenient for this.

Zemstvo power. The system of *zemstvo* power in Russia is two-level - like our system of local self-government. The first level is called a community - it is a village or several villages, a small city or a microdistrict in the middle or in a big city. In the first case, the community is called a rural district, in the second, a municipality, and in the third, a municipal district; in all cases, its size is 5-7 thousand people. The law does not forbid establishing even smaller divisions within the community with their elders or someone else - villages in rural districts, so-called ends in small towns and individual apartment buildings in big cities.

The association of a number of communities in order to jointly solve certain problems related to their competence is the second level, called the *zemstvo*; it is either a large city or a series of rural districts

and/or municipalities. The composition of a particular *zemstvo* is determined completely freely - which communities want to form it and agree on this with each other, such will enter it, and each can leave at any time, unless otherwise written in their agreement (however, it cannot be particularly rigidly binding be legal); that is why the Russians are not afraid that the *zemstvos* will turn into regions. The exceptions are large cities, which must be *zemstvos* of municipal districts without fail (otherwise they simply will not be able to function) - but in this case, this *zemstvo* can freely agree with any of the neighbors on their accession. The size of the *zemstvo* is also not stipulated in any way by imperial law - the only requirement is that communities that physically border on each other must enter it. Also, the structure of the *zemstvo* governing bodies, as well as the method of their formation, is not specified. By the way, both the structure and the method of forming the governing bodies of the communities themselves are also regulated by imperial law only in the most general form - the only requirement is that they must be elected and that all citizens of the Empire who permanently reside or own housing in a given community: the community does not, for example, have the right to establish a qualification, according to nationality or according to the terms of settlement. The volume of powers of communities and *zemstvos* is greater than that of our local authorities, but less than ours, have a total of local authorities and states; they apply to everything that, in principle, falls within the scope of public administration, which does not belong to imperial power: in practice, this is a lot - from the protection of public order (the so-called *zemstvo* militia) to healthcare.

It is important to understand that communities and *zemstvos* are not administrative-territorial units: this is expressed in the fact that all communities existing in Russia do not cover its entire territory, but only a smaller part of it. That is, part of the territory of Russia is communities and, accordingly, *zemstvos*, and the other, most of it, is a territory that is not part of any communities, where, accordingly, there is no *zemstvo* power (imperial power, of course, acts in the same way throughout the country). The latter includes, firstly, imperial lands for designated purposes (forests, reserves, exclusion zones, military bases and other special facilities), secondly, lands for agriculture (their status will be discussed in the chapter "[Economy](#)"), thirdly, lands for mining or other industrial use of natural resources, and finally, fourthly, imperial lands that do not have any special status, on which no significant activity is carried out. I have listed the largest categories - and besides, there are also lands of industrial enterprises, etc. The essence of this state of affairs and at the same time its difference from the generally accepted division into territorial units is that, for example, our state or district boundaries are drawn without connection with the actual residence of people - any territories, even in which no one lives, are certainly included in one or another state or district; and in Russia, the community and the *zemstvo* are only the territory in which, in fact, people live compactly.

The imperial law rigidly establishes uniform rules for determining the boundaries of communities and *zemstvos*, the algorithm of which is that they are held no further than the distance determined by the formula from the last house (usually about 200 meters for a community), and it cannot be single and must not stand further than a certain distance from other nearby houses. Simply put, if, for example, a rural district consists of 10 villages of five square kilometers, then only these villages themselves, that is, 50 square kilometers, will be considered the territory of the rural district, and the space between them, if no one lives there, cannot be considered its territory, even if there are single houses there.

The same applies to the space between the communities that make up the *zemstvo* - it is not considered the territory of the *zemstvo*; the exception is the territory of *zemstvo* objects, for example, *zemstvo* roads. In practice, this means that, for example, the *zemstvo* militia cannot detain you or even check your documents outside settlements, except for cases stipulated by law. The meaning of all this in the very Russian philosophy of *zemstvo* self-government is the right and duty of people to organize life at their own discretion where they live compactly together; so why should they establish their own rules where no one lives? This provides an additional degree of freedom to Russian citizens - after all, in everyday life, if you are not a criminal and are not interested in politics, you do not feel imperial power in any way (in any

case, you can create such a life for yourself so as not to feel it). And the local *zemstvo* authorities cannot be overlooked, because they tell you where to put and where not to put garbage bags, or after which hour you can't turn on music. Of course, at the same time, it cleans the driveways and patrols the streets - but very many people, even among us, dear compatriots, and in the same way in Russia, are ready to voluntarily lose all this, but not have any power over them (not counting the imperial, which, as I said, you don't feel much) and don't ask anyone where you can walk the dog. So, in Russia, for this it is enough to settle in the outskirts, and not so far away - a couple of kilometers from the nearest settlement is enough, even if there are two or three more houses next to you. In this case, you pay taxes differently, and in total it turns out less than you would pay in the community. This is considered fair, because you still use some of the things from the state and society (protection from criminality or external invasion, for example), but not others (for example, street cleaning or law enforcement). Many Russians have made such a choice in recent years, since there is enough land in the Empire.

Communities (or *zemstvos*, if the communities have delegated this to them) elect deputies to the House of Commons, the so-called left chamber of the *zemstvo* Duma of Russia, the highest body of *zemstvo* power. The order of elections, as well as the norms of representation, are determined by the Duma itself (the number of deputies in 2053 was 5,508 people). There are no parties in Russia, although they are not prohibited: under such a system of power, they simply cannot arise and become stronger (we are talking about *zemstvo* parties - in imperial power, among guardsmen, participation in the activities of any parties is expressly prohibited by the charter). A very large number of deputies, coupled with a non-uniform procedure for their election and the absence of parties, are essential for the Russian political system: a deputy in the Russian Empire is not at all such a significant person as ours, and is by no means in the center of attention of the press and public interest in general. This is also due to the fact that the deputies do not work in a common building in the capital (it exists in St. Petersburg, but only ceremonial events are held there), but remotely via the Web. At the same time, the functions of deputies do not include general representation - the representative of the population of the community before the imperial authorities is, according to the Constitution, its head or other official, depending on the charter of the community (usually this role is delegated to the head of the *zemstvo*); thus, deputies are not a representative power. Although the Duma is bicameral and works according to the classical scheme of a bicameral parliament (one chamber considers and adopts a law or resolution, and the other only approves it or, conversely, vetoes it), both chambers are equivalent in it, which is why they are called left and right, and not upper and lower, as we have: each of the chambers can pass any law or regulation, and it will go to the other for approval. The *zemstvo* Duma does not have an all-Russian executive body (such as the *zemstvo* government), and according to the Constitution it cannot be - the laws adopted by it are executed directly in the *zemstvos*.

The right chamber is the House of Peoples, where representatives from all nationalities of the country are elected; its number is equal to 1,000 deputies, who before each election are distributed according to quotas corresponding to the share of each nationality in the total population of the country. That is, if some nation makes up 10% of the population of Russia, then it should have 100 seats in the right chamber - but at the same time there are some complex adjustment factors that progressively reduce the proportion of large nations and increase the weight of small ones. The meaning of this is that Russians or Russians plus Germans do not have an obvious majority in the chamber, which makes its activities meaningless. The general principles of this are determined by the Imperial Law "On the House of Peoples", and the specifics - by the Duma: in practice, it works in such a way that in the current chamber, Russians, who make up 44.3% of the population, have 31.6% of the votes, and, for example, Germans - 7.7% (with 9.9% of the population); while the Tatars, on the contrary, have 1.7% of the vote with 0.93% of the population. The allied peoples, by the way, do not have any privileges in quotas. The peoples that make up less than 0.1% of the population, but numbering more than 50 thousand people, have one deputy each, plus four deputies are allocated for all those numbering less than 50 thousand. Deputies for one or another national

quota are elected only by citizens of this nationality - technically, this is not difficult to do in Russia, since the nationality of each person is recorded in his passport and in the general electoral database.

The Chambers of Peoples exist not only at the national level, but also in the so-called national districts, the composition and boundaries of which are approved by the Chamber of Peoples of the Zemsky Duma. Naturally, they do not cover the entire territory of Russia - why do we need a chamber of peoples where all or almost all the population is of one nationality - but only in multinational places. By law, the district chambers are the upper chambers for all *zemstvos* located in their districts, that is, they have the right to veto all their decisions; the principle of their election is the same as that of the all-Russian chamber.

In addition to the district chambers of peoples, in which all the peoples living in a given district are represented, there are all-Russian national chambers in which only one people is represented, but from all of Russia; they adopt legislation for their people, which the Constitution refers to the relevant jurisdiction (for details, see the chapter "[Nationalism](#)"). This whole system is the embodiment of the centuries-old Russian constitutional principle of the "union of peoples" – of course, a union that is not quite symmetrical, in which the Russians, and to a lesser extent the allied peoples, play a special role, pivotal for the Empire. In fairness, it must be said that, by their national nature, the Russians are indeed a very imperial people. This principle of the "union of peoples" in Russia is opposed to the principle of federalism that exists in our country, that is, the "union of territories".

The Duma adopts all-Russian laws on matters within its competence (the so-called *zemstvo* laws); The Constitution, however, clearly establishes that *zemstvo* laws cannot prohibit anything to citizens and legal entities, nor force anything, that is, they cannot interfere with rights and freedoms. In practice, everything is more cunning: for example, the Imperial Criminal and Administrative Codes do not prohibit prostitution, and therefore not a single *zemstvo* or *zemstvo* Duma as a whole can introduce such a ban. But they can prohibit public coverage of this (including any advertising and even the presence of signs) on their (or the entire Russian) territory, impose restrictions on the behavior of prostitutes in public places, and also oblige them to restrict this activity territorially, for example, to certain areas of the city. (Here we are talking about restrictions beyond those set by the Empire - they are actually quite severe.) But if any community considers the restriction to be infringing on its rights, it can challenge it in the Constitutional Court - this is a very common practice.

In general, consideration of litigations about whether this or that *zemstvo* law or the decision of some *zemstvo* or community in this sense is constitutional, makes up more than three-quarters of the work of the Constitutional Court. The situation with business rights is a little different - communities can also impose bans, but on the so-called exclusive basis: this means that a community or *zemstvo* can, for example, adopt a legal decree banning the construction of a plant on its territory, but then any one is sure - if then the construction of some other plant will be allowed, and before that someone else was denied, then this will be the basis for the intervention of the imperial prosecutor's supervision, and for the claim (with a 100% chance of winning) of the person who was denied. In addition, communities and *zemstvos*, when accepting such prohibitions, always remember that most of the land is not included in any community or *zemstvo* at all (see above). Therefore, by banning the construction of, for example, a large shopping center on its territory, the community runs the risk that the developer will either agree with the neighboring one or build it a little to the side on no-man's land (in terms of *zemstvo* division) land; that is, the shopping center will still be in approximately the same place, but taxes from it will no longer go to them.

Identification of violators of community orders and *zemstvo* laws (for example, prostitutes who trade on the street where this is not allowed in a given city) is carried out only by the local police - the Imperial Criminal Police Service does not deal with violations of *zemstvo* laws and regulations; however, observance of the general imperial rights of the individual is mandatory, and this is already monitored by the Imperial Prosecutorial Supervision Service.

In general, in terms of local self-government, the imperial government of Russia takes a position not just of non-intervention, but of self-elimination: God's is God's, and Caesar's is Caesar's. This is very important in terms of the analysis of the separation of powers in Russia (see the Conclusion chapter).

Political system. The complexity of characterizing the state system of Russia is that many concepts from this sphere, introduced as strict terms back in ancient times - first by the Greeks, and then by the Romans - such as democracy and the republic, in recent centuries and especially in the 20th-21st centuries, imperceptibly changed their meaning. And the system of Russia should be called differently, depending on whether we use the original meaning of these terms or the one that has developed in the last two centuries in Western civilization. From the positions of Plato and Aristotle, Russia is certainly a democracy - its supreme power, the emperor, is elected by all who have the right to vote. On the other hand, since the twentieth century, democracy has become unambiguously associated with universal equal suffrage, and it is not even close in Russia - only members of the service class, that is, guardsmen, who now make up about 2.5% of the population, have the right to vote in the election of the emperor. But even among the inhabitants of the cradle of democracy, Ancient Athens, only free-born men also had the electoral and civil rights in general - and they were a minority, even without slaves. By the way, the connection of citizenship with military duty was as unambiguous among them as in modern Russia - a citizen, and only he, had his place in the phalanx of the city without fail in any war, like the Romans in the legion. In general, universal suffrage is a very late innovation that appeared only at the beginning of the 20th century. And less than a century before, in our northern states, which are the cradle of modern democracy, not only blacks and women were not considered voters, but also white adult men who did not meet property or religious qualifications. Subsequently, this changed, but the USA was considered a democracy even before these changes! At the same time, an apology for the presence of a qualification was the reasoning that it is not eternal - everyone can, for example, earn money and become a voter. But a similar consideration fully applies to the Russians, since there, in order to become a guardsman at any time in your life, you just need to submit an application. So if you use classical terms, then Russia should definitely be considered a democracy, despite the fact that suffrage is not universal there.

It is more difficult to decide whether to consider it a republic - in modern usage this word means nothing more than "not a monarchy." According to this criterion, Russia, of course, is a republic, and the presence of an autocracy in it is not a contradiction to this, because the autocrat is elected there for a fixed time. In the days of the Roman Republic, the election of a dictator for six months or a year was also practiced, and this did not at all make Rome a dictatorship. In the [Polish-Lithuanian] Commonwealth of the 16th-18th centuries, the king was also elected by the Sejm (that is, the congress of the nobility), and, unlike today's Russia, for an indefinite time (that is, until his death or abdication), and nevertheless the Commonwealth was considered a republic. However, personally, I would not dare to call Russia a republic, since in all the republics there was a separation of powers, which is not so at the imperial level in Russia. Russians consider the idea of separation of powers to be a liberal product of Western civilization (although this is not entirely true), designed to facilitate the rule of the oligarchy. (And please do not consider it nonsense, dear compatriots, to discuss whether the Russian Empire is a republic: the British Empire of the 18th-20th centuries, formally being a monarchy, not even a constitutional one, was in fact a typical republic.) In general, even in the very word "republic" (lat. common cause) contains an indication not so much of the source of power, as in the word "democracy", but rather of the participation of all strata, population groups and estates in governance - therefore it is still difficult for me to imagine a republic without separation of powers in one form or another.

Do not take it for impudence, dear compatriots, but while writing this book about Russia, it became especially clear to me that the classification of types of state system that exists in modern political science is, to put it mildly, incomplete; and some thoughts came to my mind on this occasion, to which I think I will devote a separate work in the future, but for now I just want to announce them. It seems to me that if we abstract from the specific content of the ideology and politics of a certain country, then the type of its

state system should be defined as a matrix of two parameters, each of which can have one of several values. The first parameter is how the new ruler is selected after the departure of the previous individual or collective ruler, and the second parameter is how the state power makes significant decisions: individually or collectively. In other words, the first parameter is the source of power, and the second is the way it is exercised.

The first parameter can be: 1) archaic (power); 2) hereditary; 3) theocratic (election or approval of power by organized clergy); 4) bureaucratic (election by the government itself, that is, the state apparatus, of its own top); 5) paulocratic (I introduced this term, see below); 6) democratic (election of power by the population with universal suffrage). Paulocracy (from the Latin "Paulo" - a little) I call such a system where the government is elected, but with the right to vote, far from universal, that is, with some fairly serious qualification - in other words, not by the entire population, but by some then a part of it.

The second parameter could be: a) dictatorship (completely one-man); b) autocracy (individually, but within certain limits and under control); c) oligarchy (collectively, but rather narrow group); d) republic (collectively, by a wide group, with public discussion, if possible, and separation of powers). By the way, Ancient Rome went through these four types in exactly the reverse order - the early republic was type d, the late one was c, the principate was b and the dominant was a. This approach seems constructive to me - in particular, it allows you to automatically resolve the old, but still relevant question: can a state be considered democratic without separation of powers, but with an elected government. The answer is: it can be democratic, because democracy is a kind of source of power, and the separation of powers is a kind of its implementation (there was no separation of powers in the homeland of democracy, in Ancient Athens); but such a state is definitely not a republic.

It can be clearly stated that according to this classification, Russia is a type 5b, a paulocratic autocracy, our Federation and India are 6d, democratic republics, the Caliphate is 2-3b, a hereditary-theocratic autocracy, and the Celestial Empire is 4c, a bureaucratic oligarchy. Truly, all types of states are represented in our orderly world! The same bureaucratic oligarchy, 4c, as the current Celestial Empire, was the Second Russian Empire (at least before and after Joseph the Great - there are obvious elements of dictatorship in his reign), and the First was 2b, hereditary autocracy. The Russian Federation and the Russian Union of 1991-2012 were a 6th century democratic oligarchy (it sounds strange, but accurately reflects the essence of the matter). Thus, in terms of the state system, the revolution of 1917, with all its cataclysms, was nothing more than the transfer of all power to the state apparatus - both in terms of the source of power (from hereditary to bureaucratic), and in terms of the method of its implementation (from autocratic to oligarchic). This trend took shape and strengthened in the last decades before the revolution, only the tsarist government interfered - and its fate was a foregone conclusion. And the revolution of 1991 was a transition from a bureaucratic source of power to a democratic one - the oligarchic nature of power has not changed in any way. It did not change during the reforms of 2013-2020 (although I designated the modern, post-reform system of Russia as 5b, not 5c) - starting from the Second Empire, even from the end of the First, and to this day, power in Russia is intermediate in nature between institutionalized - autocratic and oligarchic collegiate: in 2013, it simply shifted its focus from collegiality to autocracy. But in terms of the source of power, the complete disappointment of Russians in democracy by 2013 could not but lead to its replacement with something else. Paulocracy is a clear attempt by Russia to find a historical compromise between democracy and bureaucracy, which was disappointed even earlier; therefore, it is likely to remain in Russia for the foreseeable future. But it is very likely that the Third Russian Empire will further evolve to the 5th century, a paulocratic oligarchy - elements of this already exist now, and this does not contradict basic Russian values (unlike replacing the paulocratic type with some other). Indeed, what will fundamentally change in the Russian system of power if its supreme bearer becomes not an elected emperor, but some kind of supreme imperial council, elected in the same way by the guardsmen?

Chapter 4

National Self-Identification

Autonomy

In this chapter, I will talk about two constitutional principles of Russians that determine their self-identification both as a nation and as a state, which determines the place of Russia in the world order. These principles essentially distinguish it from all other countries and to a large extent determine the originality of its way of life. It should be noted that these principles are not norms, but guidelines that set the vector of development, and do not determine a specific point on this vector.

For the first of them, **autonomy**, such a vector is the desire to minimize interaction and interdependence with other states; in Russian journalism, this principle is usually called “Fortress Russia”. Russians perceive themselves not as a nation, but as a civilization, and accordingly they treat foreigners not as distant relatives, but almost as representatives of a different biological species - that is, they are not at all bad or unfriendly (I confirm from my own experience - this is not so), but completely alien. They consider the ecumene not the Earth with the habitable part of the solar system as a whole, but only the Russian Empire. They do not just ignore the rest of the states - this would be wrong for military reasons, and they are often ready to adopt a variety of material and intangible models - but they treat their existence as a necessary evil and would not grieve at all if they suddenly disappeared. There are other peoples and countries - good, no - even better; such an approach of the Russians is very different from our attitude towards the surrounding world as a partner and, ultimately, the source of our enrichment (as well as other trading civilizations - India and the Celestial Empire), and from the attitude of the Caliphate to the entire non-Islamic world as an object of expansion, a “war zone”. This is a very deep difference, and I would advise you not to underestimate it, dear compatriots. This difference stems from a different attitude than ours towards foreigners and non-believers. Both in the European tradition and in our civilization, which, of course, is its successor (despite the fact that Europe itself is now geographically a part of Russia), this relationship exists in the antinomy “worst-equal”, that is, a foreigner is either perceived as *a priori* the worst, or as the same person as you, that is, equal; an indispensable attribute of this antinomy is the comparison of a foreigner with himself, which necessarily carries a negative or positive assessment. The Russian tradition is much more ancient, going back to cave-ancestral times, and there is no antinomy in it, just as there is no comparison with oneself - it is replaced by the perception of a foreigner as “alien”, not reducible to either “worse”, or “better”, or “equal”, because “alien” means incomparable. The very concept of “foreigners” at the same time, of course, is not eternal - the French or Armenians were foreigners, but became their own, and the Tatars and Germans in general became best friends from sworn enemies.

The origin of such an attitude of Russians towards foreigners is obvious - while the European peoples lived among fellow believers, the same Catholic peoples like themselves, the Russians after the final fall of Byzantium, and before that it was incorrect to talk about the Russian ethnos, they existed practically as the only Orthodox people in the world. Earth (a few other Orthodox peoples lived far away and were much smaller in number), surrounded on all sides by Gentiles, moreover, religiously aggressive. During the period of the Second Empire, this attitude only strengthened - how, only in the USSR they live correctly, all other peoples wander in the dark, while considering us ourselves the kingdom of unfreedom and evil (with the exception of a few socialist countries, which were taken lightly due to small in comparison with Russia and obviously dependent on it). But finally this attitude crystallized relatively recently, 50-60 years ago, during the second Time of Troubles and the Period of Restoration. Russia was then demoralized and weak, both as a state and as a nation, and the outside world did its best to reinforce in Russians the feeling that they were flawed and should, for their own good, give up their otherness and dissolve into the Western world, adopting its ways and remaining within it no more special than the

Dutch compared to the Belgians. At first, everything seemed to be going in that direction, especially since the feeling described above was shared by almost the entire elite of that time, but it turned out that the national feeling among Russians is stronger than one might have imagined. Propaganda efforts unprecedented in history in terms of power, hitting both Russian self-identification as a whole and its individual foundations, did not give the desired result - the number of those who feel like “citizens of the world” (Western, of course) did not increase, but, on the contrary, decreased. Moreover, many of those who used to be indifferent to their own “Russianness” began to consider it the core of their worldview. This was the time of the crystallization of the attitude of the Russians towards the outside world as initially hostile, and hostile not only and not so much to the Russian state - this would be understandable - but to the Russian nation as such. This attitude could develop into hostility, as with the Germans after the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles, but instead, alienation became a spontaneous response of the Russian people to the unrelenting oppression of Russophobia. These four sources - the ancient pre-ethnic tradition of feeling foreigners as absolute strangers, the medieval tradition of religious alienation from the outside world, socialist times, the tradition of perceiving the rest of the world as backward and underdeveloped, and the newest tradition of alienated perception of the outside world as *a priori* Russophobic - and gave rise to the modern attitude of Russians to the outside world as to absolutely alien and hostile, but with a neutral emotional assessment, without any malice - as to a natural element.

And just as people try to isolate themselves from the disasters of nature, so the Russians build their interaction with other countries, trying to minimize contacts. In the Russian Constitution, the article “Autonomy” begins as follows: “The purpose of Russia’s relations with other states is exclusively to satisfy its own interests; such a goal cannot be the satisfaction of interstate and universal interests. Russia enters into one or another bilateral or multilateral relationship with other states only when any of its vital interests cannot be satisfied without it; the level of such relations is determined by the volume and degree of vitality of this interest. Moreover, relations here mean not only what belongs to the sphere of big politics and is determined by state agreements, but also any contacts at the level of individuals and organizations. That is, any contact with the outside world is initially considered evil - which can be tolerated as inevitable, but only when the problem cannot be solved in another way.

Russian civilization considers itself self-sufficient: everything it needs - both in the material and in the spiritual sense - it can produce itself. For Russians, it is not an argument that someone can do something better than them: in their view, either they don’t need it, or they will strain and be able to do just as well (this has indeed happened more than once in history). The Russian Empire does not want to either push around other countries, or kowtow to them, or compete with any of them; neither accept other people’s rules of the game, nor impose their own. Directly in foreign policy, this is expressed in the principle of equidistance: for example, having a state system that is very different from others and considering it the only correct one, Russians, nevertheless, will not at all feel special warmth towards those who try to reproduce it in their country. (Usually this is not the case: back in the days of the Peloponnesian wars, Athens supported all democratic, and Sparta all aristocratic policies; the same was true in the Middle Ages and in modern times - it is enough to recall the struggle of the USSR for socialism or the West for human rights and democracy in all over the world.) The Empire does not enter into alliances with other states - this is not a formal requirement of the Constitution, but an unequivocal imperative of Russian foreign policy, voiced by Gabriel the Great. The explanation for this is this: the Constitution directly states that Russia must be ready to confront the whole world, including alone, and any alliance will only weaken it in an effort to ensure such readiness. Russia also has no permanent enmity with anyone, even with the Caliphate, although it fought with them three times already during our era of an ordered world, and fought quite bloodily. Russia tries not to participate in multilateral treaties, such as environmental or space ones, and does this only in extreme cases - you all remember how nine years ago, having received a joint proposal from our Federation, India and the Celestial Empire, to ban the use of [thermonuclear elements](#)²⁴ in cars as extremely dangerous for the external environment, Russia replied that it does not

concern anyone, what it uses on its territory, and it is not even going to discuss such things. The Russian Empire understands that all proposals for new rules for anything are always connected with the selfish interests of your corporations, it was said further, as in the case of the ban on freons 60 years ago, which, as it turned out later, turned out to be absolutely harmless, or the sadly famous Kyoto Protocol. With the Empire, such things will not work. This is just an example, but a very characteristic one - the words "international" or "global" are considered almost indecent in Russia. This attitude is connected both with the unwillingness to enter into unnecessary, unnecessarily contacts, and with disbelief that someone other than them will fulfill their obligations if it is unprofitable for him - and if it is profitable, he will fulfill and without any contract.

Those of you, dear compatriots, who remember the history of Russia (at least in the volume of the first part of this book), will not fail to notice that in the more or less long term, Russians can easily conduct such a foreign policy based on the principle of autonomy now, in our era of an orderly world, and in the period of globalism, that is, until 2019, this was possible only for the mobilization period. Now even the trading powers - we, the Celestial Empire and India - are much less interdependent (more autonomous, in Russian terminology) than it was then. This is not a coincidence - after the coming to power of Gabriel the Great and the constitutional reform of 2013, Russia, having already accepted the principle of autonomy, perfectly understood that it could be implemented only under a very specific type of world order, and was determined to create it. She understood that for this, first of all, it was necessary to crush the West, the rest would be a matter of technology - and now, after the Twelve Day War, the moment had come.

I already wrote in the first part, in the chapter on the establishment of a new world order, that Russia almost forced China to carry out the process of joining the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. And that when my grandfather, the founder of our Federation, Alvaredo Branco, understood this plan and, in fact, demanded Russia's help in uniting the New World into one country, the Russian Empire gave us Canada and agreed to leave the USA. In fact, the unification of the Islamic world into a single Caliphate could not have happened, as I now understand, without the secret help of the Empire. Think about it - being at the peak of its power, being stronger than the rest of the world put together, Russia with its own hands created countries of equal size to itself, some of which obviously could become (and became!) its enemies - why? I put this question to Jan (baptized Ivan) Mickiewicz, head of a department in the Imperial Chancellery for Foreign Policy. "But it didn't work out any other way," Comrade Mickiewicz answered me. - When there are many countries in the world that are very different in size, and among them there are those that are stronger than any other three combined, then this is the ideal order for satanic globalization. Because then the weak countries, which are the majority, become nothing more than a playground for the clash and competition of strong countries. And if there is only one superpowerful country, then it is a playground for the clash and competition of transnational corporations of this country and its allies. We tried to create a world where this is impossible, and for this the smallest country must be large enough to be too tough for others in the military sense, and different enough in way of life and thoughts from the rest that it could not be controlled in a non-violent way. Yes, we ourselves have created enemies for ourselves (namely, enemies, not competitors - we have no one to compete with and nothing for), but we got a world in which we are comfortable - we can go our own way, not paying attention to anyone. And the fact that we are forced to stand watch on our borders and see if there are any threats to us is even good - we will not relax." Thus, the Russian principle of autonomy had a direct impact on the face of the modern world - both by predetermining the above actions of Russia that created this face, and by the fact that it became an example for others, including us, because by the standards of 2018, and more than 2006 and we are now unprecedentedly closed and autonomous.

In the economy of the Empire, autonomy is expressed in the fact that the state tries to minimize any cross-border economic relations. In Russia, the national currency does not convert to the currency of other countries - more precisely, it does, but only by the state represented by the Central Bank and only in

certain cases. A person or organization cannot be the owner of foreign currency other than legally received from the Central Bank - otherwise it is a criminal offense, and although you will not be jailed for this, you will pay a large fine (in addition to confiscation of the currency). Through this mechanism, imports are regulated: the state sells currency only for the purchase of such goods and services that are not and cannot be in Russia, for example, for tropical crops (coffee, tropical fruits, etc.) or for minerals, which the Empire does not have or lacks. If, however, some material or informational product is not produced in Russia, or if significantly worse consumer properties are produced, but in principle it can be produced, then an import substitution program is adopted, which basically boils down to the fact that a regressing schedule for the sale of foreign currency for the import of this product is established: years - at the usual rate, then - at an increasing rate, and from such and such a year the currency will not be sold at all. It is understood that investors, seeing in the future the opening market niche that imports previously occupied, will invest in the creation of appropriate corporations - the schedule is determined by how much time is needed to create new industries, along with technology development, corporate construction and general buildup. The schedule is drawn up and published by the Imperial Agency for Industry Development, without seeking and attracting specific investors - in such private matters, unlike strategic development, Russians firmly believe in the "invisible hand of the market." If, however, domestic business lags behind other states not in a specific product, but in the whole industry, an industry-wide program of accelerated development is adopted, including science, infrastructure, etc.; this was the case with medical and biological technologies - by the 2040s and especially by now, the Russians have managed to catch up to our level, although we still remain recognized leaders in these areas.

The Russians are so consistent in their unwillingness to contact the outside world that they discourage exports as well. As Deputy Director of the Central Bank Dieter Mayer explained to me, the meaning of this is as follows: if you export a lot, then you become dependent on importing countries no less than on exporting countries otherwise. The second Russian Empire, the USSR, collapsed not least because of the collapse in the price of oil, which was a major part of its exports. By the way, then this collapse did not occur at all according to the mysterious laws of the market, but as a result of the purposeful work of the United States - and if the USSR at that time had not been so dependent on its exports, it would not have had this sore point. There is certainly some grain of truth in this - if we impose an embargo on imports from the Middle Kingdom and India (and our business can easily produce most of it ourselves, perhaps a little more expensive), then their economy will collapse overnight, and this understanding will always present in our relationship with them. "But such issues can be regulated, since this dependence is mutual," I objected. "Exactly," Meyer answered me, "if you become a workshop of the world, you will inevitably have to either become a world policeman, like Britain once, and then the United States, or a client of a world policeman, like China later, - and we don't want to be any of those."

Exports in the Empire are limited, limiting the sale of rubles to residents of other countries - after all, export from Russia is allowed by imperial law only for rubles; export for foreign currency and barter transactions are prohibited. So if exports are not restricted, then the Central Bank will begin to accumulate a lot of foreign currency received from the sale of rubles to non-residents, which means that imports will also have to be increased, because otherwise this currency will become a dead weight. Foreign investment in Russia is prohibited: if someone really wants to do business in Russia and is ready to treat it as their own country, Russians argue, let them apply and become Russian. For the purpose of making Russian investments abroad, the currency is not sold (therefore, it is technically impossible to make such investments), except for creating their own service centers, etc. It is not sold for issuing loans to non-residents in foreign currency and other forms of operations in foreign financial markets - issuing loans to non-residents in rubles, as well as attracting loans in foreign currency, is expressly prohibited.

Surprisingly, this draconian, in our opinion, economic regime is such only in terms of transactions with the outside world - in general, the Russian economy, as you will see below, is more liberal than ours. As Mayer explained to me, the only good thing about the market is that it is a self-regulating system - unlike

us, the Russians generally don't like the market (of course, if the word "mercantile" is abusive) and tolerate it only for the sake of this self-regulation. But the market loses this quality when the country ceases to be a closed system. For example, if during a period of rapid economic growth, life becomes more expensive (not necessarily due to inflation - maybe simply due to rising consumption standards), then workers demand higher wages, and employers will always have to meet them, because life becomes more expensive for everyone: in this way, wages automatically adjust to prices, and it is not only entrepreneurs who enjoy the fruits of growth. Or the owners will automate their business, which will lead to an increase in labor productivity and, as a result, national wealth, which, again, through various mechanisms, will benefit all the people. But if a significant part of the workers are foreigners, then they will not demand a raise, because they have a thought, and they earn money to spend it there, there is no growth and, as a result, a rise in prices, and this will significantly slow down the growth of wages from their employees, and automation processes. On the other hand, higher wages for their own workers is more effective demand, which makes economic growth a self-catalyzed process - but not in the case of foreign workers, who save the maximum possible part of their wages for home. This is just one example - and probably not the most typical one, because it is related to the labor market - but it is indicative of the Russians' philosophical foundations for the intrinsic value of economic autarky as part of the principle of autonomy.

The restrictions in the political and social life of the Russian Empire, imposed by the principle of autonomy, are even more severe. Naturally, contacts and interaction with the subjects of other states are reduced to a minimum for power structures, just like ours: this means the impossibility of having foreigners as employees, consultants or contractors (surprisingly, this rule did not exist in Russia during the second Time of Troubles). As for non-profit structures - and they, in particular, include all public organizations - they are, in addition, not allowed to have foreign legal entities or individuals as founders, and it is also forbidden to accept any assistance or grants from them. As in the economic sphere, these restrictions do not in any way affect the content of the activities of public organizations - there are no fewer of them than we have, and many of them are not particularly loyal to the regime. Religious organizations are an exception - for them, contacts with the outside world, in particular with their co-religionists from abroad, are not limited to the state. But it should be remembered that there are practically no Orthodox Christians outside of Russia, as well as Ravilite Muslims, and other religions are either officially discriminated against in terms of public preaching and proselytism as having a center abroad, or are ethnically niche and therefore of little importance on the scale of the Empire, like Judaism or Armenian Gregorian Christianity. All the above prohibitions apply to the media as well; moreover, they are also forbidden to accept articles and any materials from foreigners and provide them with a tribune (although they look at this through their fingers). News and, in general, any information about events in other countries is allowed for public circulation, but only in separate relevant sections or publications: for example, any Russian media can cover our American basketball championship, but only in the "Foreign Sports" section or something like it. Moreover, if it is placed simply in the "Sports" section, along with the Russian championship, then this will be a violation, for which, after the second case, the media will be closed. However, since Russian athletes do not participate in international competitions, Russian films do not participate in international festivals, etc., all this does not really affect the majority of Russians.

Restrictions regarding personal communication - both private and professional - and the flow of information are even tighter. As you know, dear compatriots, it is technically impossible to call directly to and from Russia - they have different codes. Also, their Network, Runet, is not connected to the Internet, covering us, the Celestial Empire and India, and even the Caliphate, due to a different protocol. Make no mistake, however, these technical barriers are political in origin: Russian laws prohibit the use of instrumentation and information technology that is compatible with us. There are, however, special portals through which you can connect, but these services are subject to a large excise tax, as a result of

which a minute of a telephone conversation with the American Federation costs more than two rubles (about ten dollars). True, if a Russian has relatives abroad, then he is legally entitled to a subsidy to pay the excise part of the price, which, with close kinship and not very large volumes of conversations, can be up to 90%. The same restrictions exist for audio and video content: all the standards of electronic devices in Russia are deliberately different, and our compact capsule simply cannot be reproduced there, and its replication in the Russian standard is also subject to a large excise tax. A similar situation with the reception of TV programs via satellite. By the way, there is another curious trick - as you know, Russia is not connected with other countries by either bilateral or global treaties on the protection of copyright and intellectual property (although such laws are in force inside the Empire, and quite tough ones at that). Therefore, any citizen of Russia can not only, for example, replicate foreign music or use a patented foreign invention without asking, but also put his name on them. Naturally, everyone else is free to do the same with Russian copyrighted products, and the Empire is acting quite fairly in this matter, that is, it is not trying to push through any asymmetric advantages for itself. Actually, this is the quintessence of their principle of autonomy - do what you want and do not interfere with us doing what we want. But let's get back to entertainment products from other countries: they often appear on the Russian market after appropriate processing - but already as Russian, with indication of supposedly Russian authors; the authorities do not pose any obstacles to this. That is, the Imperial Department of Education believes that it is not foreign films, music, etc. that are a violation of the principle of autonomy in themselves, but only if they are openly positioned as foreign - if the people consider them home-grown, then good luck. In general, watch and listen to what you want - but only domestic.

The same applies to physical communication: for example, scientists working in state research institutes can read all the articles and other materials of foreign colleagues, but do not have the right to communicate with them, face-to-face or video - if this does not suit them, they are free not to work there and get a job in industry or private institutions. I had a conversation with Dmitry Korin, deputy head of the Imperial Agency for Science, and asked him what such a ban is about - is it not detrimental to efficiency? He answered me that it is very common for all creative people, and especially scientists, to feel that they belong to one global caste: they consider themselves, first of all, not Russians, but scientists. And this is unacceptable according to the fundamental principles of the Russian Empire, even directly according to the Constitution (by the very principle of autonomy that I am now describing, as well as by the principle of nationalism). As for efficiency, Russian science is more than 30% of the world, and the big question is who needs whom more. In general, direct contacts of Russians with foreigners, as well as trips to other countries, are not prohibited (my own stay in Russia is an example of this), but all this is greatly limited by financial considerations: my one-year visa cost me 12 thousand dollars, and, of course, about they will charge a Russian for a visa to us. As in the case of telecommunications, you can get a big discount on a trip to a relative once a year or on business trips for exporters-importers: the source of government compensation for this discount is visa fees from foreigners. Such high fees for visas (the Celestial Empire and India pay no more than \$50 for visas) were introduced solely at the initiative of Russia, which considers it harmful and unnecessary for its citizens to travel abroad. Why is this necessary, the Russian authorities believe, if we have everything of our own: we stretch from the tundra to tropical islands, we are 12,000 kilometers long and 3,000 wide, and most of the great cities and historical sights of the world are located with us - what do you lack? But the Empire does not want to ban foreign trips or force them to obtain an exit visa, as was the case in the Second Russian Empire or in the current Caliphate - so that the effect of the forbidden fruit does not arise for its citizens. In addition, suddenly someone wants to go abroad so much that he will be ready for any costs: why deprive him of this opportunity; as the Russian proverb says, "hunting is worse than captivity." By the way, this is a manifestation of Russia's rather Jesuitical policy in the field of propaganda: for Russian citizens, everything looks like the exorbitant price of a visa is set not by Russia, but by other countries - but few Russians realise that this is nothing more than a forced response to the price set by Russia.

But it should be understood that the fee for visas, although high, is not prohibitive even for the average Russian, due to fairly high incomes. The fee for a 20-day tourist visa is about \$3,000 - about 60% of the average monthly salary. And for those few who still have commercial business with other countries, all this does not apply to business visas - their procedure for issuing and fees are completely different. Moreover, since much in Russia is free (health care, school education, a significant part of higher education, lawyer services in criminal cases), it is easier for Russians to decide to spend money on things that are not very necessary than for Americans. So it is financially impossible for an ordinary Russian to travel abroad many times a year, but going to stare at foreign shores once every two or three years is not a problem - and as a result, a very large part of the inhabitants of the Empire over the past ten years has at least once been abroad. At the same time, the vast majority of Russian citizens return from foreign trips rather disappointed. Well, now it is difficult to surprise Russians with warm seas and a variety of natural landscapes. Therefore, the issue of abolishing visa fees is now widely discussed, and it is very possible that this will happen in the near future. But this is now, when Russia has won the war, has become a world leader and, as a result, has achieved high unity of the nation - and in the 2010s visa restrictions were necessary and inevitable.

But all the restrictions and prohibitions that I have described are not at all the essence of the principle of autonomy - they are nothing more than its instrumental manifestations, and by no means the main ones. Autonomy in Russia is not a rule of law, but a worldview. That is, for the vast majority of the Russian people, the restrictions are not relevant, they themselves are not eager to watch foreign films or travel abroad, because they perceive the outside world as wrong and vicious (churched people are just like the kingdom of the Antichrist) and, moreover, hostile to Russia. Restrictions and prohibitions are needed not for them, and not even for the re-education of the minority, but in order to prevent processes that will blur and eventually destroy this worldview. For example, the imperial government itself, which, of course, studies foreign media professionally and accordingly knows what [topics] and how they cover, will never publicly respond to statements by foreign statesmen or the media themselves about Russia - this is considered humiliating. To the question of a journalist, they say, how do you feel about such and such a statement from such and such a country, any official of the Empire will answer in the same way: what do we care? Whatever they want, let them say. I think that the majority of the population will respond in the same way - precisely because the principle of autonomy for them is a worldview. It is based on the notion that in addition to the antinomy "good way - bad way" there is something much more important - one's own way or not one's own. Every nation, like every creation of God, has its own meaning and its own destiny with God, and it is not worthwhile to follow other people's paths - "every creature after its kind." "Have you ever thought," Archpriest Dean Daniel told me, "why the Old Testament forbade sodomy and even just dressing a man in a woman's dress on pain of death? Or do you Americans think, in your quest to reduce biblical truths to rationalism, that this prohibition worked to increase the birth rate or something like that? No, the point is quite different: the Lord created a man and a woman different, and He made you, your unique personality, a man: do not resist His plan! So Russia must go its own way, and we do not want to borrow other people's ways, nor impose our own on others. We are different and we intend to remain different. Therefore, after the Twelve-Day War, and the wars of expansion, in the twentieth year, we stopped, but we could have subjugated the whole world - well, who could have prevented us then, your Brazil, isn't it? We also conceived the orderly world - it was we who created it! "for countries to be so big, self-sufficient and different from each other that they don't really need each other, and can go about their own business without regard to others." "But you still annexed Europe," I objected. "We have reached our natural boundaries, which God judged for us, between three oceans," was the answer to me. "There we set limits for ourselves and never again claimed anything - we even refused our part during the division of Antarctica, because it is not ours." - "But what about the "all-humanity" of Russia, about which many Russian philosophers wrote? I asked. "Didn't even the fathers of your Church say that you are destined to embrace, if not by force, but by love, all peoples, and that therefore your path is universal?" "All the peoples of that time were Europeans and Turks, they simply didn't know others then,

but they are all now indeed, thank God, our Russians, and Orthodox Russians love them as brothers” I heard in response. “And the universal destiny of Russia is not to merge with everyone, but to testify before God and other peoples about the possibility of building a right life on Earth.”

But there is another aspect. The central idea of the Third Empire, the very essence of its existence, is that it is and should be the Kingdom of Truth. But the Kingdom of Truth can exist only in a situation of opposition to its opposite, therefore, there must be a kingdom of untruth, the onslaught of which is restrained by the Empire: this is how Russians feel about themselves. If the whole world becomes one state, then the untruth will be inside it - this is the meaning of the prophecy of the Apocalypse. This can happen not only when you are conquered, but also when you yourself conquer the whole world - that is why Gabriel the Great did not allow this to happen in 2019. However, the whole world becomes one and under the condition of globalization, without any conquests - with the same result. Therefore, in order for the untruth not to be within your limits, you must be closed. This is another deep foundation of the Russian principle of autonomy.

Thus, in the worldview of Russians, active interaction with the outside world, especially under the condition of mutual penetration, is evil, or at least a harbinger of evil, regardless of whether this world is good or bad - it is enough that it is different. In general, it should be noted that Russians consider our present world of the middle of the 21st century to be the kingdom of the Antichrist - not to the same extent as at the beginning of the century, when, in their opinion, the end of the world was very close, which they managed to push back, changing the world, but still - darkness only retreated for a while. This applies to all countries, with the exception of their permanent military adversary, the Caliphate (which they, however, also consider to be an instrument of the devil, although not his kingdom). There is nothing surprising here - the Caliphate is, albeit hostile to them, but, in fact, the same ideocratic religious state as the Russian Empire. Russians hate - or rather despise - both Catholicism and Protestantism, and Indian polytheism, and the atheism of the Celestial Empire; and our liberal democracy, and the Indian caste system (although not spelled out in the laws), and the heavenly [ie Chinese] bureaucratic oligarchy. They consider all of us, except Islamists, to be hucksters (this is a curse in their mouths) and individualists who live according to the principle “man is a wolf to man”. They believe that no matter how rich, free and secure we live, our life lacks the main thing - meaning and dignity.

In the Empire, it is believed that the division into Western and Eastern civilizations originates in the confrontation between ancient Hellas and ancient Israel, the confrontation between Japheth and Shem, and their first clash was the Maccabean Wars. Subsequently, the Western civilization became the successor of Japheth, first Europe, and after it our New World, and Russia became the successor of Shem, the new Israel. The humanistic culture of the Hellenes, which created masterpieces of art, science and political thought, but at the cost of godlessness and, as a result, a complete loss of moral guidelines, is conceived by Russians as the focus of evil and untruth, “diabolical charm” - in contrast to the harsh culture of the Old Testament, which did not create anything like that, but by faith knowing the one God and rewarded for this to give birth from itself to the incarnate God-Man. And in our era, in their opinion, everything remained the same - the West, even by adopting Christianity, imbued it with the human spirit of humanism and logic coming from the Hellenes, and thereby perverted it. Attempts to comprehend God by rationalism, they believe, inevitably lead to the emasculation of religion, the pinnacle of which emasculation they see as Protestantism. Byzantium, and then Russia, having become the new Israel, retained the original spirit of perception of God, coming from the ancient Jews, the spirit of faith, and not selfish logic. Thus, the confrontation with the rest of the world - with India and the Celestial Empire, who did not know the true God at all, and with us and the Islamists who perverted Him - for Russians is not primarily geopolitical, ideological, or even more so economic in nature. For them, this is a universal eschatology that will only end with Armageddon and the end of the world. Only by understanding this, dear compatriots, will you understand the origin and essence of the Russian principle of autonomy.

Nationalism

This constitutional principle, interconnected with the principle of autonomy, has several layers. The first of them is the perception of any person on Earth in inseparable connection with his nationality, which is thought of as one of his most important properties, no less important than gender. There is no person at all - there is a Russian, an American or an Indian, and among the Russians there is, in turn, a German and a Pole. All this is very different from our [ie American Federation] worldview, in which the national origin of a person is no more important than, for example, his height. But one should not immediately consider the views of Russians as chauvinism, because they do not at all contain contempt for other nationalities - just as people who consider a woman a woman, and not generally a person, do not necessarily consider her lower or worse than a man. Without nationalism in this sense, there could be no principle of autonomy - you cannot declare isolation from others if you do not consider them *a priori* different. Actually, there is nothing unusual in this: everywhere in the world, in all cultures of all times, people felt at the same time membership in their tribe and civilization, and in humanity as a whole - but with a different ratio of the first and second. The Russians' sense of self is almost completely shifted to the first of the two, which predetermines the primacy of the Russian national over the universal - this is the first layer of the principle of nationalism; and the practical implementation of such a sense of self (at least one of them) is the principle of autonomy.

But it was no coincidence that I contrasted the universal with the tribal and civilizational at the same time - in foreign policy in our world these are one and the same thing, but in the inner life they are different things. In such a multinational country as Russia, this means that a person is both a Russian, on the one hand, and a Russian, Ossetian or Spaniard, on the other. So, the Russian worldview assumes the primacy of the civilizational over the tribal, but the tribal, unlike the universal, is not ignored and plays a subordinate, but very important role (later we will see how this is embodied in the social structure). Thus, the principle of nationalism in this first layer means that any Russian is first of all a Russian, secondly, but importantly, a member of his tribe, for example, a Serb or a Bashkort, and, in almost no order of importance, a person in general. In a word, Russia is above everything. The second layer of the principle of nationalism is the imperative "Russianness" of the Russian Empire. Russia is by no means what it is customary in philosophy to call a "nation state", to which we [ie American Federation], and the Celestial Empire, and, probably, even India belong. I say "even" because India, it would seem, has its own national culture, and even way of life and thinking, quite different from all the others - but at the same time, it is more or less obvious that if the national composition of the population there changes, then so will this image. And along with it, in full accordance with the democratic principle, the self-identification of the country will change. This applies to us and the Celestial Empire to an even greater extent, and we all consider this natural and normal - otherwise, the principles of the country will not correspond to the principles of the majority of the population. Not so in Russia - it is considered a country of Russian culture and Russian worldview, regardless of whether the majority or minority is the Russian ethnic group from the general population. I got the impression that for this principle it is not essential even if there are no Russians left at all. There were precedents of this kind in history - for example, the Hellenistic states of Antiquity, in which there were almost no Hellenes by blood. This applies especially to the late Roman Empire, in which the Romans - I do not mean the Roman citizens, which embraced all, but the Latins proper - constituted an insignificant part; at the same time, it was clearly and undoubtedly precisely the Roman, and not just a pan-European empire. Actually, the Third Russian Empire itself had no more than a quarter of Russians in the 20s (now this has changed, see the chapter "[Geography and Population](#)"); nevertheless, the Russian Empire is primarily a Russian state ("the state of the Russian people, the peoples - allies, namely: (the list is in progress) and other Russian peoples" - as it is written in the Constitution). Quite practical, including constitutional, conclusions follow from this: for example, Russian is not just the only state language, but no other can become such in the future, even alongside Russian, as it is written in the Constitution. Also, any people of the Russian Empire can have their own

holidays, if their national chamber decides so - this does not concern imperial power at all, unless the holiday is anti-Russian - but only Russian national or Orthodox holidays can be all-Russian. This, by the way, causes a certain tension in society, although not strong, even between the allied nations - national holidays are the victory over Germany in 1945 (May 9) and over the Poles in 1612 (November 4). Also considered holidays, although without declaring a non-working day, are the days of victories over the Tatars and the French. Now all these nations are part of the Empire, and many do not like such celebrations; but when I asked one of the oprichniki about this, he briefly answered: "They will tolerate it." True, not everything related to "Russianness" is so unshakable: the circumstance, for example, that one can enroll in the guardsmen only by being (or becoming) a Russian or a member of an ally people is not a requirement for eternity and will be canceled, I think, within two or three decades - in contrast to the requirement of Orthodoxy.

What is the Russian nature of the Russian Empire? After all, as we shall see later, the national is not suppressed by the Russian in any way, much less humiliated; on the contrary, when they say that, for example, the Buryats or the French are Russian peoples, one can hear a certain pride in this. Russians are not privileged in any way, with the exception of the rule of entry into the service class; and from the position of the Church, there is no concept of "Russian" at all - whoever belongs to the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church is Russian, and whoever does not, he, strictly speaking, is not a foreigner, but a non-Christian, even if he is Vasya Ivanov. Therefore, by the way, the Church does not recognize twinning - it does not condemn, but simply does not notice: for it, any child of the EROC is Russian anyway. If you look at the statistics, in particular, the income and property of Russians in comparison with the rest, then they are not higher, but even somewhat lower than the average for the Empire. I don't want to say that all Russians share their last shirt with the rest of the peoples of the Empire, but they definitely don't fatten on them. By the way, it was the same at the end of the First Empire, when it had already become multinational, and in the Second Empire. It is absolutely impossible to imagine that all the peoples of the Empire serve as a source of enrichment for the titular nation - and this is exactly what happened, dear compatriots, among our ancestors, in the Spanish, Portuguese and British empires - in Russia it is absolutely impossible: the very idea will seem vile to everyone, and Russians more than anyone else.

It cannot, however, be said that in the sphere of the economy the Empire ignores national factors - this is not so. It is not entirely indifferent to the places of residence of which peoples the centers of certain industries, sciences, etc. are located. For example, the military industry, the space industry, strategic energy facilities, imperial scientific centers are located almost exclusively in historical Russia and Germany. (True, the concept of historical Russia includes far more than just lands inhabited predominantly by ethnic Russians: for example, the main Tatar city of Kazan is the second most important aerospace industrial center in the Empire.) But this is by no means connected with the desire to ensure priority economic development for the Russian people and to the ally-peoples - the production of consumer goods and services gives the region in which it is located, significantly more material wealth. Rather, this is due to the desire to minimize risks - it is believed that in Russian, Tatar or German regions there is a lower probability of any unrest; after all, it is customary all over the world to locate thermonuclear power plants in seismically inactive zones. But the probability of concentrating any business sectors in the ownership of people of one nation - as under Alexander III, when Jews who made up 4% of the population held 92% of the grain trade - the Empire today is not particularly worried. Not because it doesn't exist - very much so - but because the Empire considers it normal for one business to basically control one nation and another business to control another. Now, if it turns out that, for example, in the business of building large facilities, dominated by the Turks, a non-Turk is disqualified in dishonest ways, the state, of course, will react. In addition to criminal prosecution of those personally responsible, antitrust proceedings will begin, which will most likely end in so-called direct action (see the relevant section of the Economics chapter). But how the Russian state will react if a strong bias in favor of one nation happens among university students - as under the same Alexander III, when Jews began to make

up to half of university applicants - it's hard for me to say, since there were no such situations in the Empire. It will definitely not introduce quotas, like the then tsarist government - this is prohibited by the Constitution, and contradicts the whole spirit of modern Russia. Most likely, the Empire will propose to the chambers of other peoples to develop programs to stimulate their youth to receive higher education and will give them money for these programs, as well as instruct the social engineering service to start introducing appropriate values into the specified youth environment.

In addition, as I already wrote, any citizen of the Empire can become Russian through the procedure of twinning: it consists in the fact that the person who submitted the application in the registry office, in the presence of an official and three witnesses, reads out the text of something like the oath of the Russian nation. At the same time, it is obligatory to provide a certificate of baptism - a Russian by blood remains a Russian, even if he is an atheist or a non-Christian, but anyone who wants to become Russian by blood must be Orthodox. (By the way, the same concept exists among most traditional peoples - for example, in order to become a Jew, one must go through the religious rite "conversion", although a Jew by blood can be an atheist.) Returning to naturalisation: a naturalised person is issued a new passport, wherein the nationality column reads "Russian", and if he asked in the application, then the origin is added in brackets - for example, "Belarusian". An interesting detail: in Russia, insulting national feelings (non-Russian and Russian equally) is considered a serious crime, and the punishment for it is quite serious - but telling a German or a Tatar that he is not a real German or Tatar is not. But if someone tells a relative that he is not Russian or not a real Russian, then this is a separate, even more serious, *corpus delicti*. In general, crimes against national dignity are spelled out in the Criminal Code in great detail and constitute a separate chapter, and not included in Chapter 2 (crimes against the person), as it would seem logical, but in Chapter 1 (crimes against the state). Therefore, in Russia there is no criminal punishment for anti-Semitism - not because of its encouragement, as many of our Jews from the northern states claim, but simply because it is only a special case of a more general crime.

By the way, there is no Jewish question in today's Russia, unlike the First and Second Empires. Even at the beginning of our century, Jews were disliked in Russia - not, of course, in the same way as in the Caliphate, or even more so in Germany during the time of Hitler. At the individual level, they were not discriminated against at all (even the prime minister was a Jew), and even more so they were not perceived as carriers of something negative - but they believed that Russia and the Russians suffered from the Jewish people, as a whole, a lot of evil, and it is completely incomprehensible why. (This refers to the role of the Jews in the revolutionary movement of the 1860s-1910s, in the satanic Soviet state of 1918-1929 and in the ugliness of the second Time of Troubles of the 1990s - all this was done by Jews in a very large part, although not exclusively, and was invariably directed against Russian statehood.) To this was added the annoyance that most of the Jews emigrated from Russia to Israel and the United States in the early 90s - just when all discrimination against them ceased. It's your right, the Russians reasoned, but why are you now saying "we" - what do you have to do with our country? But at the moment when the area of historical residence of the Jews, the island of Israel, became part of the Empire, the Jews ceased to differ in the perception of Russians from any other enterprising and mobile people of the Russian Empire. True, a people inclined to consider themselves better than all others - but there are many of them in the Empire, besides the Jews. And the danger of their breakthrough to power in a country with anti-Russian goals, as in the 2020s or 1990s, does not exist under the current Russian state structure. And the Russians themselves, having settled in significant numbers in the places of historical residence of other peoples, among them (for the program of resettlement of Russians in Europe, see the chapter "[Geography and Population](#)"), they began to treat those who seek their destiny among others more calmly - not where their fathers and grandfathers lived.

So the Russian spirit of the Russian Empire is not at all a special status of Russians or Russian culture, but a spirit that includes a system of views and values. What it is - the spirit of the state, was best explained to me by the head of the department in the imperial censorship supervision Andrey Nezovibatko. "Everyone

knows that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, this is a well-known philosophical principle,” he said, “and, accordingly, the state is something more than its citizens. So, the difference between the sum of all the inhabitants of the state and the state itself is its spirit. And this spirit is purely Russian, although it has absorbed and continues to absorb a lot, starting from Byzantium and the Golden Horde. And in our century, the Russians adopted quite a lot from the Turkic and especially the Caucasian peoples of Russia, although this did not happen explicitly. I mean the spirit of national closeness, the perception of Russians as a family - earlier, during the Second Empire, if such feelings were experienced, then only in relation to the entire Soviet people, that is, compatriots, and not fellow tribesmen, that is, Russians. When this lack of national cohesion among Russians collided with its antithesis among the Caucasian and Turkic peoples of Russia in the 1990s – and such a clash occurred throughout Russia, from everyday situations in cities to the fronts of Chechnya – Russians began to adopt such an attitude. The return of the concepts of the value of the family, male dignity, female honor also took place - all this, as a result of the Time of Troubles, was blurred from the Russians and borrowed from the Caucasians. To a certain extent, the Russians succeeded in all this, and it was very beneficial for them, although the Caucasians did not plan to help them in this at all. But the peoples receive the most valuable borrowings not from well-wishers at all - the same Russians learned to rule the peoples from the Mongol-Tatars of the Horde, who conquered them.

But the main part of “Russianness”, imperatively extended to the entire Empire, is Orthodoxy. Back in the Restoration Period, under Vladimir II, when the revival of the Russian nation and the Russian state began, there were heated debates: what should be considered primordially Russian - pre-imperial, pagan Slavic culture or Orthodox culture? Many declared the first to be primordial and completely their own, home-grown, and the second - brought from the West, a Jewish religion alien to the Slavs. The unequivocal choice, however, was made in favor of the latter. Moreover, it was proved by documents, and after the seizure of the US archives in 2019, it was absolutely clear that the first, despite the ultra-nationalist rhetoric, was inspired and even directly funded by the US CIA, specifically to weaken Orthodoxy and, as a result, Russia. Therefore, in particular, the passion and fashion for everything Slavic in pre-Christian times, including the glorification of that period, which took place in the 2000s, has now come to naught. And the Constitution of 2013 already explicitly declared that Russia is an Orthodox state, and this cannot be canceled by any change in the national or religious composition of the population. At the same time, the Church in Russia is separated from the state, that is, neither the Church is subordinate to the state, as was the case in the First Empire in the 18th-20th centuries, nor the state of the Church, as in theocracies. True, unlike us, this was done to protect not the state from the Church, but the Church from the state - it is believed that the Church of Christ, whose kingdom is not of this world, will only weaken in spirit from too close symbiosis with power.

Orthodoxy in Russia, unlike the Russian nationality, even formally has a special status - however, if we talk about specific rights, then the so-called traditional religions that do not have a center abroad have no fewer of them; these include Ravilite Islam, Buddhism and Judaism - the latter with the exception of Hasidism, whose center is in our New York. In places of compact and especially historical residence of peoples professing one of the above religions, even the presence of secular laws of religious origin is allowed: in many traditionally Islamic territories it is forbidden to sell pork and alcohol in shops and serve alcohol in restaurants, on the island of Israel firms and institutions are forbidden to work Saturday (at least in public). And in the Caucasus, many Sharia norms even operate - this, by the way, did more to reconcile the Caucasians with the Empire than the defeat in the third Caucasian war. At school, education necessarily includes a religious part, and not some kind of comparative history of religions, but [Orthodox] Religious Law, but there are also Islamic, Buddhist and Jewish schools. Religious schools of non-traditional religions or religions having a center abroad are not allowed, as well as atheistic ones, and by default the schools are Orthodox. The apology for this is that the upbringing of children has its own specifics - they are not capable citizens, and therefore decisions are made for them in any case by others,

and their own “small” family (parents or relatives) in this sense has no more rights than a “large” family, that is, the whole country. Indeed, in higher educational institutions, even in state ones, where adult citizens study, there is no “obligation” or, conversely, prohibitions on the religious component of education. Thus, the special status of Orthodoxy in Russia is manifested not in special privileges, as in medieval Europe, but in the spirit: the point is not whether the Orthodox Law of God is taught in school (at least not only in this), but that the teaching of all subjects is, to one degree or another, imbued with the Orthodox spirit, as is the general attitude towards students and the general atmosphere of the schools. The whole political and significant part of the social life of the country is imbued with the same spirit, in any case, the country is striving for this. In the relevant chapters it will be seen how this is concretely reflected in the laws governing this or that side of life. The solution to this problem is facilitated by the fact that all state power is concentrated in the hands of guardsmen, who are quite religious and consider themselves as defenders of the faith, and power always and everywhere has a strong impact on society as an example to follow, especially in Russia. And this is how one should understand the status of Russia as an eternally Orthodox country, written in the Constitution: the majority of the population may, as a result of some processes, not be Orthodox, but the spirit of the country, the system of values and goals and the foundation on which it is built, will remain Orthodox - this Orthodox oprichniks will provide, who, if necessary, will easily oppose the majority, because the position of the majority does not arouse in them either reverence or fear.

The third layer of the principle of nationalism is the attitude to each nation and, to some extent, to the Russian people as a whole, as to one big family. I want to illustrate this with an example that I myself observed. A Tatar boy of fourteen lived near Moscow with his aunt after the death of his parents in a car accident - and then his aunt also died. Many Tatars, about twenty, came to their house to arrange a council without any social services - what to do with him (I was with one of the couples with whom I visited on the recommendation of their relatives living with us in New England). These were not relatives, but they behaved like relatives, because both he and they are Tatars, which means that, to some extent, they are still relatives; and it was immediately determined, with his consent, in which family he was going to live.

This approach is also reflected at the level of the state system - in the corresponding chapter, speaking about the *zemstvo* power, I already wrote about the all-Russian national chambers (not to be confused with the district chambers of peoples!). They exist for one nation, regardless of where its representatives live inside Russia - in this they fundamentally differ from the legislative assemblies of the national republics that existed in Russia from 1991 to 2008, where the position of only that part of the nation that lived on this territory was expressed (and more Tatars, for example, often lived in Moscow than in Kazan), moreover, smeared with the position of the non-titular nations of the republic.

Continuing the example of the Tatars, now there is no Republic of Tatarstan (as well as any other territorial entities, by the way), but there is a chamber of the Tatar people of Russia, which is elected only by Tatar voters from all over the country. It adopts laws on the subjects of competence corresponding to the Constitution, and, unlike the Legislative Assembly of the former Republic of Tatarstan, it is concerned only with this, without spending most of its time and effort on dividing the budget (*zemstvo* budgets are adopted and executed by *zemstvos*, and of course where, in fact, predominantly Tatars live, the budget is divided mainly by their representatives). Since these laws apply only to the Tatars, then, naturally, there are Tatar courts; such national courts are included in the system of *zemstvo* courts on a par with district courts. Legislation classified as national includes quite a lot: all family legislation, the main part of labor, the main part of social, etc.; there is now a lively discussion going on in Russia about whether a part of contract law should be transferred there as well, since it relies to a large extent on differing national traditions. The difference between national laws between themselves and the framework of general imperial law (when it exists) is very large: suffice it to say that the family codes of many peoples of Russia allow official polygamy. Naturally, if representatives of different nations marry,

they must agree on what (according to nationality and, therefore, according to legislation) their family will be - or one of the spouses will take the nationality of the second, which in reality happens no less often. More or less the same agreements are reached when hiring a person or [artel](#)²⁶, if they are of a different nationality than the employer.

By the way, the national structure of the Russian Empire differs from that in the Russian Federation and the Russian Union in one more thing - there was no Russian Republic, and in the Empire there is an all-imperial Chamber of the Russian people - if it did not exist, this would cause discontent not only and not so much Russian, how many others, because it would mean the formalization of the special status of Russians. (I remind you, dear compatriots, that the concept of “Russian people” includes both Little Russians and Belarusians, and they are not at all a marginal part of it - on the contrary, Little Russians, including in national issues, are perhaps the most active part of the Russian people.) True, The Chamber of the Russian People is not very active: Russians associate themselves with the Empire as a whole and therefore, even in the area that is assigned to the jurisdiction of the national chambers, they prefer not to adopt their own Russian laws, but to use the general imperial ones; this association is also manifested in everything else - in the above example with a Tatar boy, Russian neighbors would come to him almost with the same readiness as to a Russian. This, by the way, especially visibly manifests the “speciality” of the position of Russians and Russians in the Russian Empire - “speciality” is not in a formal status, or even more so in some privileges, but in self-identification.

I hope you understand from the above, dear compatriots, what is the basic difference between the national policy of the Empire and that of our Federation - a difference that to a large extent constitutes the principle of nationalism: the Empire does not seek to assimilate and unify peoples in a “melting pot” and does not encourage it. One could suspect Russia of hypocrisy - they say, in words nationalism, but in reality unification - but this does not fit in with reality. If the Russian government really wanted the assimilation of non-Russian peoples, it should have removed the “nationality” column from the passport, or rather, simply did not add it - it did not exist back in 2012. After all, some part of any people in this case will definitely declare itself a member of the state-forming people - this is a fact, because for many, “unmarked” means “unrepresentable”. And it cannot be said in any way that the state went to the introduction of this column in order to facilitate discrimination, not only because there is no discrimination, but also because if the state decides to discriminate, then it has all the necessary information about its citizens. And in terms of everyday discrimination, it doesn't matter at all what is written in the passport - no one looks there. So it turns out that this is clearly an anti-assimilation measure, one of many. Moreover, the Empire did not stop there: in 2036, during the reign of Michael the Suppressor, a law was passed according to which parents choose a name for a child (or he himself, if he changes it in adulthood) exclusively from the names of his nationality. That is, the French can call their son even Jean, even Jacques, but not Ivan or Jacob - just like the Russians cannot call their son Paul or Maurice. “Does this law violate the principles of personal freedom and non-intervention of the Empire in private life, which you proclaim?” I asked the head of the family department of the Imperial Chancellery for Social Policy, Nikolai Timofeev - by the way, one of the very few *zemstvo* residents in positions of this rank. “Can you, in the American Federation, Mr. dos Santos,” he answered me with a question to a question, “call your son a female name, for example, Veronica?” I was at a loss—it had never occurred to me—but I had to admit that they probably wouldn't allow it. “Well, nationality is the same inalienable property of a person, just as recorded in his genes as gender,” continued Timofeev. “So what surprises you?” “But gender can be changed,” I persisted. “Well, nationality can be changed, in our country it is just as formalized as possible,” the interlocutor answered. So the Law on Names is really just another one of the anti-assimilation measures, but imperial-style anti-assimilation: assimilation is allowed and formalized, but it must be conscious and obvious to others, and not creeping. In this case, the Empire loses a member of one of the peoples, but gains a member of another - and in the opposite case, a rootless cosmopolitan is acquired, which is unacceptable. Because a person is the better citizen of the Empire, the

more roots and threads - no matter which ones - he is connected with society; if we are talking about the national aspect, then with their people.

In general, in national issues, the two-level Russian philosophy is especially clearly manifested: there is society, and there is the Empire. The first regulates life, and the second - the spirit, and the imperial government tries not to interfere in the life of society, in particular the national one. And since in a closed, "autonomous" state there is no replenishment from external diversity - and it is the source of any development and therefore necessary as air - the authorities encourage internal diversity in every possible way. But the imperial power itself in its activities has no concept of nationality: members of the service class have no other homeland than the Empire, and no other tribe, except for the *oprichnina*.

II. SECURITY

Chapter 5 Law Enforcement System

Techno-interrogations. This, dear compatriots, is what is best known about Russia outside its borders (along with its class) and determines its sinister image. In our country, most people believe that this is a kind of technological analogue of torture, which is thus widely used in Russia, but in fact this is not at all the case (I speak from my own experience as well). The source of this innovation should be considered a collective article published in 2007 by three assistants to the president, including Gavriil Sokolov, about the defects of the justice system existing in Russia, as well as in the rest of the world; moreover, it was an analytical article, no recipes were given in it yet. It pointed out that there are areas of life in which the great opportunities of a rich person compared to a poor one are obvious and do not raise questions - for example, the level of consumption of material goods. There are areas where the expediency of greater opportunities for the rich is debatable from the standpoint of justice - for example, the provision of medical care (this was before the introduction of free healthcare). And there are areas where different opportunities depending on wealth are clearly considered unacceptable - for example, when drafting into the army (it still existed then). So why does it seem normal to us, the authors of the article asked, that in an ordinary adversarial court, for example, a criminal court, the guilty rich, even without any corruption, have a significantly greater chance of getting away with it than the guilty poor, by hiring an expensive lawyer - after all, if the expensive lawyer hadn't increased those chances, then who would hire him for big money? The authors also noted the peculiarity of corruption, or rather, the fight against it among judges: the two main ways to reduce corruption in any area - reducing the degree of freedom of an official in decision-making and creating a strong fear of punishment - are not applicable to judges, more precisely, they are applicable, but with negative effects greater than positive. Indeed, it is impossible to detail the law beyond a certain measure, the variety of life situations is not algorithmized. On the other hand, the creation of a strong fear of punishment among judges contradicts the principle of the independence of the court, and will lead not to objectivity at all, but to the flourishing of the accusatory bias. These ideas, coupled with the experience of psychotropic interviews for senior officials, were developed in the 2013 reform. It was established that by a court decision (later, after the elimination of corruption in the prosecutor's office, this was replaced by a prosecutor's sanction), any person can be subjected to an interrogation procedure using psychotropic drugs (we call it a drug or truth serum), as a result of which he speaks only the truth, regardless of your desire; in a significant number of procedural cases, this is required without fail. The above applies not only to the suspect, but also to witnesses and even to the victim: for example, psychotropic interrogation of the victim is mandatory in cases of rape. The law regulates in detail the procedure for this interrogation - for example, the exhaustive range of questions that can be asked is contained in the court order (or in the prosecutor's sanction) and cannot be exceeded, that is, no one can use interrogation to find out with whom a person is sleeping or where he

keeps money. To control this, a lawyer is always present at the interrogation, and at the request of the interrogated person (mandatory to satisfaction) - any other people, including journalists. They give a non-disclosure agreement, but it does not apply to the fact that the interrogation goes beyond the outlined range of issues: on the contrary, they have every right and even the duty to speak and write about this. By the way, the sanction for techno-interrogation is given only by the imperial, and not by the *zemstvo* court. It, like the prosecutor, gives it only to the Imperial Security Directorate and to no one else (including the *zemstvo* militia). Information obtained during such interrogations may be considered by the court, but, as a rule, does not in itself serve as the basis for an accusation; most often it is used by the investigation for further extraction of material evidence. It cannot be said that this system is beneficial only to the prosecution: the confession of the accused, for example, is considered in court only if it is confirmed by techno-interrogation, and if the court has doubts, it itself, without investigation, will conduct a second interrogation. And if the defendant says during a technical interrogation that he is innocent, he cannot be convicted according to Russian law - until the truth is clarified, he cannot even be kept in a pre-trial detention center.

The decision to conduct a psychotropic interrogation may also be applied to civil servants outside the framework of the consideration of a criminal or arbitration case in court. And civil servants above a certain rank - both civil and security forces - go through them once a year, regardless of anything - they are simply asked if they violated the law and their duty over the past year. Later, already in 2027, an absolute lie detector (the so-called neurodetector) was developed, which does not make mistakes and which cannot be deceived; then the main part of the functions of psychotropic interrogations (everything except for clarifying the details) passed to interrogations on the detector - both of which are now called techno interrogations. Naturally, this practice, since 2013, has led to the almost complete disappearance of corruption. However, it seems to me more important here is that it led to a change in the very mentality of people and, as a result, to a change in their behavior in the most basic manifestations. After all, if everyone knows that everything bad that he will do, someday, at any moment until his death, can be clarified if someone wants it - after all, you cannot hide your thoughts, this cannot but leave a deep imprint on how a person lives. And I think it is right, dear compatriots, that Russians take seriously the gospel words: "There is nothing hidden that would not be revealed, and nothing secret that would not be known."

The fight against crime. Naturally, such a powerful tool, which is in the hands of law enforcement services, could not but contribute to the disclosure and prevention of crimes - in fact, it was intended. In the chapter "[Economy](#)" you will see that many Russian laws in this area are, as it were, designed for the presumption of law-abidingness of both market participants and supervising officials - this is true, but the above-mentioned presumption is ensured not by the natural properties of the nation, but by the presence of this toolkit and universal knowledge about what it is.

The fight against crime, of course, is not limited to this: if a corpse of an unknown person is found on the street, killed by someone unknown, then there is no one to apply techno interrogation to, and Russian detectives in this case will do exactly the same as ours; but when the first suspects appear, their work becomes completely different. Under such a system, a criminal can hope not to be caught only when no one thinks of him, as well as of anyone who knows something important about him - a theoretically possible case (that is why crime in Russia does not disappear), but still exotic. But what is really practically impossible in such a case is any kind of organized crime, and in a broad sense - including extremist and terrorist groups, spy networks, etc. Of course, organized crime (like foreign intelligence services) has its own developed countermeasures, primarily the well-known rules of conspiracy, but this is not a panacea. Because it has long been known that organized groups cannot exist without certain assistants in the law enforcement system itself; and all its employees, as I have already indicated, undergo techno interrogations regularly, without even being under any suspicion. Over the past century and a half, many scientists have assumed that corruption is not just connected with organized crime, but is a strictly

necessary condition for its existence - and in Russia life has experimentally proved this: if there is no corruption at all, then there is no organized crime at all.

Naturally, since the mass introduction of techno-interrogations in Russia (and even earlier), attempts have not stopped to develop medical or psychological methods to deceive a psychotropic drug or a neurodetector, such as creating an additional so-called pseudo-personality inside the human consciousness. But the Russian government did not rest on its laurels, each year invested and continues to invest very large funds in science to improve medical and other means of techno-interrogation (including the development of “counter-countermeasures”) and therefore remains in the race ahead of the other side. Due to this, professional crime in Russia is not particularly high and is purely individual in nature - even apartment thieves steal mostly money, because the infrastructure (for example, buyers of stolen goods) is already needed to sell the rest, which cannot exist in a country with techno interrogations. True, all that has been said applies only to motivated crime, where criminals act according to their own conscious decision; domestic crime (mainly associated with drunkenness) remains traditionally high in Russia, and I am not sure that it can be reduced at all by this or that state policy.

Organizationally, the fight against crime is carried out by the Imperial Security Directorate. It is called the police - criminal, political, special or state, depending on the specific imperial service (see the chapter “[Government](#)”). In the structure of *zemstvo* authorities there is a militia engaged in the protection of public order in settlements, as well as on roads (including traffic safety) - there are corresponding departments in all *zemstvos*. Their activities are controlled by a few imperial overseers, but only in terms of preventing abuses, because this area belongs to the exclusive responsibility of the *zemstvo* authorities. The latter means in practice that in the event of an immediate danger to citizens, the imperial police will only provide assistance if they happen to be nearby: there are simply no duty units to call; the OPON [imperial police?] existing in its structure is intended only to suppress riots. That is, if you need to call for help, then you turn to the police, and if a crime against you has already occurred and it is necessary not to prevent it, but to disclose it, then to the police; there you go with a complaint if the police refuse to protect you. The overwhelming majority of the imperial police consists of guardsmen, the rest are old detectives who have been serving since the beginning of the century, from pre-estate times. The process of replacing them with guardsmen (both through the arrival of the latter, and through the entry of some of the old cadres into the service class) was not forced, in order to preserve continuity, and dragged on for several decades. The *zemstvo* militia, on the other hand, consists of *zemstvos*, but *zemstvos* often turn to *oprichnina* units in order to have several guardsmen seconded to them for reinforcement (such requests are always granted). This is done not only and not so much because of the professional qualities of the guardsmen, but because of their irreconcilable dislike of crime. The fact is that when the service class was just being created, Gabriel the Great himself turned to those who became thieves in the Time of Troubles. “Those of you who have chosen this life out of timelessness and rejection of the mercantile world,” he said, “are given a chance - become sovereign people, and your life will acquire meaning, and no one will ever reproach you with the past.” Many, oddly enough, responded - but for those who did not, it was no longer a consequence of circumstances, but their free choice, the choice of the life of a predator. And the guardsmen hate them as only a wolfhound can hate a wolf - like one free soul to another, but located on the other side.

Legislation: crimes. Basically, the range of acts considered criminal offenses in the Russian Empire is the same as ours, but there is also a specificity - something is considered a crime here, but not there, but something vice versa. The use and sale of most drugs is not considered a crime in Russia; only those that unequivocally cause serious damage to health and at the same time give an unacceptable dependence from which one cannot free oneself are prohibited. Such tolerance in a religious country seems strange, but Russians consider it the height of hypocrisy to prohibit, for example, marijuana and at the same time freely allow alcohol, which is more addictive, more harmful to health and provokes antisocial behavior to a disproportionately greater extent. Strictly speaking, from a purely legal point of view, the use and sale

of drugs in Russia is prohibited in the same way as in our country - it's just that the circle of substances considered drugs is much smaller there. Moreover, unlike us, for those drugs that are still prohibited, use without sale is also considered a crime (there is no concept of possession in Russia - you will be subjected to techno-interrogation and, based on its results, you will be accused of either using or selling). If you seek medical help voluntarily, criminal liability will be unconditionally replaced by community service, which is part of the recovery from drug addiction or alcoholism.

It is not considered a crime in Russia to inflict any damage, including murder, when the limits of necessary self-defense are exceeded - the Russians believe that if an attack took place, on you or on someone else whom you rushed to help, then you cannot be required to adequately calculate in a split second the degree of danger and your adequate response. It is allowed to inflict bodily harm, except for deliberately especially serious ones, for insulting honor (one's own or someone present), and accordingly this is not considered a crime. Revenge is not considered a crime if it was adequate to the actions of the victim - in other words, if he is found guilty by the court of what you avenged him for and your revenge did not exceed the established punishment. That is, even if you killed him, but he will (or has already been) found guilty of what is sentenced to death, then you are not guilty. It is not considered a crime for a policeman or police officer to inflict bodily harm on a criminal caught at the scene of a crime, even if he did not resist arrest. The degree of permitted severity of bodily harm corresponds to the severity of the crime - thus, the policeman who has caught a killer has every right to kill him on the spot (but if it later turns out that this is not the killer, the policeman will answer in full). Since organized duels are not prohibited in Russia in case of mutual desire (which is notarized at length and tediously in the form of an agreement), it is not considered a crime to injure or even kill an opponent in such a duel if you did not violate the terms of the agreement. Also, any unintentional actions (for example, knocking down a person in a car, even to death) are not considered criminal offenses, even light ones, if there are no aggravating circumstances, such as, for example, drunk driving. Taking into account the techno-interrogation in Russia, there is no problem with the exact establishment of whether the actions of a person were really unintentional, and if so, then a person should be tormented by his conscience for them, and not bear criminal responsibility.

Refusal to testify or false testimony is not considered a crime - in the presence of techno-interrogations, this is not relevant; for the same reason, in Russia there is no right not to testify against oneself and loved ones. Non-repayment of debts is not considered a crime - in Russia this is nothing more than the subject of a civil claim for recovery; if the non-repayment was deliberate, the person will be accused of fraud, but if he simply does not have the means to repay the debt, even through his fault, then criminal liability does not occur. Finally, violations of political correctness are not considered a crime: here they cannot condemn a person for statements similar to those for which Professor Garcia was convicted the year before last, who said that, in his opinion, women as leaders are worse than men, and white North Americans are not responsible for their ancestors' treatment of African Americans. Or like the journalist Harris, who wrote that the Holocaust during World War II did not really have the dimensions in which it is usually presented.

There are, on the contrary, acts that are considered crimes in Russia, while not being such in our country. Crimes against the order of government include insulting public statements about the Russian Empire, as well as about the First and Second Empires, as well as about Russia and the Russian people in general (about national minorities too - but this is a crime in our country too). It is possible to criticize a specific government for specific actions, but it is impossible to blame the country and the people as a whole.

It is considered a crime, as I already wrote in the "Nationalism" section, if someone calls a related Russian not Russian or not a real Russian - as well as violation of the "Russian oath" by the related Russian.

It is a crime to publicly insult the Orthodox religion, as well as three other traditional religions, as well as

traditional values, such as love and loyalty, service to the Motherland, self-sacrifice and selflessness. And the commission of actions deliberately aimed at discrediting the state, authorities or religion is already regarded as a crime against the state.

It is a crime to promote values that are considered unacceptable in Russia - atheism or non-traditional religions, homosexuality or abandonment of the family, selfishness and contempt for people - but only on the part of a school teacher, or in public; for a private person, this is not a crime (because it is not considered propaganda). By the way, it is not a crime to inflict light or moderate bodily harm on those who violate the above, even not in public; that is, citizens have the right to stand up for their country, people and values, even with their fists, if someone speaks offensively about them.

It is a crime to create so-called totalitarian sects, even if the principle of voluntary participation in them is observed; and in the so-called satanic sects, participation itself is a crime, as in secular subversive organizations.

Crimes in the sphere of the economy, namely a bribe, is the receipt of money for the commission of certain actions, not only by state or municipal officials, as we have. This also applies to journalists and media officials in the case of publishing particular material for money (except when it is officially paid and marked as “advertising”). This also applies to scientists in the case of paid publication of certain results (for example, sociological survey data) - that is, to any author or official for publishing something for money. And if the publication contains a deliberate lie, then this already qualifies as fraud and is punished accordingly. Thus, if a journalist received money for an article containing deliberately false information, he is guilty of both taking a bribe and fraud.

Crimes against the person, which are not considered as such in our country, are illegal influences on the human psyche, that is, any suggestion or hypnosis, and even more so zombies. It is also considered a crime against the person to interfere in the privacy of a person without his consent, including the collection of any materials of personal property (surveillance, photography, etc.) and their publication - what our paparazzi and yellow press do. Abortion is considered a particularly serious crime against a person (murder) (for more details, see the chapter “Social Sphere”). It is a criminal offense, and a serious one, to disclose the secret of adoption - and in our country, on the contrary, it is a crime not to inform the adopted child that he is such.

The murder of any domestic animal belonging to another person (except for fish) is classified as a moderate crime, and the murder of any dog, not even a domestic one (because the dog, I remind you, is a class symbol of guardsmen), is considered serious.

It is a criminal offense, and a serious one (section “Crimes against the state” of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Ingushetia), to receive any money from foreign states, their citizens and organizations, with the exception of income from legal exports.

Legislation: punishments. But in terms of punishments, the difference between the Russian Empire and the American Federation is striking. To begin with, we do not have the death penalty, but in Russia it exists. It is hard to believe that just half a century ago everything was exactly the opposite. The main reason for this situation is that in Russia the execution of an innocent person is excluded, because according to their law, a defendant who did not admit his guilt during a technical interrogation cannot be considered guilty. Nevertheless, disputes over the death penalty do not subside in Russia to this day, because in addition to the risk of executing the innocent, there is also Christian mercy - after all, it is commanded “Thou shalt not kill.” But when in 2017 the elder Saint Theodosius reminded Gabriel the Great of the words of the Apostle Paul “do not avenge yourself, beloved, but leave room for the wrath of God,” he replied with the famous phrase: “We are the instrument of God’s wrath.”

Traditional imprisonment in a prison or camp, that is, the most common type of punishment in all countries, in Russia, on the contrary, is little used. They believe that such measures only breed

professional criminals. In addition, they are incompatible with the Russian basic principle of dignity - punishment can be arbitrarily cruel, but it should not deprive a person of dignity, because this dishonors the punisher himself. The main type of punishment in the Empire is corporal, that is, a whip at the pillory. Such punishment is long remembered and therefore has the best educational effect, Russians believe, and besides, it is not stretched out in time.

Deprivation of liberty, when it is nevertheless used, is of two types - jail and hard labor (they differ in the severity of labor, and not in the regime), but the term of such punishment does not exceed five years. Here, only a pre-trial detention center is called a prison, there are no arrests as punishment and, accordingly, arrest houses or prisons for serving time in the Empire.

A fine is widespread (this concept also includes compensation for damage), but the size determined by the court - confiscation of property (meaning all property, without reference to specific stolen property or the amount of the fine) is not provided for by law. But if a person cannot pay a fine, the penalty, of course, will be directed to his property, at least for everything. If it is not enough, the person is sent to forced labor, usually quite hard and in remote places. Interestingly, most of the fines imposed on a person in a criminal or administrative manner are proportional to one or another parameter of his financial solvency. That is, for a certain type of violation or crime, the law establishes a fixed fine or impost, denominated not in rubles, but as a percentage of his official total property or income. Even fines for violating the Rules of the Road are fixed not in money, but as a percentage of the cost of the car. The logic of this is clear: the purpose of such fines is to create negative motivation, because a fine that is heavy for the driver of a simple Miass is indifferent to the driver of a Silver Arrow.

Finally, there is a punishment in the form of a complete rejection of civilization, the so-called indefinite exile to the Zone - a fenced area in Siberia with an area of about 300 thousand square kilometers, which you cannot leave, but inside do what you want and live as you know; along the perimeter of the Zone, it is even allowed to exchange goods with merchants.

At the same time, the most common measure in terms of the number of sentences per year is not at all any of the described, but a warning - Russians strictly adhere to the principle of a children's rhyme: "The first time is forgiven, the second is prohibited." Thus, when a person commits his first crime, he receives a warning accompanied by corporal punishment. The same after the second crime, if it is not serious, only the warning will be the last, and corporal punishment will be much more severe (sometimes after it they come to their senses in the hospital after three months). And if the crime is serious, then the person will receive up to five years in prison or up to two years in hard labor, usually of his choice (this does not apply to very serious ones). After the third crime, or after the second, if it is very serious, he will forever go to the Zone. This procedure applies to all crimes, except for especially grave ones: the latter include those that are considered indisputable evidence of the complete defectiveness and incorrigibility of the offender - basically these are crimes committed with special cruelty and special cynicism; offenders are immediately executed for these or in rare cases exiled to the Zone (if such a crime is committed for the first time).

There is no exception for any category of citizens in any type of punishment - neither for teenagers or even 12-year-old children, nor for women, nor for the mentally abnormal: if you knew how to steal - know how to keep an answer (pregnant women have a delay in the execution of any punishment, for obvious reasons). Last year, three 14- to 15-year-old teenagers were executed, and the majority of the population considered this deplorable, but fair - after all, teenagers committed a series of murders with amazing brutality (and for no other reason are adults executed in Russia).

For economic crimes, non-violent punishments are mainly used - bans on certain types of activities and businesses and fines: it is believed that the greed has the most sore spot - the pocket, and techno-interrogation guarantees that the criminal will not be able to hide the money in any way.

For crimes against the order of government, including those related to insulting the country and the people, bans on certain professions are widely used, as well as bans on any public activity. Both apply for a certain period or are prescribed for life.

Punishments for so-called crimes against public life constitute a special category: this includes non-payment of taxes, as well as non-compliance with other economic or social laws that are not outright fraud, such as diluting a controlling stake in a public company or violating public morals. The Russians believe that it is impossible to punish corporally, imprison or, even more so, exile in the Zone for such things - therefore (and not only because of corruption), until 2013, they practically did not imprison for non-payment of taxes. Now, according to Part II of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Ingushetia ("Punishments"), such crimes are subject to the so-called outlawing; but this is after the second crime - after the first one, a warning is given, the return of underpaid funds (if any) and a tangible, but real fine. Outlawing means exactly what is clear from the name: if you don't want to recognize the law over yourself, you don't have to, but then the law ceases to operate for you in its entirety. That is, you will not pay taxes, but neither the *zemstvo* militia nor the imperial police will protect you; you will not be able to file a lawsuit against anyone in court, even if you have been blatantly deceived; you will not be treated by health care; you will not be paid a pension (the list goes on). You can get out of the state of "outlaw" by volunteering for three years in hard labor, usually on asteroids - but only if the sincerity of your repentance is confirmed by techno-interrogation. Curiously, the presence of this type of punishment means that every person is, in fact, allowed to live outside of society. And indeed, in Russia, according to statistics, more than two million people live this way, without committing any crime, but simply by writing a statement - this is allowed. This is another additional degree of freedom for Russians.

Punishments for foreigners who have committed crimes on the territory of Russia do not differ in any way from those for Russians - foreign citizenship is not considered either an mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Russia does not transfer convicted foreigners to the countries of which they are citizens, at the request of these countries for the execution of punishment there, nor does it send such requests to other countries regarding its citizens. This is quite natural, since the system of punishments, as you understand, is fundamentally different here. How can Russia ask for the extradition of its citizen, sentenced, for example, in our country to 15 years in prison, to carry out this punishment at home, if they do not have such a punishment at all? As for the extradition of persons who have committed a crime against Russia and are in other countries, the position of the Empire varies greatly depending on whether it is a foreigner or a Russian citizen (more precisely, on his status at the time of the crime). In the first case, although the Empire insists on extradition, it is ready to provide evidence of guilt and does not regard the consideration of this issue in the prosecutor's office or the court of another country as a demarche against itself. The repeated denial of extradition may lead to Russia defiantly hosting a number of criminals from this country, as during the Cold War of 2007-2019, but no more (and most likely, will not lead to anything). But as for its citizens, Russia demands their extradition at its request unconditionally and without any evidence - it does not recognize the concept of political asylum, as well as in general the rights of its citizens to protect another state (with the exception of perhaps recruited spies - they, in fact, as if not their own citizens). Moreover, if a person is still given asylum somewhere, then the Russian special services will start hunting for him, wherever he is, without hiding it at all, and, most likely, sooner or later they will kill him. However, I repeat - oddly enough, this does not apply to foreign intelligence officers who worked against Russia: Russians treat the activities of foreign intelligence services without enthusiasm, but with understanding, in accordance with the concepts of military ethics. Russia itself is ready to fulfill the same requirements, and this suits many, therefore it has agreements on the mutual extradition of criminals with the Celestial Empire and India, and it used to be with the Caliphate, but with the latter it was terminated in 2041 due to the unwillingness of the Caliphate to extradite Russian Islamic militants. Our Federation is the only country with which the Empire has not had, does not have, and is not expected to have such an agreement, since the principle of granting asylum

to the offended and oppressed from other countries is sacred to us.

Court. In Russia, there are two judicial hierarchies - imperial and *zemstvo*, which are not connected with each other in any way, except that they use the same judicial department (in particular, the imperial service for the execution of judgments). The imperial court considers exclusively criminal cases, and the *zemstvo* court considers civil cases, including those where one of the parties is the state. This is another manifestation of the separation of powers in Russia - the imperial government believes that monetary and property litigation of citizens and organizations is not its business (I will add on my own that guardsmen, with their rejection and misunderstanding of money, will not be able to deal with them).

There is no jury trial in Russia, it is considered there at best archaism, and at worst - absurdity; in both the imperial and *zemstvo* courts, the decision is made by a single judge, and for a certain list of particularly complex cases, a panel of three judges (as for all cases in the appellate, appeal and supervisory instances). In all other respects, the judicial procedure is fundamentally similar to ours, including being based on the equality and competitiveness of the parties, but techno-interrogations have also penetrated into it. Nowadays, in Russian courts, any person answers the questions of the parties and judges only while sitting in a special "chair of truth" equipped with a neuro-detector, and the veracity of his answer is visible to the entire audience by the color of the light bulb. This applies to the defendant, witnesses, accuser and lawyer in the imperial court and to the plaintiff, defendant and witnesses in the *zemstvo* court. However, the role of this innovation in the *zemstvo* court is much less, since in civil proceedings the main thing is not so much establishing the truth as making an assessment.

If a person, not being a victim, claims that another person is a criminal and wants to involve him in a techno-interrogation, he files an application with the court - such an application is called a "denunciation". The court appoints a technical interrogation, and if the denunciation is confirmed as a first approximation, then the court itself sends an order to initiate a criminal case and investigate - but if not, then according to the Imperial Code of Criminal Procedure, the informer publicly apologizes to the object of the denunciation and pays him 500 rubles, that is, 2000 dollars, compensation; and after the third such incident, and further on, he still receives twenty light lashes.

In the imperial court, the defendant does not have the right to pay a lawyer: he must pay to the collegium, if he is not indigent - for those, like ours, defense is free. He also cannot choose a lawyer - the choice from among the members of the college for a particular process is made by a computer.

In the *zemstvo* court, the choice of a lawyer and an agreement with him takes place, as we do, by agreement of the parties. In general, the role of a lawyer in a criminal process is secondary (as, indeed, that of a prosecutor) and boils down mainly to monitoring the observance of the law by the second party - guilt, as well as the presence of mitigating circumstances, is determined by techno-interrogation, and pathetic speeches exposing social ulcers are meaningless due to the lack of jurors.

Criminal cases are initiated, conducted up to and including court, and supervised by the Imperial Control Department - namely, the Imperial Investigation and State Prosecution Services (in Russia this is divided) and the Procurator's Supervision Service.

Among the *zemstvo* courts there are national courts - the lawsuit is considered in them only if both parties agree to it. It has been established among some peoples of Russia (for example, among many Caucasians) that in order to be considered as belonging to this people and to receive a corresponding entry in the passport at the age of 15, it is necessary to immediately sign a recognition of the jurisdiction of the national court. In rank, such courts are equal to the territorial district courts, but the latter are the appeal instance, and the national ones are the first, since their decisions are appealed to the appeal board of the Supreme *zemstvo* Court of Russia (for some populous nations, national courts are divided into two instances).

Imperial judges are appointed by the emperor for ten years, more often from guardsmen (but by no means

always), and *zemstvo* judges of first instance are elected or appointed as decided in a given *zemstvo* or group of *zemstvos*, and some procedural issues are also resolved, for example, the size and composition of the collegium. The judges of the *zemstvo* district courts of appeal and the Supreme *zemstvo* Court of Russia are appointed by the Zemsky Duma, which also adopts the Civil, Civil Procedure and *zemstvo* Procedure Codes. Judges of national courts are appointed by the respective national chambers, according to their own procedure, and they adopt the appropriate amendments and additions to the codes.

The total number of cases in *zemstvo* courts is much less than ours, and there are several reasons for this. The first of them is that, according to the Russian Civil Procedure and Zemsko-Procedural Codes, the court has the right not to accept the claim as knowingly unfounded. Therefore, unlike our Federation, in Russia it is impossible, for example, to claim that children are taught the wrong thing at school - they are taught at school according to the state program, which cannot be the subject of judicial review, and if it seems to you that the program has been violated, complain to Imperial Schools Agency or to the prosecutor. Also, a Russian court will not accept a monetary claim against a hospital that is so common in our country about improper treatment that led to the death or disability of a patient: according to Russian laws, this is either the subject of a criminal case (then write a statement to the prosecutor), or not a subject of judicial consideration at all. The vast majority of those claims that we call consumer claims are not accepted there, like I want to get five million from you because I broke my finger using the remote control for your video projector, and there was no warning about this in the instructions: the law does not oblige you to write instructions, designed for morons, they will tell you in a Russian court. In addition, here the judge has the right, and even the obligation, if the claim turned out to be deliberately unfounded, to issue an appropriate ruling based on the results of the consideration of the civil claim - in this case, the plaintiff will pay an additional state fee and a fine specified by the code in favor of the defendant. This is a common thing, and therefore everyone there thinks thoroughly before filing a lawsuit. In addition to these procedural ones, the Empire has another systemic filter against endless litigation, which, in my opinion, paralyzes our Federation: material damage is compensated here only in the actual amount confirmed by the examination, and moral damage - according to the standards established by the law of direct action, and therefore filing lawsuits is much less profitable here - even if you win, you definitely won't get rich. All this leads to the fact that citizens in Russia sue less than in our country, and almost never on ridiculous and absurd reasons. As a result, practicing lawyers in Russia enjoy much less social prestige and weight than ours, and they are by no means the masters of life, either in their own eyes or in the eyes of others (although lawyers who conduct civil and especially corporate cases earn quite well).

In addition to the two judicial hierarchies described, imperial and *zemstvo*, there is a Constitutional Court that considers the conformity of certain laws with the Constitution - Russian *zemstvo* and imperial courts do not have the right to rule on unconstitutionality in private civil or criminal cases, as is done in our country. The compliance of imperial laws with the Constitution is checked preventively - according to the Constitution, the emperor sends the bill he signed to the Constitutional Court (I remind you that there is no legislative power in the Russian Empire, and laws are adopted solely by the emperor, although in practice they, of course, are first discussed in the government, and often publicly - but this procedure is not formalized). The emperor can declare a law adopted only after a positive decision of the Constitutional Court, otherwise it is invalid. If the Constitutional Court considers the law inconsistent with the Constitution, and the emperor is not ready to completely withdraw it, then approximately the same procedures are involved that we have in Congress in the event of a veto, I mean conciliation commissions.

Other acts of imperial power, except for laws, as well as acts of the *zemstvo* Duma, individual *zemstvos* and communities and all-Russian national chambers, the Constitutional Court considers for compliance at the request of the government, all-Russian national chambers, the *zemstvo* Duma, communities and *zemstvos*, as well as any courts, except for the first level. The Constitutional Court also considers court decisions for their constitutionality, including at private requests of the parties, but in the latter case, it has

the right to refuse consideration after preliminary familiarization. Judges of the Constitutional Court, like all judges in Russia, and even more so lawyers, do not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution - this makes no sense, because the fundamental guilt of a judge will become clear after the first techno-interrogation (everything further is only the creation of a formalized evidence base). By the way, for the same reason, no one else has immunity in the Empire; even the emperor is protected only by a delay in the consideration of a criminal case until the end of his reign (I remind you that there is no impeachment in Russia).

On the whole, dear compatriots, the Russian law enforcement system seemed to me to be highly effective, and the results confirm this. And by the results, I mean not so much the low level of crime, but as for organized crime and corruption, then their complete absence - this was also achieved by some totalitarian regimes of the past, at the cost of mass repressions and a general atmosphere of horror - but the fact that here the innocent cannot be harmed. You all remember how three years ago an arrested serial killer confessed to 39 murders in our country - and another person, absolutely innocent, was already convicted for this, served seven years and hanged himself in prison. In Russia, with its technical interrogations, this is basically impossible. I think that this circumstance alone can strongly pull down the scales, on the other side of which lies considerations like “you can’t get into other people’s brains, this is an outrageous violation of freedom.” I myself went through a technical interrogation when I received a visa, and I can’t understand how questions like “are you going to do anything in Russia other than what you indicated” infringe on my freedom - except if I really had something to hide. And why on earth can it be argued, as many of us do, that the presence of the death penalty is a sign of barbarism and lack of freedom, when 25 years ago, in the time of my grandfather, the great Alvarado Branco, the death penalty existed among us? Were we too, a barbaric and unfree state a quarter of a century ago? As for corporal punishment, here I am ready to agree that this is pure Middle Ages and a humiliation of human dignity. However, is prison a modern invention and the apotheosis of respect for the individual? Personally, I have come to the firm conviction that in this area it makes sense for us to take a closer look at the Russian experience and even adopt part of it - moreover, I am sure that this will happen over the next decades.

Chapter 6

Army

The army in Russia is something more than the armed forces in the other four states; in terms of functions, it is also what we call the national guard (in China - internal troops, in India - paramilitary police, and in the Caliphate - the guards of Islam). According to the Constitution of the Russian Empire, the army is officially not only an instrument for protecting the country and its interests in the world from other countries, but also a tool for ensuring the integrity of Russia and the continuity of its system of state power from internal threats. On the other hand, the importance of the army here is not limited to its functions - it plays a key role both for the attitude of the service class, and for the justification of the very fact of its existence - and the service class in Russia, as you already know, is power. Therefore, I singled out the story about the army in a separate section, although in our country these issues are mainly of interest to narrow professionals and specialists in military construction.

As I already wrote in the chapter “[Estate Structure](#)”, only guardsmen serve in the Russian army. Some of them, namely the corps of soldiers, constitute its main core (in addition to the fact that once every ten years they are obliged to transfer to serve in another corps for at least three years) - but during the period of initial service and regular training, military service is carried out by all the other guardsmen. In the Russian army there is no concept of soldiers and officers, there are no military ranks there either - everyone is equally a warrior. Such a situation in the army for Russian history is not new, it already happened in 1917-1935, but then the ranks were in fact preserved, they were just bashfully called by their positions - as the “anti-bourgeois” ideology of that time demanded. Now the reason for such an army

hierarchy is completely different - all guardsmen serving in the army have the same training, at least corresponding to our officer. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to assert, and I have repeatedly met such statements in our press, that there are no officers in the Russian army - rather, there are all officers, but no soldiers. This is also connected with the cultivated sense of brotherhood of all guardsmen - officer ranks would clearly contradict this. Command positions, of course, exist, but the warriors who occupy them do not differ in any way outwardly.

The same picture is in the civil administration and the police, where, after a certain number of years spent in command positions, the guardsman is transferred to a significantly lower position, up to the rank and file - "so that you don't think about yourself a lot." Thus, all guardsmen have the same uniform, and the only differences in it are orders and signs.

Orders & decorations in the Empire differ depending on what they are given for - for personal valor, for intellectual merit of a military leader or policeman, or for civic merit, as well as whether it is "simple" merit or special.

The main order awarded for the manifestation of personal valor (as a rule, this applies to guardsmen from the power structures of the corps of soldiers and guards, that is, the army and the police), is the St. George Cross of three degrees - it looks like a cross with expanding ends and the image of St. George the Victorious, striking a snake. Depending on the degree, it is bronze, silver or gold in color - this also applies to all other orders that have degrees. For full St. George knights, that is, people awarded the St. George Cross of all three degrees (there can be no second set for orders with degrees according to the rules), there is an order of the military Red Banner, representing the image of the national flag with crossed swords against its background.

For special personal heroism, the Order of the Red Star is given - this is an eight-pointed (Bethlehem) star covered with red enamel.

For the merits of a military leader, as well as for other intellectual military or police merits, the Order of Alexander Nevsky of three degrees is given, which is a portrait image of this commander, canonized saints, corresponding to three colors. For full holders of the Order of Alexander Nevsky, there is the Order of the Voivodship Red Banner, where, instead of swords, a mace is depicted against the background of the state flag - this is a type of mace that has been a symbol of the power of a military leader in Russia since ancient times.

For special military or police merits, the Order of Michael the Archangel is given, representing a miniature image of the Archangel made of gold.

For the corps of rulers, that is, the civil administration, the main one is the Order of Merit for the Empire, which also has three degrees - this is the state emblem of the corresponding degree of color. For full Knights of the Order of Merit for the Empire, there is the Order of the Princely Red Banner, on which instead of swords or a mace is depicted an emblem - a golden ball with a cross, a symbol of princely and royal power. And for deeds that brought special benefit or prevented a special threat to the country, the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called is given, which is a miniature golden image of this apostle, the first baptist of Russia, crucified on an oblique (so-called St. Andrew's) cross.

For special services to the Empire, no matter what, or special valor, the Order of the Golden Star is given - this is an eight-pointed star made of yellow gold; the knight is called "Hero of the Russian Empire". And for exceptional merits, in addition to the Golden Star, the highest order of the Empire, the Order of Gabriel the Great, is also given.

There are no medals in Russia, but there are so-called signs denoting participation in a particular campaign or operation, or simply serving in a particular area. The signs provide marks for wounds, marks for belonging to a distinguished unit, as well as simplified symbols of the orders described above.

In addition to the guardsmen, representatives of the first or third estate can also be awarded the above orders if, by chance, they perform the same act for which the guardsmen are awarded. Especially for *zemstvo* residents, there are the Order of Glory - for personal courage and self-sacrifice, and the Order of Honor - for contribution to science, culture, industry, etc. It is not customary to award state orders to the clergy - they have their own church orders.

The armed forces of the Russian Empire include the strategic forces, the main forces, the light forces and the navy. Strategic forces are designed to destroy entire countries or significant parts of them with the help of missiles carrying a thermonuclear or annihilation charge, as well as to neutralize such attacks on their country, if any. The strategic forces include stationary and mobile missile systems, submarines and rocket-carrying space ships, as well as combat orbital stations with missile and beam weapons. To counter an enemy attack, there are so-called air defense forces of the country.

The fleet of the Empire consists of the naval, divided into surface and underwater, air, consisting of aircraft and airships, and space fleets.

In general, these two types of armed forces are quite similar to our respective ones - of course, there are significant differences, but they are not in the possession of the general public, so I cannot judge them. It will be much more interesting to tell you about the other two branches of the armed forces.

In the second half of the 2000s, when Russia's confrontation with the West, which was then its main adversary, sharply escalated, Vladimir the Restorer and the military ministry had to solve a fundamental problem - what kind of armed forces to create in order to counter the threat. The peculiarity was that the economic capabilities of the West exceeded those of Russia by many times, if not an order of magnitude. And the type of war for which the West was preparing and which was considered the only possible one at that time, just made the main bet on technology, and the advantage in this area (naturally arising from superiority in the economy) was identical to the military advantage. Therefore, if you build your armed forces on the same principle as the enemy's, strategic planners reasoned, then they will certainly turn out to be many times weaker and, moreover, will be completely useless for "mutiny wars" with separatists and wars of low intensity with southern neighbors. But how then to resist the high-tech army of the enemy?

The answer, which was found as a result, perhaps, could appear only in Russia, because it organically flowed from its unique, albeit inglorious experience - the war in rebellious Chechnya. To turn this experience into something constructive, it was necessary to understand why that war went the way it did and not otherwise. No disastrous state of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the betrayal of its own military and political leadership, could in itself explain the success of the Chechen rebels, who are dozens of times inferior to the Russian army in terms of numbers and do not have heavy weapons (later they remembered that something very similar had place in Afghanistan, when the Russian army was still stronger than ever). A serious staff analysis showed that the secret of the success of the Chechens was that they chose tactics intermediate between the tactics of the regular army and the tactics of the partisans - they abandoned the formation, the front, etc., but acted in large detachments with excellently coordinated interaction and communication and using the most powerful weapons available to them - grenade launchers, anti-aircraft missiles, heavy mines and other explosive devices. This gave them the opportunity to attack army units, even heavily armed ones, because, as it turned out, another tank or helicopter is not necessary at all to destroy a tank or a combat helicopter - a grenade launcher or an [Igla](#)²⁷ is enough. And on the other hand, Russia could not use its own heavy weapons, with individual soldiers or small groups of the enemy as a target, not because it was impossible, but because it was too expensive. Thus, the bitter experience of the Chechen war was useful to the Russians in order to realize that once again in history the scales of war have swung and on the ground battlefield, in contrast to the sea or air attack forces, they again began to outnumber the defense forces. It remains to understand how to use this circumstance against the West. There was no doubt that it was the tactics used by the Chechens that had

the advantage: strong dispersal, which turns each soldier into a separate target, and thus makes it ineffective for the enemy to use heavy and high-tech weapons. And in order to completely negate his advantage, the offensive capabilities of an individual soldier must be maximized, and the technological capabilities of the enemy must be limited.

As a result, a new type of army appeared, which became the prototype of the current main forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Empire. It not only provided for the military needs of the Russians, but to a large extent, as will become clear from what follows, predetermined the political system of Russia. In order to increase the personal firepower of a warrior, science and industry were given the task of creating a new generation of explosives (HEs) that exceed conventional explosives in terms of power per gram of their own weight by thousands and tens of thousands of times, that is, intermediate between conventional and nuclear. In pursuance of this task, the so-called pure thermonuclear munitions (ChTB) were created, releasing thermonuclear energy without a nuclear fuse and therefore not causing radioactive contamination. And since, along with the nuclear fuse, the concept of critical mass and, accordingly, the minimum power, went away, the CTB can be of any size, even a kilogram of TNT equivalent.

Each soldier received as his main personal weapon an OMIK (multi-purpose individual Korabelnikov gun), more than one and a half meters long and weighing about 20 kilograms, in which the upper barrel is something like our 50-caliber sniper rifle (in Russian terms, 12.7 mm), and the lower one, in fact, is an unrifled (that is, smoothbore) gun. The *oprichnik's* individual ammunition load includes 120 rounds for the upper barrel, each of which, when it hits a person, even in armor, tears him apart, including 20 explosive rounds with a CTB of 1.4 kg of TNT equivalent, which, when hit, disable an armored vehicle or even a medium tank. At the same time, OMIK is effective in the mode of using the upper barrel at a distance of up to 2 km, and at a distance of 1 km, any *oprichnik* hits the target in three cases out of five, even from an uncomfortable position. The bullets of the Russians, as already mentioned, are of a cartridge type, and not of an electromagnetic type, like ours - they are thrown out by gases from the explosion of a cartridge, and not by a superconducting accelerator in the barrel. This slightly degrades the parameters, but makes the weapon immune to the electromagnetic pulse. For the lower barrel, the ammunition includes 14 ChTB shells of two capacities, distinguished by color - 26 kg and 380 kg in TNT equivalent. The first is used against infantry, heavy tanks and armored vehicles - a cumulative anti-tank projectile has a sufficient charge and is twenty times weaker, but this one does not require an accurate hit, and active protection is powerless against it. And the second - against shelters and accumulations of manpower and equipment, as well as in special cases - in cities to destroy large buildings, etc. (mostly such shells destroyed the center of Chicago in May 2019). There are also three anti-aircraft missiles in the *oprichnik's* ammunition load, mainly used against combat helicopters; they are not homing (Russians don't use electronics on the battlefield), but they have a very high flight speed, so it's nearly impossible to evade them with the right aim.

In addition to the OMIK, the warrior has a 5-gauge four-barreled non-automatic shotgun loaded with 9 mm buckshot to suppress manpower in close combat (each cartridge carries 90 grams of buckshot). For melee weapons - a large knife, more like a short sword in size, and a folding crossbow made of composite materials with ammunition from 12 bolts for silent shooting. The standard ammunition also includes three Krot directional mini-mines, which serve to instantly create earthen shelters - they give a funnel of more than one and a half meters even in frozen ground. Russian fighters do not have automatic weapons, they consider them ineffective as a personal weapon; but in every hundred there are three heavy machine guns, one automatic heavy grenade launcher and one long-range flamethrower.

The armor of Russian soldiers is titanium-fullerene, which protects against shrapnel, low-energy bullets and tangential hits from high-energy bullets. Unlike the armored suit of our commandos, it does not resist a direct hit from a high-energy bullet, but it almost does not reduce mobility.

To move directly to the battlefield, the guardsmen practically do not use any equipment (the same concept

of maximum dispersal), but instead use the so-called walkers - these are special boots with a micromotor developed back in the 20th century that allow you to rush in jumps of 5-8 meters at speeds up to 40 kilometers per hour. Over the past decade, runners have been heavily supplanted by anti-gravs, which also make it possible to rise up and hover in the air. Each warrior has a redundant communication system that is strictly secret, to the point that each instance has a device for self- and remote destruction. This communication system allows the fighters to communicate with each other in real time and receive the necessary information. Apparently, their connection has a different, non-radio nature, because it works normally even after a strong electromagnetic pulse. By and large, every Russian soldier is a highly mobile autonomous combat unit, superior in firepower to an entire company of half a century ago, not requiring any formation or even line of sight for control and coordination with other fighters.

To limit the possibility of using high-tech enemy weapons, especially heavy ones, the Russians adopted two innovations. The new tactic included the widespread use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield - all discussions about not using nuclear weapons or even not being the first to use them were unilaterally stopped by the Russians. Of course, such tactics assume that the enemy will not stand on ceremony either, but nuclear weapons, as a great equalizer, improve the chances of the weakest, in this case in terms of technology. In addition, when it is used, an electromagnetic pulse is created that disables electronics - the Russians themselves minimize the use of electronics so that its failure does not make them vulnerable. But the Russians do not rely solely on conventional tactical nuclear weapons, but also use magnetodynamic explosion generators (GMDVs), which allow almost all the energy of a multi-kiloton charge to be converted into an electromagnetic pulse, from which there is practically no protection - this is the second tactical innovation. The beginning of the active phase of a land battle with a high-tech enemy according to Russian tactics is thus characterized by the massive use of tactical and GMDV thermonuclear charges, due to which the Russian army immediately finds itself in a winning position - as a result of all the damaging factors of these strikes, a significant part of the enemy's high-tech weapons fails. In each squad (in our opinion, a battalion) of the guardsmen, there are also soldiers who have low-yield nuclear shells (20-100 tons of TNT equivalent) for the OMIK, using them in the active phase of the battle - moreover, since they have the same OMIK, enemy snipers cannot spot them.

Naturally, the Russians do not count on a 100% failure of the enemy's high-tech weapons - there is protection against any attack, and, in particular, we have weapons that retain their survivability in these conditions. The Russians' calculation is that protection against the damaging factors of nuclear weapons will make high-tech weapons so expensive that their use against single targets will become unrealistic.

Heavy weapons are represented in the Russian ground forces by self-propelled cannon and rocket artillery, with a projectile yield from 10 to 10,000 tons of TNT and a range of up to 100 km. This artillery does not use automatic fire control systems, as well as computers and radars in general, since it is specifically designed to operate in conditions of strong electromagnetic impulses. The main forces are also armed with "turntables", highly simplified combat helicopters with a turbine engine (the usual one fails on impulse), which do not use any electronic devices, armed with unguided, that is, optically guided, missiles. The use of tanks and armored personnel carriers is practically not envisaged by Russian tactics, at least as strike forces - instead they provide advanced reconnaissance.

Thus, the standard tactics of the Russian rati (division, in our opinion), advancing on the orders of the enemy defending in echelon or advancing for a meeting battle, is as follows: first, nuclear artillery preparation, which begins 40-60 minutes before the planned contact of troops, that is usually when the enemy is 10-12 kilometers away; then the second artillery preparation with GMDV ammunition for the final suppression of electronics by an electromagnetic pulse, which is carried out 3-5 minutes before contact, and sometimes after it. The attacking order of the rati itself is represented by three echelons: in the first there is a small number of armored vehicles serving for reconnaissance and suppression of the same forward detachments, which turn around and retreat when in contact with the main enemy forces.

The second echelon is represented by guardsmen on foot, moving in an extremely sparse formation, capable of seeping into any gap or junction in the enemy's orders, without wasting time destroying centers of resistance - this will then be completed by artillery. Firepower in this echelon is provided by the OMIKs of fighters, including those with nuclear warheads, and to a very small extent by tanks and helicopters. The third echelon is represented by self-propelled fire support artillery, as well as trucks, anti-gravity or hovercraft, supplying ammunition to the second echelon. If the occupation of the territory is intended, then the garrison units are in the third echelon.

Russian tactics do not provide for a defensive battle - the advancing enemy is supposed to be stopped by a head-on battle. All this makes the Russian troops an extremely difficult opponent - my cousin, the commander of the marine brigade in the city of San Diego in the state of Pacificia, told me that he did not really know how to fight, much less win a land battle with a Russian regiment, approximately corresponding to according to the size of his brigade: you can, of course, do without electronics and combat lasers - use mechanical weapons, manually guided artillery and wired communications, all this is there - but in the practice of such a battle, the Russians are much stronger. Thank God that we are separated by two oceans, we do not claim each other's territory, and a full-scale war between us is extremely unlikely.

Thus, in Russian tactics, the process that originated in the so-called positional crisis of the First World War, a departure from the idea of infantry as a passive element of the attack, received its logical conclusion (as they said then, "artillery destroys, infantry occupies"). But if the British and American armies relied on tanks with which the infantry advanced, then the Germans, who did not have tanks at that time and had no tradition of relying on cavalry at all (tanks are essentially the same as cavalry, in English tank units are so called), went the other way - creating assault groups in infantry divisions from the best fighters who, in addition to personal weapons, have mobile guns and machine guns. Such groups became key during World War II, when, starting in 1942, Russian anti-tank artillery learned how to effectively stop tank attacks. However, by 1943, the Russians also learned how to create and use such assault groups. So, the modern Russian ground army is an infantry, which, both in terms of armament and training, is such an assault group!

It cannot be said that all these Russian innovations were a complete revelation: something similar was offered at the headquarters of many armies. But everything rested on the main limiting factor of this approach - the need for extremely high physical and psychological training and combat training of personnel for such tactics. Running on your own, even with reinforced walkers, and even with 80 kilograms of equipment, is somewhat harder than riding a tank, and shooting from a hand cannon, calculating the sight in your mind, is somewhat more difficult than entering data into a computer. For a large country, there are no particular problems in training at this level a certain number of soldiers, sufficient to complete the elite special forces - but not for all the same ground forces. In principle, this problem cannot be solved for the draft army, and its solution is unrealistic for the professional army, since very few professional soldiers will agree to this and in any case will ask an exorbitant salary for it.

The Chechens in the second Caucasian war, from whom, as I have already said, the authors of the Russian military reform took an example, were helped not only by an unprecedented national upsurge, but also by the fact that almost all men traditionally went to the soldiers there, of which a very significant part went through tough "internship" in criminal structures. Russians, who have a different culture and mentality, would not be able to repeat this, especially in the absence of a "hot" war that threatens the existence of the nation, as they had in 1941 or the same Chechens in the 90s. Therefore, when in 2013 Gabriel the Great addressed the people before a referendum on a new constitution with a proposal to choose from two options - either everyone serves in the army and everyone has voting rights, or only those who want to serve, but then only they have these rights, then the response of the population was a foregone conclusion. Everyone knew that the service in the first version would be at least three, and maybe even five years,

with repeated subsequent calls for 3-6 months and incredibly physically difficult. In the view of the majority of citizens, voting rights were not worth it, especially since there was no question of the country's survival - the ruler offered an alternative. And if the combat tactics of the armed forces were different and the conscripted military service required to ensure it would be much easier and shorter, the choice of citizens could well be different, because, in general, the mood of equality and anti-elitism is traditionally strong among Russians. And then the estate of guardsmen would not have arisen, and therefore, the estate in general - like this, not for the first time in history, the decisions taken in the field of military construction predetermined the most significant changes in the entire political system.

This is how the Russian land army of the modern type arose - the Russians found a way, by changing the social and political structure of their society, to massively train soldiers of such a level of condition and valor, which in other countries could be achieved only for a few special forces soldiers. All other Russian tactics are designed only to make the outcome of the battle dependent primarily on the personal qualities of the guardsmen as warriors (and here they have no equal) and to nullify the significance of other factors. As you probably know, dear compatriots, our press has been writing for a couple of years that the Russians have a new technique on the way - a generator of some new field that changes the course of ordinary chemical reactions, so that not even gunpowder in cartridges will explode, nor the fuel in the engines will ignite. Whether this is really so, I don't know - but if so, then this is quite consistent with the line of the Russian tactical approach: the battle in the absence of cars and explosives will be fought with melee weapons on foot, and in this no one on Earth will be able to compete with guardsmen.

Separate units for the new military tactics were created before 2013, but they are separate. And after 2013, more precisely from 2016, when the first sets of guardsmen began specialization in the corps of soldiers, the transfer of all ground forces to a new basis began, which ended, and even then not completely, only with the beginning of the Twelve Day War and expansion wars.

It is interesting that the Russian authorities specifically turned to all Chechens, even those who fought against Russia (in fact, they only turned to those who fought - on the side of either the separatists or the federals) and who committed serious crimes, with a proposal to become guardsmen: their type of warfare and military training is very close to the new requirements. Oddly enough, many agreed, even among the zealous separatists, despite the condition of accepting Orthodoxy and passing a techno-interrogation on the sincerity of motivations - such a service harmonized very well with the age-old Chechen ideas about military honor and glory. In addition, their attitude towards Russia, like the attitude of other Caucasian peoples, had changed a lot by that time: if in the 90s it was contempt for weakness and lack of will, which changed in the early 2000s to hatred for a blunt and soulless force, then after then, and especially since 2013, respect began to appear. The point here is that the fair assertion that these peoples respect only strength needs clarification: we are talking about strength, manifested in individual valor and inflexibility, and not in the number of troops or the firepower of tanks. Because the first reflects the strength of the spirit, and the second is nothing more than materialized gold, which can never be an object of respect for warlike peoples. Such a worldview does not differ, by the way, from the worldview of the Russians themselves - "the spirit gives life, but the flesh does not benefit at all." Therefore, the Chechens and other Caucasians (except perhaps the Alans - they were always close to the Russians) saw that force that is worthy of respect not when Russia crushed their resistance by numbers, but when it plucked up the courage to confront the incommensurably stronger West, and especially when the service class of guardsmen arose. So it turns out a paradoxical, in our opinion, situation: if in a Chechen family that does not like Russia very much, where portraits of Imam Shamil (the leader of the Chechens in the first Caucasian war) and Dzhokhar Dudayev (their first leader in the second Caucasian war) hang on the wall, the son goes in the guardsmen, that is, in the military service of this very Russia, and besides accepting Orthodoxy, they are nonetheless proud of him, especially if he distinguishes himself in battles (this is usually the case).

All of the above referred to the so-called main forces of the Russian army. In addition to them, there are also light forces intended for combat operations with a less high-tech enemy - such actions in fact include a significant part of the military clashes with the Armed Forces of the Caliphate, as well as any actions against rebels on their territory. The name "light" does not mean anything, rather the opposite - due to the absence or small number of heavy weapons in the enemy's light forces, armored vehicles are used more widely. But much less space in their tactics is given to nuclear strikes - their opponents have few electronics that need to be suppressed by an electromagnetic pulse.

As for the strategic forces, offensive and defensive, as well as ocean and space fleets, then, as I said, these high-tech forces differ little from ours - both in terms of material base and tactics. The Russians never had any particular problems with them: since the time of the Second Empire, their aircraft, air and missile defense systems, submarines, etc. have always been quite at the level of ours - they were inferior in some ways, superior in some ways. Even in the most difficult years for Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, this was the case - the problem arose only with the number of units of military equipment, which depends on material capabilities. Therefore, the restoration of parity proceeded automatically as the gap between their economy and ours narrowed - the problem of the level of advanced weapons, as a rule, did not arise. And already in the 2010s, the Russians, as is known, took the lead in applied sciences working for defense, which predetermined the creation of a strategic shield and, as a direct consequence, the outcome of the Twelve Day War and the subsequent conquest of Europe.

The military doctrine of the Russian Empire is simple: there are no offensive wars, with the exception of punitive raids, and a defensive war (including offensive actions, including on enemy territories), the armed forces must be ready to wage and win against the rest of the world; it means to win on your own - the presence of allies is not provided for by the Russian strategic doctrine. Russia's participation in any international treaties on the limitation or prohibition of certain weapons is also not envisaged - the Empire considers it madness for itself to rely in its strategy on the honesty and good will of potential opponents. It is also not envisaged, at least as an essential element, to wage non-fire wars of the modern type - economic, subversive (assistance to subversive elements within the enemy state), informational and conscientological (creating false ideas among the population and elites of the enemy state, leading to defeat). The Russians know how to do all this (except perhaps for economic pressure - their autarkic economy is not capable of this by definition) and do not hesitate to use it - their special services are quite efficient and even cruel, but according to the dominant opinion in Russia, only that power is worthy to exist in the world as an independent and self-sufficient country-civilization that is not afraid of a direct military clash with the enemy and is ready to pay for victory with its blood. Not like Byzantium, which from a certain moment relied only on its intrigues, spies and gold, and as a result fell. That is, in response to the conduct of a non-fire war of any kind against Russia (in the Empire they are all generally called subversive), the Russian strategy involves declaring to the enemy, after a warning, a conventional fire war. The same strategy, that is, the declaration of a conventional war, is assumed in the event of sending terrorist groups into the Empire or organizing them within the Empire. According to the experience of the Russian-caliphate wars, this is what happens in reality. At the tactical level, countering terrorist threats, in addition to all generally accepted methods, occurs through a network of self-organization of guardsmen like a militia: in the event of a terrorist attack, nearby guardsmen (and they are everywhere, since there are civilian and police structures everywhere) contact each other through their connection and are in place much earlier than the regular units. This is possible because the full combat equipment of any guardsman is stored at his place of residence, and not at a military base, and he does not need to go anywhere to turn into a heavily armed combat unit.

Thus, the Russian army is not going to conquer the planet - Russia simply does not need it, which is why Russia stood at the origins of the modern orderly world - but is ready to stop anyone who encroaches on something like that. In Russia, many believe that its historical mission is precisely to stop pretenders invincible for other nations to rule the world, such as Napoleon and Hitler. Moreover, all guardsmen and

most of all Orthodox people in the Empire believe that before the end of the world, when the Antichrist will lead his army to battle, the Russian army will stop and defeat him.

In order to be ready for war with everyone, the Russians use, among other things, an absolutely amazing trick: in all wars that take place without the participation of Russia, they offer both warring parties that they will be provided with the same Russian military expeditionary corps (overseas army, in their terms) to participate in battles. The only condition that they set at the same time is not to use them against each other, especially since they will not fight among themselves anyway. This is always agreed to, because each side hopes to use these forces better than the other. As a result, the Russian rati fought in two Indo-Caliphate wars, and in the Celestial Caliphate, and in the Indo-Caliphate War. This gives not only training and combat shelling to a significant number of personnel (especially for this, the rotation of soldiers in each overseas rati is very frequent), but also complete knowledge of the weapons, structures, tactics, strengths and weaknesses of all the armies of the world - except perhaps ours, which after 2019, she did not fight at all.

Although I am not a fan of the semi-artistic genre of alternative history, dear compatriots, I could not help but think about how the fate of Russia would have been during the moments of its greatest trials of the recent past - at least in the twentieth century - if its army had been built on those the same principles as now. I'm talking about general tactical principles (without reference, of course, to modern types of weapons), and the principles of manning. In 1941, the size of the *oprichnina* army, if their size as a percentage of the population was as it is now, would be about 600 thousand people - it would seem that it is clearly not enough to resist the Wehrmacht (3.2 million people - however, together with auxiliary units, and the number of *oprichniki* indicated by combat composition). But with a threat to the existence of the country, a stream of volunteers joining the guardsmen would certainly have poured in, who would have gone to the front after reduced training. On the other hand, it is not known how the German units would have defended themselves against commando-style attacks - they were not at all adapted to this, since there were no such threats then; in general, it is extremely difficult for a regular army of the classical type to deal with the enemy, where each fighter is a self-sufficient and heavily armed combat unit. And it is clear that the guardsmen would be armed with powerful and long-range hand-held anti-tank, counter-battery and anti-personnel weapons - it would have been developed by that time, because this is dictated by the basic principles of their organization and tactics, and the technology of that time already allowed it. And it is clear that they would not have had any demoralization in the summer-autumn of 1941 - their training, including psychological, places special emphasis on the situation when they are left alone, without comrades and resources. All this would at least create big problems for the Germans, but nevertheless nothing certain can be said about the outcome of the war in this imaginary case. It is clear that in any case, the loss of a professional army would be significantly less, and they would not be perceived by the people so tragically - why mourn for a professional warrior, who in any case laid down his life for the state. But about the other two tragedies, everything is much clearer: to imagine an *oprichnina* army that succumbs to the defeatist and insurgent agitation of the Bolsheviks in 1916-1917, moreover, only because they are tired of sitting in the trenches, is completely impossible - even if the *oprichniki* were a minority of the troops, they without any order from above would have drowned in blood any attempts at revolution, even supported by the rest of the army. Exactly the same can be said about August 1991; however, the very existence of a class-based *oprichnina* army makes it impossible for such a weak and weak-willed government to exist, as in 1917 and 1991 - they will remove it themselves, before any revolutionary actions of the people. So it is impossible to say for sure whether the *oprichnina* army is a guarantee against military defeats from an external enemy, but it certainly is from an internal one.

III. MATERIAL LIFE

Chapter 7 Economy

Monetary system. The monetary unit of the Russian Empire is the ruble, divided into 100 kopecks; it is equal to 4.01 dollars or, respectively, 15.27 yuan, 67.30 rupees or 0.82 dinars. (It should be noted that this rate is nothing more than a base one - in order to discourage exports and imports in accordance with the requirements of the principle of autonomy in Russia, there are multiple exchange rates.) It is difficult to say how much this rate corresponds to purchasing power parity, because the ratio of prices for different goods and services in Russia is different than in our country, but on average, according to my observations, one can agree with this course. In Russia, cash is much more common than in our country, and the authorities are not trying to limit it, because taxes there do not depend on income, and therefore there is little point in controlling spending. However, electronic money is also in use here, but the scope of their application is the same as ours.

Russia - along with the Caliphate - is a country where there is a gold standard. In fact, this standard is polymetallic, since along with gold there are silver and platinum money, and other precious metals are present in the assets of the Central Bank - but for convenience, I will continue to call it gold. This is very important for the self-perception of Russians - many of them asked me how we can live with papers instead of money. To my objections that our money is backed not by gold, but by all the property of the American Federation, I was told that this would not prevent them from devaluing many times overnight, both as a result of the whims of the market, and the conspiracy of government or financial circles; they themselves have experienced this before, and they see no reason why such a collapse under certain circumstances cannot occur in our country. The gold standard in Russia is by no means formal - the Constitution guarantees that every citizen can always exchange any amount of paper or electronic money for gold money at face value, and it is forbidden to demand any papers or certificates from him for this, or an identity card. The denomination of the gold standard itself earlier, after its introduction in 2013, could by law change no more than once every twenty years, with an announcement three years in advance, but now they say that the current emperor Vladimir III is going to change the law and establish that the gold standard cannot be changed at all, and put it in the Constitution. The nominal value of this standard is 0.25 grams of pure gold or 0.15 grams of pure platinum in one ruble.

There are five gold coins - according to the number of Russian rulers of all times who deserved the nickname "Great", who are depicted on them. If after some time another ruler receives such recognition, another coin will be introduced. A coin with a denomination of 5 rubles is called a hryvnia, it is minted from 9-karat (in Russian terms - 383-carat) gold, weighs a little less than 4 grams; its reverse side depicts Peter I and the inscription: "Peter the Great (Romanov), Tsar of Moscow and All Russia (1696-1725)". A coin worth 10 rubles is called a chervonets, it is about the same size as a hryvnia, but minted from 18-karat gold (750-carat); it depicts Catherine II and the inscription: "Catherine the Great (Romanova, nee Anhalt-Zerbst), Empress of Russia (1762-1796)". A coin of 25 rubles is called a brand - it weighs almost 7 grams and is minted from higher-grade (900-carat) gold; it depicts Stalin and the inscription: "Joseph the Great (Stalin, born Dzhugashvili), ruler of the USSR (1924-1953)". A coin of 50 rubles is large, almost 14 grams, minted from 900-carat gold and is called altyn; it depicts Ivan III and the inscription: "Ivan the Great (Rurikovich), Grand Duke of Moscow (1462-1505)". Finally, the 100-ruble coin is even larger - it weighs more than 16 grams, is minted from platinum and is called an imperial; on it under the portrait is written: "Gabriel the Great (Sokolov), Emperor of Russia (2012-2030)". The names of all coins are ancient words: chervonets and imperial are Russian, hryvnia is ancient Slavic (although many perceive it as Ukrainian, according to the experience of 1991-2020), altyn is Turkic, and the mark is German; but the Russians, inclined to derision, call these coins not by official names, but, respectively,

petya, katya, osya, vanya and gavrik. There are also silver coins in denominations of 50 kopecks (the so-called fifty kopecks), 1 ruble and 3 rubles, as well as paper banknotes in denominations of 50 kopecks, 1, 3, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 and 200 rubles; they depict other prominent rulers - Dmitry Donskoy (1359-1389), Alexey the Quiet (1645-1676), Alexander the Righteous (1801-1825), Alexander the Liberator (1855-1881), Vladimir the Restorer (2000-2012) and Mikhail the Suppressor (2030-2040), as well as military leaders - the victor over the Khazars Svyatoslav Rurikovich (965-966), the victor over the Swedes and Teutons Alexander Nevsky (1240-1242), the victor over the Krymchaks Mikhail Vorotynsky (1572), the victor over the Poles Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky (1607-1610), the victor over the French Mikhail Kutuzov (1812-1815) and the victor over the Germans Georgy Zhukov (1941-1945). There are no substitutes for money that can de facto be a means of payment - like, for example, we have bonds of the Federal Treasury - in Russia. A couple of years ago, the chambers of the Kazakh and Tatar peoples of Russia turned to the emperor with a joint request to issue a 200-ruble platinum coin, or at least a banknote, with the image of the "heavenly warrior" Genghis Khan, since in essence it was he who was the founder of the state: the entire Russian Empire originally came from its powers: the European part - from the Jochi clan, and the Asian part - from the Chagatai clan. Now this is being actively discussed in the country, and if the decision turns out to be positive, it will be funny: on some money, Genghis Khan, whose grandson conquered Russia, and on others, Dmitry Donskoy, Ivan the Great and Mikhail Vorotynsky, who defeated and drove his more distant descendants from Russia.

I, being a humanitarian by education, of course, knew about the gold standard in Russia, but I was always surprised how the Russians managed to solve the problem of insufficient gold mining to provide money for economic growth. After all, before the gold standard was universal, and in America it existed until 1970 (although the last half century was mostly formal), but they were forced to abandon it. My interlocutor, to whom I asked this question, the head of the Central Bank department Vladimir Egorov, answered me that in fact it is just a matter of setting priorities (setting, as he put it): or you set the parameters of the economy that you want, including the size of the money supply and price dynamics, and then see if you have enough gold, or you take as a given how much you have and will have, and then see what economic parameters you get. "You didn't have enough gold for a normal economy," he said, "but to print money without restraint, which is what you did throughout the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of our century, creating an inflationary bubble, only hidden. Of course, in order to have a money supply of 150% of annual GDP (with an optimum of 60%) and a total domestic debt of 400% of annual GDP - and this is exactly what the United States had at the beginning of this century - there will not be enough gold. "But by strictly limiting these parameters, for example, by unambiguously pegging to gold, you artificially limit economic growth," I objected. "It's like undernutrition of nutrients and vitamins to a growing body, because it's over the recommended amount." "And the way you did it was to give him doping," was the answer, "and this doping is always great at first, and then bad. For several decades, your economy was inflated by a giant bubble, and you proudly looked at everyone else - and then it naturally erupted with the Great Crisis of 2010. And we have as much money as we have gold, and if there is not enough money, then deflation will occur. This is a self-regulating process, and the less you interfere in it, at least roughly, the less cataclysms and crises it will bring."

I cannot say that the interlocutor completely convinced me, but there are certainly some rational grains in his words. It cannot be argued that inflation in Russia is zero (the Central Bank does not want this), but over the past 25 years it has been about 1.5-2% per year, with fairly high GDP growth rates. To ensure the required amount of gold, back in 2013-2017, a state program was implemented to increase production, and by 2020 it was already about 800 tons per year (not counting platinum); and now, on the increased territory and plus on asteroids, in total 3680 tons of all precious metals are mined per year, in terms of equivalent tons of gold. In addition, a significant part of Russia's imports comes from the purchase of gold and platinum in the Caliphate, as well as silver from us. Thus, the Empire manages to ensure the growth of gold reserves by 5% per year, that is, by the amount of the average growth of the economy and,

accordingly, the money supply. Inside the country, there is a strict state monopoly on the purchase and sale of precious metals (meaning metals in ingots, not jewelry), but private companies can also mine them (mostly this happens), subject to the delivery of products to the state.

Financial sector. One of the most visible and unusual manifestations of the fact that Russia is an Orthodox country, not only according to the Constitution, but also in its Christian spirit in all spheres of life, is the Russian credit system. One acquaintance with her is enough to start taking seriously the words of Russians about the primacy of Christian values in their lives. As you know, Holy Scripture clearly and unequivocally forbids usury, that is, lending money at interest; but we, unfortunately or fortunately, do not take it literally - unlike the Russians. Back in 2013, at the beginning of the reforms of Gabriel the Great, it was announced that, by disregarding this ban (it was observed in Europe, by the way, back in the Middle Ages), Western civilization had embarked on a satanic path and that this was unacceptable for Russia. But the obvious alternative to this was a complete legal ban on usury, which would be the first step towards turning Russia not just into an Orthodox, but into a fundamentalist country, which no one wanted. As a result, an intermediate solution was found, which is still in effect today: usury in Russia is not prohibited and not even limited by law, but the state, represented by several state-owned banks, issues loans to interested legal entities and individuals without interest. This does not mean that anyone can get a loan: just like in America in ordinary commercial banks, in the Russian state bank you will be required to provide collateral in the amount determined as the loan amount divided by the liquidity ratio, a business plan to assess the seriousness of your projects (if we are not talking about a small, so-called non-targeted loan), and they will also check you for your credit history. But if all this is OK for you, then you will receive a loan without interest. It will not be completely free, because you will still be charged an issuance fee (compensation for the bank's organizational expenses), as well as a fee for the risk of the lender - in essence, non-repayment insurance. But this cannot be considered a disguised percentage, because these payments are small and, moreover, are proportional not to the amount given out, but to the amount of time spent on your request - like lawyers' fees. By the way, our banks, in addition to interest on a loan, take money for many operations (they form the so-called non-interest income of the bank).

I was very interested in the question of how an interest-free loan affects inflation - after all, in our country, on the contrary, it is controlled, when necessary, by a high loan interest-rate, and, accordingly, with a zero rate, inflation should be very high. A careful study showed, however, that the analogy is not applicable here, because in the American Federation and in the Russian Empire the total amount of credit in the country is formed in completely different ways. In our country, the Federal Reserve System sets one or another discount rate, that is, the amount of interest at which it lends to banks, and gives to all willing banks as much as they ask (taking into account their capital, of course), issuing the necessary funds for this. The volume of lending is determined only by effective demand - the lower the discount rate, the higher it is. In Russia, the discount rate is fixed at zero, but on the other hand, the total amount of lending cannot exceed the limit set by the Central Bank (actually, not even a lending limit, but simply a limit on the M1 money supply aggregate, that is, the total volume of non-cash money in the country); therefore, if the demand for loans is too high and hits the limit, then the borrower at the bank may be asked to wait in line. Although not very often, it happens and is therefore regulated in detail by the Central Bank: it is clearly stated what has priority when the financial system approaches the limit - whether lending to the current activities of functioning businesses, their capital expenditures or loans to create new businesses. (At the same time, Russians are not afraid of corruption - responsible employees of state banks undergo regular technical interrogations.) Such an approach, as you noticed, quite accurately illustrates the principles outlined to me by Vladimir Egorov when talking about the gold standard (see above) - it allows you to prevent inflation, and, although it sets the limits of growth, stability of development is ensured with it. Nobody prevents private capital from giving you a loan at interest - but who will take it if you can get it without interest? Only if they offer to give a loan without collateral - but this is an almost unacceptable risk for the lender, which, however, some venture investors still take, so

that the market for ordinary interest-bearing, but unsecured loans in Russia exists, albeit a small one. Or you may be offered an interest-bearing loan at a time when there was a queue for an interest-free loan in state-owned banks due to a lending limit, but this does not happen often, and most borrowers will prefer to wait. Thus, usury in the Empire is not prohibited, but forced into marginal economic niches. This has one significant consequence, the importance of which cannot be overestimated: since you cannot earn money on money simply by lending it in growth, no one will give you interest on the deposit either - on the contrary, you will have to pay 0.3-0.7% for keeping your money in the bank, 7% per year, as well as for each banking operation; if not for these payments, then in the absence of loan interest, the banking system could not exist.

Of course, you can rent a safe deposit box and keep the money in cash, but the government is fighting this by imposing an excise tax on the provision of safe deposit boxes, so it will be even more expensive. (The state is fighting this in order to reduce the exchange of banknotes for gold money specifically for the purpose of storing them - in a scientific way, hoarding - this will increase the required share of gold in the total money supply.) Or you can keep money at home - but then it can be stolen by thieves or taken without asking by household members. And there is also a property tax (see below), and inflation, although small, still exists - all these factors "eat up" your money. The result of the foregoing is as logical as it is unusual for us: if we have money, unlike any other form of capital (real estate, factory, shop, etc.), does not require any costs to maintain it and, on the contrary, bring some income, even if you don't invest it in anything, then in Russia it's impossible to save money just like that, not to mention making money on it! You can invest money in something and then not only save, but earn at least 1000% per annum - but this is no longer rent, but an active business, impossible (at least too risky) without your personal participation. That is, there are a lot of businessmen in Russia, but there are no rentiers, therefore, in order to simply save money, you have to be a businessman (this all applies to corporations). This situation leads to the fact that investment activity in Russia is very high. But the psychological consequences of the described circumstances are no less important - entrepreneurial income is perceived as the result of your talent and labor, and not capital. This is one of the components of what Russians mean when they say, as Oksana Terebilko, another senior official of the Central Bank, told me: "With you, money has become the goal of everything, a self-sufficient quantity - but with us it remains in the traditional role of a measure of value and a means of payment."

Here we will smoothly move on to the Russian stock market. You could not help but notice, dear compatriots, that a person or a corporation in Russia can place their money not on deposit in a bank, but in something like an investment company or fund, both in shares (shares [акции] or shares [паи]), and in debt (bonds) instruments of this fund. As for bonds [облигаций] or bonds [бондов], there is almost no such market: why would an issuer borrow your money through them at interest if he can borrow it from a state bank without interest? Unless it has collateral or a coherent business concept, in which case it is extremely dangerous for you to buy the bonds of such a company. But equity investment companies in Russia are very common, with the difference from ours that they invest significantly less in exchange-traded instruments (as you will see below, their role in Russia is small), but mostly act as majority or significant minority shareholders of real businesses, and sometimes by their organizers - in our country it is practically forbidden. The position of the imperial supervision of financial markets and, in general, the Imperial Chancellery of Economic Policy in relation to such companies is quite favorable: by investing in them, you risk enough and therefore, in most cases, take the most active part in their activities (which is why there are no such giants among Russian investment companies like our public investment funds). In other words, an investor in a typical investment company in Russia is by no means a rentier. By the way, when investment companies place money collected from investors (or invested by several investors - then it is an investment bank), that is, they give it to some existing or organizing businesses, they do this, as you understand, in exchange for a share, not a loan. In this sense, they are absolutely identical to Islamic banks in the Caliphate - only there for business this is the only way to raise money, but not in the Empire.

Accordingly, leveraged buy-out, the usual and most common procedure for raising money for small businesses (when you invest from a quarter to a half of your own money, and borrow the rest from a bank, but without collateral), is also quite common in Russia: you either take them as they are borrowed from the state bank without interest, or, if you have not convinced him (for example, you have only a quarter of your money), go to an investment company and raise money in exchange for a share. Investment companies, of course, are private - this is ordinary commerce (as opposed to issuing an interest-free loan), into which the state does not interfere.

In addition to the almost complete absence of debt financial instruments and the dominance of equity instruments, the Russian stock market has a number of specific features. There are closed joint-stock companies (CJSC) in Russia, in which you can sell your shares to anyone only with the consent of the general meeting. This can be done freely in the so-called public joint-stock companies (PJSC), but for them the law requires the organizers to have a controlling stake. It looks like this: when a company at some point in its development wants to become a PJSC (it is impossible to organize them from scratch according to the law), then it can issue and sell shares on the market, but in such a way that it has more than 50% of the shares. This encumbrance is indefinite and is recorded in the register not on the owner, but on the package itself - that is, it remains with any change of ownership. If somewhere the controlling stake disappears, the company will be immediately closed, and the liquidation procedure will begin (in addition to initiating criminal cases). The meaning of this is as follows: where shares are freely traded, that is, highly liquid, their owners, especially small ones, act as investors - and investors are not businessmen. Businessmen should be treated as people who act, including taking risks, according to their own free and conscious choice, but investors should not be treated like that. They must be protected - both from scammers and simply unscrupulous people who will manage the money of depositors, not being owners and therefore not having real responsibility in decisions. The Russian law considers the simplest way of such protection to be the obligatory presence of a real owner, who remains so even when he has attracted the money of depositors. Thus, in Russia, the usual situation is impossible for us, when the founder of the company, as a result of a series of issues, remains with 10-15% of the shares, completely retaining real control; one cannot but agree that in this case his interests cease to be identical with the interests of both the firm itself and the other investors.

For ordinary CJSCs, there are no requirements for the presence of controlling stakes in Russia, because the shares are not freely traded there. That is, liquidity, within the meaning of Russian law, can be either when you are a real businessman (that is, you yourself manage a business you own or have a controlling stake in PJSC), making decisions alone or consolidated with a small number of partners, or when you are a contributor with a real owner, and on the contrary, obviously nothing depends on you. The head of the imperial supervision of financial markets, Akezhan Sabirdin, joked about this: "As you know, the stock market is called the market of fictitious capital in economic science. So here, in order to get access to the free market, this capital must be truly fictitious." By the way, such an order makes almost impossible both corporate wars for control and raids for the purpose of hostile takeovers - there is simply no place for all this. As for friendly mergers of PJSCs, they are possible and take place in practice, but only when the owners of controlling stakes in both merging PJSCs agree to merge them into one inseparable controlling stake in a new PJSC belonging to their common closed CJSC.

Real sector. Since, in general, in terms of the way of life, Russia does not differ much from us - it is the same urbanized, technological society - the general structure of the real sector of the economy (that is, what exactly, how and in what proportions is produced) is fundamentally similar to ours. The general level of technological development also roughly corresponds to ours, although in some areas it may be somewhat inferior to us or, conversely, surpass, but not much. But the Russian real sector has very significant features: one of the main ones is that there is a state sector of the economy there, which is quite extensive, if not dominant (although it does not exceed a quarter in terms of GDP share), and its role in the overall economic structure is very great. The public sector is represented both by unincorporated

state property, which is operated directly by the Imperial Finance Office in the person of the State Property Agency, and by enterprises managed by the Imperial Economic Administration or the Imperial Infrastructure Administration, depending on the profile. Such enterprises are in the form of either SUEs or PJSCs with a controlling stake in the state - the latter are organized on the basis of SUEs in highly commercialized sectors. The purpose of such an organization is that the shares of such companies increase the number of attractive investment instruments in the stock market and, thus, bind additional volumes of money supply. Starting to recreate the state sector in 2006-2007, the new Russian school of economics was fully aware of the real danger of being carried away by this process, and no one in Russia wanted or wants to return to the state economy. Therefore, clear criteria have been formulated (modified as technological and other progress) of what may apply to the public sector - and the authorities do not go beyond them. I will list these criteria below.

Firstly, the entire production of weapons and military equipment belongs to the public sector. The point here is not the fear of abuse, and even less the desire not to give private traders a tidbit, but the fact that in this industry the contractor no less than the customer determines the strategy of technical development - and the Russians do not want to allow private investors to do this in the strength of their motivations, which are obviously not identical to the interests of the state. By the way, a very significant, if not the main, part of the applied science of the country is concentrated in the state military-industrial sector - except perhaps for the biological sciences, which, however, are also mainly in the public sector (in any case, medical), but not in the economic, but in the social sphere, together with practical health care.

Secondly, the state owns all mining, as well as other natural resources, in particular forests and fish, because nature is a gift from God to all people, and not to anyone in particular, and why should anyone get rich on the exploitation of the common property. It should be said, however, that in this part the word "public sector" should not be misleading - almost all state-owned natural resource enterprises are managed by private management companies, that is, the Imperial Economic Department does not decide where and what brand of pumps to buy for oil fields.

Thirdly, the state owns the so-called strategic energy - these are giant thermonuclear, hydro- and geothermal power plants, as well as the country's unified energy system, consisting of superconducting main lines and storage stations; more than 85% of Russia's electricity is produced here. The rest is generated in the power plants of a number of industrial enterprises for their own needs, as well as at relatively small private power plants operating for the local market. CHPPs that generate heat for communal needs, as well as power and heat distribution networks, are also private. Thermonuclear power plants, it would seem, could be private - they are completely man-made, not nature-using objects, in principle, not very different from ordinary plants. But for reasons of economic efficiency, they are very large (usually one has a capacity of 30-40 million kilowatts and costs about 50 billion of our dollars), and the Russians do not want objects of this size and importance to be in private hands. In addition, they were built in the 2020s and 2030s by the state, so they are public property, and Russians are very sensitive to privatization (in general, and because of the extremely unsuccessful experience of the 1990s).

Fourthly, the state owns obviously monopoly elements of infrastructure - primarily railways and roads. This applies only to the roadbed itself - transport companies that own rolling stock and vehicles and carry out the actual transportation are all private and often own their own stations and terminals. This situation is due to the fact that the railway and road networks were historically created in Russia in a centralized manner, unlike, for example, our northern states, and therefore, as a rule, only one road leads from point A to point B. As this situation changes, the position of the state also changes - over the past decades, almost all ports nationalized in 2007, as well as transcontinental fiber-optic cables, have been withdrawn from the public sector.

Fifthly, a state monopoly is space exploration - all industrial bases and settlements on planets and asteroids, as well as large orbital stations and interplanetary ships, are in the hands of the state, and

private entrepreneurs are not allowed there yet, although this situation is likely to change in future. True, this does not apply to near-Earth orbital entertainment, medical and other commercial complexes, as well as to the shuttles flying to them - this is all private. The monopoly of the state sector also does not apply to the production of interplanetary ships and stations by order of the state.

Sixthly, the state implements investment programs in those areas that private capital is not ready to invest for one reason or another, although the already created and launched facilities are commercially quite viable and attractive (they are then sold into private ownership - keeping facilities in state ownership, not related to any of the above is not allowed). If earlier, in the first decades of the 21st century, such areas mainly included objects with a high investment barrier (that is, those where private capital was not opposed to investing, but the required amounts, taking into account the risks, were beyond its capabilities), now these are investments either to the development of backward regions, or to new industries with as yet unproven commercial potential. For example, the state needed to develop the economy of the Caucasus for social and domestic political reasons, but there were no private traders willing to do this. When a large-scale program of this kind was carried out by the state and the whole image of the region (not only economic) changed radically as a result, then, due to the disappearance of systemic risks, it was no longer a problem to sell all state assets located there into private hands.

Seventh, the state owns the bulk of the country's land. The land legislation of Russia is curious enough to dwell on it in more detail.

Land. Although private ownership of land is not prohibited by the Russian Constitution, in reality it is practically non-existent - at least, there is no large and even medium-sized land ownership. The Russian people do not understand and, judging by its history, have never understood how someone can own not only a purely natural, but also a completely irreplaceable resource. With the same success it would be possible to own a plot of the sky or space - the Russians consider this nonsense. Yes, and the Bible directly says: "Do not sell the land for good, for all the land is Mine; you are only strangers and settlers on earth with Me." However, the Russians make a very extensive exception from this rule, although not a fundamental one for the economy: it is allowed to own land for a year-round or seasonal private residential building, the so-called personal plot. It cannot be more than three hectares per person, moreover, not more than five hectares per family. The restriction applies to one location - you can have at least a dozen such sites in different places in the country, but you are responsible for the fact that you use them primarily for personal, not commercial purposes. The rest of the land, which at the beginning of the century was in private ownership (there were possessions of several million hectares), was returned to the state in 2013-2014. It was confiscated at the price of privatization, not the market, but the former owners had the pre-emptive right to provide it for one or another type of commercial use without changing ownership. Such a provision is called a lease if an annual fee is charged for the use, or an attachment if there are no annual payments.

Leasing is practiced when land is an essential or main resource of the business and when there is a lot of it - for example, for farming or for a golf course. According to imperial law, it is strictly forbidden to fence off leased land or restrict the passage of citizens in any other way (this does not apply, of course, to special cases - if you have made, for example, a commercial shooting range, then it is obvious that you, on the contrary, must close all passages). I asked, how do agricultural producers take loans if the land does not belong to them, and state-owned banks (as well as non-state ones, by the way) require collateral? It turned out that they are credited at a specialized Agricultural Bank, where they do not require collateral, but instead, the borrower signs an obligation that after two years of delay he will give a certain share of his business to the bank and is responsible for not quitting this business himself and not switching to another type activities.

The *application* when it is of a secondary nature for this business and there is relatively little of it - for example, under an industrial enterprise or under an apartment building (that's why it's called that); this

land is often given free of charge, rarely for a one-time payment, and, as a rule, indefinitely.

As you have already understood, dear compatriots, in all cases there is a designated purpose of land, which can be of varying degrees of detail. Ownership of a personal plot implies the absence of commercial use, the application is its use for a certain type of business, and the lease requires an accurate description of what exactly will be done there and with what parameters, because the preservation of both soil fertility and ecological balance in this place depends on it. Land can be transferred from the land issued in the application to personal property - this happens when the developer applies for the issuance of land for the construction of a new village or town. Such applications are highly encouraged, as they contribute to the growth of life in the Empire. The land will be given to the developer in the application - if at the end of the year his application is the only one, then for free, and if there are several, then to the one who offers more money. And when he starts selling ready-made houses, then buyers of their choice will either buy the land under them from the Imperial Office of State Property, or rent it from them - the price of the land is known in advance, because it is recorded in the title for each plot in the country and is reviewed no more than once every five years. In this way, the developer is encouraged to take large land masses and turn them into cities and towns, but is deprived of the opportunity to earn speculatively on the land itself: differential rent, that is, a higher price for a good location, the end consumer will pay not to him, but to the state.

Projects. The role of the state in the real sector of the Empire's economy is not limited, however, to the presence of the state sector. No less important is the implementation of economic projects on a national scale, in which private capital can participate, and even quantitatively dominate. Such projects were widespread during the Second Empire, and returned to them already during the Restoration Period: at the end of the first and the beginning of the second decade of our century, it was the development of the North and Siberia (the Transpolar Highway St. Petersburg - Anadyr began to be built already in 2006) and the restoration of domestic, including military, industry, that is, in a broad sense, the economic part of the preparation for war. In the 2020s, this was the development of the entire new territory of the Empire - both the assimilation of Europe and other new territories, and the "pulling up" of the old ones in historical Russia. In the 2030s and 2040s, such projects were the construction of strategic energy and the beginning of space exploration. In the 2040s - the program of "warming". Now such projects are no longer in development, but the settlement and full integration of the entire Great Eurasian Plain and the continuation of space exploration (this will last for a long time, if not forever).

In the Russian economy, which is systematically experiencing a stalling of traditional sources of growth (see below), nationwide projects are perhaps its main driver, but their role is not exhausted by this. Because, in addition, they strengthen the sense of the unity of the nation and the meaningfulness of the common life and give purpose to the individual life of millions of people. I think that without such projects - both in the economic and in a broader sense - Russia in the form in which it is, could not exist; in particular, it is they, in my opinion, that underlie the Russian idea of a strong statehood as a value in itself. In this sense, the return to "project" management in the time of Vladimir II proved to be no less important for the revival of Russia than the ideological turn and state building.

Economic projects are not of such a global scale, and are sometimes limited to one large enterprise. An example of what approaches are used in this case is the state program for the development of the automotive industry, adopted in 2007. This industry in Russia at that time was represented, in terms of passenger cars, mainly by one company, JSC "VAZ" (not counting enterprises for the assembly of foreign cars), which had existed since the time of the Second Empire. This company produced about 800 thousand very outdated, poor quality and costly cars. At the beginning of the century, there was a struggle between two points of view on what to do with it - either to encourage the creation of branches of transnational automobile companies in Russia, or to somehow try to contribute to the revival of the national automotive industry (more precisely, the birth, since it has never been taken seriously in Russia).

In 2005, the second point of view prevailed, but Russian economic thought was still in captivity of imposed stereotypes about a market economy, so the whole plan was for the state company Rosoboronexport, whose specialization [military goods] is clear from the name, to buy JSC “VAZ” (this happened at the end of 2005). It was assumed that then Rosoboronexport would initiate the merger of JSC “VAZ” with JSC “KamAZ” (a state-owned company that produces large trucks) and JSC “GAZ” (a private company that produces city trucks and buses). Of course, such plans were not absurd, but there was no reason to expect any breakthroughs in the industry from them - and they were needed. But in 2007, after the beginning of the deterioration of relations with the West and the realization of the need for a more active industrial policy, a completely different approach was voiced. The state announced a tender for the creation of two new automobile corporations, competing with each other and with the existing company JSC “VAZ”. The project included the actual corporate construction, the development of a model range, the creation of production, staff training, and the organization of a distribution network - the Russian school calls this a “turnkey corporation”. The winner of the tender had to master the state money allocated for this as a management company, and the property remained completely state-owned. Two companies won, Singaporean and Italian, and both were not automotive, but were investment and consulting. This is not an accident - global automotive companies were not allowed to compete, because the Russian authorities wanted to have a national industry, and not a branch of a transnational one. The state allocated about \$11 billion for these two projects, taken from the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Russia. And so that the injection of this money into the economy (the part that did not go abroad) did not cause a surge in inflation, it was balanced by the sale of part of the shares of these automobile companies. The funds received from the initial sale were returned to the Central Bank. But even more important is the fact that the secondary circulation of these securities, which did not exist before, required additional volumes of money supply for its maintenance, allowing and even forcing it to increase its aggregate. Moreover, if you spent 11 billion on the creation and launch of a company and did everything right, then its capitalization will be a multiple higher - these are the universal laws of the market. This is what actually happened - in 2011, after the start of production, the capitalization of these two companies was already \$23 billion, and in 2015, after reaching the design capacity, it was \$42 billion. As a result, already in 2012, these two companies produced more than 2.5 million Miass and Chestnut cars, some of the best cars in the world, creating 300 thousand new jobs and increasing Russia’s GDP by 6%, and taking into account the multiplier of related industries - two and a half million jobs and 22%. But most importantly, the organization of such projects has become a universal principle of state investment policy: the government spends a certain amount of money on the creation of new companies, and the country, through the stock market, receives the need for additional money supply, much larger than this amount.

By the way, a similar mechanism for ensuring constant growth of the economy through money issues, but without inflation, has been used by the United States since the 1980s. This approach is not suitable for all industries, but only for those where the main limiting factor is a high investment and risk barrier. But it is these industries that have become the main engine of the Russian economic revival, providing GDP growth in some years up to 20%. And further, reserves were not used for this, but simply issues (the Russian school of economics introduced a special term for this - “reversible issue”). It would not be an exaggeration to say that such an approach - the creation of ready-made operating corporations for state, including issue, funds, followed by the sale of their shares and the return of the funds spent, as a rule, expanded - has become a new word in economic management and has been repeatedly reproduced by other countries.

Antimonopoly policy. An important feature of the Russian economy is a very active antimonopoly policy. The state takes it very seriously, considering it a key tool for ensuring the high efficiency of the economy as a whole (and hence military power). This can be seen from the fact that even in purely state segments of the market, for example, in the banking or oil and gas industries, not one, but four or six

competing economic entities have power.

An important role in the antimonopoly policy of Russia, like ours, is played by the prohibition of cartel agreements and other manifestations of unfair competition; but a much more significant part of it is the so-called direct action. It means this: if the Imperial Antimonopoly Service notices that dominant entities appear in some segment of the market and competition is limited, but without a cartel agreement and other violations of the law, but in a natural way, then it accepts and begins to implement a program to stimulate competition. I will give an example from which it will become clear how this happens: in the late 2020s and early 2030s, when virtual reality appeared and spread massively on the Russian market, Virtusoft turned out to be absolutely dominant - it was this who first created virtual reality operating systems and developed standards for VR stations. Naturally, it later became impossible for others to catch up with them, although they did not use any dishonest tricks. We had very similar cases - from the beginning of the 20th century until the 70s, the Bell ATT company, which invented it, was a monopolist in the field of telephony, and in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, the Gates company became a practical monopolist in home operating systems "Microsoft", which first developed them. Both companies were accused by the authorities of unfair competition in the form of standards development - although it is clear to everyone that they simply could not avoid it. The analogy, as you can see, is complete - but if in both cases the problem was solved in our country first by huge fines and restrictions, and subsequently by forced separation, then in Russia everything was different (there is no forced separation at all). The program adopted by the Antimonopoly Service included the development of alternative virtual reality systems in state research centers with their subsequent transfer to the private sector on preferential terms; issuance of concessional (that is, unsecured) loans to private firms for the same; the creation of state-owned firms to launch the production of alternative equipment for this, with their subsequent privatization; and the issuance of soft loans to private firms for the same purposes. As a result, by 2040, Virtusoft's market share has fallen to 32% (now 23%) - despite the fact that no measures were taken against this company: the fact that its dominance is not good for the economy is not its fault. This is how the system of direct antitrust action works.

And here is another example: in the 2020s, a number of public consumer organizations complained to the state about the ridiculously high prices of notaries, reaching up to 2% of the transaction price for ten minutes of work to certify it. However, the operational development carried out did not reveal collusion - rather, it was an unspoken consensus. At that time, the Antimonopoly Service opened a large number of new notary offices, on which the sign "Responsibility of the Empire" hung, which consumers liked very much, and the prices in which, moreover, were practically dumping compared to the previous notaries. As a result, a very significant number of old notary offices were forced out of the market, and the remaining ones were forced to reduce prices very much. After that, the employees of the new offices were given the opportunity to buy them from the state on credit, moreover, with the preservation of the sign (all this was originally provided for by contracts with them). After this widely publicized story, representatives of any similar profession, such as lawyers, will think twice before deciding to raise prices for their services.

The Russian antimonopoly policy regarding the direct action system has a special impact on the market for household appliances and especially cars, making such products very different from ours. The fact is that both in our country and in other countries, machines and equipment in general, as well as their individual components and parts, are specially made not too durable - that is, they artificially and purposefully limit their service life (this is called programmed wear). The purpose of this is understandable - if the car as a whole lasts twenty years, and its individual parts - ten, then people will change them quite rarely, which will lead to the collapse of the automotive industry. Society treats this with understanding: maybe it would be better to have more durable things, but I don't want to pay for this with a decrease in economic growth rates - after all, this will entail a decrease in the number of jobs and their payment, and a decrease in budget spending. But it is also clear that the principle of programmed wear and tear can only work when all manufacturers without exception follow it: it is enough for one of

them to throw a significantly more durable product on the market for the same price, and people will start taking only it.

In Russia, the described principle is considered a scam, so the Antimonopoly Service approached this issue quite harshly. Moreover, they never had to resort to direct action in this matter - the threat turned out to be enough. Back in the 2010s, the service gathered the heads of all large companies producing durable products and clearly warned them that they were given three years to reorganize, after which the experts of the service would begin monitoring newly manufactured products for programmed wear. If there is one, the companies have been warned, the service will create new manufacturing companies and pump them with money, instructing them to start producing equipment that lasts much longer - let's see how you will compete with them. But this is on the condition that no conspiracy is found - and if it is found, then in addition to everything, you will also receive criminal charges. The threat worked - operating companies simply had no choice in such a situation - and now Russian cars and spare parts for them, like household appliances, really last much longer than ours.

“But how can it be,” I wondered, “after all, this should inevitably lead to the fact that people will change cars much less often, which means that car production will drop sharply - it will be worse for you.”

“Production is falling, but not sharply,” Gerhard Bietrich, deputy head of the Antimonopoly Service, answered me. “People do change cars less often, but they don't drive them for the twenty years that these cars can easily last. In our conditions, manufacturing companies are forced to launch new models on the market that are radically different from the previous ones, because otherwise there is no way to convince the consumer to change the car. People decide to replace the car because the new model is qualitatively different, and not because the old one has physically collapsed. Our task is to create conditions for the manufacturer to be forced to act in this way.” And indeed, dear compatriots, new models of cars from each manufacturer appear less frequently for Russians, but they, as a rule, are completely different from the previous ones - this is a significant difference from our car market, where the model range is updated much more often, but at the same time, new models are usually practically nothing no different from their predecessors.

Advertising. Another curious feature of the Russian real sector is that there is almost no advertising in Russia, in any case it is qualitatively less and it is qualitatively simpler than in our Federation, India or China. This is a requirement of Imperial law, the Advertising Law of 2013 and the Psychic Protection of the Nation Law of 2015. Before that, back in the first decade of the new century, there was more advertising in Russia and it was even more intrusive than ours.

The first law establishes that advertising must be to the point, that is, it must not contain images, characters, plots and messages that are not directly related to the advertised product. All of you know our television and video advertising of Coca-Cola with a boy unrequitedly in love with a classmate, to whom she pays attention only when he treats her with Coca-Cola. So, in the Empire, this advertisement would be instantly recognized as illegal, because neither a boy, nor a girl, nor love has anything to do with a drink, especially a non-alcoholic one. Even quite innocent, it would seem, our advertisements for home appliances, with a pretty housewife telling how happy she is now with washing, according to the Russian expression, “do not roll” - according to the law, there should be no actor-characters at all. You can show only the product itself and talk only about it, moreover, only about its essential properties. If, for example, clothes are advertised that are difficult to show without a person, then they are shown on a mannequin. Accordingly, so-called image advertising is also prohibited, including billboards or streamers like “Such and such a company congratulates Russians on the New Year.” It is also forbidden to use famous people (athletes, actors, singers) - both images and just names; this applies even to those cases when they themselves are the owners of firms - manufacturers of the advertised product. In addition, according to this law, there should be no lies in advertising - therefore, things like “Since I started using this shaving cream, all the girls are crazy about me” are strictly forbidden. Also, other than unedited photographic

images of the product are not allowed - that is, it is impossible to show on a billboard a painted residential or office building that has not yet been built. Comparisons and evaluations are not allowed - that is, slogans like “The most reliable investment fund in Russia” or “Leader in sales in such and such a sector”, even if this is true. Clearly psychedelic phrases such as “You are the best” or “Everything will be fine” are strictly prohibited in advertising. Thus, this law limits advertising to essentially informational messages. In addition, for a number of categories of products, such as medicines, even such advertising is prohibited. Although, at the same time, advertising of alcohol and legal drugs is not prohibited in Russia - what is allowed to be sold is also allowed to be advertised - advertising of drugs and the like is not allowed just to prevent people from engaging in dangerous self-medication.

The second law (the part dealing with advertising) forbids the use of psychedelic devices of any kind. We also have such prohibitions, for example, since the 20th century, the so-called 25th frame has been banned, but Russians understand the psychedelic device much more broadly, as any influence on the subconscious - with a symbol, image, timbre of a voice or other sound. Television advertising is therefore generally prohibited, including on the Web. In certain cases, the impact on the subconscious can be considered simply too frequent repetition of some advertising, even made without violations - in this case, it will be prescribed to increase the distance between billboards with this advertising on the street or highway, or the time between its repetitions on the radio or on the Web.

The meaning of the ban is that, according to the ideas of the Russian economic school, the impact on a person of a real, not limited by such methods, advertising of any product is much stronger than the product itself. Therefore, the main efforts of business entities are beginning to be spent not on improving or reducing the price of the product (this is difficult and time consuming), but on how to present it better - the economy is becoming more and more virtual. There is something in this, dear compatriots - if in expensive goods, where people in our country are primarily oriented not to advertising, for example, in cars, Russians do not surpass us in quality, then the quality of simple goods (food, clothing, electronics) is clearly higher in Russia.

Taxes and budget. The tax system in Russia is simple, although in its specifics it is rather unusual. At the same time, it is very stable - according to the Constitution, a change in the rate or procedure for levying a tax is supposed to be announced no less than three years in advance. Taxes on net income (that is, corporate income tax and personal income tax), which since the 19th century have been the main taxes in the entire civilized world, do not exist in Russia at all. The main Russian tax is the property tax; its rate rarely changes even by Russian standards (that is, it simply has not changed since the introduction of this tax in 2013) and is 5% per year. The taxable property of legal entities (or individual entrepreneurs) is understood as real assets at the purchase price, with the deduction of standard depreciation and the addition of actual repair costs. In addition, for each property, the so-called source of differential rent, that is, the component of the market price that is associated with land (location), is re-evaluated every fifteen years. Taxable property is also money, intangible assets at the book price, as well as listed financial assets such as lots and options for exchange commodities, shares, shares, etc. - at the weighted average quotations of the current financial year. It is extremely important that the tax base is not reduced by the amount of liabilities - even free money in the account is taxed the same, regardless of whether it is owned or borrowed. Thus, the property tax is a tax on assets, not on net worth. Moreover, the Russian authorities do not care that you can burden your company with obligations (for example, by registering your buildings and equipment as a lease, and not as property), thereby reducing your taxable base - after all, it will grow by exactly the same amount for someone else (in our example, from the landlord).

Taxable non-commercial property of citizens means money and financial instruments, real estate and part of movable property (vehicles, furniture, jewelry, works of art). One household (house or apartment) per family, together with movable property located in it, is taxed at half the rate, and there is a non-taxable minimum (now - 20,000 rubles). If a citizen is a businessman, he separately calculates and pays tax on

capital in business and separately on the rest, non-commercial property; at the same time, the same object cannot be taxed twice.

There are no exemptions and benefits for this tax, as well as for others, in Russia, with the exception of the so-called non-profit organizations. Here they are called such religious, public, *zemstvo* or imperial organizations that do not and cannot, according to their charters, engage in any economic activity - they do not pay taxes. But the Empire understands this very strictly - in order to obtain such a status, it is necessary to have an entry in the charter and an instruction at the settlement bank that money cannot be credited to the account from any sources other than from founders or philanthropists, but can be debited only for strictly statutory tasks (violation of this is treated in criminal terms not as tax evasion, but much more harshly - as fraud). But organizations that can engage in economic activities - it does not matter, limited or without restrictions - but cannot share the income received between the founders, are called non-profit organizations in the Empire, and they pay taxes like everyone else.

For business entities there is the second main Russian tax - the sales tax. It changes from time to time and now stands at 5%. This is not a value added tax or a retail sales tax - it is a turnover tax levied on every transaction. Thus, one of its consequences is that the price of a good increases the more transactions it goes through from the producer to the consumer. For this reason, such taxes did not take root in the Western world, although they were repeatedly introduced during the wars. But the Russians thought that if they were firm and endured, then the economy would adapt to it under the pressure of competition - and indeed, now it contributes not so much to raising prices, but to squeezing out unnecessary parasitic links from the market.

There is also a *social tax* - 15% of wages or income; the employer pays it from salaries, and the self-employed population receiving income pays it themselves. In both cases, the taxable base is determined by the fact, but not less than half and not more than double of the average salary in the country. That is, rich people who receive a large income pay a very small (in percentage) social tax from it; the poor are not particularly annoyed, because they receive a salary, and not income, on which it is not they who pay the tax, but employers. Moreover, the idea of switching to a per capita social tax, which does not depend on income at all, has been actively discussed in Russia for a long time. The social tax is not mixed with the budget, but goes to two separate social funds, which, although they function under the Imperial Finance Directorate, like the imperial budget, are executed independently of it. Of these, social insurance payments (sick leaves, etc.) and pensions come. These three taxes are the main ones; there is also a small-family tax levied on citizens over 25 years old - 20% of their income in the absence of children and 5% with one child. With one adopted child, you pay 10%, and if you are physically unable to have children, then as with your own, 5% (with two adopted children, nothing, as with two relatives). Also, 10% is paid by a woman who gave birth to one child, but gave it to an orphanage or another family; to all this, 5% is added in the absence of a spouse (if there are two or more children, it is not added) - that is, this fee can be maximum 25% of income.

In the Russian tax system, like ours, there are *excise taxes* on some goods and services that the state does not want to prohibit, but would like to limit (not without benefit to the budget), but there are not many of them. The remaining taxes are secondary and do not significantly change the total tax burden. Its total volume - 26% of GDP for the consolidated budget of the Russian Empire - is quite small (in our country, I remind you, 15% of GDP is federal taxes, 9% state taxes and 12% local taxes - a total of 36% of the GDP of the American Federation).

There are two budgets in Russia, imperial and *zemstvo*; the second has three levels: communes, *zemstvos* and all-Russian, and the first is the basic one - the initial filling occurs only there, and if the community does not want it, it may not transfer anything to the *zemstvo* and further (it may, in fact, not be included in any *zemstvo*). The community budget receives all tax and all excise duties from sales in its territory, but only from retail ones - because it is impossible to say where they occurred for the rest of the transactions,

which take place mainly in electronic form. Half of the tax on real estate of citizens and corporations physically located on its territory, and on their movable property, if they live (are) on its territory, is also credited there. That is, a citizen or business pays half of the property tax in terms of movable property to the community at the place of their residence or registration, respectively, and in terms of real estate - to the community at the physical location of the property. The second half of the property tax goes to the imperial budget, and all property tax from those citizens and enterprises that live or are outside any community (see the chapter “State Structure”) goes there. Half of it also goes to the communities, but is distributed among all the communities of the Empire in proportion to the population. These receipts, along with another part of the funds going to the communities, are called transfers to equalize living standards, which is considered an important state task, because without it the sense of unity of the country begins to erode. Nevertheless, communities and *zemstvos* that have businesses on their territory are in a much better position. Therefore, for example, *zemstvos* go out of their way to build more roads (both internal and main roads together with other *zemstvos*) - because these roads become the territory of the *zemstvos*, and the electric hydrogen filling stations located there (as well as cafes, and any other businesses) begin to pay the entire sales tax and half of the property tax to the *zemstvo* - and the *zemstvo* has received and continues to receive its part of the transfers. The *zemstvo* budgets also receive subventions for those areas (mainly health care and education) that are controlled by the *zemstvo* authorities, but represent the general imperial system and therefore are financed from the imperial budget.

In the formation of the latter, taxes do not play a dominant role at all: a more significant role is played by revenues from the public sector and fees from other state property (including land and nature use fees) - 82% of the imperial budget of Russia (35% of the consolidated) in 2052. This is what gives Russia the opportunity to have a lower tax burden on GDP than ours, although the state’s spending there is not less, but more.

Orthodox values in the economy. The economy is not a primary task for the Russian authorities, although it is important for the normal solution of other tasks; therefore, it is of no small importance for the state to what extent the basic principles of the economy correspond to the Orthodox spirit. It should be noted that the above principles also correspond to both Islamic and Jewish values - as the founder of the neo-Eurasian school Dugin pointed out in his works at the beginning of the century, these are common Eurasian principles that have a common source in all Abrahamic religions (except for Catholicism and especially Protestantism - Russians believe that that these principles were perverted there). What is meant? The actual ban on usury is much more fair to people than a direct ban, because they are given a real opportunity to get an interest-free loan. A ban on private ownership of land, as well as on private exploitation of the subsoil, again taking into account the traditional way of life. Mandatory presence of a controlling stake in public companies - to protect small shareholders. The prohibition of zombie advertising, in reality depriving a person of the opportunity to choose. A tax system designed to make it nearly impossible for a rentier to exist. Even the presence of the gold standard is not least due to the fact that it was gold and silver that were money in the Old and New Testament times. Moreover, the Russian authorities are well aware that much of the above slows down the economy, but for them it does not matter, because the economy and, ultimately, the wealth of the population and the state are perceived by the authorities as important things, but secondary in comparison with the correct order of life.

There are other examples of Christian values in economic legislation, for example, the law on transparency: according to it, there is no secrecy of deposits in Russia - all deposits in banks are absolutely open, and not only for the police or special services, but for anyone who wishes - banks are required to display all deposits on the Web in real time. The same applies to the registers of shareholders of CJSCs and PJSCs, shareholders of LLCs and holders of shares of investment funds, as well as real estate registers and taxpayer databases. That is, any person, by launching a search engine, can find out everything about any other person in ten minutes - how much money he has and where, how much and what securities, businesses and real estate, and how much he pays taxes. Moreover, LLCs can be

established only by individuals, and CJSC - by legal entities, but only by those that themselves are established by individuals. For ease of practical implementation of this, the relevant joint-stock companies are designated by law as CJSC (CU), that is, with corporate founders, and they themselves cannot establish new companies (this also applies to DP - 100% subsidiaries). Thus, in Russia there can be no situations when an intricate corporate structure is deliberately created to hide from the public what really belongs to whom - as well as situations when a corporation publicly justifies its action or inaction with a difficult financial situation, while itself swells from money. Those who have a clear conscience have nothing to hide, the Russians believe; and besides, as the Savior said, "there is nothing hidden that would not be revealed, and nothing secret that would not be known."

Mercy, even to the guilty, is manifested in Russian legislation on tax evaders: if they do not want to pay them, they are still punished, although not in a violent way (see the chapter "Law Enforcement System"). But if they are simply unable to pay them, then defaulters are not only not punished, but also not evicted. That is, if, for example, you owe taxes, but live in an expensive house (inherited, for example, or preserved from better times) and the investigation finds out that you honestly pay everything except the living wage to pay off the debt, then you cannot be evicted from your home. This applies, of course, only to one house or apartment per family. Even if you inherited a luxury home and don't want to sell it, but you don't have enough money to pay taxes, and you already sold your previous house and the rest of the inheritance, this house will not be foreclosed. Instead, you will be issued a so-called tax debt (interest-free, of course), which you must pay when you have money. Moreover, if you apply with a statement that you are asking not to take anything from the current income of your business, despite the fact that you have a tax debt, in order to invest them, earn money, get on your feet and at the same time pay off the debt, you will be allowed to do this (however, after checking your sincerity with a techno-interrogation). By the way, evicting a family from a single house or apartment, even from a large and expensive one to a smaller one, is also prohibited for other, non-tax debts (therefore, by the way, you cannot get a loan secured by a single apartment). The argument that this is an inhibitory factor for a market economy seems to the Russian satanic reasoning ("charm"). This also applies to arrears on utility bills: after all, it is up to the operator of heat and electricity distribution networks, how to make it so that one apartment can technically be turned off for non-payment (this is not forbidden by law).

The general structure of the economy. As for the macro parameters of the Russian economy, they are as follows. The GDP of the Russian Empire (all data for 2052) amounted to 12.79 trillion rubles, or a little more than 50 trillion of our dollars - 22.2% of the world's gross domestic product. This is the second or third place in the world in absolute value (we have 10% more, and the Celestial Empire has exactly the same), but in terms of specific value, that is, in terms of the amount of product produced per capita, the indicators in Russia are almost the same as in us, and 70% more than in the Celestial Empire, because the Empire has a smaller population (in India and the Caliphate, both values - both absolute and specific - are much less). The growth rate of production in Russia in 2052 was 5.2%, about the same as in all recent years. This is a little more than ours (4.4%), and exactly the same as in the Celestial Empire - that is, if we extrapolate, then the Empire and the Celestial Empire are gradually catching up with us in terms of total GDP, and in terms of specific GDP, the Empire is already the next two or three years will come out on top in the world.

The average salary in Russia of workers (including the income of the self-employed) is 287 rubles a month, which is somewhat less than ours, due to the smaller share of the consumption fund in GDP. The total money supply of the M2 aggregate is 6.1 trillion rubles, the supply of gold and other precious metals is about 6.75% of the M2 aggregate (102 thousand conventional tons of gold), but since the M0 aggregate (cash) is about a quarter of M2, then cash is backed by precious metals by more than a quarter, which is quite enough.

Naturally, the Empire has no external debt, and no internal public debt either - without loan interest, the

state could not attract borrowed funds, even if it wanted to. The total domestic debt of citizens and organizations is 14.4 trillion, that is, 113% of annual GDP (we have about 270%).

Exports amount to 680 billion dollars, imports - 632 billion (1.3% and 1.2% of GDP - we have 10.8% each). Foreign exchange assets of the Central Bank for sale to importers amount to about 460 billion dollars (for 8 months of imports). So-called colonial goods are mainly imported (that is, plants and products from them that do not grow in Russia or grow of the wrong quality - for example, Chinese tea, Brazilian coffee, Uzbek melons, virgin cotton, Ecuadorian bananas), national luxury goods (for example, Japanese sake, Mexican tequila, Indian pashmina, Cuban cigars, Chinese silk), South American cocaine, South African gold and North American silver, minerals not available in the Empire in sufficient quantities (African and Australian bauxite and alumina, Mongolian molybdenum concentrate, Colombian and Burmese emeralds and sapphires), as well as a few high-tech materials and, to a lesser extent, industrial equipment that the Russians themselves have not yet mastered. The main exports are electricity and hydrogen, some metals (nickel, titanium, palladium), tonnage chemicals, national luxury goods (French wines, Scotch whisky, Russian caviar, Italian furniture, Swiss watches) and some machinery and materials, mainly for space.

In its basic type, the Russian economy is basically similar to ours - it is a market economy based mainly on private ownership and initiative, where even the public sector operates in the market on a common basis. At the same time, a number of specific differences described in this chapter lead to the appearance in it, as consequences, of very specific general features.

First, taxes on property and turnover do not allow Russian market entities to grow beyond a certain amount. The fact is that these taxes, in contrast to taxes on profits and value added, are very beneficial for those whose efficiency is above average, and very disadvantageous for those who have it below average. And efficiency decreases with the size of the business, this is an indisputable pattern - if this were not so, then the centralized state economy would be the most efficient. Let's look at an example of how this works: let's say you have capital invested in something - whether in real estate, in stocks or in an active business - and it brings you net (that is, after all expenses and paying sales tax) purely average return for Russia, 18% per annum. Property tax you pay 5% [of the capital] per year, which is 27.8% of net income (5% divided by 18%) - a little less than ours. But if your business is underperforming and you only get a 10% return on capital a year, then since you still pay 5% property tax, it will be 50% of net income - a rate almost prohibitive. And if the return is less than 5% per year, then your capital will generally begin to depreciate. If your business is highly efficient and you get, for example, 30% per year of return, then your property tax will be 5%:30%, that is, 16.7% of net income - almost an offshore rate. Similarly with sales tax: if your company has sold goods for one million and has an internal profitability of 25% (that is, 750 thousand costs and 250 thousand profitability), then excluding property tax, you will pay sales tax of 20% of the "dirty" income (50 thousand from 250). But the higher your current account margin, the lower the sales tax percentage of your income, and vice versa. This is how these taxes work, making life very sweet for those who manage the most efficiently, and cutting off inefficient businesses; moreover, both taxes work in pairs - the property tax stimulates the efficiency of capital activity (the ratio of income to capital), and the sales tax stimulates the efficiency of current activities (the ratio of income to revenue). You may ask: why stimulate highly efficient subjects, because the market does it without any taxes? But the fact of the matter is that this happens only with an approximate equality of participants - and a huge corporation has a huge head start over a much more efficient, but significantly smaller one. The Russian tax system nullifies this - an inefficient corporation cannot survive under it, no matter how unequal, semi-fair or completely dishonest methods of competition it uses.

So it turns out that in Russia they found a simple cure for the main problem of capitalism, discovered by Marx in the 19th century - that capital has a positive feedback, that is, that capital in a market economy tends to become infinitely concentrated. This can only be prevented artificially, for example, by strict

antitrust laws, moreover, interpreted broadly, and this only slows down the process. The extreme reaction of society to this problem is either to hope that everything will somehow work itself out, which is the case with us, or to completely ban the market and capital, as in Russia in 1917. But Russian philosophers already in our century realized that in fact capital has a positive feedback not because its efficiency increases with its concentration - it, on the contrary, falls, for purely managerial reasons - but because the possibility of unequal competition increases, more than compensating for the drop in efficiency. And on the basis of this understanding, a natural counterbalance was found in the form of the taxes described above, which do not go beyond the limits of market regulators. I found a historical analogue - in those countries where there was a high land tax, latifundia did not arise (more precisely, they did arise, but were not kept), because in principle it is impossible to exploit large land masses with the same intensity that a farmer has on his couple of hundred acres. Similarly, the Russian tax system naturally places limits on the growth of companies.

As for the fortunes of individuals, there is a second natural limiter: already in the 20th century (even from the second half of the nineteenth) very large personal fortunes were made almost exclusively through shares; and the Russian stock market is much smaller than ours, and the opportunity to earn a lot on it is very problematic. This is due to the impossibility of dispersing the share capital of PJSCs (and others are not traded on the stock exchange) more than twice and imposing property tax on shares at current quotes, and not at the purchase price. In addition, when it is necessary to pay a tax of 5% per year on the share price, then no one will buy shares that pay dividends less than this (otherwise the tax will have to be paid out of pocket), and there are few such high-dividend shares, and sharp fluctuations in prices are uncharacteristic for them. As a result, there are many rich and even very rich in Russia, but there are practically no super rich - the richest man in the Empire, Beibut Baimenov, has a fortune of 2.6 billion rubles, that is, 10.5 billion dollars, and all those who have more than one billion rubles (that is, 4 billion dollars), in Russia there are 28 people. We have 422 people with a fortune of more than 4 billion dollars, with more than 100 billion - 19, and Jorge Lopez has a fortune in excess of a trillion. As a result, business in Russia, of course, is a separate instance of power (according to the theory of multiple instances) - but only in the sense that it basically sets the rules of the game on the economic field itself. In this situation, business cannot influence the strategy of the state (the Russian authorities aspired to this, and the people also like it). I'm trying to imagine, dear compatriots, our Federation with business, but without magnates - and I'm not very successful: it will obviously be a different country.

Secondly, in Russia the concept of “proprietor” [хозяин], that is, the owner, has a much more immediate meaning than ours - their economy is mainly built on real business owners, unlike ours. We all know that even though our economy is private, the concept of a private owner in the literal sense is applicable only to small and to a small part of medium-sized businesses - and in the rest of it, and even more so in large businesses, it is blurred. Who can be called the owner of a joint-stock company, where the largest stake is 10% (and sometimes much less)? The one who owns this share is, without a doubt, the owner of the share - but how justified is it to consider him the owner of the enterprise? Everyone knows that managers, not owners, manage medium and large enterprises - it cannot be otherwise with dispersed capital. But how then do co-owners of an enterprise differ from rentiers? These questions are not idle - according to our fundamental ideas, the strength of the private economy lies in the fact that enterprises are managed not by officials, but by owners, whose interests are basically identical to the interests of the enterprise. After all, if a hired manager, whom the owner only controls, can manage no worse than the owner, then what are our advantages compared to the state economies of the USSR or communist China - managers can be hired and controlled by the state? But as I have already pointed out, it turns out that in the true sense of the word we have not so many masters, except in small business; this is a strategic problem, well known to our scientists, it is not yet clear how to solve it. But in Russia, everything is different: as I already wrote, there is no dispersal of capital even in large PJSCs - a controlling stake necessarily belongs to a specific owner. By law, LLCs and CJSCs can have many owners, but in practice there are almost never

more than three of them (except when one has a controlling stake - then there can be several minority shareholders). It all happens for the same reason - when capital is not at all immune from depreciating, few people will dare *de facto* to get rid of management. Therefore, managers in Russia up to the level of director (technical, financial, commercial, etc.) are professional managers, but the general director, unlike us, is almost always the owner. Thus, another basic problem of capitalism, which has existed since the 20th century, has been solved in Russia, namely, the problem of the alienation of the owner from the management of an enterprise in the dominant sector of the economy - joint-stock companies.

In the same way, an important social problem of market capitalism is solved - the association in the minds of the people of the words "capitalist" and "parasite": in Russia there are no rentiers, there are only entrepreneurs. Because even the holders of shares and other securities are not rentiers, their risks are quite high, as is the ingenuity required from them in order to succeed or at least not go broke (this is by no means uncommon when playing on the stock exchange). And there is no true rent, in guaranteed amounts, in the Empire and cannot be.

Thirdly, Russian business, both small and large, is, on average, significantly less liquid than ours; making decent money in the Empire is no more difficult than in the American Federation, but selling one's business, going into money, or, conversely, buying a ready-made enterprise for money is much less accepted there. The main reason is in the tax legislation - let's look at this again with an example. Suppose you built a factory for a million rubles ten years ago, and because of your great production and marketing success, it is now worth three million (for simplicity, we will not consider additional investments made by you during these years). You pay property tax, of course, on a million, and not on three, that is, 50 thousand a year. When you sell it for three million, you will start paying tax already on this money (or on the business in which you place it), that is, 150 thousand a year, plus you will pay 150 thousand tax on the sale of the factory itself. In the general case, you will earn no more for this money than from your factory with lower taxes (if you invest well, and if not, they will simply begin to depreciate quickly): so what the hell is a button accordion, as the Russians say? But your buyer will also have to pay 150 thousand a year, and not fifty, as you paid, although the factory will initially bring him the same profit as it brought you. Thus, the property tax systematically makes any business less profitable in the hands of each next owner compared to the previous one. Therefore, there are not so many who want to sell their entire business, and it is impossible to sell or buy a business through shares due to the above-described legislation on controlling stakes; besides there is still tough antimonopoly legislation.

But there is another reason: as I already noted, in Russia the vast majority of businesses are managed directly by their owners - which means that when you buy a business from a previous owner, you get it without a manager, and you absolutely do not know in advance how much it will be able to maintain its position in the market; there are few who want to buy such a business for adequate money, and when someone who wants to cash out appears, it is not so easy for him to find a buyer. Hence the general underdevelopment of the market segment of the purchase and sale of existing enterprises. As a result, Russian business is much more similar to what we had in the 18th-19th centuries, when an entrepreneur built his business for many generations, or in any case for his entire life, and was not a free investor who today earned on one, and tomorrow on another. In Russia, this is important, among other things, from the point of view of reconciliation between the people and the rich - in Orthodox culture, personal wealth is not only not sacralized, as among Protestants, but rather directly condemned. So, the above-described "attachment" of an entrepreneur to business, as well as the fact that he cannot be a rentier, but must constantly work his business, maintaining its high efficiency, is one of the factors of such reconciliation. Another is that in Russia they believe that the completely unrighteous paths to wealth are closed by the state and the business community itself, and, therefore, those who have succeeded are not so bad. But the European socialist apology for wealth, which consisted in the fact that the rich are bad, but they must be tolerated in order to tear three skins from them in the form of a progressive income tax and the like, did not take root in Russia, just like the Marxist or Scandinavian idea of equalization.

Fourthly, in Russia there is much stronger competition than in our country - this is manifested not so much in the fact that it is so difficult to stay in the market (the number of bankruptcies in the Russian market is not so high), but in the fact that you relax and rest on laurels there, according to the Russian expression, “does not roll” and retire from business, remaining the owner, too. This is mainly due to the fact that the number of entrepreneurs, including constantly emerging new ones, is very large - both because of free loans and other elements of state support, and because of the general mood of the people for business, which I already wrote about above. But even more important is the fact that the very competition of market participants in the Empire is much more equal and creative - both as a result of the antimonopoly policy, and because there are significantly fewer giants on the market and there are no supergiants at all, and, most importantly, because of the extreme underdevelopment of advertising. After all, how can a small company win a big one in general - only due to greater disclosure of human potential; but for this it is necessary that the overall significance of creative factors be significant - and with us 90% of success is determined by the intensity of the advertising campaign. Moreover, one should not think that advertising itself is also a creative element - this, of course, is so, but not at all from the side of the manufacturer of the advertised product or service, but exclusively from the side of the advertising agency; on the part of the manufacturer, everything is determined by the size of the advertising budget, on which it is impossible to compete with a large company. The essential properties of the product are another matter - the deliciousness of food, the elegance and comfort of clothes, the reliability of software; here you can compete on an equal footing with anyone and win through your creativity, and if you do at least a little, then many investment companies vying with each other will offer you equity money. Thus, the well-known words “an eternal battle, we can only dream of peace” can be said about the Russian economy with good reason - but this battle is quite equal and therefore interesting.

Fifthly, the Russian economy has other incentives and engines of growth than ours or the economy of the Middle Kingdom. Undeveloped advertising, like a number of other factors, leads to the fact that, although the consumer demand of the Empire is huge, it is significantly less than ours and, most importantly, is growing more slowly. Why spend money in three years on a new car, many Russians argue, when the old one runs just as well for another three years? And the point here is by no means only in advertising: Russians are generally inclined to a somewhat different attitude to life than we are (I will write about this later), and, in particular, this is expressed in the fact that, although they are not at all indifferent to material wealth, they do not play such a big role in their lives as they do with us. This is especially true for those who are no longer in need and are more or less well off - it is not typical for them (although there are different people) to strive for the maximum growth of personal consumption with the same force. All this is very commendable from a spiritual point of view, but sharply raises the question of what, then, will be the driving force of the economy, if not unbridled growth in consumption? In the Empire it is an investment, often, in fact, for its own sake. After all, if, with the same amount of money, the population has less overall consumer demand in Russia, then the money must go somewhere - so it goes into investments (ordinary savings, as already mentioned, are almost impossible there).

The general investment activity of the population in Russia is significantly higher than in our country - this is both because free credit is available here, and because if money is not invested, then the property tax will gradually eat it up; and other than real investments, there are no other ways to save and increase money, when there are no deposits and bonds, and the stock market is undeveloped and not prone to strong changes. An equally important engine of economic growth is the nationwide economic projects mentioned above. The Russian space exploration program ensures that this driver will last for many centuries. An analysis of both of these engines of growth shows that the Russian economy is largely working for itself, and not for people - like the economy of antiquity, which existed not least for the construction of palaces or pyramids and the accumulation of treasures. This is visibly manifested in the fact that the share of investment goods and services in Russia's GDP is significantly higher than ours, while that of consumer goods is lower. For Russia, this is not news, the economy of the Second Empire

was organized in the same way, which, although it achieved colossal economic successes, could not provide an appropriate standard of living for the people; there it was done consciously - officially there was the principle of the primacy of the production of means of production over the production of consumer goods. In fact, within reasonable limits, this is not at all bad (if it corresponds to the mood of the people) and is capable of ensuring stable development for a long time - if only the quality and range of goods and services of the consumer market (which are visible to everyone, unlike investment ones) do not start to drastically yield to those in other countries' markets, creating a sense of inferiority among their populations. But this is clearly not a threat to Russia yet, primarily because of fierce internal competition.

And finally, *sixthly*, the Russian economy is completely autarkic, as I already wrote in the "Autonomy" section; all the features described here would not be possible without it. There is a common understanding, which we cannot fully have, that the interests of society and the economy are identical, because it cannot be that the economy develops and profits are calculated elsewhere, just as it cannot be that money has increased, and independence diminished. This has already become a public archetype in Russia - only their own money can enrich their own money, and what is good for their own (as opposed to not theirs) is to some extent good for everyone. (In a globalized economy, "What's good for General Motors is good for America" no longer worked—it might be good elsewhere.) Whoever wins the competition, the country as a whole will be better off—let alone in an open economy, where if your firms lose to foreign ones, absolutely nothing good will come of it for anyone in your country. And it is certainly impossible in Russia that whoever wins would be indifferent to everyone here, because in the market for this product the country is nothing more than an arena for competition between foreign transnational corporations.

On the other hand, for entrepreneurs and managers in Russia, only those processes and changes in the surrounding world that affect the opportunities for their business occurring within the country are important; here you rarely see a businessman reading international news at breakfast. But in his own country, a Russian businessman does not feel like a grain of sand. Yes, his opinion is not decisive, but he has every opportunity to be heard, to find like-minded people, and to unite with others. His state will hear and help; and the whole society in which something important for you happens is not a strange and incomprehensible society, but your own, with the same ideas and values that you have. The Russian businessman does not feel like a sliver among the waves. He is not afraid that the rate of his own or someone else's currency will collapse, a regional or global crisis will break out, or something else will happen that he and his colleagues can neither foresee nor prevent. Therefore, there is no perception of market macro-processes as a blind and frightening element, with which you are alone and from which there is no protection; and, accordingly, there is no fear of them - Russian business is not afraid of change. Thus, in the Russian economy, the alienation of capital from one's own country, which is characteristic of capitalism in general, but especially of globalized capitalism, has been overcome. From the foregoing, it becomes clear that the Russian economy, except at first glance, does not resemble either the American, or the Celestial or Indian, not to mention the Caliphate: it is a market economy, but it cannot be called liberal, although it is obviously not socialist either. It seems to me that according to the totality of the described features, it should be distinguished into a separate type of market economy, which I would call the imperialist economy (since it takes place in the Russian Empire). To summarize, its main distinguishing features are the following: a) a high level of direct participation of the state in the economy (public sector), but a low indirect one - the private sector is regulated and orchestrated by the state very little; b) "dispersion" of business entities, the absence of companies of such a size and profile of activity to directly or indirectly influence the state as a whole - in other words, the absence of commanding heights in the economy among private capital; c) the primacy of investment and "development" factors of economic development over consumer ones; d) a high level of autarchy, moreover, perceived as an end in itself and a value in itself; e) the archaic, characteristic of early

capitalism, status of the owner, more merged with property and more tied to his business in space and time, which makes the source of enrichment to a greater extent labor and talent, and to a lesser extent capital.

If we recall the thesis that practice is the criterion of truth, then we should admit that such an economy works - and, judging by Russia's economic successes, no worse than our liberal-capitalist one. If we compare them in terms of efficiency, then the main disadvantages of the Russian Empire compared to the American Federation are the impossibility of having such a large money supply as we have, due to the much less involvement of capital values in circulation, lower consumer demand and autarky. But they are fully compensated by free credit, less tax burden, greater competition, greater government demand, and more motivated owners. So it is possible that imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism.

Chapter 8 Social Sphere

Social Security. The pension system in Russia is purely state, at least the part of it regulated by law; There are no trade union pension funds and other non-state pension funds like ours. The Pension Fund of Russia is a state institution, and the state is fully responsible for it with the imperial budget and all the assets of the Empire. It is formed from social tax revenues (11.7% of wages and incomes out of a total of 15%), reports to the budget agency of the Imperial Finance Office and executes its budget through the Imperial Treasury - and this is monitored by the Imperial Social Security Supervision Service. If there is a shortage of funds from the Pension Fund to ensure the statutory pensions, it is obligatory to lend it from the imperial budget, and if there is an excess, the funds are returned or accumulated. The reverse procedure, that is, a loan of funds by the budget from the Pension Fund, is theoretically also possible, but in practice it is not allowed. That is, the Pension Fund is separately formed and executed solely for the convenience of accounting and management, but in fact it is part of the state budget. Individually funded principles of providing even a part of pensions, after numerous discussions, did not take root in Russia, although attempts to introduce them were made at the beginning of the century.

Pensions are little differentiated in size - 60% of pensions (the so-called social part) are the same for everyone, but the remaining 40% (the so-called labor part) do not depend on how much you earn, but only on the length of service (which includes raising children up to 8 years, and for families with three or more children - up to 15 years). Thus, the maximum pension (except for very few groups that have more, the so-called personal pensioners) differs from the theoretically possible minimum (if a person did not work and did not look after children for a single day) by only a little more than one and a half times. This is the fundamental position of the Russians, their understanding of justice - any citizen is needed and important for the Empire precisely as a citizen, and not as a labor or tax unit; and since the right to material support in old age is a civil right, why should it be so different? (On my own behalf, I'll add that this also has a purely material meaning - in a market economy, everyone is useful by the fact that they create demand.) Therefore, the taxable base of the social tax cannot be less than 50% and more than 200% of the national average - why not if your pension does not depend on the amount of your tax payments?

The social part (that is, the minimum) of the pension is now equal to 547 rubles a month (about \$ 2,200), and the full pension for someone who has worked or looked after children for more than a certain time is also the most common - 912 rubles (about \$ 3,650) per month. Upon reaching retirement age, everyone in Russia receives such pensions, except for the guardsmen - they don't have a pension, since the only reasons for the guardsman to leave the service can be either leaving the service class (then he is no longer a guardsman) or death.

The retirement age in Russia during the Second Empire and the Restoration Period was low and

amounted to 55 years for women and 60 years for men, while in our country it was higher, namely 65 years for everyone - this was considered a great Russian social achievement. But already in 2010, the retirement age bar was raised to our level, and after the spread of anti-aging therapy, it surpassed ours and now stands at 85 years against our 75. However, here we are not dealing with indifference to people, but with the same as small differentiation in terms of size, a consequence of Russian ideological attitudes: a pension here is not at all a reward for long work - it is one of the meanings of life, and therefore it should not be rewarded, Russians believe. No, a pension is an aid, proceeding from the principle of equity, to those who can no longer work and support themselves (therefore, only a smaller part of the pension is kept for a working pensioner); and sybaritism is not included in the desired value range for Russians. Accordingly, they believe that the longer a person remains an active worker and a member of the labor collective, the better for him - and tearing him, still quite capable, from a normal life into complete idleness, even financially and secure, you will not render him a service. If he simply cannot work anymore, he will be given a full pension for medical reasons, as happens with the disabled. By the way, a larger part of the pension is retained for working disabled people than for old-age pensioners, and for disabled people of group I, as well as those who received disability in the service of the state, it is retained in full.

Voluntary pension provision (in addition to the state one), for which you yourself pay contributions throughout your life of your own free will, is not limited in any way in Russia, of course - it is simply not called a pension there: for Russian legislation, this is just a kind of funded insurance scheme offered by numerous private insurance companies. Very common in Russia, unlike, for example, from us, are schemes where a citizen makes not regular contributions, but a one-time large amount in order to protect it from depreciating under the influence of property tax, and in exchange receives obligations of monthly payments starting from a certain age - but the return on the money thus invested is not very high. It is interesting that for all "long" insurance products of private companies, unlike ordinary ones, the state bears full responsibility and therefore tightly controls them: the meaning of this is that a normal market choice for a person is impossible in the case of a long product - if at the end of life he discovers that he chose the wrong company, it will not help him.

The second social fund, the Social Insurance Fund, has the same status as the Pension Fund (in terms of both subordination and supervision), and is engaged in paying citizens for temporary disability due to illness, pregnancy and childbirth, and a number of more exotic reasons. In reality, all employees, except for the self-employed population, continue to be paid by the employer, and the fund is already compensating them. It is formed from the remaining 3.3% of the 15% social tax, as well as from subventions of the imperial budget to pay for the decree (that is, pregnancy and childbirth). But unlike the funds of the Pension Fund, the Social Insurance Fund has the right by law to invest money according to the profile of its main activity, that is, to put it simply, to pay people for all kinds of preventive measures - from sanatorium holidays to vaccination (not included in the mandatory free list), which reduce morbidity and thus payments. This is allowed if the savings from the reduction are greater than the costs.

During the Second Empire, the funds of the Social Insurance Fund were managed by trade unions, and in the 1990s and 2000s, there was a discussion with varying severity whether to continue to manage them in the same way or to transfer this function to the fund itself, that is, to the government. As a result, a third decision was made - now social insurance funds are managed "on the ground" by private management companies. They receive from the fund funds calculated according to the standards for a group of payers, they are also potential recipients (as a rule, from one region), and they themselves determine which preventive measures and in what volume to allocate funds, as well as who will personally be the beneficiary of these measures (for example, who will go to a sanatorium for free) - but in such a way that it does not violate not only laws, but also generally accepted ideas of justice. In addition to a small percentage of the total amount of funds (similar in meaning to the fund's organizational costs if it were to do it itself), the management company receives half of the savings (also calculated according to the

standards), and the second half is returned to the fund. The criteria for its activities are the amount of savings and the number of justified complaints from citizens and employers - the less, of course, the better. Recently, the following case occurred in Russia and received wide publicity: one management company spent part of the funds on improving the skills of employees of its payers-recipients and requested half of the savings resulting not from a decrease in payments, but from an increase in social tax revenues (due to wage growth). And now there is a lively discussion of whether they had the right to do so and whether it makes sense to expand or, conversely, narrow the legislation. For example, the Imperial Revenue Service has already stated that it can also invest in the businesses of taxpayers and thereby increase their tax revenue by more than they invest. The third type of social security, health care, is free in the Empire (except for biomorphing and other operations that are not done for recreational purposes, but for entertainment purposes), but there is no insurance element in it - medicine is directly paid from the budget. Free is not seen as a desirable social achievement, but as a rigid ideological requirement, without which there is no compliance with the basic principle of justice: the right to life and health cannot depend on money. Therefore, if there is not enough money in the country to ensure that all those in need receive some type of medical service, then no one will receive it. But it would seem that it is possible to have free healthcare within the framework of the insurance system, for example, having compulsory medical insurance, by analogy with social insurance; indeed, there were such attempts in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, but they were subsequently abandoned. The reasons were explained to me by Robert Werner, deputy head of the Health Agency. "In this case, there will certainly be - and there were then - voluntary health insurance with a significantly higher level of medical care," he said. - And this, unlike additional pension payments, contradicts our initial position: the market and money are not acceptable everywhere, and we will not let them in here. But this is also a particularity - and most importantly, medicine itself is a business in this case; and although we recognize that business always provides any services more efficiently than the state, we don't want this for medicine that ensures the right to life - we don't want to be operated on by a businessman who thinks first of all about his own benefit. What efficiency of health care we can provide through the state, we will provide it, the same for everyone, it will be fair. Well, that it will not be maximum - well, eternal life on Earth still does not shine for anyone. Another thing is that the mechanisms of budget financing themselves, after active and fairly successful experimentation in the mid-2000s (payment for one treated patient instead of one bed, government orders for medical services, etc.), have become quite effective and stimulate growth quality and cost reduction.

There are features of social payments for certain groups of the population (a different retirement age for a number of professions, pension supplements for certain categories, etc.), but these are nothing more than nuances. As well as social benefits for certain groups (as in Russia they call associated expenses that cannot be received in cash, for example, appropriate equipment for the disabled) - they are, in general, few. Care for the elderly is not a separate type of social security in the Empire, because all old people, without exception, receive a pension, and even the minimum amount of it is sufficient for a normal life, especially with free healthcare - thus, there is simply nowhere to come from for poor elderly who need to be taken care of. Nursing homes exist, but by virtue of what has just been said, they are all paid, mostly private. In addition, they are not very common - society looks askance at people whose parents are in a nursing home, and therefore they try their best to prevent this.

There is no separate youth policy at the general imperial level, because, according to current Russian concepts, there is no youth as a separate group - there are young adults (in the section "Education and Science" it will be explained why this happens). The policy in the field of guardianship of minors differs little from ours, and the policy in the field of the family will be discussed below.

I have not forgotten unemployment insurance - it simply does not exist in the Empire (except for purely market products from a number of insurance companies); in addition to a severance pay in the amount of a month's salary, the person who lost his job does not receive any benefits. Instead, there is an obligation written into the Constitution of the state to hire any person who cannot find [other employment], with a

salary not less than the minimum established (but not necessarily in his specialty). This, however, does not mean that he cannot be expelled from there - Russian social security is not going to stand on ceremony with the arrogant and negligent. How this will be applied in practice, I cannot say, because mass unemployment in Russia in our century has not yet occurred, that is, the problem has not arisen. One might guess that there would be an increase in the budget for nationwide economic projects, especially in the most labour-intensive parts (somewhat analogous to our public works of the 2030s), but by all existing theories, this would cause an economic revival that would remove the very cause of unemployment.

Thus, these three parts - pensions, social insurance, health care - generally applicable Russian social security (not to be confused with social policy, which is much broader!) is exhausted, except for the system of hospices, which will be discussed later.

There is a curious and very important element of Russian life, which I would call the concept of the last chance. In essence, this is a kind of rooming houses, only organized by the state into a single system and without an element of humiliation. They are dormitories of the most primitive type, that is, with bathrooms for each floor, with rooms for 6-8 people; they are in every city. Any Russian citizen who comes there receives a place upon presentation of a passport - the law does not allow anything else to be asked from him - and lives there as long as he wants, at least until the end of his life. It is fundamentally important here that no evidence that he has nowhere to spend the night, and even unsubstantiated statements about this, is not required from a person. There is also a free dining room - not the Grand Novikov restaurant, of course, but you won't die of hunger and you won't even stay hungry.

There is also a free issue of clothing, two sets per citizen per year: either new military clothing from army warehouses, or used civilian clothing, handed over by the population as a charity. For accommodation, clothing and feeding, guests are only required to work around the house (cleaning and repair) and the dining room, it is forbidden to oblige them to do other work. There are practically no cases when one or a group of people in a hospitable house begins to bully others or push them around, and if it happens, it is quickly stopped, because in each such house a policeman is constantly on duty, moreover, a guardsman - they inspire almost animal horror on potential bullies. The only restriction for guests, in addition to the ban on making noise after 23:00, is that they cannot reserve a place for more than a day; that is, if you did not spend the night there, then your place remains yours only as long as there are other free places - otherwise the entire population would reserve places just in case, and no number of houses would be enough.

In general, these houses are quite decent; I myself went to look and once, with special permission from the agency (because I am not a citizen), I even spent the night there. It may seem that this whole system is a way of non-monetary social security for vagrants ("homeless people", as the Russians call them). It really has such a function, but this is by no means the end of the matter. By virtue of its presence, any Russian knows that, no matter how life turns, he will not reach the bottom - hunger and cold will not threaten him in any case. But this is not the main thing. The complete absence of bureaucracy (you settle with a passport, which all citizens have, in one minute) leads to the fact that for a day or two many people go there, leading by no means a vagrant life. I myself spoke, during my one-day stay there, with a man who had been plagued by material misfortune for the past year and had ended up in a fight with his wife and her mother the day before; with a 16-year-old teenager who had a fight with his parents and decided to leave home (I hope not for long); and with a young girl who two days ago arrived from a small town to conquer St. Petersburg. We are talking, of course, about poor people - even middle-income citizens, in which case they will simply go to a hotel; but these are completely ordinary people, not downtrodden homeless people, and it is they who determine the atmosphere in these houses (positively influencing many homeless people at the same time). It is unusual that those who do not want to work and earn money, but do not particularly lay claim to anything material (except for the maintenance of life), are put

by the state, due to the presence of a system of hospices, in a completely normal position. Not the most respected citizen, to whom strangers take off their hats, of course, but a full-fledged citizen, not an outcast vagabond. And although many objected to this (communal ideas such as “who does not work, he does not eat” are very strong among the Russian people), the authorities insisted on their own: as Mikhail the Suppressor put it, “no one knows who is more pleasing to God.” This is another indicator that in the Third Empire, unlike its predecessors, people are really citizens, and not labor, tax or military conscription units.

Family and fertility. The banal phrase that the family is the cell of society applies to modern Russia in full measure. The very word “family” is understood there in a very conservative way - the union of a man and a woman (or a man and several women - among those peoples whose tradition and family law allow polygamy), including cohabitation and common property and registered by the state. What we call civil marriage, that is, cohabitation without official registration, and even more so same-sex marriages, is not considered a family in the Empire. Even at the beginning of our century in Russia, as well as in our country, and in Europe (in our country to this day), the trend was the opposite - the number of registered marriages was falling, and the line between them and civil marriages, as well as non-traditional marriages, was erased in the public mind.

But this is the external side of the process - the essence of it was that even traditional marriage began to be perceived as a rationalistically chosen joint convenience, and not as a sacred union. The same trends took place in the situation with the birth rate - the number of those women who made a conscious decision not to have children grew, and even more of those who decided to limit themselves to one child, which did not ensure the reproduction of the population. If it were not for those women who gave birth unplanned, which for various reasons it is stupid to count on, then the population decline would have been much greater.

When society became seriously concerned about this problem (from the middle of the first decade of the 21st century), all proposals for correcting the situation and subsequent actions came down to one thing - the socio-economic encouragement of the birth rate (financial, housing, etc.), which did not and could not give significant result. The fact is that these measures, in principle, could have a positive effect only on those who consciously wanted a child (a second child, a third, etc.), but could not afford it for material reasons. But there were a minority of them - and most women simply did not understand why it was necessary to have more than one child, even if financially this was not a problem. After all, this means prolonged physical torment during pregnancy and childbirth, the loss of a lot of time and strength subsequently, a spoiled figure and, accordingly, the prospect of sexual life, a decrease in the chances of remarrying - why, when one child has already satisfied both instinct and social norm? After all, the meaning of life is in pleasures, and the state directly says that the main thing is that people live richly and happily. So what else are kids for? Therefore, the statistics clearly showed that in the most prosperous regions of Russia (and the differentiation was very high) the birth rate was not the highest, but rather the lowest, and vice versa. Everyone saw this, but had absolutely no idea what else, besides benefits and apartments, could be done to resolve this issue in a de-ideologized society. But when the ideocracy returned, everything fell into place.

Starting from the time of the reforms of Gabriel the Great, the Russian state waged a resolute struggle against the described tendencies on several fronts at once. All the possibilities of official propaganda (schools, state universities, state television) and at the same time church preaching were focused on one thing: marriage and children are both a sacred duty and a blessing, and everything else is an abomination. At the same time, the newly created service of social engineering (now - the imperial service of social arrangement) attacked from the other side - not propaganda, but fashion. All the most popular singers and singers, actors and actresses, athletes and TV presenters, as well as other cult characters, suddenly began to acquire exemplary families, and pop divas, who had said in an interview yesterday that pregnancy

spoils the figure, urgently became pregnant and began to twitter that women's happiness lies precisely in this. (How could it be otherwise, when a special agent of the imperial service spoke to you and warned that not only would they stop showing you in movies and on TV if you didn't do what you were told, but a long-closed criminal case on the purchase of a stolen car with falsified numbers could easily be reanimated.) It suddenly turned out that all the main sex symbols of the country are 30-year-old women with two or three children, and not childless girls; and men who are emphatically respectable family men, and not young (or not very) playboys. Even on calendars and other pictures of this kind, the image of a beautiful woman with a baby or a married couple began to dominate. Somehow, imperceptibly, it began to be considered indecent to cohabit without registering a marriage - even those who still live like this have stopped talking about it in public. It has also become unacceptable to appear in society without your spouse or wife. And it is completely impossible to imagine a public confession of homosexuality - and yet half a century ago it was as common in Russia as it is in our country.

On the legislative side, the state also helped the process of strengthening the family, including indirectly - non-family people in Russia are not discriminated against, but employers are allowed to discriminate against them if they want, and this will not be considered a violation (where the employer is the state itself, such discrimination based on departmental instructions is mandatory, but with freedom of interpretation). As a result, not immediately, but changes in public consciousness took place - this can be seen, for example, from the fact that 72% of Russians consider the above-mentioned discrimination to be correct. Moreover, in details it is quite reasonable (does not apply to persons under 25 years of age, widowers, etc.). In total, 73% of Russians consider the family of the traditional type to be the main thing in a person's life. I would like to draw your attention, dear compatriots, that permission to discriminate is not mandatory, therefore obvious exceptions - for example, when a woman clearly wants to get married but cannot find a husband - are decided by themselves. By the way, a woman or a man with three children, his own or adopted, is considered a family, even if they do not have a spouse.

The same with the birth of children: it gradually became generally accepted that having less than three children is shameful, and more than three is prestigious; and that raising adopted children is not an eccentric whim and is not a substitute for your children with infertility, but is very respected and, again, prestigious. This is manifested, as well as the attitude towards marriage, in the social status of a person in his social circle: where he is invited (by the way, in high society, non-family and childless people are almost never invited to solemn events and receptions); whether they delegate to the leadership of public organizations - various kinds of public councils, charitable committees, professional societies; how respected and ready to deal with their colleagues. Even more important for the everyday life of an ordinary person, which depends on his marital status, is how respected and simply ready to communicate with him by his housemates and parishioners of the church where he goes. But the pressure of society in these matters is not limited to the attitude of neighbors or secular society, it also manifests itself in material matters. For example, any loan that is not secured with a large margin will usually not be given to a bachelor or unmarried person, as well as a family without three children. It is the same with getting lucrative contracts, as well as with promotion to high corporate positions. Moreover, this is not a requirement of the law or the position of the state - it has already become part of the corporate philosophy of financial institutions and business in general. It is believed that the absence of a family and several children is a sign of a person's aspiration for life's pleasures and carnal joys - and this is at least lightness and frivolity, making him an undesirable employee or counterparty in business. Banks and corporations therefore prefer to enter into loan agreements or contracts not with an individual entrepreneur, but with a family, considering this to be more reliable; in order to make this possible, in the Russian Civil Code in 2026, the list of six types of business entities (PBOYuL, IChP, PT, LLC, CJSC, PJSC) was supplemented by SBOYuL (family without a legal entity) and SCHP (family private enterprise). And although all these processes, without any doubt, were initially initiated by the state, in the person of the service of social arrangement, now they have turned into self-sustaining public ideas.

A few more words about Russian customs in the sphere of family and children. Abortion is strictly prohibited, as are many contraceptives. More precisely, there is no separate prohibition or article in the Criminal Code - it's just that according to the Constitution, the fetus becomes a person not at the moment of birth, but after the first division of a fertilized egg, that is, practically from conception. Therefore, mechanical, chemical or hormonal abortion, as well as the use of contraceptives that act after the start of division of a fertilized egg, are automatically qualified as murders, and with aggravating circumstances (Article 106-f of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Ingushetia - "murder of an unborn or newborn child"). There are no endless discussions in Russia about whether, on the one hand, the doctor should share the guilt for the abortion, and on the other, the father of the destroyed fetus: in accordance with the general part of the Russian Criminal Code, the doctor is automatically guilty of complicity in the murder, and the father, if he put pressure on a woman, even if purely moral, in incitement to murder, and if he organized an abortion, then in complicity.

This approach required a change in public attitudes towards women who give birth to children and give them to state orphanages (in fact, to other families - almost all children from orphanages are adopted) - they are no longer condemned. To give birth and raise oneself, of course, is the most correct thing, the society argues, but just giving birth is also not bad, in any way better than killing by abortion. The attitude towards juvenile women in labor has generally changed to a diametrically opposite one - from condemnation to respect. It is interesting that in the context of the overwhelming majority of women in the Empire aiming at the birth of three or four or more children, the medical drug "Folistim", which promotes multiple pregnancies, has become colossally widespread since the 2010s - well, a pregnant woman has delivered only twice, and there are already four children! Therefore, in Russia there are a lot of twins and triplets, it catches the eye even on the street.

As for marriage, in Russia it is believed that one should marry for love - a marriage of convenience is not that much condemned (although, of course, condemned), but considered inferior; therefore, marriage contracts do occur, but rarely, and those who conclude them do their best to hide this fact. In general, the role attitudes of men and women in the Empire are more traditional and archaic than ours: in terms of civil and political rights, women, of course, do not differ from men, but, so to speak, they "do not mix" with them. That is, a woman is perceived first of all as a woman: they let her go forward, give way, do not use rude expressions in her presence, no matter who she is - even a homeless woman, even the owner of a large corporation (except perhaps for female guardsmen - they are simply afraid, so same as men). And these role settings operate in the sphere of not only public behavior, but also within the family (not always, but often enough), which greatly contributes to its strengthening.

But let's get back to the Empire's policy of strengthening the institution of marriage and ensuring a high birth rate (so to speak, the biblical commandment "be fruitful and multiply"). This is taken so seriously that they are not limited to these two areas of action (direct propaganda and creating a public mood), but work on three more.

Firstly, the Empire adopted direct material incentives for matrimony and fertility: although this in itself does not give any result (which can be seen, as I already wrote, both from the experience of Russia and from the experience of Europe at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century), but in combination with the rest it works fine. In addition, given the attitude towards children that exists in Russia, leaving them without a livelihood would be perceived by everyone as a social injustice. I already wrote in the Economics chapter about the tax on small families: if a young man or girl, upon reaching the age of 25, does not have a spouse or spouse and children, they will pay no less than 25% of income - and unlike our income tax for this there are no tax deductions. If I can understand the "childless" part of this tax, then the meaning and justice of 5% for the absence of a spouse eluded me: what if you can't find your true soul mate, although you really want to? And why, when you adopt a child, you pay, although less than when you are childless, but more than if you have your own - after all, adoption in Russia is highly respected

and encouraged? These questions were answered by the already mentioned head of the family department of the Imperial Chancellery for Social Policy, Nikolai Timofeev. "It's a matter of attitude to a large extent," he said. "If you have clear pressure to find a spouse, then your chances of doing so are much higher than if you agree only to Maria Zapolskaya and Natalia Bibikova in one person." (The famous beautiful actress and the famous physicist are meant.) There is something in this, dear compatriots - it's like those of us Americans who are zealous Catholics and, accordingly, do not recognize divorce: and their marriage is unhappy, but much less often, because if you tune in in advance that this is until death, then internally accept your spouse and calm down much easier than if you tune in to sorting through the options. (By the way, like ours, civil divorce among Russians is allowed, unlike church divorce - there it is allowed only because of adultery or dechurching of a spouse; but one divorced two or more times is looked askance in society.) "As for adoption," continued Nikolay Timofeev, - everything is very simple: having children is not only raising and loving them, but also enduring and giving birth. And that woman who is ready for the first, but does not want to get pregnant and lose the shape of her breasts and hips, fulfills her destiny from God and her duty to the people only half - just like the one who gave birth, but does not want to bother with the child. However, half is already something, therefore both of them are not condemned by us, although they are not considered the most respected people, and are not punished financially in the same way as those who do neither the first nor the second.

Financial stimulation of the birth rate is not limited to the difference in taxes: when a third child (together with adopted children) appears, a benefit of 750 rubles per month (\$3,000) is assigned, plus 250 rubles per month for each subsequent child, which is paid until the child reaches 15 years of age. A new family, even with one child, including an unborn child, receives benefits on a loan for the purchase of housing - it is issued to them without a down payment. But in the event of a divorce within the first ten years after that, the contribution (or the entire loan) is supposed to be returned. For families with many children (four or more children), the state budget pays the difference in prices for moving to a larger apartment or house and does not impose property tax on this additional area (in reality, the state usually simply provides new home ownership for free, and takes the old one, without moving money). All this applies only to the taxable estate: the clergy do not pay any taxes at all, and receive an allowance of 250 rubles a month per child (for the white clergy) starting from the first child - since the family and children are already the highest values for them, there is no need to encourage it. And the service class, which also does not pay any taxes, receives 350 rubles a month per child, because for a significant part of their lives the guardsmen cannot live with their children and, moreover, cannot have any income other than the imperial salary.

By the way, the fact that guardsmen rarely have families, and even have fewer children than the national average, is by no means connected with greater moral licentiousness. They are simply warriors, ready to lay down their lives for the state at any moment, so having a family and children is not very fair for them in relation to this family and to the state. They do not at all consider single life a value - on the contrary, they voluntarily deprive themselves of the joys of marriage and parenthood - this is another link in a long chain of their voluntary deprivations. However, the guardsmen, in addition to their own or adopted children, have one tradition dating back to the times of the First and Second Empires: each unit, military, police or civilian, patronizes one orphanage or shelter. Moreover, the charter orders to treat this informally, and guardsmen, as a rule, really spend quite a lot of free time there, playing with children who adore them.

Secondly, in Russia, the family of the archaic type is highly encouraged - where several generations live together, instead of grown-up children dispersing around the country. Such a "big" family significantly strengthens the "small" family, that is, marriage, which exists inside it as its core. It is this kind of family that is considered in the Empire to be the true cell of society, the strongest link between a person and his homeland and generations with each other. By the beginning of the century, the Russians practically did not have such a family model left, it was considered old-fashioned and marginal - although many peoples

of Russia, primarily Caucasian and Turkic, did not stop living in this way. Their positive example, when official propaganda began to widely cover and advertise it, and the social arrangement service to instill public ideas about its correctness, played a very important role. (Although, in general, due to the public pressure to have at least three children, the incentive for this appears naturally - someone should take care of them if the mother works.) But, as in the case of fertility, purely material measures are also taken here: if three or four generations come together, then the state provides up to two hundred additional square meters, depending on the number of people, and separately from other benefits, a very decent amount, which can be up to three hundred thousand rubles; and state banks give a longer installment plan to pay the main part of the price for a new home for such a family - up to 50 years instead of the usual 30. It is difficult for me to judge how good this kind of family model is for children (although it is probably good), but that it is very good for the older generation, there is no doubt: life together with young people, feeding with their energy, and with a sense of their obvious usefulness, is clearly much richer and more natural for a person than even the well-to-do, but empty and lonely life of our old people.

Finally, *thirdly*, society's attitude towards sex has changed. Back in the time of Vladimir II, the Russian state waged a decisive struggle against public coverage of everything connected with this - in 2008, the Law "On Public Morality" was adopted, which radically changed the situation in this area compared to what happened in the 1990s and the first decade of our century. All programs of a sexual nature completely disappeared from television, and a number of TV people were roughly punished. Now it is hard to imagine, but back in 2005, on the state (!) Channel, the TV presenter broadcast throughout the country that a woman who does not have a man on call is outdated and backward. Erotic films disappeared both from television and from the Web (there is nothing to say about publicly accessible porn sites!), and the sale and rental of such discs (as compact capsules were then called), as well as pornographic publications, were obliged to become non-public (see criteria for this in the Culture chapter). Similar rules were introduced in relation to real life - a closed club entrance with the inability to become a member of the club here, the absence of any advertising and the prohibition to invite new members by any means. Therefore, striptease bars and "male" or "female" nightclubs (not to mention gay and lesbian) disappeared from the streets of cities, moving to remote areas, as well as their flashy advertising. The countless billboards with half-naked girls are gone (here, the Law "On Advertising" also contributed - see the chapter "Economics").

Homosexuality, which flourished in Russia since the 1990s, provoked an even sharper reaction; even today it is not banned there and is not criminally punished, but it is essentially deprived of its rights. Homosexuals and lesbians are prohibited from working in schools and universities in any positions, as well as in public service, in courts, etc. They are prohibited from adopting children, persuading people of ordinary orientation to enter into a sexual relationship, and publicly advertising their addictions. They are allowed to have their own media - both ordinary and network, as well as their own clubs, but they must be non-public. The general meaning of the described policy is as follows: the state allows its citizens a non-standard sexual orientation that does not correspond to its moral standards, which are rooted in religion or tradition, but such permission only means that they will not be imprisoned for this - they will be considered equal to the rest, having the same rights and respect, no one is going. Moreover, if homosexual orientation itself is not a crime, then failure to report one's orientation where it is necessary - for example, when applying for a job at school - is such (the law regulates in detail who is considered homosexual and who is not). And if at school a teacher hints at the children about the permissibility of same-sex love, he will go to court and receive a greater punishment than if he robbed those children.

In addition to all such prohibitive measures, stimulating ones were also implemented: for example, with the help of the so-called limited state support (see below, in the "Culture" section), many films and books began to appear, including hits and bestsellers, in which, between times (that is, not as a main storyline) praised love compared to just sex, chastity compared to promiscuity, etc. For its part, of course, the social engineering service also worked - if in 2005 a high school student already leading an active sex life (and

there were almost no others), became as a result of this only more attractive in the eyes of others, including peers, then in 2015 this already caused disgust, at best, an unhealthy secret interest. The same attitude began to take place with adults who openly demonstrate sexual promiscuity. As a result, sex has occupied in the public life of Russia approximately the same place that it had with us 150-200 years ago: something that everyone knows and practices, but which is not customary to talk about out loud. It is important to understand, however, that this struggle - both in terms of legislation and in the sphere of public perceptions - was not fought with sex as such, even “wrong”, but with a distorted attitude of society towards it. Therefore, there were no attempts to combat prostitution - on the contrary, it was actually legalized - but they did so that this side of life became inconspicuous, and the public attitude towards both prostitutes and their clients was rather contemptuous. As a result, sex did not decrease, but it was withdrawn from the public sphere, remaining only in marginal niches - the state was not going to fight this, because it had completely different goals.

You ask, what does the strengthening of the family and especially the increase in the birth rate have to do with it? The fact is that at the beginning of our century, Russian philosophical thought realized that the transition of sex from the sphere of the unpronounceable into the sphere of the trivial everyday drastically reduces libido. For the vast majority of people, libido can only be strong when sex and the opposite sex itself carry some kind of mystery. This also applies to the birth of children - if you remove the sexual component from this action, then there is no need to give birth to them in a society of social prosperity, in general. The Russians believed and still believe that the widespread public coverage of sex in public life in the second half of the 20th century was a conscious step by the behind-the-scenes strategic rulers of Western civilization, designed specifically to reduce the libido of their population, in order to thereby reduce the birth rate and avert the threat of overpopulation, which then seemed urgent. Moreover, according to the Russians, this goal was achieved in Europe and among the white population of the United States - which in reality, however, led to the beginning of significant shifts in the ethnic composition. And when it became clear that this goal was false, but it was impossible to turn such things around 180° overnight, the West began to export public coverage of sex to other countries so that they would not be in a better position than themselves. By the way, the wide spread of homosexuality from this position is explained mainly by the same, and not by the softening of morals and the growth of feminist sentiments, as we usually think. This understanding of Russian philosophers was shared by the then and subsequent Russian rulers. Moreover, unlike their predecessors, they were believers, and the Russian Church took an even tougher position on this issue (she considers the public exaggeration of the topic of sex to be the machinations of Satan).

In addition to the actions outlined above to implement the Law “On Public Morality”, radical measures were taken in schools: not only did the so-called sex education lessons disappear without a trace, but teachers also received new tough guidelines on this matter. School education itself has become completely segregated - this reinforces the sense of mystery of the opposite sex: all schools in Russia are now either male or female. Moreover, we are not talking about puritanism - the secret in question remains even when in the country you can get a porno magazine or get into a strip club; as long as it is difficult to access and remains in the realm of the forbidden and unpronounceable - that’s why the authorities are not trying to completely ban all this. I think that the return of sex to the sphere of the unpronounceable has made no less contribution to strengthening the family and increasing the birth rate, which began in Russia at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, than all the measures described above. And the fact that sex itself, in contrast to talk about it, has become not less, but more, did not at all contradict the real goals of the authorities. After all, the Third Empire, unlike the Second (it was stated that “there is no sex in the USSR”), is not totalitarian-sanctimonious - it is only important for it to establish Orthodox values in public life, strengthen the family and ensure a high birth rate, and the personal life of its citizens is not at all not interested.

By the way, the desire of the state for high reproduction of the population is by no means only connected

with the fear of the extinction of the nation and the depopulation of the country - although the demographic processes that took place in Russia at the beginning of the century drove this fear very deeply into the Russian national consciousness. But I think that today, even if in all other countries the population suddenly decreased by a hundred times and, accordingly, Russia could afford to have a much smaller population, nothing in the Russian approach to this issue would change. Because if you do not have the imperative of reproduction, then what else, besides the birth and upbringing of several children, can give the feeling of a life not lived in vain to an ordinary person, especially a woman: everyone can't be Einsteins or Rockefellers? Yes, and the age distribution in such a country will be poor, it will have few young people and many old people - this is a typical demographic profile of a dying civilization. So the mood for the maximum birth rate in Russia is clearly of a long-term nature, since there is enough place suitable for life here - and extraterrestrial territories are on the way.

However, I do not want, dear compatriots, that you form an opinion about Russian society as a kind of machine that the authorities control by pressing the necessary buttons; It's just that I, as a sociologist and political scientist, am very interested in the mechanisms of state power and control, and in this book about the Russian Empire, I tried to show and explain precisely these aspects in more detail. In fact, the vast majority of Russians love children very much at the behest of the soul and have them in the first place for this reason, and also because they really feel in space and time a part of the nation that needs to be reproduced, and not at all for status or benefits. The family in Russia is considered a sacred union and the main citadel in human life, and the duty to one's family is their highest destiny (except perhaps for salvation and eternal life), also at the behest of the soul, and not at all for the goodwill of banks. Russian women do not go naked in thermal paint, as we do, and men do not do the sexual zoomorphism that has become so widespread in our country because they sincerely believe it is vile and obscene, and not because the Kremlin thinks so. And sexually horny Russian teenagers (like any teenagers in the world) dream not so much of "getting laid" (although you won't get away from that either), but of love to the grave, not at all because teachers tell them so. It's just that Russians are like that and have been exactly like that for centuries, and even when degradation was maximum, at the turn of the past and present centuries, in the depths of the people, admiration for family values is still preserved - and it immediately manifested itself with all its might as soon as such an opportunity arose. No government, with any service of social engineering, can impose (especially without the use of force) public ideas that run counter to the archetypes of their people. It can only do the opposite - bring them into line with them. But this is also very difficult, and I wanted to show you how the Russian imperial government does it. Let's not be hypocrites - the state's subtle and unadvertised interference in matters of tastes and preferences of the public has always taken place and still takes place in our country, only we bashfully call it "work with public opinion."

Labor Relations. There is no separate imperial labor code - this area belongs to the *zemstvo* and national regulation. Any employer or, conversely, a labor collective can declare in advance in their charter that they act according to the labor legislation of such and such a people (as a rule, the one to which they themselves belong), and if there is no such record, then *zemstvo* labor legislation of Russia is applied by default. Imperial legislation is limited by direct constitutional provisions on the prohibition of discrimination, except for that which follows from the concept of diversity (discrimination against certain groups, for example, sexual or religious minorities), and also except for discrimination on the basis of inclusion (see below). Imperial legislation provides for the possibility for an employee in a labor dispute to apply not only to the *zemstvo*, but to the imperial court - but only if not only his material interests are infringed, but also the basic principles of justice.

Basically, the labor laws of different peoples do not differ very much, but there are exceptions: most of the peoples of historical Russia, both Slavic and Turkic, have the concept of mutual responsibility in their labor laws, while European peoples (except Germans and Serbs) do not have such a concept. Mutual responsibility is when all the others are jointly and severally responsible for each employee, although in a

row not an artel [?], but an individual one; employers under collective agreements with mutual responsibility pay much more, as they reduce their risks. In all national legislations, as well as in all-Russian *zemstvos*, there is the concept of a collective agreement, but in some it is obligatory, and in some it is not. In the latter case, on the subject of its regulation, there should be a declaration by the employer (in the form prescribed in the *zemstvo* legislation), which the person being hired acknowledges by signature. Industry or local collective agreements or agreements are prohibited and are considered contrary to antitrust laws.

Interestingly, even under the all-Russian legislation, private employers are allowed to discriminate in hiring based on religion and even on national grounds (this is prohibited for state bodies, institutions and enterprises) - but only on the so-called inclusive, and not exclusive, principle. This means the following: if, for example, a Bashkort entrepreneur wants to hear his native language at work, the usual jokes, in general, to be among his own by blood - please, Russian law considers this his right. But then hire some Bashkorts and make an appropriate entry in your charter, and if at least one of the hired people is of a different nationality, including Russian, then this will be a violation. That is, you can announce that you are only hiring people of such and such a nationality, gender, or religion, but you cannot announce that you are hiring everyone except such and such. The logic of this restriction is completely clear to me, it is only incomprehensible why such a thing should be allowed at all. The position of the authorities on this issue was explained in a video conversation with me by Friedrich Brenner, head of the imperial service for the supervision of labor relations: "The employer is also a person, according to the constitutional principle of nationalism, one cannot deprive him of his natural right to be among his own."

On the basis of inclusiveness, it is allowed to discriminate against both small families and homosexuals (this should also be reflected in the charter or declaration), but this is exactly permission: if you want, discriminate, if you don't want, don't. At the same time, the legislation uses the same approach: if you want not to hire homosexuals, declare it openly and then don't hire a single one; moreover, such a possibility is symmetrical - according to the law, employers can exist and exist in reality, on the contrary, hiring only bachelors or homosexuals.

Strikes are not prohibited, but not encouraged - this is expressed in the fact that the employer has the right to dismiss the strikers for absenteeism, unless otherwise provided by their collective agreement, and the strikers do not have the right to interfere with the functioning of the enterprise, including the hiring of strikebreakers. If workers take the enterprise by force, then no one, of course, will send troops, as was the case a century and a half ago - the enterprise is not a public territory, and therefore this is not a violation of public order. But if there is a corresponding statement from the owners of the enterprise, criminal cases will be initiated against those who have seized it ("forcible appropriation of real estate"), and if they do not appear on the summons to the investigator, then the OPON will definitely arrive. The logic here is something like this: why would you go on strike - after all, instead of going on strike, you can go to court, in certain cases even to the imperial court; and the court, like any court in Russia, will treat your case fairly and by no means formally. If you know that the court will not take your side, and yet you are confident in the success of the strike (for example, the enterprise is located in a labor shortage zone), go on strike, this is fair, the employer should have treated you more carefully in this case.

There are almost no trade unions at enterprises in Russia - their role is played by the labor collective; it has many of the rights of a legal person, even without being formally registered, and its two-thirds have the right to sue on behalf of all employees of the enterprise. There are territorial and all-Russian professional organizations of workers in Russia, they are called guilds, but they are much more fragmented than our trade unions: we have four trade unions of truck drivers, and there are 27 guilds. The guilds, to a lesser extent than ours, are engaged in protecting the rights of workers and to a greater extent - their representation, retraining, financial mutual assistance through the relevant funds, often settling professional issues between members - in my opinion, they are more like our bar associations than trade

unions.

In recent years, the so-called labor brotherhoods have spread - in essence the same as guilds, but without a rigid connection to a common profession. They often offer entrepreneurs to fully staff a newly opened enterprise with all professions, usually with mutual responsibility, that is, they take on the functions, including recruitment agencies, but in general they are more like large clubs.

In general, labor relations in Russia, compared to ours, are characterized by greater diversity and less tension between employers and employees - in my opinion, because the imperial authorities do not interfere in these processes, allowing everything to develop naturally, and clearly does not give preference to any of the sides.

Migration policy. In 2000-2020, Russia actively stimulated the immigration of ethnic Russians from the former parts of the USSR that are not part of the Russian Federation, and later into the Russian Union - Ukraine, the Baltic states, Moldova and Central Asia. These processes have been especially active since 2006, after the corresponding decree of Vladimir II. The flow of immigrants from these territories consisted not so much of Russians in the strict sense, but of the so-called Russian-speaking - that is, all those citizens of the collapsed Empire who did not belong to the local titular nation, and who continued to identify themselves that way. After the start of the Great Crisis of 2010-2014, it was joined by a stream of Russians (here also Russian-speakers are meant) from the United States and the European Union, seeking to return to their homeland for economic reasons. And in 2020-2021, more than four million US residents with Russian roots (many in the second or third generation) re-emigrated to Russia, because after the Twelve Day War and the US occupation, life for them in America for obvious reasons became unbearable (despite all the efforts of the White House, they actually turned into outcasts and could not even be sure of saving their lives). In contrast, the Russians, who emigrated to Europe in the past and early this century, have remained there, since these territories have become part of Russia.

In addition, there has long been so-called contractual immigration, carried out within the framework of intergovernmental agreements that Russia has had with India since 2007 and with China since 2008. Contractual immigration is subject to quotas that are regularly reviewed bilaterally. Such immigration is quite strictly regulated, primarily in terms of preventing coming to Russia for temporary work (contractual immigration is only allowed permanently) and settling in national ghettos such as Chinatowns - Russia is ready to accept as contractual immigrants only those who want to become, if not Russians by nationality, then in any case real assimilated citizens of the Empire. However, the bulk of contractual immigrants, especially the Chinese, go even further - they take Russian names and try to become Russian, although no one forces them to do so. According to statistics, 69% of the Chinese marry [женятся] (or marry [выходят замуж]) Russians and their children are brought up purely as Russians. The total number of contractual immigrants has so far amounted to about 25 million people (excluding their descendants who were already born in Russia) and will probably amount to at least 15 million more in the next twenty years, mainly from India. The Russians could do without migrants, since there is no particular shortage of labor in the Empire, but they deliberately pander to the influx of fresh blood; in Russia it is believed (like in our country) that the influx of new people, with their own special vision of the world, ideas and culture, greatly enriches the country. But only if one's own culture is strong enough not to capitulate to a foreign one, but, on the contrary, to assimilate it, adopting all the best.

In addition to ethnic re-immigration and contractual immigration, one can get to Russia in another way - religious. It stems from the identity in the Empire of the concepts of "Orthodox" and "Russian" - since the Russian Orthodox Church became Ecumenical, Russia has proclaimed the unconditional right of any Orthodox on the planet to receive Russian citizenship, and without a period of naturalization. This applies both to those who write a statement of relatedness, and to those who are Orthodox, retaining their original ethnicity. But if it turns out later that your churching was feigned, you will be subject to criminal liability. Also having an unconditional right to receive Russian citizenship, are those who ethnically belong to all

other, except Russian, peoples of the Empire. It is impossible to become a Russian citizen without this, including businessmen with large capital; the exceptions are scientists and specialists, who are sometimes given citizenship, but without much desire. It is also impossible to obtain political asylum in Russia - this concept does not exist there, since Russians do not care about what happens outside their state; the natural exceptions are those who worked for Russian intelligence.

Nowadays, the process of contractual immigration has specifics: immigrants are not sent to Europe, but only to historical Russia, mainly to Siberia and Turkestan - contractual immigrants, according to Russian laws, live in the region specifically assigned to them for the first eight years and do not have the right to change. The decline in the population in Europe is compensated by immigrants from historical Russia, as well as Germany and Serbia - the settlement of ethnic Russians and other "old" Russian peoples in Europe is highly encouraged. All this is being done to ensure that the Russians and allied peoples are evenly settled in all parts of the Empire.

However, at one time, after the first steps to restore the empire under Vladimir II, this policy faced a certain problem: in order to settle Russians and other loyal peoples in new territories, these territories must be cleared, that is, the indigenous population must be evicted from there and taken away from them. earth. And the Third Russian Empire, more humane for all its rigidity than its predecessors, could not go for this - the Russian people would never have suffered such injustice, especially in their favor. (You will say that there were Latvia and Estonia in 2020 and Galicia in 2034 - but that was revenge, not politics.) The way out came when the right to large landed property was abolished in Russia in 2013. Large land holdings, from hundreds to millions of hectares, which were in private and corporate ownership throughout the Russian Union, were withdrawn into federal ownership. Even earlier, the lands that were state-owned by Ukraine (in the eastern and southern parts), Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan moved there; and after 2020, also lands that were in state and large private ownership in the countries of the European Union and the former USSR. When the Empire thus had enough land in state ownership, it made possible massive resettlement programs, and unlike in ancient times, they were not of a forced nature. It is worth dwelling on these programs separately, since they concern not only immigrants, but also internally displaced persons.

In Russia, the construction of new ethnic settlements outside the place of historical residence of a given people is especially encouraged, since such construction is considered a factor that firmly holds together a single country. This applies primarily (but not only) to the Russians and the allied peoples. The initiative to create such settlements can belong to both a commercial developer and a group of future settlers (this is especially welcome), and the state - the last one according to general Russian management principles only when the first two cases do not take place. The only hard limit here is that these must be villages or separate small towns, but not new areas of existing cities - big cities are considered outdated and unlivable. Thanks to this, now even in the very center of historical Russia, including near Moscow and St. Petersburg, there are many Tatar, Kazakh, German and other towns and villages. In Europe, Turkey, Transcaucasia and other places there are no less of them, as well as Russians. Even such unusual settlements as Polish and Spanish (not to mention Indian) can now be found in the expanses of Russia.

The foregoing does not mean that the Empire does not encourage new settlements without ethnicity - they are simply other programs in terms of public administration (for example, the imperial program for the development of the Great Eurasian Plain, which allocates funds to stimulate the creation of new settlements on the territories formed as a result of the "warming" program). Youth communities are especially widespread, where groups of young people who do not have enough money, united by interests and mutual sympathy, build a village for themselves with their own hands - the state provides loans for this, some of which are actually irrevocable. Very frequent are also religious communities, the so-called brotherhoods (see the chapter "[Religion](#)"), which build a settlement for themselves together with a temple or a monastery. And any other such initiative from below will always find state support, since the

authorities are sure that new settlements, wherever they are, especially those that have appeared at the behest of the settlers themselves, are outposts of the Empire.

IV. SPIRITUAL LIFE

Chapter 9 Religion

[The following contains many Russian Orthodox theological terms. It would be too tedious to include definitions (some may be controversial) for all of them here.]

Epochal events in the Orthodox Church. Already in our century, events took place in the life of the ROC, perhaps the most significant in the entire more than a thousand-year history of its existence. The first of them is the church reform that took place in the 2010s against the backdrop of the constitutional reform. Thus, church life was no exception when the most radical processes of renewal of all aspects of life took place in the country, accompanying the establishment of the Third Empire. It began with the fact that the new Constitution, in terms of class, provided not only for the service class, but also for the clergy, and its rights and obligations were described in some detail, as well as the structure (slightly different from the existing one); therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church needed to carry out certain reforms to bring its own structure in line with the new constitutional provisions. The need for these reforms, which the ROC did not plan at all as deep, was superimposed on several factors: the pronounced religious nature of the new Constitution, and in its very essence - in terms of goals, as well as the strong religiosity of Gabriel the Great (as, by the way, his predecessor, Vladimir the Restorer) and the entire leadership of the country; this inner religiosity longed for changes in Russian Orthodoxy in the direction of increasing its passionarity. It also had an effect that, starting from 1991, the Church gradually began to gain strength and significantly strengthened both materially and spiritually. Although St. Alexis, Patriarch of Moscow, who was then the hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, avoided drastic actions (like his contemporary ruler of Russia Vladimir the Restorer), considering the Church spiritually weakened and not ready for them, latently and imperceptibly the number of church people increased noticeably, as did the role of church life in the collective consciousness of the people. Finally, as always in history, the subjective factor played an important role - a bright preacher with all the qualities of a spiritual leader appeared and quickly gained popularity among the Russian people (thanks to television), Archpriest Nikita of St. Archpriest Avvakum, a participant in the church events of the 17th century). He went down in history (more precisely, he will go down - he is still alive and, after widowhood, accepted monasticism and schema in the Pskov-Pechora Monastery) under the name of Nikita the Preacher. He threw out a cry that gained numerous supporters and, as a result, became the core of church reform: let's cancel Nikon's reforms. These reforms of the 17th century (it was with them that Archpriest Avvakum fought in his time), carried out under the slogan of a return to the original Greek rite, actually led to bureaucratization and nationalization of the Church, as well as to a split, as a result of which the so-called Old Believers separated from it, with whom the struggle was tirelessly waged in the 17th-19th centuries.

At first, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church tried to calm down Archpriest Nikita, and not out of any villainous motives, but simply to avoid sliding into anarchy and a new split. But Nikita was supported by Gabriel, and although he made the reservation that he was not going to dictate his will to the Church and expressed his personal opinion as an Orthodox layman, the Russian Orthodox Church did not want to ignore Gabriel's point of view and announced an unprecedented thing - a general church discussion. A major role here, apparently, was played by the fact that Gabriel managed to convince Patriarch Kirill in a private conversation that such a discussion would cause a huge surge of interest in the affairs of the Church and, thus, would benefit the Church regardless of the result. The patriarch knew for certain that Gabriel fully shared his fear of a new schism, and trusted his arguments. The discussion lasted

three years and, together with subsequent actions, entered the history of Russia as the church reform of 2013-2017.

The forecast of a surge of interest in church life was more than justified - a fierce struggle of positions flared up. The Old Believers also joined it - and not only the so-called co-religionists (those who retained the old rite, but recognized the ROC of the Moscow Patriarchate and, accordingly, had canonical communion with it), but also many others who had previously considered the ROC almost a stronghold of Satan, and the Russian state as the kingdom of the Antichrist. These latter existed completely autonomously both in the First and in the Red Empires, in most cases not even getting into the population censuses (at first it was a consequence of persecution, and when they stopped, a consequence of the memory of them). Their spiritual life was just as autonomous, including, by the way, from each other. It seemed that nothing could turn them away from this total non-recognition of the surrounding life and the feeling of being an island of salvation in the pre-apocalyptic world, but the slogan of canceling Nikon's reforms seemed to return the situation to the pre-split period and made it very difficult for them to apologize for further rejection of the state. Looking ahead, I'll say that as a result, the main part of the Old Believers "consent" and "interpretation" (which means about the same as the denominations of the Protestants in our northern states) returned to the bosom of a single Russian Orthodox Church - we can say that everyone returned, except for those who had fallen into sectarianism. This had a positive impact on the subsequent development of Russia both in spiritual and material life - because, although there were only about four million Old Believers, they became a very passionate part of the Church and a very active part of the economy (the latter, by the way, was also characteristic of the last decades of the First Empire, up to the communist revolution).

In the course of the church discussion, it turned out that the abolition of the Nikonian reforms in terms of worship and church texts, for which they were once started, did not cause much rejection, since the new ideology of Russia no longer required feeling like the descendants of the Byzantines. The nationalist perception of itself as an absolutely original civilization, no more than picking up the banner of the center of Orthodoxy from the hands of Byzantium, became much more in demand. And such an ideology made Nikon's idea of returning to Greek roots of little relevance, that is, sweeping aside all the differences with the Greek original that have accumulated over six and a half centuries in Russian Orthodoxy - it turns out that such differences, on the contrary, must be protected.

But real passions flared up around the structural issues of the Nikonian reforms - to put it simply, around the relationship of the community ("world") and hierarchy. This heat of passion, as often happens, also led to a discussion about changes in the canon, at first quite consensual, much further than a return to the pre-Conian rite. As a result, in 2016 the Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church adopted a reform that returned the pre-Nikonian textual and liturgical order, and also introduced a number of other fundamentalist changes. Today it is called the reform of St. Cyril and Nikita the Preacher, and no one in church circles doubts that when Nikita passes away, he will be canonized and the celebration of his memory will be established on the same day as St. Cyril. (The patriarch was canonized as a saint almost immediately after his death because he became famous for many other things - the fight against Markian and other heresies, the organization of the VIII Ecumenical Council, the establishment of the Ecumenical Church, the conversion of most of the Germans to Orthodoxy, as well as numerous miracles performed by him. His merits and holiness are so great that now, when I write these lines, there is a discussion in the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church about whether to change his glorification from the face of saints to the face of Equal-to-the-Apostles.)

Now it is difficult to say what role Gabriel the Great played in the adoption of the reform. He obviously sympathized with the goals that ultimately materialized, and clearly had various opportunities for informal influence on the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church. Be that as it may, the reform passed, as a result of which, among other things, the principles of the organization of the clergy were formed (see

the chapter "[Estate structure](#)").

But an even more significant event occurred eight years after the church reform. The global changes that took place in the Eurasian space after the events of 2019-2022, especially the conquest of Europe and its incorporation into the Russian Empire, could not but affect church life. Almost all local Orthodox churches ended up on the territory of Russia - Albanian, Bulgarian, Georgian, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Cypriot, Polish, Romanian, Serbian, Ukrainian, Czechoslovak and Helladic. The local churches of Alexandria and Antioch ceased to exist after the decree of Caliph Mahdi Omar on the expulsion of Christians and Jews from the country in 2024, and the American Orthodox Church greatly lost its position after the events of 2019-2020, in particular, the status of a local church, like the Chinese and Japanese Orthodox churches. And although our country provides freedom of religion, including the Orthodox, according to the Constitution, the modern orderly world of five civilizations is arranged in such a way that non-believers are under great pressure - at least in our country, from the side of society, and not from the authorities, as in the Celestial Empire.

Thus, practically the entire Orthodox world ended up inside Russia. On the other hand, for the first time since the Baptism of Russia, the Russian state found itself in a situation where the majority of the population, although Christians, were by no means Orthodox, and, moreover, very unfriendly to Russia and Orthodoxy. The result of this understanding was the convening of the VIII Ecumenical Council in 2026 - at it the ROC was transformed into the EROC (Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church), and all local churches were liquidated as autocephalous units and reunited and merged with the ROC. This idea was more than 250 years old, it was worn both under the tsars in the nineteenth century and under the rulers of the USSR in the XX century, but only now there are real prerequisites for its implementation.

The VIII Ecumenical Council lasted more than three months and was indeed an epoch-making event in the life of the Orthodox Church and the Russian state, and possibly the entire Earth. It was not at all easy: none of the local churches was against the proclamation of the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church and was not against joining it, but no one wanted to lose their status. Let us be, if not autocephalous, then at least autonomous and self-governing churches, they said. But the ROC remembered well what happened to the self-governing Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the end of the last - the beginning of this century: first, Filaret's schism, which he was able to carry out mainly due to a long uncontrolled period of self-government, and then the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, like the loyal ROC would *de facto* become completely independent, and the Ukrainian Orthodox in the bulk would begin to feel like children of something other than the ROC. So the Patriarchate showed complete firmness in this matter, and there are no autonomous and self-governing Churches within the EROC. In the resolution documents of the VIII Council, for the first time, the concept of the canonical territory of the Orthodox Church (before that, this term was unofficial) formally appeared - it was called the entire Russian Empire, and only it. In essence, this meant the rejection of proselytism in other states and therefore aroused (and continues to arouse to this day) the resistance of the most radical part of the Russian Church. But the Patriarchate firmly stands on its own (together, by the way, with the imperial authorities) and claims that such a large part of the world, which is now the Empire, is a completely sufficient stronghold for the triumph of the true faith. "By the way, our Empire," Archbishop Theognostus said at the Council, "includes most of the world and peoples known during the period of the Savior's earthly incarnation—should we go and preach where He did not send His disciples?" However, there is still no complete unanimity and agreement on this topic: very many of the clergy and laity believe that the Church is almost committing a crime before God by not starting a wide mission in India and here (it is forbidden in the Celestial Empire and the Caliphate).

It is interesting that in the Orthodox world there has long been a tradition - a kind of prophecy - that the Eighth Ecumenical Council will be the last before the end of the world. At the same time, many predicted that this would be a Council of the Triumph of the forces of Antichrist, a Council of the atheists, at which the Renovation and Ecumenical heresy would prevail - all faiths would be declared one, fasting and

monasticism would be abolished, the Church would switch to the Gregorian calendar, and the episcopate would become married. Therefore, passions before the opening of the Cathedral raged serious. But Patriarch Kirill himself addressed this topic in his opening speech. “This Council will indeed be the last Ecumenical in our holy, catholic and apostolic Church,” he said. – But only because now all the Orthodox people of the Earth will gather at the regular Local Councils of our Church, and they will not differ in any way from the Ecumenical. How is it possible to assemble an Ecumenical Council if there are no local Churches, except for the Russian one, and its council, according to the charter, is Local, and not Ecumenical? As for the prophecies about the Council of the Godless, it is not in vain that the Savior commanded us to beware of false prophets: look, where do you see the godless here? We have never been so strong in Orthodoxy and rejection of foreignness - look, even the Catholic Church left Europe across the ocean, away from us, and Orthodox crosses over the Cathedrals of Saints Peter and Paul in Rome, as well as over our main shrine - Hagia Sophia in Constantinople. There have never been so many monasteries and monks before, even in Byzantium. The calendar was changed not by the Church to the Gregorian, but by the entire state to our old, Julian, and satanic TIN [see below] was canceled, and even in passports now there are no numbers! (Russian believers have long irrationally believed that any designation of a person in addition to his name by a certain number, for example, a TIN, even just for convenience, is a sign of the Antichrist, and an identification biochip implanted in a hand, as we have in the American Federation, is for some reason called an apocalyptic sign.) Satanists are now not in power, but in prison, because now it is a crime and according to worldly laws. How could it be otherwise - after all, now we have an Orthodox Empire under the Constitution, and this cannot be changed!”

This was convincing, but when Cyril made a proposal to introduce a white (that is, married) episcopacy and the ordination of women to deaconesses (they have been ordained since 2017, this was one of the points of the church reform, but only in the ROC), passions flared up again, and mainly on the first question. But Cyril was adamant - he had a vision from the Most Holy Theotokos, who ordered him to guide the people on the true path, and from his heavenly patron, Equal-to-the-Apostles Cyril, a Slovenian teacher, who asked not to leave the people in error, which he and his brother first enlightened. Thus, Cyril fulfilled the Lord’s explicit will. “Why do you compare our Council with the satanic Second Local Council and reproach me for renovationism? he asked angrily. – Me, who all my life struggled with the altars in the center of the temple, and with divine services in Russian, and with the second marriage of priests? And the holy fathers of the VI Ecumenical Council, who established an episcopate only of monks, were also, in your opinion, Renovationists then? After all, they changed the previously accepted apostolic rules! Or the Catholics in the 11th century arbitrarily and non-canonically established celibacy among all the priests - so what if they want to return to the original order in this, which we also adhere to, will they also be renovationists? Pray better to Nicholas the Wonderworker, the Archbishop of Myra, who was married, that he would enlighten you. (This saint among the Orthodox, unlike us, is one of the most revered, if not the most.) Nevertheless, more and more voices were heard that there are now many monks, quite enough to choose bishops from among them, as in the times of the VI Council - and if you allow bishops from the white clergy, then this will kill monasticism.

Metropolitan Arseniy of Constantinople and Jerusalem, who was Metropolitan of St. Petersburg before the annexation of Europe, came to the aid of Patriarch Kirill, perhaps the second most important person in the Russian Orthodox Church, who had rather cool relations with Kirill. But he saw the correctness of Cyril and put his duty above his personal relationship. “What does it mean to “kill monasticism”? he said harshly and sarcastically. – In your opinion, people become monks only for a chance at a bishopric? And why then do monks take the vows of the great schema, losing their chances for archpastorship, or is no one going to the schemamonks anymore? What, then, shall we introduce a prize for every hundredth who takes the tonsure, as when buying household appliances, and we will make the work of the monks easier, and we will introduce considerable allowances, and also take care of the conveniences - so that monasticism definitely does not die? The hall is silent. “So that this does not happen,” continued Arseniy,

“and it is necessary that the path to the bishopric does not necessarily lie through monasticism. Only then can one be sure that among those who take the tonsure there will be no wolves in sheep’s clothing that are objectionable to the Lord. Let us not kill monasticism with this, but save it, because only that choice is truly free, in which a person does not have any worldly benefit - and many people really want to become an archpastor, because the temptation of pride and lust for power is harder to overcome than the temptation to please the flesh. And the fact that you can find worthy even among the monks is possible, of course, but that’s not the point at all. There are simply two types of faith - the way of life in the world and the way of leaving the world. And who will undertake to confidently say that the Lord is always more pleasing than any of them? Look, among our saints there are hermits, and there are kings who ate from gold, there are martyrs, and there are those who have passed away in old age. According to the Savior, “there are many rooms in my Father’s house.” And I, myself a monk for many years, will tell you this: well, the Lord allows even the laity to become His saints - but we will not allow even priests to be bishops? Without monasticism, they say, there will be no Orthodoxy - but who proposes to abolish it? And then it is right to ask such people: will there be Orthodoxy without the laity? Would any of those present dare to assert that if now, without waiting for the onset of apocalyptic times, all of our people would shave their hair and stop multiplying, this would correspond to the providence of God?

As a result, this, the most controversial, item on the agenda was adopted, and, as it should be at the Council, by consensus (in Russian this is what is called *soborno*). Other innovations were also adopted, and in addition, the provisions of the reform of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2016 were approved and extremely dangerous heresies were anathematized (see below).

It deserves special mention that the Council adopted a new edition of the apostolic canons, a kind of code of piety that determines what to do and what not to do for church-going people in their church and everyday life. The new apostolic rules did not fundamentally differ from the ancient ones, but this was their revolutionary nature - over the past centuries, everyone had become accustomed to much softer and less unambiguous interpretations. True, in some ways they were adjusted taking into account the experience of previous centuries, but almost exclusively in the direction of tightening. For example, now, when taking tonsure, a monk, taking a vow of non-acquisitiveness, promises not only not to strive to have property, but also not to use someone else’s or public property, except for what is necessary to maintain life. A similar vow, only slightly softer, is now given by priests at their ordination. And although five more Local Councils of the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church have passed since that time, and after St. Cyril, the second Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Nikolai, who was elected according to the new rules (Kirill was the last patriarch not chosen by lot), officiates, but such large-scale events in the life of the Church no longer happened. This is not surprising - this happens once every few centuries, or even less often (the previous Ecumenical Council before 2026 was held in 787).

Canonical and liturgical innovations. As I have already pointed out, the reform of 2013-2017 was marked by the abolition of the Nikonian reforms of the 17th century and a return to pre-split norms, although it was not limited to this at all. In part of the service, the main elements of the old rite were indeed restored: the spelling of the name of the Savior with one “and” (Jesus), the addition of “az” in the third member of the creed for the Son (“born, not created”) and the words “True” in the eighth member for the Holy Spirit, two-handed baptism, double (so-called double) hallelujah instead of triple, service on seven prosphora, walking “salting” at baptism, wedding and consecration of the temple, the use of the six- and eight-pointed cross and more. But much more ancient elements were also restored, and not of worship, but of the canon, which had been gradually abolished much earlier than the schism, back in the 15th century. To the seven sacraments: baptism, chrismation, confession, communion, ordination, weddings and unction, five more were added that existed earlier: the great consecration of water, tonsure as a monk, the consecration of a temple, the consecration of an icon, and the setting of a priest for the parish. All these ceremonies (“chiny”, in Orthodox) existed even before the reform, but were not considered sacraments.

The great consecration of water, performed at the Baptism of the Lord (also known as Theophany), has become, as in ancient times, a sacrament, unlike all other prayer services for the blessing of water. It is interesting that traces of this were also preserved in the rite of the great consecration of water, which was not a sacrament, even until 2017 (the words “... those who partake of this water...” - and after all, you can only partake of the Lord). The tonsure as a monk also became a sacrament, both the first and the second, the so-called great (in the schema) - and before that it was just a rank. It is the same with the consecration of the temple. For believers in Russia, it was extremely important that the consecration of an icon became a sacrament - icons in Russia are very loved and are present in every family, and the difference between a sacrament and a rite, as you know, is that during the sacrament an event (in this case, consecration) occurs exactly and undoubtedly.

Of particular importance for the life of the Church was the revival of the sacrament of ordaining a priest for a parish. This applies only to the rector, and not to other priests serving in the same church, if there are several priests there. This sacrament is preceded by a petition to the ruling archbishop - in it, the community of the parish, newly formed or having lost the rector due to death or other reason, asks the archbishop to appoint a specific priest for them, that is, they indicate the name. The procedure for the selection by the community of a candidate for sending to the bishop is clearly regulated. In particular, if the one desired is not a priest, they can still apply for his ordination. The bishop (archbishop or vicar bishop authorized by him) may not satisfy the request of the community, even several times in a row, including without explaining the reasons - in this case, the community will send petitions with new candidates; but the bishop cannot appoint one for whom the community has not asked. If the community does not know who it wants, then in a petition it will ask to send them someone worthy. But then everything will be the same as usual: after getting acquainted with the candidate sent by the diocese, if they like him, the community will have to send a petition already with his name. When the bishop is satisfied with the candidate of the community, he comes with him and performs the sacrament itself - it, of course, is only the action of the bishop itself, and not the previous procedure. As in the sacrament of the wedding, there is a question for the parish: “Do you agree to have this person as a presbyter?”, And for the priest: “Do you agree to become the presbyter of this parish?” Moreover, as in the case of a wedding, there is no divorce here, that is, the rector is appointed to the parish for life (this was the case in Byzantium - this is the symbolic meaning of the so-called bracers in priestly vestments). He can cease to be a rector only in two cases (except for the liquidation of the parish and his death) - during the great tonsure into the schema or when he is ordained as a bishop. In these cases, his departure is not an act of his will - simply, according to the charter, neither a schemamonk nor a bishop can be parish priests.

In addition to the restoration of these four sacraments, one of the previously existing ones - the sacrament of chrismation - has undergone a change: now for those baptized in childhood it is performed again at the age of 15, so that an adult consciously joins the Church of Christ, without which he is not considered part of it (although he is a Christian in general sense, since there can be only one baptism according to the Orthodox creed). This roughly corresponds to our Catholic confirmation. In addition, the liturgical order of all twelve sacraments has changed - now, as in ancient times, both the previous seven and the new five sacraments are inscribed in the liturgy, are part of it and cannot be celebrated without a liturgy. In practice, this does not mean that now, for example, a separate liturgy is served for a wedding, but that this sacrament takes place during a common Saturday or Sunday liturgy, in front of all the parishioners present (like reading congratulatory and funeral notes).

In the section “The Spiritual Estate” of the chapter “[Estate Structure](#)”, as earlier in this chapter, I already wrote that the church reform and the Ecumenical Council introduced other canonical changes regarding the clergy, moreover, they were of a radical nature. Nevertheless, none of them, even the ordination of women, can be considered modernist, because this took place as early as the time of Basil the Great (4th century), and in the Russian Church it was discussed more than once, and not at all antagonistically. By the time of the Ecumenical Council, deaconesses were already customary, because there were quite a lot

of them at once. And other innovations, both in letter and in spirit, are addressed to tradition, and not to modernism: the episcopate was, among other things, married until the 8th century, and the primate was elected by lot in Russia as early as the 15th century, for example, in Veliky Novgorod. But the Russian Church leads this custom much earlier, from St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, who was elected Archbishop of Myra by God's command (as the person who will be the first to enter the church from the night - that is, in essence, according to the same lot). In addition, these innovations did not cause such qualitative changes in the composition of the bishops: to this day, almost thirty years after the Council, no more than 20% of the bishops are married, and no one can guarantee that this proportion will increase in the future. But among them were and are the true lights of the Orthodox Church, such as the living Bishop Peter, Archbishop of Rostov, and the Hieromartyr Archbishop George, who died a martyr in 2037. And the election of the Patriarch by lot among all the bishops has led to the fact that among them the element of hierarchization has become much less - when everyone can become a patriarch, and with strictly equal chances, this cannot but affect the atmosphere among the bishops.

The canonical changes also affected more fundamental issues - first of all, this concerned the veneration of saints. The host of saints themselves, as well as icons depicting the Mother of God and saints, have always played a crucial role in Orthodoxy, and at the level of both the Church as a whole and the feelings of each believer. Therefore, there could not and cannot be any talk of any changes like the European reformation of Luther and Calvin, aimed at abolishing this, in the Russian Church. But the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church came to the conclusion that many deviations from the original tradition and ancient deanery had accumulated in this part, and the VIII Council was considered the right moment to correct this. It made a number of decisions in this direction, namely: the words "Most Holy Mother of God, save us" were removed from the liturgical canon, and for the future the same words were forbidden when praying to any saints - only God can save. They were replaced by the words "Most Holy Theotokos, pray to God (or "pray to your Son") for us," as was customary for the saints.

The temples have retained names for certain saints or events celebrated as church holidays, but only after the name of God. Thus, now the temple can be called, for example, "the temple of our Lord Jesus Christ in memory of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker" or "the temple of our Lord Jesus Christ in memory of the Assumption of the Virgin" - the name simply "the temple of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker" is considered non-canonical.

Church holidays of the miraculous icons of the Mother of God (as well as the names of temples and aisles) are also now supposed to be named "in memory of the miracle of such and such an icon of the Mother of God" - a different name is considered non-canonical.

Icons of the Mother of God and saints can and should be kept at home and prayed to (ask "pray to God for us"), but now only together with the icon of the Savior or the Holy Trinity. To have at home or at work only icons of saints is considered a violation of decency. At the same time, the canon now establishes that on any icon of the Virgin or a saint there must be at least a small image of the Savior or the Holy Trinity; however, this applies only to new icons that are being painted now - old icons that do not correspond to this canon are in no way prohibited and are considered quite blessed (as, by the way, and all New Believer Nikonian icons with a spelling of the name of the Savior other than before the 17th century and after the VIII Council, writing the name of the Savior). All this was aimed at ensuring that the veneration of the Most Holy Theotokos and the saints was an additional part of faith in God, albeit the most important, and not a substitute for it, as, in the opinion of the Orthodox, is the case in Catholicism. It has been so since ancient times - it is no coincidence that in the Orthodox creed, in contrast to the Catholic one, the words "... and into the communion of saints" in the ninth member (after the words "Into one holy, catholic and apostolic Church") have not been preserved. In addition, the VIII Council introduced a hierarchy of saints: now there are saints themselves, the criterion for belonging to which is the presence of clear and undoubted signs of God's election. And separately there are the faithful, the

criterion for belonging to which is simply living a life that can serve as an example for Orthodox Christians. Only miracle workers, as well as martyrs, belong to the saints - because, as the already mentioned Metropolitan Arseniy of Constantinople said on this occasion at the Council, "if a person prefers to die, but not utter the words of renunciation of the faith, which, after all, one can then refuse, it is and there is the greatest miracle. Accordingly, they are called according to their face, with the addition of the words "miracle worker" or "martyr" - for example, "holy reverend name miracle worker". The faithful, however, do not have faces, they are called with the addition of their position in earthly life, for example, "the noble prince name" or "the noble monk name". The image of the passion-bearers (saints who accepted death not at all for faith, but humbly), which had existed since the glorification of Boris and Gleb in the 11th century, was completely transferred to the faithful. This practically ended the confrontation within the Church on the question of whether the canonization of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II was correct - no one objected to his inclusion among the faithful. The same applies to the reckoning of many rulers and military leaders, such as Dmitry Donskoy or Admiral Ushakov. The conciliar faithful are commemorated only in thanksgiving prayers, and they are not asked for help (in an individual prayer, you can ask anyone to pray to God for you, even deceased relatives).

It became forbidden to call clergy "father", because the Savior said: "Do not call anyone on earth your father, for you have one Father who is in heaven." Therefore, all believers address each other as "brother" or "sister" (according to the same words of the Savior - "... you are still brothers"), and to the priest - "elder brother" or, in short, "elder" (for example, "Elder John, bless"). However, any bishop is still called "Vladyko", because there is no prohibition on this in Holy Scripture, and Russians understand Scripture literally.

Finally, the Feast of the Creation of the World was established, only, unlike the Jews, not weekly, but annual - it is celebrated on the last Saturday of the year, on Christmas week. The Council considered that in the absence of this holiday, the Orthodox people are inclined to under-worship the first hypostasis of the Trinity - the Beginningless Creator. By the way, when pronouncing the creed, it is now obligatory to be baptized when pronouncing the first term ("into one God the Father Almighty"), and the second ("and into one Lord Jesus Christ"), and the eighth ("and into the Holy Spirit").

Relations between Church and State. For centuries, the Russian, and indeed the Eastern, church knew only two modalities of relations with the state - symbiosis ("symphony") or persecution by the latter. The first took place throughout the history of Byzantium, as well as the entire history of the First Russian Empire, and the second - the entire history of the Second Empire.

It is not typical for the Eastern Church to desire to acquire secular power for itself, as it wished, and not unsuccessfully, in the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church - for such claims, the initiator of the schism of the 17th century, Patriarch Nikon, was deprived of both the bishopric and the priesthood in general. But the meeting of two equal parties is also to a large extent a myth - in reality, both in Byzantium and in Moscow Russia, the state led the Church (for example, in the structure of royal power there was a monastic order back in the 17th century). Well, there is nothing to say about post-Petrine Russia - there the primacy of the state was generally formalized, since the Holy Synod was officially a state institution.

When St. Cyril and Gabriel the Great were pondering how to build a new status for the Church in the Third Empire, none of the above inspired them or served as an example for them. This applied not only to persecution and direct statehood, but even to co-government - worldly power, even "in a share" with the state, corrupts the Church, by virtue of its very nature. On the other hand, this did not mean that in the past there was nothing to focus on - there was a period of early Christianity, when the Church could only rely on itself, because it was persecuted, but it was strong in spirit and therefore did not bow before the state, but did not at all try to replace it, in strict accordance with the words of the Savior, "give to God what is God's, and to Caesar what is Caesar's." Approximately this (only without persecution) constitutes the Russian ideal, in contrast to the Byzantine one - not the state and the Church together rule the state,

but the state rules the state, and the Church rules the spirit of the people. The purpose of the Church is to be saved together, and nothing else. Her interests and goals lie outside our world (believers strive to attain the Kingdom of Heaven, and “My Kingdom is not of this world”), and therefore participation in any earthly affairs, even the most charitable, such as material assistance to the orphans and the poor, is for her a purely secondary matter. The Church, of course, must denounce the evil of this world, including that which comes from the authorities, not being afraid of anything, as St. Philip did under Ivan the Terrible, but not in order to change this authority, but in order to testify before the world that the faith of Christ is alive in His Church.

In view of what has been said, it is clear that if we are to open a new page in the relationship between the Church and the state, then we should avoid the temptation - no small one, it must be said - namely, the acceptance of the model of active direct assistance to the Church from the state. This will inevitably lead to the dependence of the Church, even if such assistance, financial or otherwise, is absolutely sincere. As the rude Russian proverb says, “he who has dinner with a girl, he dances with her.” It is difficult to expose the evil that comes from the authorities (today it is not there - and tomorrow, you see, it will appear), if it involves you. An even worse option than direct budgetary assistance is the provision of various kinds of economic benefits that make it easy to earn money on your own. It is still dependent on the state (benefits can be withdrawn!), but besides, how can one serve two masters, simultaneously engage in salvation and commerce? It is not for nothing that the Savior expelled money changers from the Temple. As for direct assistance that is not financial, as was the case in the First Empire from the 18th century, that is, the establishment of state and civil benefits for the Orthodox and discrimination against non-Christians, as well as the use of the state repressive apparatus against opponents of the Church (heretics, for example), then the worst Church services cannot be rendered. Perhaps, as a result of this, it will become a powerful organization in the earthly sense (although it will still be a colossus with feet of clay), but it will cease to be the Body of Christ for sure. What then could the state do for the Church, with such a sincere desire?

The answer lay in two planes, in two, so to speak, socio-political plans.

The first plan is that the state, by personal example, set a model for churching, including - and even in particular - for the elites. The service class, to which all state power passed as a result of the constitutional reform, is obliged by the Constitution to be Orthodox, and according to its charter, not just believers, but really churched. Moreover, this was not a formal record, as the Russians say, “for show” - right from the initial military service, the cadets, that is, the future guardsmen, are intensively brought up in a truly Orthodox spirit. This is done by the Church - the military authorities are only responsible for ensuring that its requirements are unconditionally fulfilled. Accordingly, when these Cadets become the top leadership of the country, they cannot make decisions except in the spirit of imbibed values. Indeed, in Russian politics, considerations are of paramount importance whether this or that action is right and just, and before every important decision, leaders usually fast and pray, and often even leave for a monastery or skete for several days. Moreover, citizens understand that this is not window dressing - there is no democracy in Russia, the authorities are elected only by guardsmen, and they do not care what the public thinks of them. When the government behaves this way, it is certainly adopted by a significant part of other elites - this is a centuries-old Russian tradition, and therefore an active church life and turning to God to make responsible decisions have become the norm for a large number of Russian businessmen and managers and, to a lesser extent, scientists, doctors, engineers and others.

The second plan is that the state declared Russia an Orthodox country in the Constitution. It would seem that this is a direct departure from the concept of the separation of the Church from the state, which for us is a synonym for civilization, but, oddly enough, the Church is separated from the state in Russia as well, according to the Constitution. This is the new modality of interaction between the Church and the state: neither the Church is subordinate to the state, as was the case in the First Empire in the 18th-20th

centuries, nor the state to the Church, as in theocracies. True, unlike us, this was done to protect not the state from the Church, but the Church from the state - it is believed that the Church of Christ, whose Kingdom is not of this world, will only weaken in spirit from too close a symbiosis with power. A curious illustration of this kind of separation is marriage - in Russia it can be civil (by this they mean not cohabitation without registration, as we have, but, on the contrary, state registration) or church. So, when getting married, the Church does not take into account the civil status of the spouse (he may be married), it is only important whether he is married, and, on the contrary, cohabitation with a legally registered spouse, if he is not married to him in the church, is considered a grave sin, such a person is usually not allowed to take communion. Conversely, for the state, for example in the imperial courts, married but not registered citizens are considered unmarried. The logic here is simple: you get married to save your soul, that is, to receive the protection of the Savior and His law, and you register a marriage in order to receive the protection of the Empire and its law. If you did only one thing, it means that you are not interested in the second, and there is nothing to complain about now.

In general, the status of Russia as a constitutionally Orthodox country, as I already wrote in the Nationalism section, does not mean any discrimination against non-believers or atheists and in general any specific management decisions, but rather refers to the sphere of goals and norms. For example, the Orthodox, especially the churched, may be a minority of the population, but the natural default is to be Orthodox. The same is true of specific spiritual and ethical aspects of personal and social life. Therefore, the Orthodox status of Russia is mainly manifested in purely symbolic things: in the Orthodox coat of arms, sign, flag and anthem, which cannot be adjusted or even discussed; in the glorification of the Orthodox vector of Russian history, also without the possibility of publicly even discussing this in terms of doubt; in national holidays, which are mostly Orthodox; in a return to the Julian calendar, which now differs from ours by 13 days; in the ban on the use of any numbers for people, including in places of deprivation of liberty - even in the passport there is now no number, and to distinguish between full namesakes, in addition to the name, the time and place of birth and the full names of the parents are used; etc. The Orthodox spirit of the country is also manifested in specific legislative and regulatory acts of state power - above I wrote a lot about how Orthodox values are embodied in the economy, social sphere, law and order, etc. That is, the constitutional status of Russia as an Orthodox state manifests itself in many ways, but not in direct support of the Church and not in the fight against heretics or non-believers, as is the case in the Caliphate.

As for the financial basis for the existence of the Church, in the context of the spread of real churchness, the ancient custom of tithing, which existed both in the early Church and in Old Testament times, also spread. Only now for active parishioners, who, however, are not community members, this is not a tithe (10%), but a fortieth (2.5%) or, more rarely, twentieth (5%) of income. Church people, who are community members, usually pay a fifth or, more rarely, a tithe, and in autonomous communities (see the section "The Spiritual Estate") they often decide to give away all their earnings, leaving themselves only pocket expenses. In addition, it is customary for all parishioners to participate at least once a month in the affairs of their church and parish directly by their own labor - cleaning, sewing, cooking, repairing, tinkering, etc.; moreover, it is impossible to pay off with a large monetary contribution - money is money, and labor is labor. The Church does not pay taxes, but it does not engage in any economic (in the sense of commercial) activities, with the exception of its few enterprises - but they pay taxes like everyone else (except for non-commercial ones). That is, this is not a special benefit of the Ecumenical Russian Orthodox Church, but a natural consequence of its status as a non-profit organization. The fact that the Orthodox clergy - the first estate - does not pay personal taxes, is precisely a demonstrative benefit, since the clergy of other religions, even the three traditional ones, do not have it. But this does not matter much, since they are all not rich, taking a vow of non-acquisitiveness, and they can't wait for anything else in their midst.

All this provides a fairly solid foundation for church finances, especially since pensioners, who

traditionally make up a significant part of the parishioners, have ceased to be beggars. Of course, large sponsorship contributions from the rich come in very handy, but they are no longer the only serious source, and therefore the Church can afford not to curry favor with them and not accept such help from those from whom it should not be accepted. At the end of the last - the beginning of this century, the Church took money en masse from bandits (not from a good life, of course), but later this was recognized as wrong. Not because it is not necessary to forgive them too - the Savior ordered to forgive up to seventy times seven times - but because it is necessary to forgive for sincere repentance and readiness to shake off the dust of the old life, and not for a monetary contribution.

Fight against heresies. Since the 90s of the last century, the Renovationist and ecumenical heresies began to gain strength in Russia, anathematized by the VIII Council as one Renovationist-ecumenical heresy. The Renovationists called for bringing church life in line with the changed life of society: allow widowed priests to remarry; to make the bishopric married—not just to allow married bishops, as the 7th Council did, but to make it obligatory; to drastically reduce the number and duration of posts. Subsequently, some of them went even further - they proposed to abolish monasticism altogether, allow church divorce, allow living out of wedlock with a married man or woman, as well as living with each other without a wedding, allowing sodomy and lesbianism. They also sought liturgical changes: to replace the language of services from Church Slavonic to modern Russian; to have an altar not outside the royal gates, but in the center of the temple - this was allegedly the case in the early Church; and drastically shorten the duration of the liturgy (much like we had a shortened Mass since the 70s of the last century, which was canceled by the New Roman Council in 2028).

All this fit perfectly into the mainstream of those modernist tendencies that have been growing in liberal societies since the end of the 20th century in all religions: and, as I just pointed out, in Catholicism, and in Judaism (the so-called reformed Judaism), and even in Islam. I don't even speak about Protestant denominations, because these tendencies were inherent in them from the very beginning.

The Renovators emphasized that, they say, all the rites and rituals in religious life are relics of the past, which came from the times of darkness and savagery of people, and the only thing that matters is whether you believe in God in your soul. A favorite expression was: “God dwells in a temple of bone (*meaning the chest*), and not of stone.” In fact, all this led to the desacralization of religion and, as a result, to its complete emasculation and transformation into a secular club, because the main thing in the good news of Christ is Christ himself, and not the ethical principles of His teaching; and the main thing in religion is the salvation of the soul, and not noble behavior in everyday life (although this is also important).

In Russia, purely religious reasons for the rejection of such innovations were exacerbated by two historical features. Firstly, the relatively recent bitter history of the church turmoil of the early 20s of the twentieth century was still alive in the memory, during which the Renovationists were already trying to come to power with the help of the Bolsheviks and even convened the Second Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. And secondly, five centuries earlier, the first attempt of this kind was made by the so-called Judaizers, who tried to destroy the Russian Orthodox Church from within by emasculating its essence and also under the slogans of renewal. In addition, the Renovationists of the late twentieth and early our century were financially supported by Western Protestant funds (and Orthodoxy traditionally had a particularly bad attitude towards Lutheranism, as “graceless”), and simply by special services; morally, they were supported by the Russian “democrats”, who by that time were already sick of everyone, at least among the children of the Church. Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church, under Patriarch Kirill, waged a struggle against them for destruction, thus replacing the negative, but conniving attitude that had previously taken place. As a result, Renovationism was recognized at the VIII Council as heresy, anathematized, and a ban was imposed on all its specific liturgical and other manifestations. But the Church had enough conciliar wisdom not to throw out the baby with the [bath]water and use in its own way the few reasonable grains that were in the Renovationist heresy, or, more precisely, simply pay

special attention to a number of problems. In addition to the admission of a married episcopate, this concerned the language of worship - the transition to Russian was out of the question, but at the same time it was necessary to solve the problem, since the main part of the parishioners did not understand the sacred texts. As a result, of course, the old liturgical language was preserved, but under the Moscow Patriarchate they decided to create a commission for the improvement of the Church Slavonic language, by analogy with the same commission for the Russian language under the Russian Academy of Sciences. This commission made certain adjustments to the Church Slavonic language itself, which made it much more understandable for any person who knows the Russian language. And as a temporary solution, all parishes were ordered during the final part of the liturgical service, along with the dismissal and the sermon, to read the Gospel and the Apostle in Russian, which were read that day at the liturgy in Church Slavonic.

The ecumenists, on the other hand, did not emphasize the modernization of the Church, but that all religions are one and the same, only expressed in different terms, and even all Christian religions are strictly identical, the differences between them are contrived by the clergy for their own interests. Therefore, we must move towards unification, but for now, communicate with each other, including prayerfully, discussing and overcoming disagreements. It is obvious that the roots of this trend lay in the globalization of all aspects of life at the end of the last and the beginning of our century, on the one hand, and in the modernist trends discussed above, on the other. After all, if all rituals, the canon, and even dogma are nonsense, and religion is just an internal belief in some kind of foggy god (foggy - because all the specifics are given only by the Church and other organized religions), then, of course, there cannot be any difference between world religions. For this reason, ecumenism was defined by the VIII Council as part of the same heresy with Renovatism and anathematized along with it. In addition, ecumenism contradicted the very basic principles of civilizational self-identification of Russians (autonomy, nationalism, etc.).

Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the century, ecumenism posed a serious threat to Orthodoxy, especially while Russia still thought that its future was to be an integral and significant part of the world community. There were cases when even well-known hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church conducted church services together with Catholics. From a human point of view, this is understandable - it's so nice to feel not like a provincial Russian, even a high-ranking one, but a citizen of the world, and not one of the last, communicating on an equal footing with the arbiters of the planet's destinies - the ancient leaders and kings, finding themselves in the brilliant and powerful Alexandria or Rome. In order to avoid this in the future, in the new edition of the apostolic canons adopted at the Council, they returned in this matter to the original rigidity that took place in the ancient apostolic rules: any Orthodox, both layman and clergyman, who voluntarily entered a church of a different faith (these are understood, among other things, including Catholic churches, and Protestant prayer houses) during worship, is subject to rejection from the Church. Interestingly, at the same time, modern Orthodox dogmatic theology considers the Catholic faith, in contrast to the Lutheran faith, to be grace-filled (albeit erroneous), but alien: in the words of the Reverend Elder John of Ugresh, who died in 2041 and canonized in 2052, "a Catholic, probably, can be saved, but a Catholic from Russians - no way.

The Markian doctrine became a much more serious challenge for the ROC. It arose later, in the second decade of our century, although it also has roots in the general tendencies of the spiritual life of liberal societies at the turn of the century, however, rather of their non-church part. At the end of the 20th century, interest in everything occult and esoteric increased noticeably and spread in society - perhaps this interest was even more widespread than at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. Moreover, the distribution is ubiquitous - both in the West and in the Russian Federation and other countries - remnants of the Second Russian Empire. Although by the beginning of the 21st century, this hobby had largely acquired the character of a religion (in our country it even received the generally accepted name "New Age", and precisely as one of the religions), it did not cause much excitement among Christian churches - churches

always react harshly to heresies within themselves and are much calmer about what happens outside of them, with people who are not their flock anyway. But in 2012, the teachings of Hieromonk Abbot Mark (later called Markianism) became widespread, which could no longer be ignored, since it promoted occultism and esotericism from Orthodox Christian positions - at least, the Markians themselves positioned themselves that way. It is clear that if earlier such things, as I have already indicated, aroused wide interest, then Markianism went around the world like a fire across the steppe.

It was a typical syncretic teaching that combined a certain amount of Orthodox rhetoric (rather, just a feeling that you are not torn away from your national roots), some of the most common ideas and terms of the New Age (such as energy, aura, etc.), some of the positivist ideas about the omnipotence of the human mind that have entered the flesh and blood of modern man, as well as a number of elements of the Jewish Kabbalistic teaching. To what extent the latter were related to the real teaching of Kabbalah, I cannot say, because in fact this teaching is secret. God created man in His own image and likeness, hegumen Mark taught, but what does this mean - we are not like Him in body, after all, God does not have a body? We have an immortal soul and free will, but is that enough to call us His image and likeness? If the matter were limited to this, then the Scripture would simply say: "He created them with a free will and an immortal soul." No, God created man completely equal to Himself, which means that he possesses all the abilities of the Creator. Moreover, it is understandable why He did this, Abbot Mark taught - in order to have comrades for Himself, because this is the only thing that God does not have - He is absolutely alone. But after all, it would seem that we do not have any supernatural abilities - but the whole point, the Markians said, was that God did not want to give this to a person right away and just like that, because then the person would be ashamed and embarrassed, and there would be no equal relationship with him. It will be - just like if a billionaire just gives you part of his fortune, then you will not feel equal to him at all, rather the opposite. But if you yourself earn a fortune, albeit with his help, then it's another matter. In the same way, God gave people only the opportunity to become equal to Him, so that they could use it and be proud of the fact that they themselves have risen. So people have to develop inherent superpowers in themselves in order to fulfill God's plan for themselves - this is their duty. Then, among other things, they will be able to see Him and communicate with Him during their lifetime, and the very human concepts of life and death will cease to exist for them. And Jesus Christ appeared in our world in order to teach people this, and he himself had previously gone the same way and ascended to God and merged with Him - this is what it means to become the Son of God.

Mark argued his teaching with three places from the Gospels: how a woman with bleeding imperceptibly touched the clothes of Christ and was immediately healed, and He felt the outflow of Force from himself (Mark 5, 28-30) (this is exactly how the Markians wrote it with a capital letter, according to New Age custom); how Jesus told his disciples that if you have faith, you will be able to move mountains and nothing will be impossible for you at all (Matt. 17:20); and as Jesus wrote (in other translations, he drew) something on the ground, when they brought him an adulteress (John, 8, 6-8), the Markians argued that, apart from Kabbalistic signs, He had absolutely nothing to draw or write.

It is not my purpose to describe in detail the theology of the Markian doctrine, much less to present its argumentation or apology - I personally do not sympathize with it in any way, since I was brought up in a strict Catholic spirit - but it is necessary to explain why it spread so quickly and represented such a large danger. In the Markian groups (the Markians themselves called them communities), people really began to acquire parapsychological skills: to see and even read blindfolded, to learn everything about a stranger at a glance, to move objects without hands, with one effort of will, to heal many diseases without drugs, by imposing hands or just a look, and other things like that - I myself got acquainted in the archives with the protocols of state commissions that studied this issue. Whether the Prince of Darkness himself helped the Markians in this, as St. Cyril claimed at the Council, or whether all this is actually available to anyone, like how to pump up muscles or learn languages, and the Markians simply developed or got an effective technique from somewhere, it's hard for me to say. In all countries, and Russia is no exception,

special services are especially interested in such issues, and there is little serious public information about this. The Markians began and ended their meetings in groups with Christian prayers, and the most advanced among them (the so-called fifth-degree initiates) claimed to communicate with many saints, the Mother of God, and even Jesus Christ himself. At the same time, they said that at this level of spiritual growth (approaching the Creator, in their terminology), it becomes obvious that all religions are one and the same.

People flocked to the Markians in droves, and paid a lot of money for classes in groups I, II and III (stages IV and V, where not everyone passed, were free). Abbot Mark, however, had enough faith or simply the mind not to start luxury and not let his associates do it. When the Patriarchate realized it, and this happened at the end of the 2010s, it was not very clear what to do with Mark: it was useless to ban him from priestly service, since he did not fulfill the requirements, but to deprive him of the priestly rank, or even more so the grace of monastic tonsure would only turn him into a martyr, and would not achieve anything. In addition, there was no reason to do this - he regularly confessed and took communion in ordinary churches (in their communities, the Markians did not perform the sacraments, apparently, specifically to make it harder for them to make claims). Mark regularly repeated the symbol of the Orthodox faith and, apparently, sincerely believed in it. He simply believed that people like him knew immeasurably more, and the creed, and indeed faith itself, for them, like a children's primer for an adult, is certainly the right thing, but not very relevant anymore.

There was also no reason to ask the secular authorities for intervention - the Markians did not fall under the concepts of a totalitarian or even more so satanic sect: they did not have a rigid hierarchy or subordination, there was no socialization of property, they did not worship Satan and did not serve him with black masses, and in general, they went to services in ordinary churches. In addition, any of the initiates of the higher levels had to spend some time on walking and healing the suffering for free. However, in 2018, Mark publicly predicted that in a year Russia would start a short and victorious war, and in two years it would become a world empire - after the prediction came true, the situation became critical: it was no longer just the people, as the Russians say, "rushed" there, and from the whole new territory of the Empire, but entire parishes, together with the abbots, began to declare themselves Markians. The struggle of the Moscow Patriarchate against them, led by St. Cyril, ended only in 2026, at the Ecumenical Council.

At the VIII Council, the discussion of Markianism became the most acute issue. Many Markians were present at the Council, and since there was nowhere to retreat, hegumen Mark himself stopped pretending to be a sheep and spoke quite directly. "Let's not dissemble and pretend to agreement and unanimity, brethren," he said. - Let's not be like those about whom it is written in Jeremiah: "They say: peace! peace! - but there is no peace. I want to tell you in the words of the Savior, when two disciples of John came to Him: "Go and tell what you hear and see - the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear"; isn't it the same now? I know they say about me that we do it by the power of demons - but didn't they say the same about the Savior? I do not declare myself a Savior, I am just a person who is openly and commanded by God to reveal to others: you are all like gods and can do everything, and if you can, then you must. And now I say to you, brethren: yes, it has been revealed to me, unworthy, that our faith is incomplete, and we need to supplement it, and if you want to call it the word "change," as my accusers say, well, let it be changed. In our creed, in the third term, after the words "For the sake of man...", we must insert "... consubstantial with Him." And so I will tell you, brethren: at the First Ecumenical Council, Arius said that the Son of God is consubstantial with man, because there is no Divine nature in Him, and he was wrong. And those who objected to him and defeated him, said the opposite - and were also wrong. In fact, the Son of God is indeed consubstantial with man, but not because he does not possess a Divine nature apart from the human one - He possesses it. And because it is the same with all people - it is only our bodies that were created on the sixth day, and all souls were born from the Father before all ages. And why reproach me and my students for what we do - don't we

pray to God for the acquisition of all our abilities, and, therefore, aren't they from God? And do we do it for ourselves, for the sake of money or something else low?

Very many of the delegates of the Council were seduced by his words, even non-Markians, but not all. Clement, Metropolitan of Moscow, showed himself to be a true warrior of Christ. "There are things forbidden for a person," he said, "and it doesn't matter if it's for evil or for good: even in the Law of Moses, which the Savior came not to cancel, but to fulfill, all magic or sorcery is categorically forbidden - unless it is said there that only for evil, but for good deeds, let's, they say, conjure? Yes, you heal, and for free, and I don't even tell you, like many of the brethren here, that this is certainly from the devil, but this is impossible, and there is no benefit in such healing, because the Creator did not intend it that way." "Don't take heart pills then!" exclaimed Protopresbyter Thomas, one of the prominent Markians. "They were invented by people, not by God, and don't drive cars, and don't call on the phone!" "When you take a pill or even make one, you don't change yourself," Clement answered. "No more than when you mold a pot out of clay or carve a staff out of wood. If in the future scientists understand how these skills of yours work, and all this turns out to be ordinary material, and they invent machines or chemistry that will do this, please, I myself will take advantage of this. But changing oneself is impossible, it's like eating the fruits from the tree of knowledge, like our ancestors Adam and Eve. But it seems to me that what you are doing is even worse - these are fruits from the tree of life, and completely forbidden."

I will not touch here on all the vicissitudes of this dispute, dear compatriots, it lasted more than a month, and dozens of books have been written about it; St. Cyril put an end to it. "Yes, you said right, Mark, that we are returning to the Arian heresy," he said. - This is how it should be, the beginning and the end always close, and therefore at the last Ecumenical Council we again face the same questions as at the First, albeit posed differently. Therefore, I say directly, unlike many of my brethren here, that it is from the Prince of demons that your teaching is - it is his hand that is visible in this. It is impossible to eradicate the faith and the Church of Christ without affirming that there is no difference between Christ and man, which means that we must try differently than Arius. What is seventeen centuries for Satan - him at the door, and he at the window! Many have said correctly here, but I will say something else: you say that all people can do this - but is it really so? Do you have all those who have passed the first stage reach the fifth, and even more so become mentors of perfection, as you call it? I know, you say, that everyone can do it, but not everyone has enough desire and perseverance, but don't be cunning: you yourself use the word "ability". But can any ability, like, for example, mathematics or music, be the same for everyone? Is there such perseverance and such a desire in the world that could make Mozart out of Salieri? And if not, it means that you separate people much more than their wealth, origin or ordinary natural abilities can separate. Yes, the Savior said that if you have faith, you will be able to command mountains - but you are saying something else: some of you will be able to command mountains and large ones, and some will not. So, what happens - there are just people, but there are others? And who then are people for these others: they are not creations to them, as to the Father, because they did not create them; they are not a flock to them, as to the Son, for they came into life not to suffer for them, like a good shepherd, but only to exalt themselves, and with full reason they will say with the words of Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?" Yes, and they are not brothers to them - also brothers to me, who can do nothing; except, as we say about animals, "our smaller brothers." So Satan tempted you not with something new, but with the same thing that he always has - a power that others do not have, and pride from the fact that you have it. And that you use your power not for food from gold and not for the maintenance of harems, but for something else, so pride can manifest itself in different ways - do you, Mark, who lived in a monastery, not know this. The divine in the Son is not that He walked on water or even healed - it's you, maybe you really do no worse - but that He, sinless, came to take torment for us, mired in sin, and wept in Gethsemane garden in the mortal anguish of His human nature, but did not give up. You are not the Son and cannot be consubstantial with Him, because for all your skills you turn to the Creator with a prayer - you yourself said here that without prayer they are not found - and He did not need

anything from the Father, except to fulfill His will. But woe to you, there will be no salvation for your pride, as the Savior said: “Whoever offends one of these little ones who believe in Me, it would be better for him if they hung a millstone around his neck and drowned him in the depths of the sea.”

As a result, a decision was made to anathematize Markianism, impose a ban on all their customs and excommunicate Mark himself and his most prominent associates, as well as all Markians who did not repent of heresy within three months. As the chairman of the commission, Bishop George from Kharkov, said: “You can practice your teaching outside the Church - as long as you do not do evil, you do not violate earthly laws, but this does not concern us. You can even call yourself a Christian if you like - the laws of our Empire do not forbid that either. But you are not Orthodox and you shouldn’t call yourself that – and you don’t need to, judging by what I heard from you.”

It is interesting that the voting results (and the conciliar principle, I remind you, requires 75% of the votes to make a decision) remarkably illustrated the original meaning of the words “conciliar decision”, that is, resulting from the indulgence of the Holy Spirit: part of the Markians already at the Council changed their views under the influence of speeches, and another part left, which made the above voting results possible. Marcianism did not completely disappear after the Council - it exists to this day, though already outside the EROC, and by analogy with Arianism, it can be assumed that it will be alive for quite a long time. But the strongest and most visible manifestations of the Markian superpowers have disappeared, as if the anathema of the Council deprived them of their power - all the church people of Russia are sure that this is the case. Thus, the most dangerous threat in recent centuries to Russian Orthodoxy, and perhaps to all Christianity, was defeated - it was certainly more terrible than the physical persecution of the Church by the Bolsheviks, exactly in the words of the Savior: “Do not be afraid of those who kill the body, but do not kill the soul.” mighty; “but fear the One who can destroy even the soul in hell.”

Folk religion. When I had already returned from Russia and was preparing this book, in particular, discussing it with my supervisor and colleagues at seminars, one of the teachers from our faculty, Professor Martinez, asked about this chapter: “What place does religion take in Russia in the life of the people? Here you write very curiously, dear Mr. dos Santos, about the clergy, about reforms and Councils, about heresies and the canon - but besides the clergy, are there many who are ready, as Christ said, to give up everything and follow Him? In many ways, do people limit themselves in everyday life for the sake of the commandments of Christ; are they afraid of death? I thought about it and supplemented this chapter with the section that you are now reading.

People for whom the Orthodox faith is not just a part of life, but its main content, in Russia, of course, are a minority, but not so small - according to my ideas and observations, 10-12 percent of the total number of Orthodox, that is, about 55 million people. These are those for whom missing more than one Sunday service in a row is an emergency, and such things as theft, adultery, or refusing to help someone in need will not even cross their minds. Their proportion is higher in small towns and villages and lower in metropolitan areas, and they are usually modest in behavior and position in life and therefore hardly noticeable, although they are immediately visible from their facial expressions and especially from their eyes. But they are the accumulators of the truly Russian spirit, and in any difficult time for the country they are the first help. Among the rest (besides the clergy, which I already wrote about in the relevant section), another 20-25 percent of all Orthodox are people who live an ordinary earthly life, the same as we do, for whom, nevertheless, the presence of God and the Church is a constantly present and felt factor of this life.

Russians are very fond of discussing and arguing about matters of faith; heated debates on theological topics are not uncommon both at the feast and on the street. But the matter is not limited to this - religiosity leaves an imprint on all aspects of Russian life. The thought “It is not good to do this, because the Lord does not command” definitely visits Russians more often than us; it replaces many social norms with them. Russians are more inclined than we are to forgive others - I mean those whom there is no

reason to forgive from the standpoint of ordinary morality. Moreover, by the word “forgive” I do not mean the absence of hostile actions or even words, as we often understand it, but the restoration of friendly relations and communication in full. Russians are more typical of simple pity, without elements of duty and justice: for example, I can’t say that they serve the poor there more than we do, but if no one gives to a professional beggar, then a Russian can easily do this and say: “Well and what, am I to decide who is worthy of help?”

As I already wrote in the chapter “[Economy](#)”, Russians are more characterized not by a craving for unlimited luxury, but by a contemplative attitude towards life. They are more inclined to ask themselves the question “Why is this all?”, and although for many this will only lead to melancholy, drunkenness and other negative manifestations, many people think about this question and resolve it for themselves in a religious way. Russians are more inclined to see in their lives the direct manifestation of God’s will and not resist it; such considerations as “I will not oppose this course of events, not because I am lazy or afraid, but because I feel that this is not without reason with me” are quite common.

Equally widespread are the notions that your achievements are not your merit, at least not only and not so much of it, but a manifestation of God’s favor or His other providence for you. This gives rise to a feeling of gratitude - among Russians in everyday life, thanksgiving prayers are even more frequent than pleading ones. But this also leads to a characteristic attitude: in order to preserve one’s happiness and ward off misfortunes, one must not so much make efforts to preserve what is available - loved ones, health, money - as pray to God and do things pleasing to Him. And vice versa, stoic patience in difficult life circumstances, the absence of grumbling about fate and the belief that everything will be decided by the Lord in the best way are also revered as a great virtue and are very common. To fight for the correction of undesirable circumstances on one’s own, in the usual earthly way, is considered acceptable, but not the main means of correcting these circumstances.

The afterlife for many Russians is much more real than for us: in ordinary life, the fear of punishment at the Last Judgment for sins already committed is quite common, which does not give a person peace of mind and makes him pray for it or compensate for it with something good. Just as often there is not a conceptual, but a completely real and serious expectation of a meeting after death with deceased loved ones - the vast majority of Russians, for example, believe that married spouses will certainly meet in heaven, and they get married specifically for this, although this is not a dogma, but simply tradition.

Finally, Russians are very serious about the choice of their country by God: for example, opinion polls show that more than 80% of Russians are firmly convinced that the events set forth in the Apocalypse will take place all over the world, but not in the Russian Empire - its army, under the invisible leadership of Archangel Michael, will repel the troops of Antichrist, and Russia will stand as a stronghold of the true faith within its borders, as if behind a wall, under the protection of the Most Holy Theotokos. This, by the way, is one of the most profound justifications for Russian isolationism (the principle of autonomy).

On the whole, dear compatriots, the Russian society is much more churched than ours, and really churched, that is, not only in terms of following the established order, but also in the public consciousness. And this is precisely churching, and not just an abstract faith or the exaltation of moral standards in themselves. Because the Russians already had “secularized” Orthodoxy: both Orthodoxy without the Church – the last decades before 1917, and Orthodoxy without Christ, with only moral norms that came from nowhere – from the 1930s until the end of the Second Empire.

It is impossible not to say a few words about the beliefs of the service class. As I already wrote, the guardsmen are very religious, but their faith has a peculiarity that at first seemed wild to me - they believe in the transmigration of souls. For a Hindu, a Buddhist, or a fan of the New Age, this is natural, but for an Orthodox? When I began to deal with this, curious details came to light: firstly, the guardsmen believe that the souls of not all people repeatedly return to Earth, but only warriors (both in the physical and in

the spiritual sense of the word), because there are few of them, and their fate and destiny is an eternal battle. At the same time, in their view, warriors are not at all identical to just soldiers. Secondly, they believe that those into whom the soul of the eternal warrior has entered become guardsmen, and if this happens to a person not at the minimum allowed 15 years, but in adulthood, then this only means that after some the shock of the previous incarnation, the soul needs a little rest. In their view, there is no predestination here, it's just that no one else will want to join the guardsmen.

I pointed out to several of them what arguments the Church used when she did not accept the doctrine of metempsychosis in her time: the most significant of them always seemed to me personally that if the soul lives several lives, then how can it bear an answer at the Last Judgment for this particular a life? But when discussing this particular argument with the guardsmen, it turned out that they imagine the transmigration of souls in a rather peculiar way, not at all like the teachings rejected by the Church, and their views do not seem to directly contradict dogma. In particular, they do not recognize any karma that leaves the fate and salvation of each to the mechanically working spiritual law, instead of the living mercy of God. Without going into details, which, moreover, I didn't understand everything, I can say that faith in the repeated reincarnation of a part of one's soul for eternal battles occupies a very important place in the attitude of the guardsmen. The Church seems to be tolerant of this. In general, the attitude of the guardsmen contains, in addition to Orthodoxy, a very significant element of stoicism, going through the times, as I already wrote, from their ancestors in spirit - the ancient Varangians. If the rest of the true believers have no fear because the Lord will not allow anything really bad to happen to you, then the guardsmen do not expect anything good for themselves at all, but they consider fear for their lives to be contrary to the duty and honor of their class.

Other religions. In Russia, there is a gradation of religions: since 1998, according to how traditional this religion is, and since 2013, according to whether it has an organizational and spiritual center abroad. The constitution in Russia declares freedom of religion (except for Satanism and the like), so everyone has the right to worship, but their rights to public activity are highly differentiated. Non-traditional religions do not have the right to public preaching (for the Russian definition of publicity, see the chapters "[Social Sphere](#)" and "[Culture](#)") and to any of their schools, but they are not in any way restricted in terms of funding; for the state they do not seem to exist. Traditional religions, but having a center abroad, have the right to preach publicly, but not to their own general education schools (although they have the right to elective ones), and are also strictly regulated in terms of funding sources and are constantly monitored in this. Finally, there are religions that are traditional for the peoples of the Russian Empire and do not have a center abroad - they do not differ in rights from the Orthodox Church, except in national symbols, and in particular they have their own general education schools. But one must firmly understand that only organized religions can be discriminated against in their organizational and proselytizing activities - people themselves, who believe other than in the Orthodox way, cannot be discriminated against in their secular life, this is a requirement of the Constitution.

Since 1998, in addition to Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism of the Lamaist persuasion have been classified as traditional religions of the peoples of Russia (from ancient times practiced by Kalmyks, Buryats and Tuvans). And since 2013, only Islam has remained an absolutely full-fledged religion - it did not have a world center at that time; Catholicism and Protestantism were both non-traditional and had centers abroad, Judaism had a center in Israel, and Buddhism in China (Tibet) - however, the latter was not obvious to the authorities, and in reality Buddhism did not undergo any restrictions, at least in places of traditional confession. By the way, in Islam, this approach allowed the authorities to discriminate against certain movements that obviously have centers abroad - first of all, this applies to Wahhabism. But this situation changed radically in 2020, when, in connection with the accession of Europe and Israel to the Russian Empire, Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism became the traditional religions of the peoples of the Empire, and besides, their centers, without changing their geographical position, became Russian from foreign ones.

Since 2025, after the exodus of the Roman Catholic Church to the American Federation, Catholicism again became a religion with a center abroad, although traditional for the peoples of Russia (Western Europeans). On the other hand, with the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate in 2022, Islam has a distinct world center.

Thus, today the traditional religions, but having a center abroad and therefore impaired in some rights, are Catholicism (our center); some denominations of Protestants (our center); traditional Islam (center in the Caliphate) - in contrast to Ravilite, see below; Hasidic Judaism of the Lubavitcher persuasion (our center). The following are considered full-fledged religions: a) the Armenian-Gregorian Church; b) the main part of Judaism, except for the above-mentioned Lubavitcher Hasidism; c) Lamaist Buddhism - the presence of its center in the Celestial Empire was considered by the Constitutional Court unproven; d) part of the Protestant denominations, mainly from Northern Europe; e) Ravilite Islam. I will not describe these religions - this is only a subject of special interest - except for Ravilite Islam, because it is curious.

When at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century Islam was subjected to strong pressure on all fronts from the West, while being in the material and geopolitical sense on the world periphery, this did not make much impression on Muslims - everything is clear, Allah is testing them and preparing them for a decisive battle with the devil-West. But when the West was nevertheless crushed, and clearly by the will of the Almighty (remember the prophecy of Mullah Omar), but not at all by them, this made many think: so who does Allah love more, whom does He make His sword - Muslims or Christians (according to the Koran, the latter are “people of the Book”, that is, also the chosen ones of the Most High, and not unfaithful pagans)? But this crisis of religious self-identification was especially acute for the Muslim peoples who turned out to be part of the Orthodox empire (it doesn't matter when they found themselves - in ancient times or just recently): how should they consider themselves in an alien environment, when fellow believers finally created the largest state in the world by the will of Allah living according to the laws of Islam? Whether those who should pack up and go there - but it is here that the homeland! Or by those who must patiently wait until this “territory of war”, *dar el-kharq*, turns into the “territory of Islam”, *dar el-Islam* - but this Empire is strong, stronger than all in the world, including and spirit, so it is very doubtful that it can be defeated in the foreseeable future. Or maybe we should consider ourselves the vanguard, which should not wait, but prepare from within the victory in the last jihad - but the Almighty clearly favors this Empire, and in this case, will we not go against His will? So what is the meaning of our existence as Muslims?

As already mentioned, many answered this question for themselves by accepting Orthodoxy or even switching to the Russian nation, but the majority were looking for an answer within the framework of Islam. And finally, in 2023, it was given by a young mullah, a Tatar, Ravil Idiatullin. “Everything in the worlds happens by the will of Allah, and nothing is done by chance,” he said. “Everything has a meaning, and the task of the intelligent is to understand it by signs, and then they will be able to serve Allah. Let's see what signs we see now: Allah clearly loves the Russian empire and gives it strength - this can be seen not only in the results - they were also impressive in the sons of Iblis, the Americans, but also in how they were achieved. And also by the fact that He did not allow Omar III to defeat the Orthodox, as He gave Omar I almost a millennium and a half ago. So, the will of Allah is not to overthrow this empire. But the Caliphate was clearly formed according to His will, and His favor on it means that His intention is not to destroy Islam and Muslims for sins, and, therefore, it is not His will for us that we convert to Christianity. But if both the Caliphate with Islam and the Empire with Orthodoxy are blessed by Allah, then what is His plan for us, the Muslims living in the Empire? Only the blind will not see this, because the Qur'an clearly states: Christians are the People of the Book, and among them there are righteous people who believe in the Lord and the Day of Judgment, and their reward from Allah is prepared for them, and they will go to heaven. But it is also clearly stated that they are extremely close to infidelity and then they will only go to heaven if they hold on to this dangerous line and do not cross it. Is it not clearly stated there that there are among the People of the Book those who can be entrusted with even a quintar of gold, and

they will give it to you - and there are those who will not give even a small coin, no matter how much you stand over their souls? The followers of the Prophet have much stricter monotheism, which means that our goal from Allah is to influence the Orthodox, living among them in the Empire, and not to let them slip into polytheism and idolatry under the cover of Scripture. Just as the business of life of some is to fight or trade, while others are to train warriors and merchants, and these others are no less important and respected. And the day will come, maybe even shortly before the Day of Judgment, when it turns out that we and they believe in different ways in one Lord; for is it not said in the Qur'an: "O People of the Book, let us acknowledge one word for us and for you"?

This is the main essence of Ravilism, which for ten years has become completely dominant among Russian Muslims, giving them a sense of their role, a sacred one, in the Empire. And the Empire recognized Ravilite Islam as an undiscriminated religion (the center is in Russia) and, on the whole, treats it normally, like the Russian Orthodox Church, to the extent that religious people can generally treat non-believers normally.

Chapter 10

Education and Science

School education (concept). By the beginning of the 21st century, in Russia, as well as in the West and in the economically prosperous countries of the East, the tendency to increase the duration of universal compulsory education by increasing the amount of knowledge taught became absolutely dominant. This trend also applied to higher education (for some professions, the duration of education at all levels reached 25 years, that is, a third of life), but this will be discussed further. In Russia, compulsory school education in the 60-80s of the twentieth century was 10 years, in the 90s its transition to 11 years was completed, and after 2007 - to 12 years. This was argued by the increased volume of knowledge necessary for a person in general, and especially for a qualified worker, as a result of scientific and technological progress. This lengthening did not cause unanimity in society, on the contrary, many considered it unjustified (parents and teachers), but only in terms of the fact that the increased amount of material could be conveyed over the previous ten years, due to more efficient use of time. No one doubted the objective need to increase the volume of material. After all, the level of complexity of technology with which you have to deal at every step is growing? Grows! This means that the people interacting with it, both at work and at home, must adapt to this circumstance in terms of their level of knowledge, it is the level of knowledge that determines the country's competitiveness in our century. Moreover, we can meet such a level - in Soviet times, our school education system was already the best in the world! These considerations were considered commonplace until the general reforms in the country reached the education sector.

Vladimir the Restorer did not get around to a radical reform of the school education system, although he did a lot for it in the preparatory mode - first of all, he transferred its funding from the so-called residual principle to the priority one, which at least improved the situation among people professionally involved in education. But when the reforms of Gabriel the Great began, the government took up this area in earnest.

In addition to the general atmosphere of global change, the reform of the educational system was also facilitated by the fact that in any case it was necessary to build an education scheme for guardsmen - a qualitatively new one even in its purely civilian aspects. As is customary in the Russian government, a commission was first created - but not a senseless bureaucratic formation, but a shock working group, sufficiently provided with resources and powers. This analyzed (both by its own research and by studying research conducted by others) how adults of different generations master the material covered at school. The result was disappointing - a very small part even remembered the basics of many subjects, and this applied not only to those who studied in the 1990s (it could not be otherwise with them), but also to those

who graduated from school back in the period of its heyday, until the collapse of the Second Empire. However, this result was quite expected.

The commission, however, did not stop at this unfortunate fact and took the next step in the analysis - for each subject, it determined the mastery of it separately for those who are somehow connected with this subject at work (engineer - with mathematics, humanities - with literature, etc.), and those who are not connected. It turned out that if the former have little active basic knowledge (except for those that they regularly use in their work, such as trigonometry construction), but still present, then the latter know practically nothing. It would be very disappointing if it did not turn out along the way that in other countries the picture is the same, and in some - for example, in the USA - even worse. But the most interesting thing was revealed further. It turned out that for most professions, including those generally considered prestigious and creative, there are no school disciplines at all that would correspond to them and be used by people who succeed in these professions. And if these people knew something basic, then this knowledge turned out to be not just specialized, but ultra-specialized. For example, a journalist writing a column about art in a magazine, of course, knew history - but only the history of culture: he could, of course, answer the question in which country and when did the [Barbizonians](#) work, but [here's what was happening at that time with this country, with whom it fought, how it developed - he, as a rule, had no idea about this. The manager of the travel agency knew, of course, geography and knew about any country not only where it is located and what kind of climate it is, but also other things that are important for him and his clients - the state of its economy, history, culture. But what are the main parties in this country, he usually didn't know, because vacationers are not interested in this. The picture that opened up made me think: why do we teach our children at school if they do not use and forget most of the knowledge they have received, why do we spend a lot of money on school education, which could instead be spent on increasing pensions, space exploration or producing aircraft carriers?](#)

[One would think that the school simply teaches the wrong thing, because people still receive some knowledge, otherwise they could not work. But universal compulsory education, by its very nature, does not at all imply the provision of specialized knowledge and skills, especially since paid courses do an excellent job of this. And is it necessary, the commission wondered, to teach what is really necessary in everyday life? After all, everyone learns what is really needed, and so, first imitating others, and at an older age consciously learning from them. For example, no one specifically teaches a child to speak, but he still learns, although this, if you think about it, is much more difficult than reading and writing. Even if we admit that many parents teach him this, then in dysfunctional families, where no one takes care of the child at all, all mentally healthy children nevertheless begin to speak.](#)

[Moreover, a rigorous study unambiguously showed that those children who, for some reason, did not study in the first or second grade of school and did not study with private teachers, still somehow learned to read \(thus, the statement, that there are many people in the United States who cannot read, turned out to be a fiction\). But opponents objected, what about before, a hundred years ago, when only a minority went to school and, accordingly, the majority could not read? However, this circumstance quite fit into the ideas that the commission began to form. The ability to read in the modern world is not a requirement of high-society etiquette or an imperative for intellectuals - it is a skill without which it is almost impossible to exist at a purely everyday level, because it is impossible to understand either a label on a product or a hyperlink on the Web. And a hundred years ago, the world was arranged in such a way that it was quite possible to do without it - precisely because it was designed for the majority who could not read. It is absolutely unnecessary for an ordinary person to write in the modern world, therefore, children who did not go to school do not learn this \(as, indeed, many who did\) - but this is if the word "write" means writing with a pen on paper and without errors. And if we mean by this the use of a keyboard without observing spelling, then everyone learns this - because without it you cannot use a computer, and the computer has become a part of everyday life. The point here is precisely in everyday and social necessity, and not in complexity or simplicity - the same hundred years ago, typing on a typewriter \(the same](#)

keyboard) was considered much more difficult than just writing, and this was specially taught. But the most convincing fact was that most of the best hackers and even systems programmers - and this, according to accepted ideas, is already one of the most difficult and prestigious professions in the modern world - never studied their specialty in the traditional, formalized sense.

Thus, as the situation was understood, the following picture emerged: the elementary school teaches to read, count and write, and the latter is bad, but the children would have learned all of the above without it. The secondary school, on the other hand, teaches a large amount of fairly detailed knowledge in all major scientific and humanitarian disciplines, which practically no one remembers in a year, not to mention the longer time that has passed since graduation. But this near-zero performance is only one side of the coin. The other, paradoxical at first glance, is that maybe, thank God, children don't remember any of this, maybe they don't need to be taught this? Maybe it's just normal that no one has ever learned to sing or draw at the appropriate music or art lessons: why should the state care if a person knows how to do all this - what, if he can't sing, is he a second-class citizen? Maybe it's nothing that no one learned to jump over a "goat"²⁸ in physical education - but in fact, why be able to jump over it, especially when it was decided that only guardsmen volunteers serve in the army, and the rest do not even need to pretend that they are potential warriors? And the fact that no one remembers from the course of stereometry, what is a prism, maybe not a cause for regret? Or is there a reason? Here I recall the character of the famous Russian classical play "Undergrowth", who said that there is no need to know geography - a cab driver will take you where you need to go. On the one hand, I don't want to be like him - but on the other hand, in the opposite direction, you can easily go as far as teaching children geography in the volume of a university special course. In a word, the commission came to the conclusion that not only huge amounts of money are spent almost in vain, but it is also impossible to determine how, in fact, it should be, what and how to be taught at school. In any case, until an absolutely clear answer to the question is formulated: what is the goal of school education and the upbringing of children in general for the state?

In an attempt to find an answer to this question, the commission analyzed all types of schools and education systems that existed from ancient times to the present day, and came to rather paradoxical, but well-reasoned conclusions. The idea of universal education in the form in which it took shape at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries could not have appeared earlier - but not at all because of a lack of material resources or the absence of new views on humanism and justice. The fact is that before that, the very approach to education was the opposite of the approach that prevailed in the twentieth century - the approach of the universality of education.

Previously, education was seen and practiced as a sign of a different position in the world of a young person, and not as a way to equalize him to a certain extent with all his peers. For the European Middle Ages and the beginning of the New Age, education was characteristic, which consolidated class distinctions, primarily feudal (later - noble); it is here that the roots of the concept of a "classically educated person", or otherwise a gentleman, are found. The younger generation was taught geography, not because a cab would not take them without it, and certainly not so that they would grow up as harmoniously developed personalities - at that time they did not know such ideas, and if they had known, they would not have accepted them. No, the children were raised by nobles, flesh of the flesh of their class, who do not spare their lives for their rights and status - and for this they, as members of the class, had to differ from others in something other than a passport: otherwise you won't be able to distinguish your own in contingency situations, and you cannot justify your natural right to be above the rest.

Religious schools in the same Europe were also a tool for educating class distinctions, only a different class - the spiritual. And education in China served as a tool for educating members of their main class - the bureaucracy, which played there approximately the same role in government as the nobility in Europe.

So the current supporters of the study of Latin and ancient literature, sighing about the versatile man of the Renaissance, should clearly understand that this was taught solely for the purpose of educating a

person differently from others. It is very likely that this is a completely noble motivation, but absolutely inapplicable to universal education - if everyone is taught this, it simply loses its meaning. As for the ancient schools of Hellas and Rome, they also inculcated differences, only not class, but national (more precisely, tribal). In the pagan-tribal era, the most important thing was to educate not so much the faithful sons of one's estate, but one's own tribe - and the ancient schools coped with this perfectly. Both Greek and Latin had the word "barbarian" meaning any person from a different tribe, as well as the Hebrew equivalent word "goy" - and in the main modern languages there are no such words.

It is important that until a certain time, education has always been seen as preparing a young person to be a faithful son of a certain group - an estate, a Church, a tribe. It was supposed in various aspects to make him capable of fulfilling his national, religious or class duty - and the task of making him prepared for life in terms of personal success and prosperity in education was never set, since this was considered his personal business.

Since the end of the 19th century, when all European countries were already preparing for a world war, just because of the change in the type of war, a new task arose - its solution was the system of modern universal education. Schools of the modern type, where they studied secular sciences, existed before and in some places - for example, in the USA - they were quite popular, since graduating from such a school meant taking the first mandatory step on the path to the highly coveted professions of a lawyer, doctor and engineer. But such schools were not public or free, just as they were not universal and compulsory. But a new type of war on a mass scale required officers and non-commissioned officers who knew the sciences. That is, officers and non-commissioned officers existed a hundred years before, but their duty was mainly to beat the crap [sic] out of soldiers with a stick, which is not easy, but does not require any special education. But for counter-battery artillery fire, a non-commissioned officer needs to measure the ogive and tail of an enemy projectile, using a slide rule, to calculate the location of an enemy battery using ballistics formulas, and quickly enough - for this you need to know mechanics, geometry, trigonometry and so on. For this, and for nothing else, the states introduced universal compulsory secondary education - they prepared cannon fodder, at least its elite part. The fact that such an education is very useful for working on industrial equipment and with complex mechanisms, transpired later - industrial giants also need cannon fodder.

But now such requirements have ceased to be relevant, the members of the commission understood: not only the army, now consisting exclusively of *oprichniki* with a separate education system, no longer needed the masses of educated soldiers and sergeants, but also peaceful equipment, although in itself becoming more complicated, due to automation no longer needed comprehensively educated workers and employees. It was a surprising, albeit fairly indisputable conclusion - the technique itself has become more complicated, but it has become much easier to work on it. Although, if you think about it, it's pretty obvious - shooting a gun is much more effective than a bow, but it's also easier, and not at all more difficult.

Thus, the commission approached the answer to the question of what should be taught within the framework of universal compulsory education, and on the other hand, drew conclusions about what should not be taught. The Law "On Compulsory School Education" was adopted, which proclaimed three goals of school education: the first is to educate a student as a good citizen of the Empire, the second is to create a base for the student, informational and especially methodological, which in the future, already outside the school, will facilitate mastering the special subjects and skills they need for a career or hobby, and the third is to improve the physical condition of students to those considered acceptable and teach them to keep themselves in physical shape in the future. And that's it!

These tasks do not seem too ambitious, but it was decided that this is precisely what makes them completely achievable. In addition, the commission sincerely believed that teaching something more meant intervention on the part of the state (after all, universal compulsory education is a requirement of

the state) not on its own behalf. Because these three goals are easy to justify: to have citizens ideologically devoted to the basic principles and values of the Empire of citizens is a necessity. Having a population capable of quickly learning and relearning something specific is ultimately a strengthening of the economy and, as a result, the state budget. And a healthy and self-maintaining population means lower health care costs. But such concepts as a harmoniously developed personality are completely subjective, and the state has no reason to force, if you call a spade a spade, to teach everyone, for example, music or drawing solely for the sake of it. There is no reason to consider school as a place for preparing young people for entering the institute, because the minority will go to the institute (there is simply no need for more). There are no grounds for teaching various kinds of specific skills, even if they seem to be generally useful, such as languages or labor training (for girls - housekeeping). On the other hand, there is no reason to teach reading or computers in elementary school - start it a year later, and everyone, or almost everyone, will already be able to do this, just like all non-mentally retarded people learn to speak by the age of three.

School education (reality). I needed this long historical excursus, dear compatriots, in order not just to outline the modern structure of the Russian school - it would seem strange and incomprehensible to you - but to convey the logic of the Russian authorities, with which they approached the reform of the school. Now you can go to the device.

Compulsory universal education in the Russian Empire lasts seven years - these classes very roughly correspond to classes from the second to the eighth in our country or in the USSR until the 1990s. Children go to the first grade (corresponding to our second) from the age of eight, and not from six, as in our country or as in Russia until 2014; in the Empire, they believe that there is no need to torment children ahead of time, especially for minimal results.

Primary school, where, like ours, one teacher teaches all subjects, lasts three years, and it teaches (more precisely, finishes teaching) reading, arithmetic, writing and use of a computer - such subjects as "Natural History" or "The World", are absent, because they still duplicate what is passed in high school, and there is no music, drawing and labor for the reasons indicated above. But from the very first grade, [Orthodox] Religion is taught here, and starting from the second grade, all baptized children, in addition to the lessons of catechism and worship, go to church services. Accordingly, in Islamic schools they study the Koran, in Jewish schools they study the Torah and go to the mosque or synagogue. Atheistic education is allowed in Russia because, according to the Constitution, religion is not compulsory, but there are no atheistic state schools (and there are no non-state ones at all, see below). Therefore, Russian atheist children must go to an Orthodox school (they simply will not be accepted to an Islamic or Jewish school), and during the lessons of [Orthodox] Religion and going to church, they do menial work at school. This is very humiliating, but it is intended, because it corresponds to the attitude of Russia, as a constitutionally Orthodox country, towards unbelievers (unlike those of other faiths). This setting looks like this: you are allowed to exist, and you enjoy the same legal, economic and social rights as we do, but this is the end of the matter - you should not count on equal respect. Also, physical education is taught from the first grade, but it is strikingly different from ours or that which took place in Russia earlier - it does not teach any specific skills such as swimming or skiing, and most of it is a specially designed set of exercises similar to the Chinese [wu-shu](#)²⁹. In the same place, at physical education, all children are taught to meditate - unlike the occultists, Russians do not invest anything esoteric in this concept, only the ability to deeply relax the body and brain to quickly restore physical and mental strength (in Russian this is not called meditation, but auto-training). The main feature of the Russian elementary school is the presence in it of a subject (the largest number of hours are allotted for it), called "Vseobuch". It includes a set of skills well known to psychologists, which, however, it had never occurred to anyone to teach in public schools before: speed reading, various mnemonics, that is, quick memorization techniques, ordinary and eidetic (figurative), the ability to concentrate, etc. The name of the subject is due to the fact that the skills acquired on it help to quickly and effectively assimilate any other subject. The overall goal of the

elementary school is formulated in the regulatory documents quite specifically: to develop in students the skills necessary to master everything that is taught further.

High school education lasts four years, from fourth to seventh grade (very roughly equivalent to our fifth to eighth). Officially, its goal corresponds to the goal of school education in general. Unlike our schools, in Russian schools there is no system “for each subject there is a separate teacher”: Russians do not believe in the ultimate specialization of teachers, although this was the case with them before. Now there are only four teachers in each class - in religion (this is an employee of the diocese or the relevant body for other religions, and not the Department of Education), in physical education, in science and in the humanities. By the way, the profession of a school teacher in Russia is quite prestigious, although it is more of a medium than a highly paid one: an elementary school teacher has a base salary of just over 1,000 rubles and an average salary of 1,500 (4,000 and 6,000 our dollars, respectively), but various additional payments can be here up to 40-60%.

Religion classes teach the Old and New Testaments, as well as the history of Orthodoxy with selected patristic literature. Physical education continues the same as in elementary school, with the addition of practical skills for pain relief and self-healing for minor illnesses, as well as teaching proper breathing. I asked Pyotr Meshcherov, head of a department at the Imperial Agency for Schools, why there is no actual training of physical data in physical education, for example, as in fitness clubs. He was very surprised at my question. “And why should the state care about the size of the biceps of a boy or what shape of a buttock a girl has?” he asked me. “With the help of physical education lessons, we provide a certain basic level of health, and not at all strength or a good figure - this is already a personal matter for the student and his parents, let them go to the gym or study at home if they want.”

The natural sciences studied in the Russian school are approximately the same as ours - mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology, but their volume is much smaller: for example, in the course of mathematics there is almost no trigonometry and stereometry - for them there is only an introduction to basic concepts, which takes only some twenty hours. Algebra and geometry are also taught to a much lesser extent, and there is no programming and drawing at all (or astronomy, by the way): they are considered unnecessary for anyone except specialists, even at the level of general concepts - and Russian secondary schools do not train specialists. As for physics, the situation here is as follows and very indicative: if earlier in the sixth-seventh grades some of the sections of physics were covered at the level of general ideas, and in the eighth-tenths the remaining sections, and those previously covered, were already at a fairly deep level, now all four years of high school, from the fourth to the seventh grade, all physics from mechanics to quantum mechanics is passed at the level of general ideas. This is the whole essence of the Russian concept of learning - if you teach only basic concepts, then they will be learned and remembered, and if you teach in-depth subjects, then all of them, except for those related to everyday work, for the most part will be forgotten, as well as poorly mastered basic concepts. Technology has been added to the natural sciences, which studies the fundamental structure of the most important machines and assemblies and the mechanism of the most common processes. There are no laboratory works in physics, chemistry and biology, as well as labor and technological training - it is believed that this is not necessary for anyone except future students of the corresponding profile.

Of the humanities, the main part is occupied by history - this subject is considered the main one in terms of the formation of a citizen, and it is the only one in which the volume of teaching is greater than it was before. At the same time, history as a general educational subject is understood broadly - it includes elements of philosophy and sociology, and after a presentation of any events, it takes no less time to explain why this happened and what conclusions should be drawn from it. It is in the history lessons that those works of art that create the pantheon of heroes of the Empire are studied, and from the standpoint not of literary criticism, but of heroics. History is not studied sequentially - first the history of the West, then the East, etc. - but in parallel: when, for example, the 1200s are studied, they are studied as a time

slice of the whole world, that is, on the material of all countries, with comparisons and parallels. Particular attention is paid to the study of the history of the peoples of the Empire, mainly the Russian people, although a lot of time is devoted to the history of the allied peoples (primarily the German people); in general, it is during the lessons of history that the main part of political indoctrination takes place. The second subject after history is Our Country. It passes the geography, economy and constitutional system of the Russian Empire, that is, its territorial, economic and state structure. Geography is studied in the fourth and fifth grades, at the level of general ideas about the continents of the Earth and the main planets and asteroids.

Relatively little time is devoted to the Russian language in the fourth or fifth grades. Foreign languages are not taught in the Empire (with the exception of German) - this is considered the lot of the colonial countries, and in the Empire, almost no one needs languages, given its autarkic structure. In addition, in national schools they also study their native language, in addition to Russian, and the history course is supplemented by the history of their people.

There are no economics and social sciences as separate subjects in Russian schools. Surprisingly, there is no literature here in its usual form - according to the aforementioned Pyotr Meshcheryov, "books, including the classics, are read when it is interesting, and it is very easy to discourage any reading by their tedious examination." Therefore, there is a program of compulsory extracurricular reading, and in the classroom it is simply checked that the student has really read what he should, and let him draw conclusions from what he has read.

The main meaning of the significantly reduced training program (in comparison with what it was before) is that students learn it thoroughly, for life. This is achieved, firstly, by the general education of elementary school - the mental techniques learned on it in the future significantly increase the perception of any material (for which they are taught); and secondly, a different system of teaching the material and monitoring its assimilation. The material is structured more like a university - this, in particular, is expressed in the fact that different parts of one science are studied not sequentially, but in parallel. For example, instead of studying botany in the fourth grade in biology lessons, and zoology in the fifth grade, during all the fourth and fifth grades they study both in parallel, as well as evolutionary theory using their examples. After each class, starting from the third (despite the fact that it still belongs to elementary school), exams are taken in each subject: after the third - [Orthodox] Religion, reading, writing, arithmetic, general education and physical education, after the fourth and fifth - according to the Law God, the Russian language, history, our country, geography, mathematics, physics, biology and physical education, and after the sixth and seventh - the same, but without the Russian language and geography, but with the addition of chemistry and technology. There are no grades in the exams, their result is expressed as "passed" or "not passed", and knowledge of the relevant subject is not checked in the volume of the past academic year, but cumulatively for all the years since the beginning of its study - therefore, the option "learned-passed-forgotten" doesn't work very well here. The exam after the seventh grade is considered graduation, so they again pass general education, geography and Russian, which were completed, respectively, in the third and fifth grades. As a result, the result of universal compulsory education in the Empire is exactly what the developers of the reform wanted to achieve: among those who graduated from school even thirty years ago (the first graduates after the reform), the level of religious and political indoctrination is very high, as well as the level of physical fitness. And although the natural sciences are not given in a very large volume, they are remembered in the same volume.

As I already wrote in the chapter "[Social Sphere](#)", education in Russian schools is completely separate, and in men's schools all teachers are men, and in women's schools - women. Only in [Orthodox] Religion, these are sometimes deaconesses, and sometimes male priests. Thus, except on the street, boys and girls see each other only at balls in honor of the holidays - November, Christmas and New Year, Easter and June graduations, which are mandatory in schools every year. So that none of the students feel

disadvantaged, the budget provides for luxurious costumes and dresses for these balls.

Schools in Russia are exclusively public, private initiative (in the form of both entrepreneurship and non-commercial activities) is not allowed here, as is the initiative of communities and *zemstvos*. The logic here is the same as for healthcare: this area refers to those where, according to the Constitution, the opportunities of citizens should not differ, and, therefore, complete unification is implied. *Zemstvos* manage schools, which receive subventions for this from the federal budget; but they do not have the right to add their own funds, the program is strictly unified, and instructional letters from the Imperial Agency of Schools are obligatory. Moreover, in order not to have state schools, but privileged ones, parents by law do not have the right to choose a school - it is unambiguously and without the possibility of exceptions determined by the place of residence. And so that schools located in wealthy areas do not become de facto privileged, they try to locate them on the periphery of these areas, on the border with areas that are not so prosperous. Parents, as well as former students and everyone in general, are prohibited from giving any money to teachers or the school as a whole; even if they were paid to the cashier and spent equally on all students, this is considered a bribe and is punished accordingly. National schools open without restrictions and are supervised, in addition to the Imperial Schools Agency, by the respective national chambers. Their status does not fully correspond to religion - there are national schools, but Orthodox ones, for example, German or Ossetian (although the opposite does not happen - for an Islamic or Jewish school to be Russian).

Specialized schools, such as maths or humanities, and specialized classes in mainstream schools are prohibited, as is any gradation of classes in the same school based on student ability or achievement. The exceptions are special schools for children with serious physical and mental disabilities, as well as special boarding schools for underachievers, where those who have not passed exams for a year are transferred immediately and without argument - if they improve next year, they are transferred back to a regular school. Precisely for the reason that the goal of the school is to educate citizens, not specialists, they try to avoid competition between students: as in exams, there are no grades for the quarters, only pass or fail. And although grades for a lesson are not prohibited, they do not have an official status - their presence is a personal matter of a particular teacher, and there are many schools where there are no grades at all. Also, in physical education, exercises are avoided in which the result has a numerical expression (weight, time, etc.), as well as sports games with a score - a diametrical difference with us, where in each class, all students, according to the results of the semester, take places from first to the last, and in sport the spirit of competition is encouraged! The Russians believe that for the education of good citizens it is important that no one stands out, since the main property of citizens is their complete initial equality for the Empire; competitiveness is important for personal success in a career, and the state is indifferent to it. But it is not at all indifferent to the fact that the student does not encounter a single unpunished injustice - a citizen must know for sure that life is not a jungle. Therefore, each school has an operational unit with a police officer who monitors not only order in our understanding, but also the absence of any kind of “hazing” between schoolchildren. At the slightest suspicion of this, as well as the distribution of alcohol, drugs and similar illegal actions (and considerable funds are allocated for video surveillance and other special equipment for the school [opera](#)³⁰), suspected children are subjected to techno interrogation without any sentimentality. Identified perpetrators are severely punished corporally (according to the law in some cases immediately, sometimes after the first warning), without fail in front of the entire school. For this reason, graduates of Russian schools, of course, are distinguished by serious law-abiding, and “wired” from childhood on a very deep level. This is not just fear, although this, too, but a firm belief that not a single offended state will refuse protection and not a single guilty person will walk around as if nothing had happened, brazenly grinning. So the expression “big brother” (about the state) is perceived in Russia absolutely literally and purely positively.

Special and higher education. A Russian teenager graduates from school at the age of 15, and this age is considered the age of majority - he or she receives a passport and all civil rights, including the right to

marry, own any property, speak in court and elect and be elected in *zemstvo* elections. When asked whether these rights are not given early, Russians usually notice that 300 years ago (before acceleration, by the way!) noble children began military service precisely at the age of 15. And among the ancient peoples, the coming of age was generally considered simply the onset of puberty - which happens today much earlier than 15 years. The Constitution of the Russian Empire forbids having an age limit other than the age of majority for anything, and therefore even the sale of alcohol and legal drugs from the age of 15 is allowed. (However, this does not mean that one can actually take a position in the structures of imperial power from the age of 15 - after all, for guardsmen, one must first serve eight years before taking vows.)

Candidates for the service [ie guardsman] class can continue their education immediately - by entering the cadets, and candidates for the clergy - by entering a seminary or monastery school. But all the other young people, who by default belong to the third estate, can continue their education no earlier than after three years, during which they have to work anywhere and for anyone. Russians do not want the business, intellectual, creative and managerial elite of the state to be made up of people who have not seen real life before graduating from university or even graduate school. It seems wild to them when a person in our country becomes a doctor or a lawyer under the age of 30, and not just an ordinary person, and thus has a good chance of never experiencing the life of an ordinary person at all and, accordingly, not imagining this life at all. The logic of such legislation is the same as for schools: the state also wants the elites, first of all, to be good citizens. It is believed that without the experience of ordinary life this is difficult (unless this is replaced by serious self-denial, as in the first and second estates), therefore, the mandatory three years of work cannot legally be spent in firms and organizations whose owners or leaders are the parents and relatives of the young person or their friends.

After these three years, a boy or girl can enter any school, institute or university. The college provides special education (about the same as our two- or three-year college), while the institute and university provide higher education. As far as the school is unified and monopolized by the state, the state practically does not touch these levels of education: both schools and institutes can be established by anyone, in the form of both commercial enterprises and non-profit organizations, no licenses are required for this, and they can teach anything and everything. The empire considers this sphere to be purely market-based and gives the market the opportunity to regulate it. Accordingly, education in schools and institutes is paid, and if one of these institutions considers it expedient to give away part of the places to the most gifted applicants for free, as is often practiced in our country, this is their own business - let them give at least everything. The only strict rule that I have already written about is not to accept those who have not completed the required three years after school. And of course, to comply with the general requirements of the law - not to allow homosexuals to teach, not to allow statements in lectures and textbooks that discredit the Russian Empire, its people or religion, etc.

Universities are the only exception in terms of state involvement in higher education. By law, state universities should be called this and only this word, while others cannot be called that - therefore, all universities, by definition, are state, that is, imperial, they are so called (Moscow Imperial University, St. Petersburg Imperial University, Berlin Imperial University, etc.) Private or *zemstvo* universities are called institutes, and any institute can have any structure of faculties and curricula, including the university type. The Empire differentiates names solely to avoid confusion and not to create preferences. In most universities, in addition to natural sciences and the humanities, there are pedagogical, medical and a number of technical faculties - since these areas are exclusively state-owned (in technology this applies to the military-industrial complex, space industries, etc.), accordingly, the state itself trains personnel for them. But there are also a number of separate technical, medical and other specialized universities. Medical and teacher training schools are often also located at universities. Education at universities is exclusively free, and with the provision of a free hostel - but not only and not so much for the sake of social justice, but to raise the level of graduates. The fact is that Russian social thought believes that free higher education, in comparison with the same paid one, filters out people who are somewhat less

motivated (compared to those who earn money for their studies themselves), but more talented. And this is considered more significant, for example, for science or space exploration, for which universities to a large extent train personnel (I remind you that these areas in Russia are exclusively state-owned). Excessive purposefulness in general in Russian life, especially in that part of it that is connected with the state, is not very welcome and is traditionally considered to border on careerism - this word in the Empire has a negative connotation.

The prestige of the universities is maintained, apart from their relative small number, not only by the fact that they are free and thus by the higher intellectual level of the students, but also by two other things. Firstly, the state does not spare money on them, and the level of technical equipment and teaching staff there is higher than in the richest institute. And secondly, either only university graduates are hired to work in the state system (in the public sector of the economy, in state institutions and governments, in science), or they have absolute priority over those who have graduated from private institutions. There is a consistently high competition for admission to universities, and students are selected from applicants based on the results of passing exams - no exams or tests passed at school, as is the case with us, are taken into account there. Moreover, since the law does not establish preparation for entering a university as one of the goals of the school, universities and institutes have every right to arrange exams in sections that were not taken at school at all. You can study them on your own or attend VR courses that are available at any university and most institutes. You can also attend full-time courses, but they are paid even at universities, plus you have to pay for a hostel or other housing.

Since, in fact, a significant part of the state elite is selected at the university exams (except for the ruling elite, of course, that is only from the guardsmen), control over them is very strict; bribes in this area (as well as personal agreements without money - for example, by kinship) are punished extremely severely.

For those cases when a young man cannot enter the imperial university for many years in a row, although he has quite decent knowledge and abilities, but still insufficient for admission due to high competition, despite the fact that this profession is a calling for him without it life, a special order is provided - the so-called corps of civilian volunteers (KGD). A citizen who has joined the KGD is sent to a variety of unskilled or low-skilled jobs, where for one reason or another there are not enough people - either because of danger and physical severity, as, for example, in asteroid mines, or because of moral gravity, as, for example, care for the terminally ill or something else related to human grief. A person who has worked in the State Duma for three years is entitled to numerous non-monetary benefits from the state, including enrolling in any university out of competition, that is, having received not grades in exams, but a test (when working in the State Duma for more than three years, the benefits increase, but before entering a university this no longer applies). Thus, if an applicant cannot enroll in the same faculty in any way, he, after a failure, can write a statement that he asks to put a pass or fail on the basis of his last pass. In the first case, he goes to the State Duma and after three years he enters without exams; or he can first work in the State Duma, and then take the entrance exams, or rather, already tests. By the way, it is not the university that considers this application and makes a decision on it, but a commission under the Agency of Higher Schools. In general, there is no hint of self-government of universities - these are state institutions, without any exemptions from this status; if even the most respected rector refuses to comply with the agency's order, or at least publicly declares that he does not agree with it, he will be fired before the end of the working day.

Curricula at universities do not differ much from those at institutes for the same specialty and approximately correspond to ours. The programs of two- and three-year schools are also approximately the same as in our respective colleges. The only thing is that in Russian universities and colleges there are no courses of the student's choice - all the courses of the program are rigidly fixed. The structure of education is somewhat different from ours - first of all, this concerns the concepts of bachelor's and master's degrees. If in our country the first four years of higher education are called a four-year college

and give a bachelor's degree, and the next two or three years are called one or another school (medical, law, etc.) and give a master's degree, and the school may be at another university and even a slightly different profile, then in Russia such a system did not take root. Here, higher education is one-level, lasts 5-6 years and does not give any degree - just everything else is not considered higher education. If you have completed several courses, you can, of course, indicate this in your CV as an incomplete higher education, but this has no official status. Another thing is that education in Russia is even more modular than ours; in other words, if you have completed a number of semesters at a university or college, then you have the unconditional right to leave and continue your studies at any time from the next semester by the number - this does not require you to re-enter or provide a good reason for the break. Moreover, you can write a statement about your desire to continue your studies at another university or college or at another faculty (of course, of a similar profile). In the case of a university, it will be considered by the mentioned commission under the Agency of Higher Schools, and in the case of private universities or schools, the institute or school where you want to transfer. The law contains an exhaustive list of reasons why you can be denied, so such a transfer, as a rule, occurs without problems.

Such a legislative position (this is also widely practiced in our country, but only in working order) is due to the fact that in Russia they consider it wrong when higher education can be obtained only at a time, spending 5-6 years on it, and without the possibility of changing its orientation - it is almost impossible to return to such a rut if you fell out of it due to some life circumstances (this is especially true for women who have given birth to children). As a result of such public perceptions, in the Empire, 50% of doctors and 60% of teachers, in fact, first graduated from the corresponding school, then worked for some time in their specialty (a nurse or nurse in the first case and an elementary school teacher in the second) and only then completed their studies and moved to a position that required higher education.

In addition to single-level, there are other differences. So, if our universities are located, as a rule, in small towns or in general on the outskirts and students come there from all over the country and live on campus, then in Russia all universities are located in large cities, and usually at least half of their students are local, and of visitors, at least a quarter rent apartments. The Imperial Agency of Higher Schools is deliberately trying to prevent the appearance of campuses and is even taking measures to spread the dormitories of one university to different parts of the city. The Russian government has studied history well, European and ours, and considers campuses a potential site for a highly likely start of civil unrest - it is not afraid of this, but believes that there is no need to shed young blood in vain. Therefore, in the agreement that the enrolled student signs with the university, any participation on the university territory in political actions or in general in any public actions, except for those approved by the administration, is the basis for immediate expulsion (although not prohibited by the Criminal Code of the Empire). The Constitutional Court considered this agreement in 2041 for compliance with the Constitution and found it legal, as well as the general introduction, under pain of dismissal by the employer or its analogue (in this case, the university), of some additional restrictions compared to the general legislation on the rights of citizens. (Under this decision, for example, an employer may require its employees not to publish their photos in erotic magazines and online publications, although this is not generally prohibited.)

As for two- and three-year schools, as well as their more simplified version - half- and one-year courses, this link is extremely widespread in Russia and does not differ from ours in its structure.

Although at first glance the Russian system of special and higher education is quite similar to ours, the existing differences lead to systemic social characteristics. The main one is the following. Since Russian young people cannot enter an institute or university immediately after graduation and must go to work (they themselves are quite happy about this - at this age it is very pleasant to feel like an adult), the continuity of education is stopped. And after three years, they already have the opportunity to look around and think, and the influence of parents on an 18-year-old person, who has been working and an adult for three years, is far from being so strong. As a result, many of those who, under the old system, would have

gone without hesitation from school to institutes and universities, simply because it was customary, are now in no hurry with this; they either come to the conclusion that they do not need a higher education, or go there later, at the age of 20-25.

As a result, the percentage of people with a higher education in the Russian Empire is noticeably lower than 40 years ago and than in our country (with a special education, on the contrary, it is slightly higher). The constitutional abolition of conscription into the army, which was a very strong motivation for young men to enter a university (due to the presence of a delay for students), also played a big role here. This situation suits the imperial authorities quite well - they are not at all enthusiastic about the trend that took place in Russia back in the 2010s (and we have to this day), when many employers demanded an institute diploma from candidates even for waiters not to mention salespeople or travel agents. At the individual level, this is their right, the authorities believe, but on a national scale as a whole, such an approach clearly means a waste of human and material resources (since people learn what they will not use) and, therefore, should be discouraged in some indirect way. The Russian authorities are not embarrassed that this may become a factor in the country's loss of competitiveness in comparison with us or other countries - as I already wrote, their studies clearly show, including on our material, that in the modern world, the vast majority of people have unused knowledge anyway are not held. Consequently, only those who are employed in jobs that really require it will benefit from higher education - the rest simply wasted their money and time; and the number of such places in Russia is no less than ours.

In addition, their other studies just as clearly show that the mobility and "ease of climbing" in terms of changing professions in people with special education is significantly higher than in people with higher education. And the opportunity for people to change their profession relatively often, in accordance with trends in the labor market, is considered in Russia as a factor both in the country's competitiveness and in the quality of life of citizens in terms of self-realization - especially now, when active working life continues at least up to 85 years. Studies of Russians show that in their country (and even more so in our country) for a huge number of jobs, about which everyone is firmly convinced that they are impossible without higher education, there is more than enough special education - first of all, this applies to a variety of corporate managers. Thus, they consider our universal focus on obtaining higher education as a typical false social goal, partly due to the aforementioned necessity of it in a large number of jobs where it is not really needed, partly due to the ridiculous incomes of some professions (they consider the income of our doctors and lawyers insane), and most importantly - because of the loss of entrepreneurial spirit. If you want to get rich, they think, open your own business and get rich, and do not go to get an education - life itself will teach, and you will receive the necessary special knowledge along the way.

Another feature of the Russian education system is also initially related to the fact that after the age of 15, their young people are required to start working (if suddenly a job cannot be found, it is guaranteed by the state). Moreover, they do not work among their own kind, but among people of all ages, since they are adults and, thus, cannot count on special standards and working conditions, except for medical reasons. On the other hand, those young people who still go to universities are not so much among their peers - for the reasons mentioned above, the age composition of Russian students is now much more heterogeneous than before, when the vast majority of first-year students were eighteen. This has led, I don't know consciously or not, to the complete disappearance of the youth subculture: if for a century now young people dress differently, listen to different music, have their own jargon and customs, and since the time of the hippies and have a different worldview than mature people, then in Russia, after the education reform, this quickly became different (although before that it was exactly the same). In the Empire, young people have a combination of a number of factors: adulthood, having their own income, merging in an environment of adults of different ages, and not having a purely peer environment, as we have in high schools and colleges. In sum, this leads to the fact that all the teenagers there are just young adults. Accordingly, their ideas, language and consumer preferences are no different from the rest of the older population. I don't know if this is good or bad, but in Russia it immediately catches the eye. This feature,

however, fits perfectly into the general vector of Russian life - the vector of a conscious and purposeful partial regression to more ancient and traditional social forms. Because in traditional societies, young adults have never and nowhere been a separate group that differs from others: depending on gender, they either gave birth, or went hunting or to war.

Science. It is believed that during the period of the Second Empire, Russian science was experiencing its finest hour. In fact, this was unconditionally true only for large nationwide projects such as creating a hydrogen bomb or flying into space, and with science research, everything was not at all so smooth. But these problems really seemed like flowers when the second Time of Troubles began with its general collapse - science turned out to be among the most affected areas of life, and one of the most difficult to restore. In particular, almost all scientists from the then most fashionable fields of science emigrated to the West. Paradoxical as it may sound, the worst thing was that fundamental science did not completely collapse by the time it returned to priority funding at the end of the first decade of our century - because it lost everything good from the organization of science in the USSR (the concentration of resources in key areas and etc.), but retained everything bad, including obsolete forms that sabotage any changes. It would probably be easier to create it from scratch. As a result, before the radical reform of science, as in the case of school education, Vladimir the Restorer and his government did not get around to it. True, here, too, there was a change in wages, as a result of which the “brain drain” almost stopped and, on the contrary, the process of returning to the country of those who had previously emigrated gradually began.

But Gabriel the Great had already decided to take the problem seriously and, for a start, asked himself the question: why, in the extremely unfree atmosphere of the era of Joseph the Great, especially in the so-called sharashkas (laboratories set up in prisons and camps for the work of scientists serving time [in prison], most often imposed for no offence), science moved forward by leaps and bounds? This really was the case, except in a number of scientific areas, for some reason forbidden by Joseph, but that’s another story. But is it believed that scientific creativity seems to need freedom? Starting from this paradox, Gabriel looked further: already after the death of Joseph, when society became freer, at least general fear disappeared, the main part of natural scientific achievements fell on the so-called closed (in the sense of secret) part of science. The analysis showed that the reasons for this state of affairs clearly did not boil down to better resource provision. Moreover, the lion’s share of these achievements fell on the so-called closed cities, and in the unclassified part of science - on their counterparts, the so-called academic campuses. Even in the cult Russian novel of the second half of the 20th century, “Monday Begins on Saturday”, which touches on this topic, where society’s ideas about ideal (in fact, even idealized) science were quintessentially expressed, the action takes place in a fictional town, which is essentially an academic campus, and almost all employees of the fictional institute live in a hostel on its own territory. That is, it turns out that in the post-Stalin era, science was most successful where there was the least freedom!

After thinking this over, Gabriel came to an unexpected conclusion: the main factor that strengthened scientific creativity in all these cases was precisely lack of freedom. He realized that a scientist needs inner, intellectual, freedom of the ways of scientific research, and not at all the freedom to choose a place of residence or activities for spending free time. In his “external” lack of freedom, from a sharashka to a closed town, the scientist was, to one degree or another, torn off from the ordinary surrounding world with its temptations, worries and fuss and put in a situation where he had practically nothing to do except to do science (and not only in work, but also in thoughts), and there is nothing to express oneself in, except in science. This was the point, and not motivation - the motivation in the “open” science of the Red Empire was, in essence, the same as in the closed one. Strange as it may seem, a scientist in a “sharashka” or in a secret institute had more intellectual freedom, and not less, than his colleagues in an ordinary institute, because he was led by officers of the special services or the military, and not by other scientists. They could demand faster results, but not choose one or another scientific path. The effectiveness of secret institutions began to decline precisely when the scientists in them actually began to

be led by other scientists, and not by officers.

Having understood what to do, Gabriel created a number of closed scientific campuses, in which he offered places for scientists on the following conditions: they agreed, during a standard three- or five-year contract, not only to live in this town in hostels, but also not to start a family (all this, of course, purely voluntarily). Naturally, in return, scientists who worked out the entire contract, especially the five-year one, received very great encouragement, both moral and material, and very significant career advantages in their future work. Of course, subject to scientific success - but a lot was promised in the event of limited success. The working cell in these towns was not an institute, but a small group, often including one scientist with a laboratory assistant or technician, less often a laboratory. They were supervised by officials or officers. As for protection from crooks, who could not help but appear where the customer is not a professional, the Russian authorities were not particularly worried. Still, the main motivations of the scientist are moral, since he still doesn't get a very large salary, and this puts a certain natural barrier to cheating. In addition, the absence of direct scientific guidance did not at all mean the absence of the scientific community as a whole, in any case directly or indirectly evaluating any scientific results. It was possible to create such a system quickly enough, since many such science cities, both open and closed, were still functioning from the time of the Second Empire, although they eked out a miserable existence.

The results of the experiment were very impressive, but one had a special impact on world history - it was in such a town that a strategic shield was developed that allowed Russia to win the Twelve Day War against the United States and become a world empire. Such towns (since the early 2000s they have been officially called "science cities") are very widespread even now - more than 60% of state-funded science is located in them. True, the mode of work there has been greatly softened - no one now limits the movement of scientists or the creation of a family, because now these goals are achieved by the very atmosphere in them, which has already developed and is self-sustaining.

The further reform of science carried out during the 2020s was to a large extent based on the development of the same ideas. The main one was as follows: a formalized hierarchy of structural units and, as a result, the scientists themselves are contraindicated for fundamental search science. There should not be an Academy of Sciences headed by a president, to which an institute headed by an academician is subordinated, to which a department headed by a corresponding member is subordinated, to which a sector headed by a doctor of sciences is subordinated, to which Ph.D. At least this structure should not be the main one. It became dominant when science, at least its most important part, was understood as the creation of new types of weapons or the solution of the next complex space problem. In other words, when there is a clear goal handed down from above - even if it is not immediately clear how to achieve it - such a structure is very effective. This is how Russia's nuclear-missile sword was created in the middle of the 20th century, and the time for such projects has by no means passed, even in civilian areas - for example, this is how nuclear-powered main planetary aircraft were developed in the 20-30s of our century. But fundamental scientific breakthroughs do not occur where they are expected, and it is impossible to plan them from above. They do not need a well-functioning scientific machine that can break into a cake [*sic*], but solve the problem without sparing resources. They need only a talent capable of formulating such a problem, invisible to others, which creates a new field of science. In fact, it often turns out that, due to the non-triviality of such a task, no special resources are needed for its solution and practical implementation. This is how the scientific foundation of the Russian strategic shield was created - although the materials on this issue are still classified, but judging by the published memoirs, it is based on some kind of unusual concept that, when it was experimentally confirmed, it was not possible to create an operating installation. It took neither a long time nor large material costs.

Thus, it became clear that two types of fundamental science should coexist in parallel in the country (I am talking exclusively about the natural sciences) with completely different principles of organization. This has been the case since the mid-2020s. The first type was embodied in imperial scientific centers

organized for major scientific tasks, creating, as a rule, many new sections of science and technology. If a new center is created to solve a specific problem, which, although fundamental, implies a certain result, like the creation of an atomic and hydrogen bomb at one time, then it is assumed that at some point after its successful receipt, the center will be engaged in some completely new project. The center can also be created for a group of scientific problems, united not by a common goal, but by a common set of research tools - this happens when these tools are extremely expensive, as, for example, in temporal studies. In these cases, there is no clear project for the existence of the center, but the area of the science in which research is being conducted is simply outlined.

In all such centers there is a fairly pronounced division of labor, teams of authors are often very large, there is a clear gradation from ordinary researchers to leaders of various ranks - in a word, they are built according to the traditional hierarchical principle. In general, they differ little from our similar centers in terms of organization principles: the Kurchatov Imperial Scientific Center for Fundamental Energy is, in fact, similar to the federal Los Alamos Energy Laboratory, and the Imperial Center for Fields and Particles in Dubna corresponds to the federal Subnuclear Center in Houston.

Since the time of the first nuclear program, such centers have been one of two forms of organization of fundamental science both in the Second Empire and in the Russian Federation - the second form was the so-called academic institutes. However, the problem was that they were basically the same, although the goals were completely different. Academic institutes were created for free scientific research, and were arranged in the same hierarchical manner. Moreover, if in the choice of scientific topics the influence of the academy on the institute and the institute on the department or laboratory was not very strong (although it still was, and there were all the necessary levers for this), then the influence of the department or laboratory on individual researchers and their groups was absolute. Moreover, there was no intelligible apology for such a situation: the tasks to be solved were chosen by scientists independently and therefore could not be considered nationwide. The super-expensive and super-complex research technique, which dictates the financial and scientific need for cooperation, was not used in most studies (what is there - a hierarchical structure existed even for theorists, who, apart from a salary, do not need anything at all!) And the thesis about the greater likelihood of breakthrough ideas in a middle-aged venerable scientist, in comparison with a young and ambitious one, did not find confirmation in practical experience.

But the organization of academic science as a whole was completely parodic: all its institutions belonged to and were subordinate to the Academy of Sciences (or two so-called small academies - medical sciences and agricultural sciences), which had all the attributes and rights of a ministry, including existing exclusively at the expense of the state budget. But at the same time, its leaders (as well as members in general) were not appointed by the state at all, and it itself, together with all the institutions, was not formally a state at all! All its property (created or acquired not with its own, of course, but 100% with state budget funds) was managed by its own property agency, and not by the federal ministry (later agency) of state property. Aside from the abuses, you can guess for yourself on what scale, nothing could be expected from this. This mimicry of the academy, or rather academies, under the state sectoral ministry sometimes took anecdotal forms: for example, it was believed, at least formally, that only one institute should be engaged in one section of science, as one branch of the economy in the ministry - one head office. Therefore, when creating a new institute, it was necessary to rack their brains so that its thematic name would not coincide with any of the existing ones, sometimes coming up with something obscure for this. So, when an independent institute under the leadership of his Nobel Prize colleague headed the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, headed by the Nobel Prize winner, it had to be called the Institute of General Physics of the Academy of Sciences (a rather meaningless phrase). As if it were impossible to have two or even twenty-two physics institutes in a huge country, the names of which would be specified by their location or by an additional proper name!

This situation led to a quite predictable result - if in scientific centers where there was some sense in such

an organization, science was more or less at the level and personnel somehow remained even in the 90s, then in academic institutions, mostly (there were, of course, exceptions) and science was trampled on peripheral positions in comparison with the world, and after the collapse of the USSR, all more or less worthy personnel emigrated. In particular, it was precisely this circumstance that predetermined the very strong backlog in Russia of the biological sciences, and not at all the ban on genetics for four years under Stalin - after all, cybernetics was also banned at that time, and meanwhile, Russian programmers are still considered the best in the world. It's just that the biological sciences do not need a particularly complex technique, and the scientific search here is therefore purely individual - in this case, there is nowhere to show the advantages of large scientific centers.

A vicious circle was also obtained with funding - the leadership of the Academy of Sciences said that there were no results due to insufficient funding, and officials answered them that why give funding if there are still no results. The latter turned out to be closer to the truth - when by the end of the first decade of our century, as a result of an increase in salaries and funding, many emigrants returned to the country, science in Russia almost immediately returned to the level of the late USSR, but not higher - defects in the organization system were already clearly affecting here. In the 2010s, when there was a clear smell of the upcoming world war, it became clear that the system of academic institutions in its current form could not be tolerated.

It was replaced, in parallel with the imperial scientific centers, by the Imperial Society for Basic Research (IOFI). Its structure also included research institutes, but this was where its similarity to the Academy of Sciences, which had died as a governing body, ended.

An institute in the IOFI system is not a separate institution - it is just a building with a certain set of common infrastructure. It has no scientific plans, reporting, and even its own name - it is designated as "an institute of such and such a profile, located there," if necessary - with a number or name (for example, "Institute of Genetic Profile IOFI No. 2 in Pushchino"). The structural unit of the IOFI is a research scientist hired directly to this or another institute; the Institute itself is not an employer [нанимателем] (employer [работодателем]). It usually employs 200-500 researchers, and the researcher himself determines which institute he will work at, and can change it to another at any time without giving reasons - the only motive for refusal may be the physical lack of space there.

The employment of a research scientist is for life - he can only be fired if he violates the contract (mainly in the unlikely situation when it can be proved that he did not work at all for three years). In other cases, as if, for example, he takes a job somewhere else or opens his own business (combining the status of a researcher with receiving other income is not allowed), his contract will only be suspended until the interfering circumstances disappear, as in the case of imprisonment or voluntary statement.

The researcher does what he wants - there are no reports (except voluntary ones), no attestations, no obligations; it is believed that a scientist works only for curiosity and fame, and there is no need to interfere in this. IOFI purchases scientific equipment and distributes it to institutes of similar profile, and it can be used by any researcher (for expensive equipment, even from another institute). In the case of a heavy load of equipment, a queue appears in the order of self-organization; the managing enterprise monitors the order in this and resolves conflict situations (see below), while the factor of the relative scientific significance of the work of a particular researcher is not taken into account.

The researcher receives 30 thousand rubles a year, that is, about 120 thousand dollars, but from them he pays for his business trips, the equipment he personally needs, all kinds of consumables for experiments, scientific and information services, and the hiring of technical assistants (in addition to those available at institutes for general use). It is believed that 1,400 rubles a month of them is actually a salary, but you can keep at least everything for yourself - the unspent balance is considered the property of the researcher. In practice, the latter keeps for himself, as a rule, no more than 1000-1300 rubles a month, and sometimes

less. Researchers can cooperate with money, for example, hire a laboratory assistant or technician for several people - this is widespread; but this happens only in the order of self-organization. The publication of the results is the same - publish on the Web (in Russia, as in our country, there are no scientific publications in paper form) wherever you want, at least on an individual website, at least in a network publication, at least organize a new network publication together with a group of like-minded people - but again on the initiative.

Several institutes are managed by one managing enterprise - thus, the institute does not even have a director. These enterprises are mostly private, although there are a few public ones - IOFI pays them equally, in proportion to the number of researchers. There are no scientific councils in the institutes, although again, if all or part of the researchers of some institute or group of institutes decide to create it on their own initiative, this is their business. But they will not have any power over the rest.

Researchers do not defend dissertations - there is only one scientific degree in Russia, and it is called "scientist" (a hyphen indicates science, for example, a scientist-physicist - this degree is identical to our Ph.D. degree), and you can become a researcher only if you already have it. The degree is obtained either in graduate school, in which case it is publicly defended; or the applicant is a researcher (most often from an imperial scientific center, applied institute or university) or generally an amateur who has already published a number of articles - in this case, the abstract is distributed to members of a specialized academic council, and they make a decision in absentia, without a defense procedure. There is no Higher Attestation Commission, as before, or another state body that approves the award of a degree - the decision of the specialized academic council is final, and the status of such a council is given by the Imperial Science Agency. However, the refusal to award a degree can be appealed to the agency or in court - but only if you are ready to prove a clear personal bias against you. That is, the agency and the court do not consider the actual scientific value. By the way, if you refuse, no one bothers you to go with the same dissertation to another council.

The titles of associate professor and professor in Russia no longer exist (not to be confused with the position of professor in universities!), but there are correspondent members and academicians, but their status is not at all the same as before. This happens because there are different academies, and for the Empire they are absolutely the same - amateur public organizations, and there are no special ones among them. The largest competing natural science academies are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Imperial Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, but there are many smaller and more specialized ones. So becoming a member of the academy is not so difficult, but it does not give anything from the side of the state, either morally or materially.

A researcher can get a job teaching at a higher education institution, usually at a university - this is the only job that is allowed to be combined with his status. But then he gets a part-time job as a researcher, that is, 8,400 rubles less a year - this is approximately equal to what the university pays part-time workers, so this is not considered a special career take-off either.

Thus, it is not important whether a researcher receives a lot or a little, but the fact that from the moment of joining the IOFI and until the end of his career, neither his formal status nor his salary changes; in particular, from beginning to end he does not direct any of the other scientists, but no one directs him either. The only incentive, as well as the only motive in general, to become a researcher is scientific ambition, that is, the desire to become famous for scientific discoveries. You can call it curiosity and a craving for knowledge - but it will be the same, because knowledge itself can also be obtained from other people's works, and if you instead want to know something yourself and certainly be the first, then this is ambition. The imperial leadership considers such motivation to be the only normal and correct one, and in accordance with its general philosophy, and created the IOFI so that this motivation could be realized without being clouded by anything else (just like motivation in the form of service and honor among the guardsmen class).

Naturally, the scientific community itself (which in IOFI, by virtue of all of the above, consists almost exclusively of science fanatics) determines which works are fundamental and which are secondary and, accordingly, who are the most prominent scientists. But this is completely self-made, and neither the process of this, nor the result is formalized in any way - a great scientist is one who is considered such by the majority of the community, and not one who has some kind of document from the state for this. It cannot be said that this status is purely nominal - with scientific leaders and especially successful scientists in general, many people want to enter into cooperation, including under his leadership. This is analogous to how a successful businessman usually receives many offers from investors to take their money into the business, and to do with them what he sees fit, although he does not have any mandate certifying that he is a good businessman.

In general, individual researchers constantly enter into a variety of cooperations with each other - in addition to natural reasons for any form of organization of science (primarily the accumulation of knowledge and creative possibilities), they are also driven by the desirability of pooling resources, that is, the money from their 30 thousand rubles a year, which are issued in excess of the actual salary for costly experiments. Theorists also participate in such cooperation, since they are interested in the experimental verification of their hypotheses. But this is always cooperation of equals - and as for cooperation with a good scientist (who is generally recognized as such or only in the opinion of those who want to cooperate), then often this is a direct offer of voluntary submission. The reason for the latter may be that, working with talent, you will achieve more than alone, and simply that not all even very capable people are intellectual leaders by nature.

Having many researchers who want to work with him and under him, a talented scientist receives, in fact, a group of voluntary subordinates (among other things, possessing material resources), that is, greatly expanded opportunities both in the experimental implementation of their ideas and in their generation. Moreover, most often these groups do not physically come to one institute, although this sometimes happens, but the coordination of their work and communication in general are carried out through the Network [ie on-line]. This is how scientific schools, and award societies (as a rule, non-monetary ones - which does not prevent many of them from being very prestigious), and network scientific journals with a certain scientific line appear. So, de facto, in the IOFI scientific community, there are VR academicians, laureates, laboratories, institutes, seminars, and academic councils. But they appear without any administrative or financial intervention by the state or other non-scientific centers of influence, they do not have levers of pressure on those who are not members of them, and they exist without any mandate, only as long as their members consider their existence expedient. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the scourge of our science, as well as the former Russian science, would take place at IOFI - leading scientists attributing to themselves the results obtained by their subordinates: this simply cannot happen in voluntary cooperation. And this is really a scourge, and not only and not so much because it radically shifts the motivations of scientists - from the desire to make great discoveries to the desire to become a boss. The main thing is that this makes it impossible for anyone, including government agencies, to determine which of the scientists is worth what "according to the Hamburg score".

The meaning of the entire system outlined above is that in fundamental science no one can have any influence on the choice of the direction of scientific research, working hypotheses and ways of implementation by a research scientist - neither the state (it voluntarily distanced itself from this), nor other scientists. It is believed that this would be counterproductive, because it would cut off what most people think is stupid, but only because of their blindness. And the Empire considers it ridiculous to fear insufficient motivation of scientists in the absence of control - only those who do not need external motivation become scientists, who will not become rich in any case. This complete, in our opinion, anarchy, the Empire considers much more productive for research science than structuring by the state - as we will see below, this applies not only to science, but also to all other creative areas. This is very non-trivial for non-commercial areas (for commercial ones, this is the only thing that happens everywhere);

but the Russians, as we saw in the chapter “[Estate structure](#)”, completely trust the estates in self-structuring and self-control - and scientists, although they are not an estate, are definitely a sub-class.

Judging by the results, we have to admit that the Russian system of science is working, and if in the biological fields Russia still lags behind us (from us - because the scientific gap between our two countries from the rest is quite large), albeit slightly, then in the physical sciences, it is a clear world leader.

In addition to the imperial research centers and the IOFI, fundamental science is being done in higher education institutions, mainly in universities, and here its organization is in no way fundamentally different from ours.

There are also semi-fundamental, semi-applied centers and institutes of the military-industrial complex, but they do not differ from the imperial scientific centers either in the principles of organization or in anything else, except for military and related topics.

Finally, there is applied science, which in Russia, to a lesser extent than in our country, is concentrated in private corporate structures and to a greater extent in state ones. That is, there, investment activities for the practical implementation of scientific developments, including its engineering part (in Russia this is called “implementation”), as in our country, are carried out by the development departments of large corporations (for themselves) or the so-called implementation firms (for clients). But the developments themselves in a fairly significant part are not done there, but in the public sector. This is mainly concentrated in the military-industrial complex, in various applied institutes and design bureaus, and in terms of life sciences - in the institutes of the Health Agency and the Agency for Agriculture and Food (they are also involved in basic research).

As for the humanities and social sciences, which in Russia, with its social innovations, are given paramount attention, there is a complete analogue of the IOFI - ROGN (Russian Society for the Humanities). A researcher at ROGN is called not a scientist-researcher, but a philosopher-researcher; the philosophy dissertation required for admission has higher requirements, which roughly correspond to our PhD degree (in other words, intermediate between the former Russian Ph.D. His salary is not 30, but 24 thousand rubles a year, due to the lack of spending on experiments (of which the same 1,400 rubles a month are considered the personal salary of a researcher), but much that is necessary for their work is provided by the ROGN institutes for free (all kinds of information services, public survey services, etc.).

Universities also have social science, but there are no imperial centers in this area - for regularly emerging research and expert tasks, temporary VR research teams of philosophers-researchers are created (surcharge for work in them follows). In addition, they are often asked to temporarily participate in law-making and rule-making groups, in expert councils of all levels of imperial power, in the work of the highest instances of the courts - all this they are allowed to combine, unlike researchers in the natural sciences. Often they are generally invited to work in government structures, with the interruption of their contract for this time. In general, research philosophers, as well as humanitarian scientists from universities, are to a large extent part of the state elite in the Empire.

Chapter 11

Culture

[Inter]Net. As I wrote in the “Autonomy” section, the network in Russia has different protocols than in the rest of the world. Therefore, if in the Celestial Empire, until recently, for the purpose of censorship, there were filters that closed a number of foreign sites for users, then in the Empire this is not even necessary - it is technically impossible to access the World Wide Web for free. Interface portals exist and are publicly available, but the price for accessing the Internet from Runet includes a large excise tax and

is therefore very high (about four rubles per hour, that is, \$16, or when downloading 200 rubles per gigabyte, but not less than 20 rubles), so in fact, the Russian network is closed.

However, one should not think that this creates a feeling of claustrophobia among Russian users: after all, about a billion people live in the Empire. In other words, there are about the same number of users and, accordingly, resources there as the entire world Internet had at the beginning of the century. In addition, for those areas of professional activity where regular acquaintance with what is happening abroad is really necessary (scientific publications for scientists, the same publications for artists, audio and video files for musicians and filmmakers), the relevant imperial agencies - for science, art and others - upload such information to their sites, where it is available for free.

The Russian network protocol does not provide a technical possibility for complete anonymity, as we do, when it is often impossible to determine the original origin of the posted information at all. For them, each transition of information from node to node leaves a tracer with a return address; this allows, however, to determine only the terminal from which the information was sent, and not the identity of the person who issued the command "send". But the situation is the same with the telephone and with other means of communication, however, for the special services, if necessary, this is already a sufficient clue. However, by law, this tracer cannot be opened without the permission of the Imperial Security Bureau or the prosecutor or a court order, and privately tracking the source of information using the tracer is a serious criminal offense.

Otherwise, the protocol gives Runet users the same opportunities as our Network (except for accessing the Internet), including VR, therefore, working in Russia on the Web, you will not immediately understand that this is a different Network, except for the command language. The architecture of the Web is also not much different, opening new sites (or blogs in existing ones) is as simple - both technically and legally - as ours, that is, simply put, it does not require any permissions or money (unless you plan to create a site with expensive "excesses").

There is no censorship in the Russian Network, the installation of filters restricting access is strictly prohibited - even by the authorities, even by providers or anyone else; it is a criminal offence. But there is no situation that existed in Russia at the beginning of the century, and we still have to a large extent today: when the Network is a kind of "black hole" of legislation, in which there are no state prohibitions and regulation at all. Our legislation has taken the path of recognizing part of the network resources by the media and applying the relevant rules to them. In Russia, a broader concept of publicity was introduced (including the media), and the imperial Law "On Publicity" formulated clear criteria for which Web resources are public and which are not. The public sites of the Network include all those prohibitions and restrictions that exist for any public manifestations, from speeches in the square or billboards hanging on the highway to radio or magazines - Russian law does not distinguish between them. On the contrary, for non-public sites, as well as for e-mail or voice or VR communication, there are no restrictions - they are considered an analogue of a face-to-face conversation with friends. That is, the one who uses the Network for the tribune is limited by law, and the one who uses it for private communication is not limited. This difference has a very deep nature - the Constitution of the Russian Empire does not declare the freedom of public life (therefore, it does not proclaim, in particular, freedom of the press and marches), but declares the freedom of private life - therefore, for example, freedom of speech and assembly (non-public) is directly fixed there.

In order for your resource of any type - a one-way site, forum, VR club, trading and commercial platform, etc. - to be considered non-public, it must, by law, satisfy the following conditions: a) there must not be hyperlinks to it on other resources, except for those that are themselves non-public; b) it should not be seen by search engines, except for those that are not public themselves; c) it must not be advertised as understood by the Advertising Law; d) entry should only be possible for registered members; e) registering as such should be possible only in real life outside the Network, but not on the site itself. If

your resource satisfies these conditions, then you can place on it anything that is not prohibited by law in general, but prohibited for public distribution. This applies even to pornography (including homosexual and pedophilic), descriptions of the experience of using illegal drugs, nationalistic and chauvinistic materials, statements offensive to Russia and the Russian people, anti-religious and atheistic appeals, etc. The logic of the legislation of the Empire is that since it is not forbidden to discuss this with friends at home in the kitchen, then there is no reason to prohibit doing this on a non-public site. The absence of a ban, however, does not apply to criminality - if your resource is used in espionage or terrorist activities or in the preparation of other crimes, then you will be considered as an accomplice in the crime, and the imperial court will determine the degree of specific participation and, accordingly, guilt.

Non-public sites are beyond any interest of the imperial authorities, as well as any aspects of the private life of citizens in general, therefore it does not attempt to either limit their development or, on the contrary, stimulate it. Public resources are another matter - the state considers them as the main instrument of people's democracy (in their understanding) and therefore in every possible way encourages those of them that can be called socio-political. These include any discussion platforms in the Network of public topics, both of a general nature and specializing in certain problems, as well as tribune sites for posting all kinds of amateur proposals and manifestos and discussing them.

The government as a whole and all imperial offices, departments, services and agencies have not only official websites on the Web, but also official discussion platforms. Draft regulatory documents are posted there and they are actively discussed with everyone, and bilaterally - with those who posted suggestions or criticism, a dialogue is being held (not with everyone, of course, but with interesting and constructive ones). The initiator of this order was the imperial authorities, but since it has become very "customary" in Russia, the *zemstvo* authorities have also adopted it - in particular, now any bills of the Duma are discussed in this way. At the same time, government bodies are not limited to their sites for studying and discussing proposals - each of them has sufficiently large departments to monitor the entire Network on the subject of their jurisdiction and to communicate with the authors of materials that are interesting for one reason or another. Very often, such authors receive offers to become an expert of a government agency, or even directly go to the civil service, and the level of the offer directly depends on the level of the material they are interested in. So posting socio-political materials with analysis or proposals, as well as participating in relevant online discussions, is an important social and career lift in Russia.

But all this activity pales before what begins when the emperor announces a national discussion on a particular issue, general enough for a national discussion. This year, for example, there is a discussion about whether to allow people to change (at their request, of course) using the latest biomedical technologies - that is, to allow people to acquire special physical strength or endurance, or the ability to stay without air for a long time, or resistance to extreme temperatures, etc. And the previous discussion, which took place two years ago, was devoted to the question of whether it is worth increasing the retirement age while increasing its size [?]. According to the established tradition, one year is allotted for such discussions, at the end of which the imperial authorities publish their statistical results (which anyone can check on the Web for themselves, if you will take the time), and the decision is usually made in accordance with them.

Of course, the result of such discussions is not law, the authorities can ignore all proposals and act in exactly the opposite way compared to the opinion crystallized during the discussion. But on the other hand, if on some issue the government is not interested in the voice of the people, then it simply will not announce a discussion (the government in the autocratic Empire does not seek to please the population). Thus, a paradoxical situation arises: in our country, the authorities are forced to pretend to be interested in and attentive to the opinion of the people (otherwise they will not be re-elected) and for this to participate in national discussions of important issues, but only for show, and therefore they try by all implicit

methods to fight off any proposals from sides. And in Russia, the authorities are not forced to do this, so if a discussion on some issue is announced, then only in order to listen to it, and you can be sure that you with your opinion will not, in the Russian expression, “kick off” like an annoying fly. But everything in the world has a price - and you pay for the attention of the authorities to your opinion on some issues by the fact that on other issues no one asks your opinion, even for show.

In general, the Russian government attaches extreme importance to the possibility of VR contact between the authorities and citizens; every citizen has the right to be heard - even with a complaint, even with a proposal - this is directly written in the Constitution. Moreover, from conversations with many guardsmen, including high-ranking ones, I clearly understood that this entry was not made for the sake of formality, but reflects their deep conviction, even the imperative: we will decide according to our own understanding, and not you, but for exactly this reason we must all listen to you first. The Empire relies almost exclusively on direct VR contact to exercise this right, as the idea of representation is not popular there. The latter is expressed primarily in the fact that the legislative power (*zemstvo*, since there is no legislative branch in the imperial power), that is, the *zemstvo* Duma, is not a representative power. That is, a deputy of any of the chambers is, according to the Constitution, not a representative of the people who elected him, but only an employee hired by them for legislative activities. Therefore, as a conductor of complaints or requests from voters, no one will listen to him (let them apply themselves or through a constitutional representative - the head of the community), but they will make proposals, but like any other citizen. For the same reason, there is no institution of ombudsmen, or human rights commissioners, in the structure of Russian power, which 40 years ago took place throughout the territory of the future Empire - both in Russia and in European countries.

I talked about the reasons for this with the head of the Imperial Prosecutorial Supervision Murtaza Sultanov. By the way, the non-Orthodox name of the guardsman does not indicate his religion - a guardsman cannot be non-Orthodox - but that this person by nationality belongs to one of the allied peoples (in this case, to the Bashkorts) and used his right not to undergo twinning and remain according to the documents as a Bashkort and, accordingly, in the world be called not by a baptismal name, but by that given at birth. So, Sultanov sincerely could not understand what I was talking about and why an ombudsman was needed. “If someone is offended, why shouldn’t he turn to us?” - he said. “This is what prosecutorial supervision is needed for, moreover, the prosecutor has more than enough powers, including power, unlike your commissioner.” “But you were appointed by the emperor, and the commissioner was appointed by the State Duma,” I pointed out. “So what?” Sultanov was still perplexed. “As if it were believed that this makes him more independent of the authorities, and this is important in cases where the offender is the authorities themselves,” I answered. “But power is not just one person,” Sultanov said. “It’s not the emperor who personally offends a person. And if someone from the police offends him, for example, then why should I shield this offender: is he a matchmaker or brother to me?” - “Well, after all, corporate solidarity - although you are from different departments, but both are from the ruling elite.” - “And what, the commissioner for rights, and the deputies of the Duma who appointed him, weren’t they part of the then ruling elite? No, perhaps in those days it was necessary, but I absolutely do not understand the meaning of this now” - said Sultanov - “especially since it is not the hierarchy of imperial power that violates the rights of people most often. In addition, if the offended person suspects me of dishonesty, he can file an application with the court, and I will be subjected to a techno-interrogation - or he can write to the district *oprichnina* assembly without any trial, and I will be asked a question about his case during the next annual techno-interrogation”.

So representation among Russians is not in honor, although earlier it, on the contrary, took on very grotesque forms: for example, both in Russia and in European countries at the beginning of the century there were strange formations that we never had in both Americas - the so-called public chambers, in which there sat representatives of public organizations selected, it is not clear how and by whom. I just can’t understand, dear compatriots, why such bodies were needed where there were parliaments: if you

have popular support, get elected there, and if not, then why should they listen to you more than an ordinary citizen? In modern Russia, all this is in the past, and the place of representation has been taken by direct contact between the citizen and the authorities through the Network. I personally did an experiment by writing several proposals to various government bodies - on behalf of various Russian citizens I know (of course, with their consent). So, to all of them, except for one (which, apparently, was considered uninteresting), I received answers, and on the merits. So the opportunity to be heard with a proposal like "if I were the director" (and with a complaint, I believe, even more so) is completely real for a Russian. And I think that the point here is not only in the desire to be fair, but also in something else: the entire modern Russian statehood is permeated by the spirit of innovation and experimentation in the socio-political sphere, the desire to be as advanced as possible in this (they do not like the phrase "to be world leaders") - because it was thanks to this that they rose from their knees and defeated the West. And it is precisely this spirit of constant search, which needs, like fuel, a stream of new ideas, which makes a situation like the one that took place in the middle of the 19th century completely unimaginable in today's Russia. Then the head of the gendarmerie corps (that is, the security service), Alexander Benkendorf, said: "Your project is bad already because it disturbs the peace in the Empire and upsets the sovereign emperor with its analysis."

History and archives. If we are talking about national discussions, then I cannot but touch on a separate and very unusual part of them - historical discussions. The fact is that since the time of the Second Empire (or rather, since its collapse, which made it possible to critically comprehend and discuss what happened in it), the Russians realized in their own skin that the past is not a given, but depends on the present. This, of course, is not about the past itself, but about its interpretation - at that time there was even an expression: "We live in a country with an unpredictable past." Moreover, it is not at all necessary that the initiator of such a rethinking of the past - sometimes towards the truth, more often not - was certainly the authorities, in order to substantiate its ideology. To no lesser extent, this happened spontaneously, and the perception depended on the views that dominate in society.

For example, the wave of vilification of everything that existed in the Red Empire, which concentrated, as if in focus, on the vilification of Joseph the Great and the entire Stalin era, which began in the late 80s and peaked in the early 90s, was inspired not only by Boris the Damned and his government, who needed it as an apology for their activities to dismantle Russian statehood. And not only by foreign intelligence services, primarily the United States of that time, which were interested in any weakening of the enemy. To no lesser extent, its source was ordinary people, whose relatives were repressed in those days, or they themselves, often - although not always - innocently, and who could not forgive the pain and fear of that time. But we should not forget that pain and fear are understandable and natural feelings for those unjustly offended, but at the same time they are poor helpers in establishing historical truth. But people listened to speeches, read newspapers, watched TV, and since they really wanted to enter a new bright life, shaking off the ashes of the old one (at that time the Russians did not know that this did not happen), the criticism of the Red Empire fell on fertile ground: this wanted to believe - and believed. And starting from the second half of the 90s, when there was a rise in national self-consciousness and pride among the people, the opposite trend developed: those who experienced particular humiliation and rage during the Second Time of Troubles (for themselves or for the state - it doesn't matter), began to sincerely and with great fervor to prove exactly the opposite. Namely, that no one under Stalin, as well as in general for the seventy years of the triumph of the Red Empire, suffered without guilt, that life in it was richer, freer and more fun than life in the rest of the world, and similar nonsense. Of course, humiliation and rage are just as bad advisers as pain and fear.

This pendulum-like urge to rethink history, and often just rewrite it, was not limited to the recent past, which is still politically relevant. On this wave, "new historians" surfaced, who turned precisely to very ancient times and eras. Since the late 80s, for example, the mathematician Fomenko's theory of the so-called new chronology has gained great popularity (though only among non-specialists). Although it did

not stand up to any serious criticism, millions of people were fond of it, mainly because of the above-described confusion in their minds.

Many writers worked in the genre of storytelling simply because they felt they were riding the fashion and readership of their time. This is clearly seen in the literature of that time, revising the history of the war between Russia and Germany in 1941-1945. If part of it was directly paid for by the intelligence services of the former United States in order to blur the core of Russian self-identification (for example, what the CIA officer Suvorov wrote), then the other part was, as the Russians say, simply “opportunistic” on a fashionable topic.

But what has been said does not mean at all that all attempts to rethink history were false - sometimes it was the unwillingness to revise it that led away from the truth. An example here is the great Russian writer of the twentieth century Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who has monuments both in his homeland in Kislovodsk, and in Rostov-on-Don, where he spent his childhood and student years, and in Kazakhstan, where he was in a camp and then lived in exile, and in Moscow. At the beginning of this century, he published a fundamental work devoted to two hundred years of Jews living among Russians in the Russian state; this work, which illuminated the numerous facets of this history in a completely new way, dispelled many myths that existed among the people on this topic. But the history of one’s country is not just science, and the myths in it are not just scientific delusions; the people’s understanding of who they are and where they are going depends on it. For these reasons, by the middle of the first decade of our century, and even more so by the 2010s, a conscious and strong need arose in society to know exactly how it really was.

In response to this need, since the mid-1990s, the Russian government has developed an approach that is characteristic of it in its straightforwardness. The already mentioned question about Stalin’s repressions was chosen as a “test of the pen”. A commission was set up by imperial decree to deal with this issue. To do this, in addition to the necessary funding, it was given the right to receive and even withdraw any document from the archives of any department. No one instructed the commission to evaluate the era - this is a subjective matter. In such things, if there is a public consensus, then certainly not as a result of the work of the commissions. It was given a much more specific and unambiguous task - to accurately find out and publicly report to the people: a) how many people were deprived of freedom and life by the state in the period from 1928 to 1953; b) how many of them were unambiguously innocent of what they were accused of, how many were guilty with a high degree of probability, and how many of them could not be said with certainty; c) how many people died indirectly, that is, they were not directly repressed, but died obviously as a result of the actions of the authorities, moreover, those that could not have been taken without prejudice to the state.

However, such a formulation also contained serious difficulties, and not so much technical as purely scientific and ideological ones - for example, how to count those who died due to indirect causes. For example, a number of people died in the early 1930s in Ukraine from starvation as a result of the forcible seizure of bread - and if bread had not been seized, then during this period no one would have died there? And since part of the grain went to the cities (the rest was exported), then what about the fact that if it had not been confiscated, then they would have died of hunger not in the villages, but in the cities? And even the bread that was sold abroad: the proceeds were not used to buy diamonds for Stalin... If a factory was bought with this money, which during the war made it possible to produce an additional million shells, what to do with it? Etc.

It was not easier with the repressed: if a person was convicted of Trotskyism, and he didn’t even know the word - it happened so often - this is an understandable case (without going into details, dear compatriots, I’ll say that Trotsky’s teaching and practice were even more terrible and more disgusting than what happened in the Red Empire in fact). Well, if he really was an active Trotskyist in the late 10s and 20s of the 20th century (Trotsky really had a lot of supporters), then how? To what extent can one be considered

innocently repressed who was repressed for belonging to a group to which he really belonged? And in general, how legitimate is it to approach the deeds of another century with the standards of one century, when it is not about the soul, but about politics? Nevertheless, everyone really wanted to put an end to this issue, and such that it looked final. In short, the commission set to work and published an official report four years later, in the spring of 2019, a month before the Twelve-Day War - it contained all the answers to the questions posed, with a breakdown and explanations.

Taking into account these contradictions and the ambivalence of assessments, the commission chose the only possible program of work, which had far-reaching consequences for other areas of life - with a different approach, its decision would never be considered objective and not biased. All documents, except those containing information of a military or intelligence nature that have not lost their relevance, were posted on the Web with open access - this is not a very cheap job, but now all Russian archives are on the Web. The interim results of the commission's work were also posted on the Web, including the transcripts of the meetings of the working groups and the conclusions of full-time and non-staff experts - that is, the work was absolutely open.

However, this openness was not limited to *glasnost* - the work went on in a dialogue mode with the people: everyone could write their views to the commission demanding an answer on the merits, participate in its forums, or simply post their private opinion, but on the official websites of the commission. (You have noticed, dear compatriots, that this regime is similar to the nationwide discussions I have described above - this is not accidental: the mechanism for such discussions was worked out just during the work of that commission.) The commission guaranteed, under pain of paying compensation, that any person who demanded an answer would receive it - so many people will be hired to work in the forums to make it possible (budget allowed).

When the official result of the commission's work was announced - and everyone could check it, because the entire chain of information was open, from primary materials to final conclusions - it really put an end to this issue, and the Russian intellectual mainstream never returned to this issue. But it is no less important that even during the period of work there was an unprecedented activation of the public, so that even after the completion of the work, the educated part of the people wanted to continue - something else of the same kind. And so it happened: in 2021-2025, there was a discussion about crimes - real or imaginary, just what had to be determined - of a crushed Western civilization, on the basis of archives confiscated in the USA and Europe. In 2027-2028, at the request of the House of the German People, which the House of the Jewish People also joined (by that time everyone already believed in the impartiality of the proceedings), a discussion took place about the true number of victims of the Holocaust. And so it happened: now discussions take place regularly, occupy a very prominent place in the cultural life of the Empire, and thanks to them, history in the Empire is considered one of the most important and at the same time fascinating sciences, and the profession of a historian - one of the most prestigious.

Media. The attitude towards the media in Russia is difficult to understand without knowing their history, which is very different from ours. If in the First Empire newspapers and magazines (radio and TV had not yet been invented), despite the official existence of preliminary censorship, even in peacetime, they did not fundamentally differ from ours, then from 1917 to 1986-1987 all the press in Russia was party-state. There was nothing but praising the authorities and reporting on the labor successes of industrial and agricultural enterprises, except perhaps all sorts of reproach to the decaying West - moreover, not for what is really unloved in Russia to this day, but only for the fact that private enterprise is allowed there and therefore there are rich people. Therefore, in the Red Empire, the profession of a journalist was not exactly despised (although it definitely did not belong to the most prestigious, like ours), but unimaginably regulated and boring.

From the very beginning of the second Time of Troubles, and actually even from the last years of the

existence of the Second Empire, journalists got the opportunity to write anything and about anyone. For the journalistic corps as a whole, it looked something like they were at a feast after a forced famine: they reveled in freedom. Moreover, the two main restrictions on this boundless freedom that originally existed in our country - so that the public was interested and colleagues continued to give a hand - at that time did not exist in Russia and could not be: not only journalists, but also their colleagues, reveled in freedom, also readers. And the state - not a specific power, but the state machine as such - was strongly disliked by all journalists who grew up in the stuffy and humiliating atmosphere of the Second Empire. This situation was superimposed on three hundred years of sentiments exalting everything Western and despising everything native, especially common among the bohemian intelligentsia, which included journalists (in the days of the late USSR, pro-Western sentiments were driven inward, but did not go away). In addition, there was also a certain subjective factor - several of the most unscrupulous oligarchs (all non-Russians by nationality, mostly Jews) created private media empires, moreover, exclusively for personal political purposes. As a result, by the mid-1990s, the press (not individual publications, but the vast majority of it) became openly anti-Russian and Russophobic. It was called liberal, but it was not even liberalism, but its continuation brought to the point of absurdity - complete anti-statehood. For the above reasons, journalists have slipped into this position quite naturally - not out of necessity, but at the behest of the soul. The result was logical: when the second Time of Troubles ended and the country and the people began to return to a natural worldview, hatred of the press and journalists (liberal, but there were practically no others) reached unprecedented proportions in all sectors of society: they were called "smackers" and, in all seriousness, they were considered the main culprits for the humiliation of the country.

Naturally, Vladimir the Restorer was not going to tolerate the media, and especially television, which are openly a conductor of anti-Russian policy and, moreover, are so unloved by the people. Already in the first half of his reign, not at all rich in radical changes, he took away their TV channels from the oligarchic media tycoons. In fact, he practically began his reign with this (except for the completion of the military phase of the second Caucasian war).

The phrase "taken away" should not mislead you, dear compatriots - the media magnates never bought them, but, in fact, they themselves took them away from the state at the moment of its complete impotence (which came not without their active help); Vladimir II paid them a lot of money. Thus, by 2006, all federal television channels were in one way or another under the control of the state (Russians read little paper newspapers in those days, and on-line newspapers were just appearing - therefore, only TV had ideological importance); but it turned out that this was not enough. The owners changed from oligarchs to the state, but the journalists and editors remained the same, with the same attitude that I wrote about - and there was absolutely nowhere to take others. Therefore, there was a situation in which there was no longer any open propaganda against the authorities on television, but more subtle subversive work aimed at the gradual erosion of all the values that lay at the foundation of the very idea of Russian statehood continued almost at the same level (perhaps in a certain part unintentionally). In our modern terms, this can be described as military operations of the conscientological [sic] type against Russia. Nevertheless, the severity was to a certain extent removed, and so it dragged on until 2013. But when the reconstruction of the Empire began, it could not continue as before.

Gabriel the Great and the leaders of his government have fully learned from the media situation of the 1990s and early 2000s, albeit rather specific ones. Television in itself is too strong a tool for influencing the human psyche, and the psyche of most people is not able to critically comprehend television information and resist, they believed. After all, hypnosis, except for licensed psychiatrists, is prohibited under pain of criminal punishment - and how is TV not mass hypnosis? In the Western world, they believe that the antidote to this is the existence of as many different TV channels as possible, which reduces the power of the impact of each channel individually. This is true, but, continuing this logic, the Western world should have allowed and encouraged drugs, if only there were a lot of them and very

different ones - but this is sheer absurdity. Therefore, there can be no talk of private television at all - and in the Law “On the Psychic Protection of the Nation” of 2015, it was established that neither the owner, nor the shareholder, nor the manager of the television company can be private entrepreneurs or corporations. Nor can they be public organizations - or maybe either the government or *zemstvos* (for their regional channels). However, the reformers did not stop there: is state ownership and management a panacea? they asked rhetorically. This is not about what I wrote of above (that journalists, even on state-owned channels, continued to bend their liberal line) - this can be dealt with. But does the state even need zombie hypnosis, albeit with noble goals? If TV can be likened to a drug, then should the Empire make drug addicts out of its citizens and keep them drug addicted? “We have moved away from a democratic state system, when everyone chooses power,” Ivan Georgiev, then Minister of Culture, said in his speech in 2015, “so let’s not act like a democracy, where the main goal is to turn our population into an obedient controlled biomass - electorate. If we wanted to turn our citizens into zombies, there would be nothing better for this than state television. But they don’t choose us, and therefore we don’t need it - on the contrary, we want the fullest disclosure of their human potentials, as the Lord commanded in the parable of the buried talent, and zombies are not suitable for this.

The result of this approach was the following: in the same 2015, all federal state channels (and there were no others) were closed, with the exception of one; one more local channel was allowed to have a *zemstvo* or a group of *zemstvos*, and they were responsible for ensuring that its broadcasting was purely regional. Thus, starting from 2015 and until now, a Russian has either one (imperial) or two (imperial and *zemstvo*) channels on his monitor - because not all *zemstvos* have local broadcasting. On both channels there is only news and officialdom (on the first - imperial news, on the second - local) - entertainment programs of any kind are not allowed there.

I must assure you, dear compatriots (I watched Russian TV for almost a year), that the government did not deceive its citizens: neither news nor officialdom is used to glorify the authorities and in general for propaganda - they are served very dryly and not biased enough. They differ from ours primarily in a clear separation of domestic and world news - in accordance with the principle of autonomy, Russian viewers should not have a feeling of the unity of the planet. In addition, on Russian TV, the very choice of what is news and what is not is much more regulated. We can show in the news a story about a man who got married at a hundred years old, because this channel, unlike others, will consider it worthy news; the same applies to the political bloc - some will consider some third-rate human rights march to be news, while others will not. So, the Russians don’t have this - the news only shows what, in terms of its scale, is unambiguously all-imperial news.

In addition, the news there is much less emotional and visually spectacular - for example, in those reports where there is nothing special to show, no background video materials are shown, moreover, reports in general go only where they are really needed (the rest of the time there is only the announcer in the studio - the share of his time in news programs is much higher than in similar programs in our country). All this is done within the framework of the general line to reduce the direct (past rational comprehension) impact on the viewer. For the same reason, crimes and disasters occupy a small place in the news blocks and are never shown directly, although they are not hushed up - the Russian authorities do not like to lie, considering it beneath their dignity. The purpose of such a structure of television, in accordance with the ideas formed by the government, was primarily not even to stop the “sinister”, as it was called here, but to rid the population of drug addiction from the screen. In Georgiev’s speech mentioned, such terminology was used: “At first it will be hard for you, as always when breaking, but then you will be glad.”

In principle, this is what happened: for an ordinary person, life in Russia is now much less VR than for our average person here - since people in Russia do not sit in front of a screen, they spend significantly more time in some business, even if not very meaningful, in communicating with each other (with or without alcohol), in having sex, finally. I think the rejection of TV played a decisive role here. The

imperial authorities will clearly continue to pursue the same line - if in the next decade VR systems become a complete imitation of reality, as technology observers promise us, they will no doubt be severely limited in Russia.

All of the above applies not only to terrestrial broadcasting, but also to cable networks, that is, television programs are also prohibited on the Web - the goal of the government was by no means to replace free television with paid television. On the other hand, there was no reason to forbid citizens to order feature films and the like for money on their monitors - although Russia is not a democracy, it is a completely free country. And in a free country, it's hard to explain how ordering a movie over the Net is different from ordering a disc with this movie delivered to your home over the same Net. This situation required a clear legislative definition of the difference between television broadcasting - the one that should be banned - and other types of video materials that do not bother anyone; this turned out to be a difficult task. The law adopted as a result, which is still in force today, establishes that the main distinguishing feature of TV is the presence of a broadcasting grid, that is, showing video materials one after another in real time, according to a pre-announced schedule, without the viewer being able to stop the show and then continue it from there, the same places; this is expressly prohibited. As for an individual material about some event, place, people, etc., then this is a film, and you can sell it through the Web without restrictions (or give it away for free, if that is your business model), just like feature films. True, if this is a report from the scene of an event, including from a sporting event, then it can be placed on the Web for order no earlier than 72 hours after it happened - otherwise it is considered television. So when I say that a Russian can watch only one or two TV channels, and very boring ones (on purpose), then this refers specifically to the channels. Separate films and other video materials - educational, informative, humorous, sports, etc. - he can call through the Network in huge quantities, partly for a fee, and partly for free. Extensive and very serious studies conducted by the Russian authorities show that in this case - when everyone watches separate programs that are not grouped into programs, different and at different times, and the programs themselves are not tied to the moment of the show and do not concern today - the zombie effect is small. So television is another sphere of Russian life, where at first glance it seems to a stranger that he is faced with complete savagery, and upon closer inspection it turns out that everything is not so scary and not so much different from what we are used to - although this A small difference can have big consequences.

As for the media other than television - paper magazines, online newspapers, radio and others - they are practically unlimited. Moreover, in Russia there is no law on mass media at all. This does not mean that anything can be done here, just that there is no specific state regulation of this area, just as there are no separate laws on metallurgy or on the production of computers.

I already wrote that in Russia there is a Law "On Publicity", which establishes what cannot be publicly pronounced, published and broadcast (pornography, homosexuality, nationalism and chauvinism, anti-state agitation, etc.), regardless of the medium. The Russians believe that this law is more than enough to regulate the content of the media. The general business part of their activities is regulated by general legislation (Civil and Tax Codes, antimonopoly law, etc.). No licensing or even notification registration is required to open media outlets in Russia, and they can be closed only in the manner prescribed for the closure of enterprises in general. "And if the publication does not violate either the law on publicity or general law, but constantly and purposefully lies?" I asked Elena Putko, head of the media department at the Imperial Information Network Agency. "Well, if they want to lie, let them lie," she replied. - Let the market decide, in other words, the audience. If this is not a zombifying medium, that is, not television, then the market will figure it out. It's as if you were asking, what, they say, to do with those who sell obviously ineffective means for a love spell for a departed husband - and do nothing, unless the sellers use hypnosis for advertising. Of course, if you prove in court that this media outlet did not just lie, but did it purposefully and intentionally, that is, it itself did not consider its materials to be true, then according to the Criminal Code, this is fraud with all the ensuing consequences. But we are not going to do this, if consumer organizations want to, let them do it themselves. In some extreme cases, we can issue and

distribute an official communication to consumers, in which we will convincingly prove the falsity of this publication, but this has not happened in my memory. (This approach has an exception, more typical for art, which will be discussed later.) If there was an insult to the country, people, etc. - these are all criminal offenses (see the chapter "[Law Enforcement System](#)"), then this, of course, must be opposed, and for this there is an Imperial censorship service. Also, if journalists or publications in general take money for materials without marking them as advertising, then this is a criminal offense (bribe) - but law enforcement agencies do this, and let them do it."

I should note that in the absence of a law on the media, the responsibility of Russian journalists in terms of the correctness of the presentation of information is higher than ours - slander or disinformation is considered as such, even if all sorts of loopholes such as "according to unverified rumors", "they say that", etc.; but this is again a matter for the law enforcement system and the courts. In general, dear compatriots, in the field of mass media of all types (except for TV, which they consider zombifying and therefore they consider separately), Russian legislation is not tougher, but, on the contrary, is significantly more liberal than ours. This is not surprising, because the population is not an electorate for the Russian authorities.

Art. When looking at Russian art as a whole, including its applications in everyday life, that is, at Russian aesthetics, the combination of a number of elements that seem to be completely incompatible is striking first of all. This is a consequence of the inconsistency or, at least, the ambiguity of the structure of the very foundations of Russian life, which is present in all other areas, but in art it manifests itself most visibly. I will mention a few - the most obvious - of this kind of combinations.

Firstly, in all areas of art, as well as in applied aesthetics (design), the so-called imperial style is present - it cannot but be present! It is not always possible for a non-specialist to formulate precisely what exactly is expressed in, say, in music or painting, but nevertheless it is always felt. It can be felt most clearly in architecture - monumentalism, pomposity, self-sufficiency are characteristic of it there. Buildings, even for purely commercial purposes (not to mention state buildings, let alone temple buildings), are quite often self-sufficient, as if emphasizing their irresistible difference, disproportion with an individual. When planning new cities or districts in existing cities, regardless of who the customer is - a development company, community, *zemstvo* - preference is given to wide straight streets and large squares, rather than winding cozy lanes. And this is evident in everything: for example, Russians definitely love everything big - for example, the vast majority of people, in the presence of budgetary constraints, would prefer to buy a used, but large car, rather than a new, but small one. The same with houses and apartments. In fiction and cinema, small forms that have become dominant in our country in recent years (stories and short stories, short films-novellas) exist, but are considered completely secondary - it is hard to imagine that one of them would become an all-imperial idol. So it is in painting, sculpture and symphonic music. These features are the embodiment of a difficult to formulate, but well-felt idea: a person is not the highest value, the goal and measure of everything, but only a part of a grandiose whole, the subject of the implementation of higher plans is not life for a person, but a person for life. On the other hand, the Russian imperial style is far from the classical imperial style, as it is under pressure from the other side - from the subculture of the service class of the guardsmen, which makes up a small proportion of the population, but has a very significant weight in cultural influences. Their contempt for money and rejection of comfort, the general spirit of severity and asceticism, completely contradicts such elements of the classical imperial style as the richness of decoration, the variety of decoration, the riot of colors and, in general, decoration; the Empire style (which, in fact, translates as "imperial") is alien to them. Natural and organic for them (and through them for the country as a whole) is the spirit of minimalism. It is the combination of imperial and minimalist aesthetics, seemingly contradictory, that produces a whimsical and unusual result. They are huge and overwhelming buildings, but with simple and clean lines, without any frills; monuments [памятники] and monuments [монументы] dominating the area, but in the form of simple monochrome stela. The same is true even in applied design solutions - all the most luxurious

Russian cars are very large and aggressive, but very strict forms and almost without decorative elements. The same trend, although in a less obvious form, is present in music, and in literature, and in cinema.

Secondly, the Russian worldview is characterized by seriousness, bordering, in our opinion, on pathos. Such, no doubt, is the result of deep religiosity, a serious, not joking attitude of Russians to both life and death. Therefore, they have many more books and films about various kinds of extreme situations, especially about various wars, and in general, their style would be considered unacceptably pathetic in our country. But works about the everyday life of ordinary people (what we call urban serials), although they are common, but to a much lesser extent than ours - quite a lot of people read and watch them, but in polls, they never rate among the most beloved. On the other hand, the Russians are no less characteristic of the opposite - light and playful - attitude towards life and death, successes and failures, in general, towards the whole surrounding reality, including themselves. This is also a very deep layer of the Russian worldview, and the Russians finally became such only during the period of the Second Empire. By the way, it is useful to remember this for those of our Russian publicists who claim that the Red Empire brought nothing but degradation to the Russians. Humor is very popular in Russia, and not in the presentation of professional comedians, like ours, but as a colloquial genre of a predominantly satirical orientation - Russians laugh without malice at everything, including the most sacred things for themselves, without turning, however, into swearing. So, in Russian art, as well as in the Russian national consciousness in general, both are easily and naturally combined, pathos and humor, seemingly completely mutually exclusive. In this sense, the cult film of the [20]40s "The Last Crossroads" is characteristic, which tells about two hero-friends who voluntarily accept the last battle at the end of the film and die in martyrdom in order to prevent the enemy detachment from unexpectedly breaking through to the Russian lines, although the heroes do not have nothing to do with it (the action takes place during the second Russian-caliphate war). So, one of them, Friedrich, in baptism Fedor, a very serious, deeply Orthodox person, who knows of a grave sin in his past and is constantly tormented by it, wants to suffer for people and the country for the glory of God and for the atonement of his sin. And the second, Sergei, a rare, according to the Russian expression, "gouging", to whom everything is "to a light bulb", constantly ironical over everything, including Friedrich and his faith. But at the moment of truth, both are ready for a feat, knights without fear or reproach. This combination of incongruous rôles, reflecting two images of a feat, has very deep roots in Russian culture: both a person who prays and dresses in everything clean before a battle, and a person who has been walking and drinking all night, but in battle without hesitation protected his comrades with himself - equally ancient Russian archetypes.

Thirdly, in Russian art, traditionalism and avant-gardism are very intricately intertwined. Like all of the above, this antinomy has a long history. Until the end of the 19th century, Russian culture gravitated toward tradition - until the 18th century, to Old Russian, and after to European. But since the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, the avant-garde flourishes in all areas of art, and the Russians are among the world leaders here. This took place in the visual arts, and in music, and in architecture, and in literature, and in the newly emerged cinema, and continued until about the 30s of the twentieth century. This time became the golden age (for some reason, Russians call it the silver age) of Russian art - its contribution to the treasury of world culture can hardly be overestimated. Without a doubt, this was a direct consequence of the general spiritual state of Russian society at that time, which, among other things, led to the revolution - the feeling of the "dilapidated" old world and the upcoming and desired breakthrough to a new life (the avant-garde direction in art was even called "left", as a political direction). When such a worldview recurred at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s - it again seemed that a new happy life was coming and the old one could be shaken off like dust from one's feet - avant-garde art took off again. True, unlike the rise of the beginning of the century, it did not give rise to anything truly imperishable. It is obvious that the rise of the avant-garde could not but take place in the second half of the 2010s, the feeling that the country and people are following untrodden paths into an unknown future and making history was and is still very strong, especially since this feeling is true. But the avant-garde in

modern Russian art is intricately combined with soil and religious tradition. Therefore, in particular, avant-gardism in Russia affects the form, creative methods, but not the essence - experimenting with moral and worldview principles is not practiced there. For the same reason, the extreme forms of the avant-garde, which we collectively call actual art, did not take root there either. It is interesting that another manifestation of the combination of modern and traditional in Russian art, and in general the feeling of the past as reality, is that sometimes different times there completely merge in the minds of both the creator and the audience. So, I was surprised to learn that the most popular song "Farewell of the guardsmen" ("The order was given to him to the west, / to her in the other direction") from the 2042 cult film "Zhelezka" is actually a Soviet song about the Civil War of 1918-1921. Of course, not all - for example, there could not be a couplet "Well, I wish you / do not lie down in the distant land, / go all the way to the edge, / save the honor of the *oprichny*", but an essential part of it.

Finally, *fourthly*, in Russian culture, the general imperial and the national coexist in a very peculiar way. We have a very careful attitude towards national art - both native American, and African American, and others - but they are merged into one, which is American. It is rather difficult to imagine a separate existence in the cultural mainstream of Guarani or Seminole Indian art, in contrast to its elements in general art. The situation was similar in Russia during the period of the Second Empire, in any case, everything went exactly towards this. But now the situation is not quite the same - German art exists separately, Serbian art separately, Kazakh art separately, etc.; Naturally, there is also Russian, it is also all-Russian. This is not directly related to either the nationality of the authors or the setting of the book or film: there may be a work using local material, but its action can be easily imagined as taking place among another people, or it may be otherwise, as with the sensational Ossetian film of the year before last "My revenge", which is deeply national in spirit, and what is happening there cannot be transferred to the environment of Russians or Germans. There is only no separate Russian art - not because of any infringement or inferiority of the Russian people, but because Russian art is general imperial, and it does not need its own separate one. This is where the position that the Russian people is an imperial people in its essence is manifested. The national flavor is also manifested in other elements of culture - in food, clothing, interiors, etc. Moreover, if in our country ethnic elements are perceived as a fascinating gastronomic or design journey, then in Russia this is perceived by everyone as their own: a Russian considers German Weisswurst or Turkic kazy "our" food, although if you ask him directly, he, of course, will not attribute it to Russian cuisine in the narrow sense.

If we try to identify not stylistic, but substantive features of Russian art in comparison with ours, then they are clearly tougher. And I do not mean cruelty, that is, the number of naturalistic scenes of violence - they have just less of this - but precisely the rigidity in the perception and transmission of life. Significantly less often than ours, is there a happy ending and much more often a sad ending; moreover, the point here is not at all the socially accusatory nature of art, because the sad ending is also characteristic of narrations about quite prosperous and even heroic periods in the life of the country.

Probably, this is a reflection of the deep worldview of Russians (at least one of its sides) - tragic, not believing in true happiness in this world, mired in evil, considering suffering and a painful road to the heights of the spirit.

Russians don't really believe in the artistic depiction of justice either: for example, they all had a lot of fun when I told them about our famous film "Homecoming", winner of six Oscars, where the main character, the Castilian crusader baroness, is played by the famous Jennifer Castro. "In those days in Castile, as in any other place, no one would let a woman go beyond the kitchen," they told me with a laugh. "There weren't and couldn't be female knights, whether you like it or not." "But this is unfair," I said, "are women second-rate people? After all, women serve as equals among guardsmen in your country too." "Yes, it's unfair," they answered me, "but that's how it was - the rejection of injustice is not a reason to turn a blind eye to it." And in one Russian film that I watched, there was a character - a teenager

deprived of almost everything by fate: ugly, stupid, unpleasant, from a dysfunctional family, with a physical defect - who, out of envy and malevolence, did mean things to his classmates, ending in murder. "How is it," I almost cried, "if everything is bad with him, moreover, not through his fault, why is he also bred with a vile soul, this is unfair!" "Because that happens, too," they answered me. "Goodness does not live in any hut, just as evil does not live in any palace. Life in general is unfair, and a significant part of this injustice cannot be eliminated by any social progress. If the injustice of life is so hard for you, then you have nothing to do in this world, except to suffer and wait for death, I heard from one Russian, and he told me this not without sympathy. Probably, this is how it is, but you don't want to think about it - but the Russians want to, and when you read a lot of their books and watch a lot of films and performances, such a difference from our books, films and performances is very felt.

Governmental support. The state policy in the field of arts support in Russia is based for the most part on the same principles as the support of fundamental science, which was discussed above - that is, the main task is considered to be that neither government officials nor venerable, professional colleagues determine who is a better and more promising artist (writer, musician, etc.) and, accordingly, more worthy of state support.

Just like in science, there are state societies here, only there are four of them, not two: ROIZIA (Russian Society of Fine Arts and Architecture), RIMO (Russian Imperial Musical Society), ROLS (Russian Society of Literature and Literature) and RIOKT (Russian Imperial Society of Cinematography and Theatre). Like the two scientific societies - IOFI and ROGN - these societies do not have powers in any way connected with the content of the corresponding creativity; their functions are purely economic and organizational. Therefore, they do not have artistic councils, and it is forbidden for people who themselves work in creative professions to hold leadership positions (management companies, mostly private ones, manage the societies). Societies award scholarships to creative workers and ensure the functioning of the so-called creative combines - art and sculpture workshops, recording studios, etc. In addition, they organize the interactions of scholarship holders necessary for creativity with each other and with the public - exhibitions, creative conferences, etc. Naturally, budgetary funds for technical support for creative scholarship holders (that is, in addition to scholarships themselves) are allocated only for individual types of creativity - for paints, canvases and brushes for artists, stone and metal for sculptors, tools and processing computers for musicians, etc. No one will give money to a filmmaker to make a film or to an architect to build a building just for the sake of his creative support, because no budget would be able to withstand this. But a director or architect who receives a creative scholarship has the opportunity to slowly think over and prepare their concept for investors, without thinking about how to live and feed their families at this time.

As a result, creative workers in professions such as writers or screenwriters, who do not need anything but their mind and soul for their work, have a scholarship for life, that is, they receive the most valuable thing from the state - free time. And artists, sculptors, musicians receive, in addition to this, those devices and materials without which they cannot work. Scholarships are not grants, they are awarded not for any specific project, but for a person; in other words, the award decision is based on what the person has done, not what they are going to do with the scholarship.

The amount of the scholarship is 1200 rubles per month, and it is usually awarded for five years. The decision to award it is made by the relevant creative councils (artistic, musical, etc.), which include art historians - employees of museums, conservatories and libraries; teachers of art institutes and universities; people from near-art commerce - managers of film studios, publishing houses, architectural companies, sound recording companies; journalists writing on these topics; and representatives of the Imperial Arts Agency. The only people they try not to include in these councils are the creative workers themselves, especially the venerable ones. Here, the Russian authorities proceed from the sad wisdom of life that usually one master will say good things about another only to spite the third (of course, this does not

always happen, but the authorities are obliged to play it safe, if only for the sake of scholarship applicants). All creative councils are state-owned, budget money is paid for participation in them. The state does not interfere in the substantive part of their activities, but their members bear responsibility for good faith and the absence of a conflict of interest in their decisions.

The work of the councils is absolutely public, all minutes and even video recordings of all meetings are posted on the Web - this is a strict requirement of the imperial agency. Moreover, on the network forum of each council, you can both reasonably complain about the refusal (for the applicant or his fans), and report something that indicates the bias of certain members of the council (for other well-wishers). There are also life-long, or rather, perpetual scholarships - they are a little more, 1400 rubles a month, and are awarded to any applicant who has received a master's degree (it is called by profession - master artist, master poet, etc.); the master's degree is awarded by specialized councils, in much the same way as advanced degrees.

An important issue is the ownership of the works created by fellows (in art, unlike fundamental science, any work is potentially commercial) – all the more so because of the above-described features of the Russian tax system, buying art is accepted there, and is accepted quite widely. The author himself has the right to single-handedly dispose of the works created during the period of receiving the scholarship, but half of the money from their sale must be transferred to the state. It is not greedy and does not plan them as earnings, but has established such an order simply for reasons of justice. This is expressed in the fact that the money is not credited to the general budget of the country, but goes to the budget of the corresponding society. In addition, such a procedure has a disciplining effect - an artist who has already become famous and financially successful, by virtue of this rule, usually prefers to write a letter of refusal of a scholarship, even if it is an indefinite scholarship of a master of arts, so as not to give up half of the earnings. As a result, more money goes to the not-yet-famous creative workers who need it more.

Apart from scholarship and technical support for artists through societies, there is a separate program to support the cinema. It is believed that the market approach does not allow many highly artistic films to be made that would become a national treasure. To be honest, I did not understand what the point is and how cinema is so different from other arts - the state does not build buildings specifically to encourage architecture, because the market, they say, will not give way to masterpieces. Most likely, this is simply a relic of those times when it was necessary to support domestic films as opposed to imported ones for ideological reasons. Indeed, the so-called full support of cinema - when the state acts as an investor and owner of the picture - is one of the most scandalous spheres of life in the Empire: there is a constant stream of mutual accusations, lawsuits, proceedings. It cannot be otherwise - there are no even partially objective criteria of who to give money to, and such cannot exist. The corresponding commission under the imperial agency only adds fuel to the fire: not wanting to be reproached for being biased, it tries to give money to those films that are most likely to have a successful release (for example, famous directors or with an exciting plot) - and they are just those which there is no need to support. True, this system is still flowers, as the Russians say, compared to what it was before: then, according to the law, the state contributed part, for example, half, of the budget, and the other half was contributed by a private investor. In reality, the budget, in collusion with an official or without it, was doubled, the film was made exclusively with state money and received half of the rights to it for no reason.

I am absolutely sure - both from the analysis of the materials of the Russian press, and from the results of conversations with different people - that the system of full support in the cinema will be ended. In spite of it, the system of limited support is very viable. This system has purely ideological goals and lies in the fact that the state is ready to pay certain money to the creators of any film or book for the fact that there will be propaganda (in our opinion, just promotion) of certain values. For example, the Imperial Department of Education may announce that it is ready to pay so much if the film shows a large family that evokes strong positive emotions - and what the film will be about is completely unimportant, as long

as the subject and genre are not incompatible with it. Or the Imperial National Demographic Service can offer money for positive characters of a certain nationality - if hostility towards this nationality is growing in the country or in some part of it, which the service wants to extinguish. In essence, the system of limited support is the same as what we call product placement (when the advertised product appears in the plot of the film), that is, a kind of indirect advertising - only in this case not goods or services, but ideas. This approach is widely used by Russians in ideological work (in our terms, in work with public opinion).

A story about Russian art would be incomplete without mentioning the censorship that exists there, or, officially, the Imperial Service of Censorship Supervision. Despite the defiantly straightforward name, this is not at all what is usually understood by censorship and what took place in Russia in both the First and Second Empires. Before publication, the creators of any work do not need to obtain any permission and do not need to send it to censorship, even for purely informational purposes. Censorship supervision monitors only works that have already become public for the presence of violations of the law. In this it is no different from our anti-vice police departments, which monitor pornography and the like, or the state secrets departments of the Department of Defense and the FBI. I have already noted in a number of chapters what exactly cannot be published in Russia, in addition to what is prohibited in our country: these are materials of a homosexual nature, even without elements of pornography; psychedelic and zombie materials; anti-religious materials (in relation to traditional religions), including Satanism; materials vilifying and insulting Russia as a whole as a power; materials that are offensive to the Russian people (we only prohibit insulting minority peoples); materials that distort historical truth. The latter does not mean that there can be no fiction in a work of art on a historical theme: this is not a documentary-scientific study. But Russian law singles out situations where fiction is such that it gives the reader or viewer an idea of some historical time period or event that is significantly different from reality. In this case, at the beginning of the book, film or play, it should be announced quite clearly and conspicuously that this work is based on fiction in relation to so-and-so and that in reality everything was not so. In practice, it looks like this: when in early 2014 Russia celebrated the 25th anniversary of the end of the Afghan war and there was a retrospective screening of films on this topic, the film "Ninth Company", created in 2005, was shown, in my opinion, very good. So, the censorship supervision service ordered a thirty-second insert in the screensaver, duplicated by the text and voice of the announcer: "The central episode of this film is based on fiction. The ninth company existed and really accepted the battle with an enemy many times superior, but no one forgot about it and left it without reinforcements - help came as soon as it became possible, and therefore many soldiers from this company escaped" (in the film about the leading company, they forgot in the heat of withdrawing troops from the country, and they all perished). I asked Karl Weigel, deputy head of the censorship service: "Why is this necessary - after all, this is just a feature film?" "And how would you react, Mr. dos Santos," Weigel replied to me, "if in your country "just a feature film" an obvious and unfair lie about your great grandfather is shown, clearly infringing on his memory and honor?" "I will file a lawsuit against the creators of the picture," I replied, "and I do not need any state authorities for this intervention." "That's right, Mr. dos Santos," Weigel said. "But if not a person is offended, but a country, who will stand up for its honor?" At the same time, it should be noted that the censorship supervision service usually does not go too far in this kind of activity: another film of 2005, only about the war of 1941-1945, "Penal Battalion", which was shown at a retrospective of 2045 in honor of the 100th anniversary of the Victory, also contained very big distortions of history. But the owners of the rights convinced the service that they were not of a fundamental nature and that the impression created as a result of viewing was false only in private and unprincipled moments.

Prizes. It is impossible not to touch here on such an issue as the procedure for awarding various kinds of prizes (literary, cinematographic, musical, etc.) in Russia, since it is very peculiar. Individuals and organizations there are not allowed to freely establish any creative awards. This is due to the fact that during the Second Empire, during the Time of Troubles and the Period of Restoration - until the very reforms of Gabriel the Great, which closed the country - all kinds of Western awards awarded to one or

another Russian creative worker were, in fact, a powerful ideological tool. This was manifested not so much in the fact that they were given for works that directly criticized the Russian authorities (although this also happened all the time), but in much more subtle moments. An ordinary work, written in a more or less traditional manner, by a Russian by nationality and, most importantly, by the author's attitude, and even more so Orthodox, had no chance of any of the many Western awards. They could only be obtained for something that, either in form or content (preferably both), eroded all traditional Russian values, and preferably, spat on them and mocked them. The praise of Western values (or the so-called universal values, which is one and the same) was highly welcomed, and even better, the creation of a feeling of their absolute lack of alternatives. The fact that the author belongs to any minority - national, religious, sexual - also greatly increased the chances. The glorification of minorities was then (and still is) a completely open slogan of Western culture, so that accusations of double standards were swept aside, although they clearly took place. Moreover, a significant part of these bonuses, as was subsequently documented, was distributed under the patronage of Western intelligence services, primarily American and British, and many were paid for by them. It would seem, well, let Western awards be given to whomever they want, and Russian citizens and corporations will establish their own and pass them off as completely different - but we must not forget that this was a time when the material capabilities of Russia and the West were incommensurable. Yes, and the awards established by the Russians differed little from Western ones - everything was fine with the fifth column of the West in Russia in those days. The Russians remembered that situation well, and according to their saying "Burned with milk, they blow on the water", this predetermined the current order.

But now not only foreign persons, but also private Russian ones have no right to establish and award creative prizes in Russia. The ban for foreigners is absolute, there are no exceptions. Moreover, anyone can, of course, establish and issue any bonuses to Russians in their own country, but Russians, by law, do not have the right to receive them. If a Russian citizen does not officially refuse the award granted to him abroad, then, of course, no one will put him in prison, but he will be outlawed, that is, deprived of civil rights (see the "Punishments" section of the chapter "[Law Enforcement System](#)"). If he does this while abroad, and refuses to return upon receipt of the summons, he will be deprived of citizenship. As for the second prohibition, it is not absolute: strictly speaking, you can establish and issue an award without any obstacles, but you will be responsible for its objectivity. This does not mean that you will have to coordinate it with someone in advance - the preventive approach is generally alien to Russian law - but if later a lawsuit is filed against you about the deliberately biased nature of your award, it may well succeed, and then you will have big problems.

Russian law understands deliberate bias as follows: you can, for example, even be an atheist - this goes against Russian values, but is not prohibited by law - and therefore you can establish and award a literary prize to militantly atheistic works: if there is no insult to religion, then go ahead. But be so kind as to honestly and directly name your prize as a prize for the best atheistic works, and not for works in general, so that no one will get the false impression that the work recognized as the best, allegedly for purely artistic merits, turned out to be atheistic by accident. You can award your prize to representatives of any newfangled trends - but be kind enough to indicate that your award is for them and only for them. And if your award is designated as the award for the best novel in general, then if you please, do not have *a priori* preconceived positions - in Russia, such is understood as an orientation not to the prevailing ideas, but to certain minorities. In this sense, the Russian law, which allows you to focus not necessarily on the majority and its ideas, but in this case requires you to clearly indicate this, corresponds to the spirit of the precedent definition of the American Supreme Court: "What has been unequivocally announced in advance cannot be considered a fraud."

How can it be, you will be surprised how you can dictate to me to whom I shall award my prize: it's my money, and I do what I want with it! That's right, but here again the Russian concept of publicity comes into play: non-publicly, you can do anything. If you call the author and tell him that you, they say, liked

his work and you want to give him such and such an amount, then this is not prohibited by law and is not regulated at all. But if you make a public show out of it, then you are not quite free to do whatever you want, although the money is yours, just as a man has no right to brandish his reproductive organ in public, although it certainly belongs to him. By the way, exactly the same restrictions apply to scientific awards: the founder of such one either accepts the responsibility of objective consideration and award, or must indicate the niche nature of his award. A niche character means the following: the prize is awarded only to a certain contingent (for example, scientists of only a certain nationality) or only to adherents of a certain scientific trend or school.

Despite these limitations, there are quite a lot of creative awards established by individuals and corporations: the largest of them are the Ivanov Prize for Science in General, the Weinberg Prize for Physics, the Aliyev Prize for Technology, the Ditrikhov Prize for Literature, and the Yusupov Prize for All Arts. Most nations also have their own national awards.

There are two state prizes: the first is Imperial, it is awarded every year with one prize in twelve nominations: in four nominations of fundamental sciences (matter sciences, sciences of substances and materials, life sciences, planetary sciences), in four nominations of applied sciences (new devices, new technologies, new living organisms and medicine, urban planning) and in four categories of arts (literature, fine arts and architecture, music, cinema and theater). The second, the most prestigious in the Empire, is Gavrilovskaya, it is awarded every three years for two prizes for science and two for art, without preliminary rubrication - that is, both prizes in science can be awarded, for example, to physicists, and both in art - artists. Imperial is one million rubles, and Gavrilovskaya - five million. For the Nobel Prize, which was the most prestigious in the world until 2020, the Russians had great claims for bias, and therefore it was closed by them: as you know, it was transferred to our Federation (both the monetary assets of the Nobel Fund, and the brand) and is now awarded and presented in New York.

Sport. The first thing that catches your eye in Russian sports is that most of the most spectacular sports are specific to Russia: they are not found anywhere else. This is not an accident - after the 2013 Constitution proclaimed the principle of autonomy and took a course towards isolating the country from external influences, the social engineering service specially developed new spectator sports, primarily gaming ones, and then engaged in their promotion. I will not describe them, because it is long, but I will note that this situation in itself is not unique. Before the creation of our Federation in our northern states, the then United States, of the four most popular sports games, two (American football and baseball) were played almost exclusively there, and two more (basketball and hockey), although they were played in other countries, but for the second time - they were born in North America.

With those sports that were so popular in Russia that there was no hope of replacing them with new ones, the social engineering service acted differently: their rules were changed so that the game seemed to remain the same, but its picture changed a lot. For example, in football it looked like this: the length and width of the field were increased by almost a third; the number of players has been increased to twelve; offside rules changed; a corner when the ball went over the goal line within the penalty area began to be taken from the corner of the penalty area; etc. As a result, when I watched Russian football, I simultaneously recognized and did not recognize my favorite game. As a result, international competitions and championships with the participation of Russia are practically impossible, even without their direct ban - this was the original intention. "What is the meaning of this?" I asked Vladimir Simonov, a responsible officer of the social arrangement service (as the social engineering service is now called). "Because sports, especially popular sports games, have become a ritual sublimation for the population by the beginning of the twenty-first century," he replied. - Take for example the mass psychosis that was quite deliberately whipped up before each World Cup. It was one of the elements of zombification of the masses, used together with many others in order to deprive people of passionarity and, in general, life "drive", in order to avoid all kinds of riots, revolutions and wars. This was especially

necessary in relation to residents of smaller countries - they had the illusion that they were on the same level with large countries. And we do not need all this: we do not want our people to worry if we lose to you in football - what difference does it make to us if we won the competition from you? And we also don't want to be too excited about winning, for exactly the same reason."

So in Russia only internal competitions and championships between clubs are held, and there are no foreign players in the clubs - they are not issued work permits. Russia does not even participate in the Olympic Games - however, they have their own Olympic Games, and they are considered real in the Empire, because they are held in Olympia, as in ancient times, and only in sports that existed in ancient Greece. By the way, there is another reason why athletes from Russia could hardly compete at international competitions: doping is not prohibited there. This is quite natural, because even most drugs are allowed there; however, in a number of sports, especially in athletics and weightlifting, there are separate federations for those who want to compete without doping (voluntary, of course). In general, the situation in Russia is quite common when there are several federations for one sport - this is welcomed as an antimonopoly action. If the federation is one, then it is considered a monopoly with all the ensuing consequences - the Antimonopoly Service strictly controls it, has its representative in its highest body and does not allow any tyranny, as well as infringement of the interests of athletes and clubs not included in the federation.

Martial arts are very unusual in Russia. I must say that all martial arts are very popular here - this also applies to martial arts such as karate or judo, and European types of boxing or freestyle wrestling, and national Russian ones like sambo or others already developed by the social engineering service. Those that include body contact are carried out according to a fully contact scheme, moreover, even in boxing there are no gloves, and the fists are only wrapped with an elastic belt (there are also federations that hold these competitions using a non-contact or highly protected scheme, but these do not compete). Therefore, sports battles in the Empire are a very bloody spectacle. Death duels are relatively rare due to advanced medicine (although they do happen), but serious injuries are quite common.

Fights without rules, so common in our country, though as a show, and not a formalized sport, have not taken root in Russia - apparently, the absence of rules and regulation is not close to the national character of Russians.

Even more bloody are the super-popular gladiator fights: these are fights with combat edged weapons, usually (but not always), in armor - more or less the way it happened in ancient Rome or medieval knightly Europe. Naturally, unlike the Roman Empire in the Russian Empire, all participants do this completely voluntarily, of their own free choice - the idea that condemned criminals will amuse the public with a death duel would be disgusting for Orthodox Russians. Gladiator fights come in many types, with different weapons and armor, on foot and on horseback, as well as single, double and group fights - but unlike fights without rules, this is precisely a sport.

I want to tell you, dear compatriots, that when two equestrian combatants in full armor collide and one of them, pierced by a spear, is carried away with a hole in his body the diameter of a young tree, this is a powerful sight. Not all Russians love it, but everyone is quite calm - and this says more about their society than much else. Gladiators make a lot of money and are often quite wealthy, because fight movies are in high demand - as are the sweepstakes from which they usually receive royalties. To a lesser extent, the above applies to martial arts without weapons and to sports games. In general, athletes in Russia earn much less than ours, as well as actors, musicians, etc. - this is due to the virtual absence of advertising, which was discussed above. How exactly is it connected? Firstly, athletes cannot appear in advertisements for goods and services, and secondly, in Russia it is impossible to create an absurd hype out of sports with the help of zombie advertising, as is the case here.

Conclusion

Remember, dear compatriots, that place in the Gospel where Jesus asks His disciples about John the Baptist: “So, what did you go to see in the wilderness? Is it a reed shaken by the wind? Is it a man dressed in soft clothes? Is it a prophet?” So I thought, after reading everything I wrote: what did I see in Russia? I have described for you all the more or less significant aspects of Russian state and public life, their similarities with our American life and differences from it, and even tried, where I could, to find the origins of today’s Russia in its past; but the question, what is modern Russia as a whole, nevertheless remains. What is the integral, generalizing meaning of their entire way of life, hidden behind its particular manifestations? What is the meaning of the existence of their civilization and what is the purpose of its development? Our attitude towards Russia depends on the answers to these questions - whether we should consider it a potential enemy, not yet active, but waiting for an opportune moment to attack; or a potential friend who does not climb into the arms, but is ready to help in difficult times; or a neighbor whose hut is on the edge and who will neither help nor attack, because he does not care about us. Below I will try to show, without going into particular, what is the true content of the main categories of modern life in Russia.

Democracy. The Russians themselves do not like the word “democracy”, and this is not surprising if we remember that our ancestors worked in the name of this word during the time of the US world hegemony. Therefore, the Russians demonstratively emphasize that their country is not a democracy. But let’s think about how this is really so: not in the sense of a historical and philosophical analysis of the system - I already did this in the chapter “[Estate Structure](#)”, but in the sense that the ordinary public puts into the concept of “democracy”.

From an academic point of view, democracy is a complex of political and legal institutions that ensure the personal and political rights and freedoms of citizens, taking into account the interests of any population groups, including minorities, and the ability of citizens to participate in the political process in one form or another. But opinion polls show unequivocally that when Americans are asked to pick the few most significant of the hallmarks of democracy in order of importance, neither universal suffrage nor separation of powers ever comes first (this is what the above provides and how our polity differs from Russian). In the first places, our compatriots consistently put the protection of a citizen from arbitrariness, the equality of all before the law and the openness of state decisions to society. In fact, our school textbooks directly say that the main thing is civil rights and freedoms, and political rights are nothing more than a guarantee of their existence. The only political attribute of democracy ranked highly in the polls is the separation of powers. Let’s try to analyze the Russian reality from these positions.

Aren’t Russians equal before the law? You will say that there are estates, and the estate affiliation is absolutely formalized and official, as well as national and religious. So what? Does an *oprichnik* have any advantages over a *zemstvo* in a lawsuit, or an Orthodox Russian over an Italian Catholic; or perhaps their testimony is considered more weighty? What, the guardsman has the right to harm or insult the *zemstvo* with impunity, like a medieval lord to a commoner? But what about sexual minorities, you say, are they definitely discriminated against and, therefore, not equal before the law with the traditionally oriented majority? No, I will answer, they are defeated in a number of rights - and this is quite different; we also have categories that are *a priori* affected in some rights - minors, for example, or persons with an unexpunged criminal record. Well, this is completely different, you say: but let’s think, why is it different? Is it because the convicted person has an option - to abandon the former criminal life and calmly wait for the removal of the criminal record and, thus, full rights? Well, a homosexual in Russia, renouncing his orientation, will not he receive full rights just as automatically? Moreover, if the public in our country still treats the convicted badly, then the mentally retarded, as the hero of the recent remake of the old film “Rain Man”, are clearly treated with sympathy - but at the same time, in a number of rights they are still limited, for the safety of others and their own. So, Russians also consider sexual minorities

simply inferior - but what about equality for the inferior? The analogy with the physical extermination of the crippled in Germany during the time of Hitler, which my colleagues tried to draw at a seminar at our university, is completely inappropriate here - the crippled and disabled are considered quite complete in the Empire, like the narrow-minded (among Orthodox saints there are a lot of holy fools): inferiority for Russians are primarily a characteristic of the soul, not of the body or mind. And in general, the concept of equality, when you think about it, turns out to be far from being as unambiguous as at first glance: if you are not taken into the army because you do not have the necessary physique, or to the university because you do not have the necessary intellect, or in the model, because there is no necessary external appearance, is this a violation of equality or not? No, most people will most likely answer, it's just that you can't do this job without the relevant quality in a way that is acceptable to society, and not to yourself. So how is the situation different from this, in which sexual minorities in the Russian Empire cannot work as teachers and in general with children - after all, they are simply not able to work in the way that Russian society considers acceptable? That this is precisely the apology for the prohibition can be seen from the following sensational episode: a homosexual man worked as a teacher for almost twenty years, and no one suspected his orientation; and even in hindsight, the investigation could not find any manifestations of this. So, the court ruled that if his orientation at work does not manifest itself in any way, then the law on a ban on professions does not apply to him. And in terms of protection before the law and procedurally, sexual minorities are equal to everyone else: the police cannot refuse to stand up for them or do it reluctantly, and the court cannot refuse to accept a claim from them or be biased - after all, regardless of anything, these are people, and besides citizens of the Empire. So it is impossible to say that in Russia there is no equality of citizens before the law or that it is less than ours. But the fact that a rich person who has committed a crime cannot get away with it or get off with a slight fright by hiring the best lawyers (because there are techno-interrogations), makes one admit that in fact the equality of citizens before the law is carried out there with greater completeness.

Well, if we turn to the question of arbitrariness: are Russians in the Empire less protected from arbitrariness than Americans in the Federation? The procedural laws there are approximately the same as ours, and they are just as strictly enforced; and techno interrogations protect against errors and abuses, especially during a public trial - I would say that this is a guarantee more secure than all ours. It is difficult for a guilty person to escape responsibility in Russia, but it is possible (if he is simply not found) - but I can't imagine the punishment of an innocent person under the system of techno-interrogations. A citizen or organization can also sue the government of a country or a specific body of state or *zemstvo* administration, as we do, especially since *zemstvo* courts, where civil cases are considered, are in no way included in the imperial power hierarchy and generally have no attitude to the imperial (in our opinion, federal) power. And there is not the slightest reason to assert that the chances of winning such a case there are less - for example, back in 2007, several wine merchants' associations filed a lawsuit against the government for damages for not printing new excise stamps on time; and the treasury, by court decision, paid two billion rubles in compensation (210 billion in rubles at the time).

Numerous mechanisms are built into the Russian legal system that specifically protect a person from arbitrariness: for example, the ancient institution of "word and deed" has been revived there - the one who utters these words aloud is automatically considered under the special protection of imperial power. Any of its representatives who heard these words, even an ordinary employee of the economic or social ministry, is obliged, under pain of criminal punishment, to retire with the one who uttered them, listen to him under the protocol and immediately report this to the competent authorities. Initially, this system arose (both in the 17th century and again in the 21st) as a way to quickly convey information important for state security - about conspiracies, riots, etc. But in our time, the Empire believes that a serious infringement of the personal rights of a citizen constitutes conspiracy of officials - otherwise it simply cannot happen - so is tantamount to a rebellion in terms of the degree of danger for the state. Because if an official knows that he can violate some laws and orders of the Empire with impunity, then he will

certainly begin to violate others. Therefore, if, for example, during a round of a prison (pre-trial detention center or hard labor) by a supervising prosecutor, one of the prisoners shouts out “Word and deed!”, He will be immediately taken out of prison and interrogated; and if the prisoner himself asks for a techno-interrogation and turns out to be innocent, then he will not only be released - the reaction of the authorities will indeed be tantamount to revealing an attempted coup d'état, no less. The Russian state machine is ruthless - but it is equally ruthless to “its own”. The Empire does not tolerate deviations from its established order from its citizens, but it does not tolerate this from its functionaries either. “It is ordered to imprison - plant, it is ordered to release - release” - this seemingly archaic and soulless formula contains the Russian idea of the absence of arbitrariness of the authorities: the emperor is far and high, but a petty boss may have accounts with you, and other interests, far from legal and national, and therefore let him better not have a special will in his decisions. Let him be in fear of the imperial authorities, and let there be special mechanisms to ensure this - whether it is a rack, like 400 years ago, or a painless five-minute techno-interrogation, as it is now. So, due to the lack of arbitrariness of the authorities, I cannot rightfully give the Russian Empire a deuce.

Well, what about the right to lynching, you ask; a policeman who has the legal right to shoot on the spot a person who does not resist, even if he has committed a serious crime - is this not arbitrariness? Well, firstly, dear compatriots, there are tough statistics - in a year there are 17% fewer cases of killing a criminal by a policeman in the Empire than in our Federation, although it is allowed there even otherwise than as a defense. And I will explain to you why this is so - there is no mysticism here. Russian law allows a police officer to shoot an unresisting person only when he has committed a particularly serious crime in front of him - a brutal (simple is not good!) murder or a terrorist attack. And this is not a frequent case at all, and only a completely “frostbitten”, in Russian expression, person can do such a thing in front of a policeman. Moreover, the absence of criminal liability does not at all mean the absence of disciplinary liability: it is unlikely that your superiors will be delighted that you shot a surviving terrorist who can no longer be interrogated, and therefore cannot identify accomplices. But the main thing is that at the slightest doubt, the policeman will never do this, because in any case he will have to undergo a techno-interrogation - both on the fact of the event and just a planned annual one: you can't hide anything from him.

In general, this is a thing that is terrible in terms of its impact - an annual techno-interrogation for officials: the knowledge that it is impossible to hide the slightest violation cannot but turn the whole system of individual decision-making by a person. Here one can draw an analogy with the early Christians, for whom the existence of an all-seeing God was an absolute reality: it is known that even with the threat of death it was impossible to force them to violate God's commandments - hell is worse. Of course, earthly fear is not the fear of God, but this is the whole point of the state philosophy of Russians: building the Kingdom of God on Earth is a sin, and it is impossible, but one must liken earthly life to it, as far as possible. And the fact that earthly imitation will always be flawed and often funny - well, this is just a consequence of the flawedness of human nature.

So, we analyzed the situation in the Empire with the equality of people before the law and with their protection from arbitrariness. But what about the third point, the openness of government decisions? Perhaps what I say will seem sedition to you, but with this in Russia things are no worse, but better than ours. There, such openness is called “*glasnost*” and is a requirement of the Constitution. It obliges the authorities to act completely openly, so that everyone can be aware of not only the decisions taken, but also the progress of their preparation in real time - including in order to make their proposals if such a desire arises. Naturally, there are issues that, on the contrary, the law requires to be considered in a completely secret mode - but such issues are regulated in quite fine detail, so that it is not allowed to arbitrarily attribute anything to secrets. The level of openness is visible at least from the procedure for holding state auctions - the law obliges organizers to allow participants to film the entire course of the auction on webcams and broadcast it on the Web. Well, about the procedure for making proposals by

citizens to the government, as well as about national discussions, it is described in sufficient detail in the chapter “[Culture](#)”.

It turns out a paradoxical thing: where there is a real democracy with elections of power and political freedoms of citizens, as we have, there is less publicity and openness than in an authoritarian Empire! In fact, if you think about it, this is quite natural: with a real dependence of power on public opinion, as in democracies, there is very often a need to hide something from this very public in order to avoid problems for itself. And where the government does not depend on the people, it has no reason to keep anything secret from them - it still cannot create problems for it. In the ancient kingdoms, it never occurred to anyone to hide any of their actions from their subjects.

In general, the path of Western civilization to democracy with universal suffrage was not least predetermined by the spread of knowledge and education: the more the average person became educated and intellectually developed, the more natural it seemed to give him the right to choose. In Russian civilization, on the level of archetypal ideas, the right to make decisions for others should not belong to the most intelligent or competent, but to the most worthy. This is a consequence of both the religious tradition of the First Empire, and, oddly enough, the technocracy of the Second Empire: after all, for a technocrat, brains are a commodity that is bought by hiring experts who are not involved in the decision-making process itself. Therefore, there the growth of people’s education is perceived as an imperative to include them not in the decision-making process, but only in the discussion process. It is completely wrong to command a modern society, consisting mainly of fairly developed people, without explaining anything and convincing no one - this thesis was expressed by the main ideologist of Russia during the time of Vladimir the Restorer back in 2006 and has not changed since then. Therefore, everything must be done openly, discussing and consulting, allowing all citizens to speak out and not sweeping anyone away in advance - this is precisely the ideological basis of the constitutional principle of publicity. But there is no reason to allow them to make decisions that are fateful for the country through elections just because they are citizens.

So it turns out that according to the criteria of democracy that come first in the academic definition, it does not exist in Russia, but according to those that our citizens put in first place in polls, it does. To put it more bluntly, in Russia there are not those elements of democracy that politicians and political scientists need, but there are even more of those that are important to ordinary people than we have.

Separation of powers. Consider now the question of the separation of powers. It is hard for us to believe that somewhere it may not exist: even in the Caliphate there is a legislative assembly, a Majlis (moreover, bicameral), although not completely independent of the Caliph and the clergy. Nevertheless, the fact that it does not exist in the Russian Empire at all is even written into the Constitution (“State power in the Empire is one and cannot be divided into independent branches”). Russians do not recognize the separation of powers, not only because they consider it counterproductive in terms of efficiency and weakening the state, but also because they consider it the result of a wrong state system. As the Old Testament says, “when a country departs from the Law, there will be many different rulers in it.” Russians consider the separation of powers an invention of Western civilization, designed specifically to weaken the state, which, in their opinion, always somehow represents the interests of the people, for the sake of domination by private elites. What other explanation from the standpoint of common sense, they do not understand, can have both a president and a parliament elected by the same people by the same suffrage? Isn’t it as absurd as electing two or three presidents at the same time? If you consciously want a weakening of power and share it precisely for this, you should say so - but this is not close to us. You are afraid of the usurpation of power, they tell us - you are right to be afraid, in a country where power is not sacred and rests only on the social contract of the inhabitants (more precisely, their ancestors), this, of course, can only be prevented by weakening power and all sorts of legal chicanery. In our country [the Russian Empire], this is regulated by completely different, non-legal mechanisms.

But upon closer examination, it turns out that the gigantic difference between us and the Russian Empire is such only from the standpoint of the classical theory of liberalism. From the standpoint of the now fairly common theory of multiple instances of power (which, by the way, was developed by the Russian thinker Rifat Shaikhutdinov at the beginning of the century), everything looks somewhat different. Let me remind those of you, dear compatriots, who are not very interested in sociology and political science, that according to this theory, many instances of power coexist in society, and the state is nothing more than one of these instances. Other instances are the Church, business, the media, etc., whose exclusive resources are, respectively, God's favor, wealth, information flows, etc. - and for the state, respectively, state power acts as such a resource. According to this theory, the division of power of different types between different instances is considered primary for increasing the degree of human freedom, and the division of power of one type (for example, state power), within one instance, is secondary. So, in the Russian Empire they do not recognize the separation of *only state power* - other instances of power exist, are strong and are absolutely competent in their areas; the state does not crush them in the slightest. This applies to the Orthodox Church (as well as to Ravilite Islam, Judaism and Buddhism), to business, to culture, to the judicial system, to *zemstvo* power, to national power - the imperial power in no way encroaches there, considering these areas to be completely unrelated to the sphere of state power. But a person in everyday and professional life mainly encounters them, and their independence gives him enough freedom. That is, the tough and harsh imperial leadership of Russia is not going to share its power with anyone, just as to share it within itself, but it has clearly outlined those areas of the country's public life to which its power extends and beyond which it does not go. The Russian government would never even think of setting the rules of the game for business, let alone interfering in the appointment of metropolitans (although a lot depends on this) or the awarding of prestigious cultural or scientific awards.

So the imperial power of Russia is not an analogue of our federal power. If our federal power differs from the power of a community or state by a hierarchical level of territorial applicability (that is, it extends to the whole country or to one state), then the imperial power of Russia differs in sectoral applicability. For example, most of the all-Russian laws in the field of economics are *zemstvo* laws, not imperial ones, since the imperial authorities consider this to be none of their business. Thus, the power in Russia is authoritarian, but it cannot be called totalitarian.

As for the mechanisms of control over specific decisions of the imperial power, they are different in Russia, not related to the separation of powers (see the chapter "[Law Enforcement System](#)"). And control over the compliance of major decisions, such as basic laws, with the generally accepted values in the country is carried out by society and especially the Orthodox Church - it is absolutely independent from the Empire both organizationally, materially, and spiritually and is not at all afraid to denounce it, if there is anything for it. So the question of the absence or presence of a separation of powers in Russia is more a matter of terminology than of substance.

Freedom. Freedom and equality are the cornerstone of our, and indeed of Western civilization, of which we are the heirs. Since the time of the French Revolution and the declaration of independence of the USA, that is, in other words, since the onset of the era of modernity, our civilization cannot be imagined without them, and there are no special disputes about them. (There is also a third concept, brotherhood, but in practical terms it does not mean anything concrete.)

It is generally accepted in our country that things are bad with freedom in the Russian Empire - not as much as in the Caliphate, but bad. Is it really? To answer this question, one must clearly understand what freedom is for an ordinary person, at least our compatriot (just as we considered it for democracy). Detailed studies have been carried out on this topic, and they give a very clear picture: for the vast majority of our compatriots, political freedom - the freedom to choose power and take appropriate actions (rallies, marches, etc.) - occupies a very low place in priorities. The most significant for citizens are, if you help them to understand and formulate, the following freedoms, on which they will not tolerate

encroachment on the part of the state under any circumstances: choice of place of residence; choice of marital status and spouse; choice of profession and lifestyle in general; acquisition and use of private property; opening a business and in general any earnings; obtaining information; travel within the country and abroad. To this can also be added freedom of private expression of any opinion, freedom of religion and freedom to file any claim in court. Close to the concept of freedom is the concept of inviolability - here citizens put the inviolability of life and health, freedom, honor and dignity, property and housing, family, personal habits in the first places. That is, for the entire population, with the exception of political activists, freedom is not a political concept - it is primarily a synonym for human rights, and also mostly not political ones. Let's see how things stand with freedom in the Empire from this position.

In the past, as you know, freedom was bad in Russia: even 200 years ago slavery existed, moreover, unlike our slavery, it covered not one racial group, but the majority of the population. Even 150 years ago, non-believers were officially discriminated against, and even 70 years ago, any believers in general. Seventy years ago, any private enterprise was forbidden, as well as the possession of property, except for small amounts for personal consumption. And the freedom to choose a place of residence within the country, to travel abroad, to receive information that disagrees with officialdom, was never in Russia at all until the 90s of the last century. And how is it now? It turns out that it is exactly the same as ours: live where you want and with whom you want, work where and with whom you want. Believe as you wish and travel wherever you wish. Earn as much as you want and have any property (completely inviolable). Freely read tons of materials that are critical and even abusive in relation to the authorities and the system, if you want - write them yourself and discuss with anyone (the degree of abuse has, of course, a limit - but I would not say that it is very different from ours).

How is it, you say, because you yourself wrote that much is forbidden for public expression, that is, a person does not have the right to write it himself or read it from others? No, I will answer, all these laws impose no more restrictions on freedom of information than our laws and requirements of political correctness - not the same, but in general not great. In addition, the possibility of public statements, unlike non-public ones, belongs to the sphere of politics, and not private life - and there are no political freedoms in Russia, they do not deny this. And I don't deny this, but I'm just trying to convey the idea that this is unlikely to be significant for the main part of the population - and for those for whom it is significant, there is always the option of becoming guardsmen and acquiring all those political rights that are generally available to anyone in Russia. The Russians themselves - both the authorities and the people - consider this to be their main freedom - the possibility of choosing an estate and, thus, a life path in the main sense of the word.

Even more unambiguously, with the directness characteristic of a warrior, Emperor Michael III spoke about freedom: "Everyone from birth is given freedom by God - to be a worthy person or shit, and no one can take it away from you, even if he breaks into a cake [?]. What more freedom do you need? In our country, unfortunately, the freedom to choose a path often comes down to the freedom to choose an extravagant hairstyle or an online nickname, or the freedom to choose which of several companies to work for, although in reality they are no different.

And in what is really essential for people, freedom in Russia is not less, but, on the contrary, more. There is the freedom to use drugs (not all, but the majority) and their acquisition, the freedom to engage in prostitution, the freedom of self-defense without artificially established limits, the freedom of revenge and duels. There you can drive on the highway at the speed that your car can go, and not crawl at a speed of 65 miles per hour, like we do. There you can hire a prostitute without fear of being fired from your job, and punch your offender in the face without fear of trial and prison. There you can go to real gladiator fights, and with us you will get five years without argument just for watching their records. There you can have and carry firearms, as we once had a long time ago, and it is completely legal to take revenge on the killer of your loved one. There you can live and work without fear of idiotic lawsuits against you for far-

fetched sexual harassment or alleged moral damage. There, as an employer, you can quite legally not hire homosexuals or foreigners - but you can also not hire straight people and Russians, if that is your preference. There you can openly express your opinion about anyone and anything, if it is not deliberately offensive, without regard to the suffocating requirements of political correctness, as we have. Professional life is much freer there, because in all areas - scientific, legal, medical, educational, etc. - there are no mafia hierarchical structures like academies, associations, etc., which have monopoly power in their field (this is expressly prohibited by the Constitution). There, after all, supermarkets are open around the clock, and you can always go there - not like here, where by law you cannot trade in the evening and on weekends under the absurd pretext of creating a level playing field for small shops.

I don't want, dear compatriots, to create a [rosy] picture for you, but at the everyday level, life in the Empire is really much freer - you can feel it right away. Another thing is that many freedoms do not apply to minorities of various kinds - sexual, religious, national, ideological - for whom life in Russia seems to be significantly less free than in our country. They are not imprisoned and, in fact, they are not particularly discriminated against under the law (national minorities are not discriminated against at all), but they clearly do not feel as comfortable as we do. Russians do not argue with this, but answer that they are much more comfortable for the majority (it is more correct to speak not about the majority, but about the mainstream, because, for example, Orthodox and especially ethnic Russians until recently were by no means the majority). "You really have any Negro, whom it's forbidden to call a Negro, can publicly say that white pigs suck juice from his brothers," one Russian told me, "but we don't - and in this sense, you have a Negro, of course, live more freely. But in your country the white man is forced to endure this, but in our country he is not - so it is worse for the white man in your country, but is he less of a man and a citizen? A white cannot call the Black a Nigger, and this is right - but the Black can freely call the white "Whitey"! Why is discrimination against the majority better than discrimination against the minority? In our country, too, a few decades ago, it was impossible to insult and discriminate against anyone except Russians and Orthodox - that's enough for us! Now we have the law and custom put the majority and the minority on the same level - and to you, in comparison with your usual exaltation of minorities, it seems to be discrimination against them. That is, we, dear compatriots, believe that there is less freedom in the Empire - and the Russians sincerely believe that everything is truly free in their country.

But there is one more aspect, dear compatriots: it is known both from the personal experience of everyone and from sociological research that freedom is most important for those who do not identify and do not want to identify themselves with society and other people. For those who live according to the principle "let me do my business, and I will not interfere in yours", freedom is the most important thing - without it they are not able to realize their life principle. I will not undertake to say what proportion of people of such a class we have, but it was they who created America, both North and South: they were all the pioneers of new lands. And it is their craving for freedom that causes the greatest understanding and sympathy: one thing is a political or social activist who needs freedom to interfere in your life (if you call a spade a spade), and the other is a person who does not touch you and only wants to protect his life from interference. So, you, apparently, have already understood that for such people in Russia it's almost a paradise: live as you like, do your job as you like (or don't do it), and do all this at least alone, even with like-minded people. You can settle outside the community and not have local government over you at all, or you can write a statement of the desire to go into the status of "outlaw" and not pay any taxes to the state. Do not go into someone else's monastery with your charter, says an old Russian proverb. So, if you don't interfere anywhere in Russia, no one will ever touch you (unlike us): even discriminated minorities there will never feel this discrimination if they don't interfere in society with their own ideas, alien to it.

Equality. Russians also perceive equality, another basic value of modernity, quite differently than we do. Russians do not believe that people can be equal in our understanding. This does not apply to equality before the law, which I have already written about - everything is quite similar to us there. And it does not apply to equality before God - in the temple of God, all brothers and sisters, from the emperor to the

homeless, moreover, not only in theory, but also in practice (and at the Court of God, probably, too). But equality as a universal value is something more, because people do not spend the bulk of their lives in courts and churches. Equality is a social concept, according to which no person is more or less than any other person, and not in potential, but in actuality. But how could it be otherwise, you wonder? In other words, this is the Russian idea of the informal hierarchization of society, according to which all people are ranked according to their age, position, merit, etc. In the end, according to how much he or she is respected by neighbors. As Malyuta Skuratov, the right hand of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, said, “an ordinary person is one thing, an initial [prince?] is another.” Here, too, it was not a different status before the royal court - which, as you know, did not spare anyone - but simply a different perception.

In Russia, the same words will be perceived in completely different ways, depending on who said them; different weight, depending on the person, may have an opinion, assessment, requirement. Now there is absolutely impossible the situation that took place back in the 90s of the last century, when Boris the Damned recruited a government from young people who had not shown themselves in anything before (who, as a result, messed up firewood). It is impossible that a young, even if fashionable, journalist would write disparagingly about a big, honored person. All this is a natural manifestation of the fact that Russia has made a rather significant regression from modernity, and even more so postmodernity, to a traditional type of society - by the way, it has done it quite consciously. Like all elements of a traditional society, hierarchization hinders progress in Russia: the proposal of a young person who has not yet taken their place in a professional and public capacity is unlikely to be accepted, even if it is reasonable, and he himself is unlikely to be invited to implement it (my Russian interlocutors, generally agree with this conclusion.) The permeation of social life with various hierarchies is a purely informal thing, and in reality any person has the opportunity not to participate in them. You can write a book or music that everyone will buy, or make an invention that will work - no one will interfere with this on purpose, and in principle, in this case, you can give a damn about the opinion of professional colleagues. But Russians for the most part believe that by doing this you yourself will deprive yourself of a significant part of life's comfort, which cannot be replaced by individual success - the feeling of “fitting” into certain hierarchies, as well as into society in general. This is not the position of the state, that is, the authorities, but the position of society - the state, on the contrary, tends to perceive people, opinions and proposals, regardless of persons, as is the case in national discussions (I wrote about this in the chapter “[Culture](#)”). But do not be mistaken - the government treats everyone equally, primarily because, in its view, the difference between any *zemstvo* from the guardsman (for the worse, of course, in the direction) is so great that the differences between the *zemstvos* are lost against this background. And the Russians themselves in no way consider people equal except before God and the law; the only equality they recognize and cherish, even more than we do, is equality of opportunity.

A higher status than the rest can arise in a person only and exclusively on his merits and achievements - this is how the Russians think, and this is practically not disputed in society. You cannot receive a high status by birthright and you cannot pass it on by inheritance. Russians do not like the advantages associated with origin very much (it even seems to me that it was they who led to the revolution of 1917, and not property inequality: the nobles then - both during and after the revolution - were hated much more than merchants). Therefore, for example, any hereditary titles in Russia not only do not officially exist, but are also prohibited from public announcement. Where the law does not apply, customs come into play: for example, the offspring of wealthy families are also very unloved in the Empire (they are called majors), although what the law can do here is [limited:] money is not a title, you cannot cancel it.

This dislike is expressed in the fact that in schools, institutes and at work more, not less, is expected of them (I would even say more hostile), than from the rest. The help of parents in a career is considered an abomination, and a case where that the offspring makes a career in the same area in which his relatives have achieved great success and occupy high positions is impossible to imagine - everyone will take up arms against him. This is not considered unfair: if your father is a famous director, then you are not at all

defective from this - just make a career in temporal physics or in the oil business, and not in cinema. Such is the manifestation of the idea that exists in the third estate (especially in others) of the primacy of one's own success as the opposite of a successful birth. Only those who have achieved a lot on their own, especially against life circumstances, can be considered a blacksmith of fate, and not a chip floating along its course - and this is a cult for the *zemstvo* class.

The same with marriage: if you say out loud in society that such and such a young man has chosen his bride well, because she is from a high-ranking family, an awkward silence will hang: such statements are considered indecent. Of course, there are more than enough marriages of convenience in Russia (although the dominant trend in public opinion does not approve of them), but it is believed that if you choose a partner for money, then it's better for his (or her) money than for the money of his (or her) parents: the latter is contemptuously called "chosen for the tribe."

In general, it is fundamentally important for Russians that there is nothing in life that their children could not achieve in principle; whether they achieve it or not depends on them and on the will of God.

But one must clearly understand that the inequality of people, which was mentioned here, refers in Russian life exclusively to the public sphere in the broad sense of the word. In personal communication, arrogance and snobbery are not accepted - they are, of course, widespread, but they are condemned by public ideas. Whether you're the builder of a strategic shield or the founder of a huge corporation, you can treat your co-workers or community meeting neighbors appropriately—but not your nephew or housekeeper, much less a stranger. But even in communication with colleagues, your position should be manifested in the content of the discussions, and not in the manner of speaking. You should treat everyone equally, because if you are more deserving than others, this does not mean that you are better. A well-known or wealthy person who addresses ordinary people "hey, dearest" and considers them to be rednecks is disgusting for most Russians and is unambiguously condemned by them. The social ideal of a big man in Russia is that those who do not know who he is, would never have guessed about it by his manner of behavior; that is, "he is great, but simple." And this is natural for an Orthodox country - after all, Christ himself washed the feet of His disciples.

In fact, the whole attitude of Russians towards equality and inequality, in both forms (both by birth and by position), if you look deeper, also has a purely religious origin. The inequality of people stems from the various gifts of the Holy Spirit, as the apostle Paul spoke about. In this sense, to consider everyone equal would be to go against the providence of God. But even more to go against it is to consider the origin of man as a gift of the Holy Spirit. It should not be forgotten that the apostles themselves, with the exception of the mentioned St. Paul, were from poor and not noble families. In Judaism, before the destruction of the Temple and the expulsion of the Jews, according to the Law of Moses, only people from one particular family could be priests - there is no need to say that this is categorically incompatible with Christianity. Therefore, those who stand for aristocracy or even monarchy as extreme manifestations of constitutional inequality by birth should naturally ask: why then limit themselves to secular power, why not choose the closest relative of the previous one as the new patriarch? In general, all ideas about special gifts from above by birth are for Russians nothing more than variations of the Calvinist heresy about predestination - that is, an abomination.

Human rights. The way Russians perceive the antinomy of "equality - inequality" is also connected with the originality of their ideas about human rights. The idea that all people can have the same rights seems strange to them: as his opponent, Prince Kurbsky, wrote in correspondence with Ivan the Terrible, "one cannot compare steep mountains with hillocks." Of course, there is a set of rights that everyone has to the same extent from the moment of birth, but this set is not large. The paradigm of the Russian state and social structure, crystallized as a result of the constitutional reform of 2013, says: there are natural rights that arise for any person simply from the fact that he is a person; these include, for example, the right to inviolability of life and property. These rights are not only for citizens, but for any human being who is -

even illegally! - in Russia. There are civil rights that all citizens of Russia have, but only they have, arising from the fact that you are part of the Russian ethnic group; these include, for example, the right to freely choose a place of residence or type of activity (foreigners, including immigrants before obtaining citizenship, do not have them).

Both natural and civil rights are given by God. And there are other rights that do not stem from your belonging to a biological species or family tree, are not given to you by God - but they can be earned. Or bought, if such a wording is more pleasing (but the means of payment will not always be money). Does any of you have the right, asks a Russian school history textbook, to enter the board of directors of the automobile corporation OAO Kashtan? No, because by law you must own at least 1% of the shares, and you do not. But on the other hand, no one forces you to buy them, and if you do not have money for this, then earn it. In Russian philosophical terminology, this is an example of the so-called separate right, which must be bought or acquired in some other way - and the equality of citizens is understood as the fact that the right to acquire this separate right is the same for everyone. So, according to Gabriel the Great and other creators of the Constitution of 2013, the right to govern the state, in particular the right to elect and be elected to the highest state positions, is a separate right, not a civil right, and it must be earned, and not with money. Actually, the word "*oprichniki*" came from here - "*oprichno*" in the old Russian language means separately. The community in which people live, continues the same textbook, is nothing more than the sum of its inhabitants, there is nothing sacred in it. Therefore, the very fact that you are one of these residents is a sufficient basis for your participation in the self-government of this community, and therefore this right is a civil one. The state is something much more than the sum of the people living in it at the moment, if only because there are past and future generations. The state, unlike the community, is not a territory or a population, but an idea. Accordingly, the fact that you are a resident of the state is not sufficient for the right to govern it - therefore this right is separate; to receive it, one must belong not to the population, but to the idea. This is the central core of the concept of *oprichnina*, and with it the whole philosophy of the state, since this is its cornerstone.

Thus, the interdependence of rights and obligations is established - by default it is assumed that the first without the second does not exist (as, indeed, the second without the first). The right to participate in public administration belongs to members of the service class not as a reward for past service and merit (then it would have remained with the guardsmen who voluntarily left their class, but this is not so), but because they voluntarily assumed and continue to bear duties in the service of this state. I formulate in terms familiar to us, but the guardsmen themselves generally consider this not as rights granted in exchange for accepting duties, but as a continuation of the duties themselves: they are obliged to vote in the election of the emperor, because the Empire is based on them. And in the same way, all the rights of people, not only guardsmen, have a parallel and inseparable set of duties from them.

Natural rights are reflected in the natural duties associated with respect for the laws of the state - for their non-observance, you can be deprived of the natural right to freedom and even life. Reflection of civil rights are civic obligations, in particular, such as paying taxes - as I wrote in the "Punishments" section of the chapter "[Law Enforcement](#)", for non-compliance with them you will not be imprisoned, but deprived of civil rights. And individual rights correspond to individual duties, and not necessarily those by which these rights are acquired - let's consider this using the example of freedom of speech. (Russians don't use that expression, they talk about the right to be listened to; freedom of speech itself, that is, the ability to speak even when you're not being listened to, basically belongs, in their minds, to the inhabitants of a lunatic asylum), the right to be heard corresponds to the obligation to share the spiritual and moral ideas and norms of Russia - determined not by the opinion of the majority, but pre-existing in Russia and making it what it is, and not something else. Therefore, when journalists who publicly extol pederasty or Russophobia are not allowed to continue their journalistic career, this is not even a punishment - simply, without accepting the obligation to share the relevant values, they do not receive the right to be heard. It would seem that we also have duties, and they are punished for their violation - but with us they exist

completely apart from rights: rights are rights, and duties are duties. Therefore, we have the Declaration of Human Rights, but I have never heard of a Declaration of Duties. That is, I have duties, and they can punish me if I do not fulfill them, but my rights will not change from this. And for Russians, these are two sides of the same coin, inseparable from each other.

Another difference between Russian ideas about the rights of people and ours, even more basic, is the concept of the rights of collectives. All people are included in certain collectives - in the family, community, nation, religion and the people as a whole. Each collective consists of a certain number of people, but, according to Russian ideas, it certainly has interests that cannot be reduced to the sum of the interests of its members. This is a manifestation of a well-known philosophical principle: the whole is always something more than the sum of its parts (as Kipling figuratively wrote, "a ship is more than a crew"). So, in Russia they believe that there are human rights, but there are the rights of the family, the rights of the people, the rights of the country; and if they come into conflict with the rights of the individual, the latter at least do not have *a priori* priority (in fact, on the contrary, the public good is considered higher than the personal in Russia). As in almost everything, here we are not primarily talking about legal principles, but about diverse social mechanisms. If a man put his personal interests above the interests of his family and left his pregnant wife with three children - well, that's his right; I mean right in our sense, that is, the possibility - right in Russian terms, in the sense of moral justification, he does not have. But then others have the right not to greet him, not to hire him, not to give him loans: if you don't give a damn about everyone, along with their ideas about what is permissible and forbidden, then don't go to them for anything - live alone in a hermitage and do whatever you want. Any of our compatriots will say that what does human rights have to do with it - it's not about them, but about measures of social influence! But Russians understand rights in this way - for them, rights are not only and not so much a legal, but a worldview concept. The same applies to the rights of the peoples living in the Empire, and the entire Russian people - and, first of all, to their right to continue their original existence.

State. The Russian idea of the state differs from our similar one even more than the ideas of democracy, freedom, equality and human rights. This is all the more strange because the visible manifestations of state power in the daily life of modern Russia, as well as its fundamental structure, are quite similar to ours (unlike their Second Empire, where everything was arranged completely differently). What differs, moreover radically, is the basic idea of what the state is and why it exists, what is its purpose and meaning. This is not about the fact that the state organizes a hostel for people - everyone in the American Federation and the Russian Empire agrees on this - but about why and why it does this.

It is commonplace among us that the state is the product of the nation (or, in other words, the population) and serves it. Some may argue that the population simply hires the state power, and its agenda cannot go beyond the scope of the "hiring agreement"; others - that the people hire the government, among other things, to formulate the agenda, and in this way it can and should set tasks that are not perceived by the population as relevant, and convince them of the need for unpopular decisions. But at the same time, it is self-evident for everyone that state power is a product of civil society - in contrast to the ancient kingdoms, where the primary was the country allegedly given by God or the gods to a given family, and the subject population was no more than allowed to live in this country. This, in fact, is the difference between citizens and subjects.

In our Federation, it is an axiom for everyone that the goal of state power is to increase the quality of life (more precisely, to promote it in every possible way), which we understand first of all as a certain level of wealth and freedom, as well as security.

Not so with the Russians. For them, the state is not at all the product of the nation; rather, the nation is the child of the state. And the state in their view does not exist at all for the people - it is given by God and therefore sacred and exists, if you call a spade a spade, for the sake of its very existence. Unlike the ancient kingdoms mentioned above, the Russian state is obliged to take care of the people - but this does

not in the least make it a servant of the people: no more, in any case, than the obligation to herd sheep makes the shepherd their servant.

The task of making people's lives more prosperous is not at all the main one in the Empire, although in the old days the authorities articulated it that way - back in the Restoration Period, and even in the Second Empire (starting with the ruler Nikita Chudnugo [*sic*, Khrushchev?], who ruled after Joseph the Great). For a long time, it has been one of the auxiliary, purely instrumental tasks dictated by ideology - so that there is no feeling that life is better in other countries and that life here, therefore, is somewhat flawed. At the same time, no one interferes with the growth of living standards, the authorities create all the conditions for this, for example, a low tax burden and free credit - but this, unlike in our country, is not an end in itself. Moreover, the concern for citizens to live more freely is not an end in itself - in Russia they look at this not as a process, but as a state: they believe that since their state and social structure was artificially "designed" relatively recently, under Gabriel the Great, then all the freedoms that they consider necessary are already there. The main task of the authorities in Russia can be considered the correctness of the structure of the state and all life, in the sense of its compliance with Christ's commandments and, to a certain extent, Russian ideas about earthly justice, and the all-round strengthening of the power of this "correct" state.

It is interesting what exactly, according to the ideas now dominant in Russia, is the religious meaning of the existence of the state. For a long time it was believed that it consists in such an arrangement of life that corresponds to the collective strategy of salvation; this was even written about in patristic literature. But today such a view is not in much demand, and it is clear why: for salvation, the most preferable situation is the persecution of Christians, because it is persecution that makes it possible to separate the wheat from the chaff. Compare the number of saints with whom the Russian Church was replenished during the persecution of the faith by the Red Empire, with that in the peaceful and magnificent 18th or 19th centuries, when the state was Orthodox, it is incommensurable. So, if the state were concerned solely with the fact that more of its citizens would gain salvation and eternal life, its leaders would have to sacrifice their own salvation and start killing all Christians with lions, like Diocletian, or crucifying priests on the royal doors, like the Bolsheviks. Earthly grief would have multiplied, but many more people would have been saved than during a quiet life with its worldly temptations and vanity.

In fact, the Russians have two main reasons for the existence of the state: **the first** is to arrange life in such a way as to testify with it before the Savior that the conciliar faith in Him in the Russian land is alive and will not pass away. That is why it is impossible to do what I half-seriously wrote about above - many will be saved, but there will be no evidence. "When the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on earth?" - the Lord asked - the Russians are sure that this is not about them. At the very least, they see their mission precisely in the fact that, when He returns, He sees on their land the faith of Christ unshaken. And not just the faith of individual righteous people who will never be translated [?], because a person is endowed with free will, but the conciliar construction of a common life, reflecting His faith and commandments.

The second purpose of the Russian state is to prevent the whole world from sliding into absolute evil - into the kingdom of the Antichrist. The Russians do not know if they can save the whole world from him, but they are determined not to let the banner with three sixes fly over their land. To do this, the state must be strong - both physically, in the sense of military power and social stability, and spiritually, in the sense of the strength of faith and the correctness of the structure. And this is precisely the main Russian apology for a strong state as an end in itself. Of course, collective salvation is also important, but it is simply not the main task of the state in the Orthodox sense; but undoubtedly, participating in a common charitable cause in your Orthodox state is not the worst way to live life before the Lord.

This very strange, in our opinion, situation - when the state, even in theory, does not consider it its main goal to make people live better - has its roots in the fact that Russian civilization is not at all based on humanism, unlike ours. This does not mean, of course, that she is somehow misanthropic, but she does

not consider a person as the goal and measure of everything and does not consider human life to be the main value. Such for them are spiritual values - faith, love and justice. We also share them, but it is very unusual for us when they are disproportionately higher than earthly human values. By the way, such an attitude is not an invention of the current Third Russian Empire: this has always been the case in Russia, and if at some periods humanism was proclaimed the cornerstone, then this did not last long (the last such period took place in the last decade of the past - the first decade of the current century). This is the point of divergence between Eastern and Western Christian civilizations - when, beginning with the Renaissance and the Reformation, humanism began to gain ground in the West, but not in the East. And before that, before the fifteenth or sixteenth century, there was not much difference between them, although the split of the Church into Catholic and Orthodox took shape in the 11th century, and actually happened even earlier.

It is the absence of humanism that Russians mean when they talk about the much greater spirituality of their civilization compared to Western, and now ours: not that we do not recognize spiritual values - we, of course, recognize them, and Russians understand this, but that we do not put them above human life. And for Russians, spiritual values have absolute primacy over everything earthly, and human life is no exception: this scale was set by Jesus Christ himself, who gave his human life for spiritual values, and even then not for himself, but for others.

Because man is an imperfect being, bearing the seal of original sin. For Russians, this is not a theological thesis, but a concrete truth applicable to real life. This does not mean that people are incorrigible - everyone can be saved (with God's help, but it will certainly come to those who seek Him), but we all start life from a bad starting position. It can be changed, but for this you need to be a righteous man, and the righteous are least of all concerned about the safety of their lives, and even more so carnal joys. And the rest - those who care - are also not that very bad, but they are not an object for admiration. Such are only the heights of the spirit, and they just usually accompany hardships and even death, and not well-fed prosperity, although this is not a mandatory rule. Therefore, there are no sound grounds for placing a person at the center of the value system - this is the basis of Russian philosophy, including the state one.

One would like to object to this that man was created in the image and likeness of God, and that is precisely why Christ commanded to love people; and I repeatedly brought this argument to my Russian interlocutors. "The image and likeness of God is not a body, because God the Father is incorporeal, but a spirit. Yes, there is a spirit in any, even the most terrible person - the interlocutors answered without saying a word. "But this image is just a spark from which a flame may or may not flare up: it depends on the free will of each. Therefore, to love each person for the Image inside him is to love the potential that is in him, and not his actual state. If you have a murderous maniac in front of you, then the image of God is also inside him, under the thick cover of demonism, but so what - let him go on further exploits, or what? Therefore, he can and should be pitied for what he did from his Image, and let him confess and repent before his death, giving him to God's judgment, that is, take care, as far as possible, of his soul. And then he should be shot with a clear conscience, because why pity his body? "But the Savior commanded Simon Peter to "feed my lambs", " I didn't give up. They answered me in different ways, but the best answer I received was not in a face-to-face conversation, but I got it from the Web. An interview was posted there with the head of the Imperial Security Directorate, Alevtina Itzhakova (I once met with her, as described in the chapter "[Estate Structure](#)"), who, judging by the press, will be the next emperor, if before 2060 they do not pass a law on the transfer of the election of the emperor to the principle of lots. This interview contained the following words: "I don't like people - most of them have nothing to love for - but I will do everything for them that is necessary, and if necessary, I will give my life." But the Savior called the good shepherd not the one who loves the sheep, but the one who is ready to lay down his life for them. It turns out that the Russian bearers of state power are good and worthy shepherds, despite the seeming misanthropy. Where does this readiness for self-sacrifice for people (the sincerity of which I have no doubts) come from if you do not love them and do not serve them? And from there, in

the Russian civilizational code, there is a feeling of a much higher responsibility to those who depend on you than to those on whom you depend.

It is clear that with such an attitude towards people, the empire will be considered the highest form of the state. It protects people and provides just and decent conditions for their existence - it may even consider this to be its integral function - but it will never see this as the main goal and meaning of its existence: such is the fulfillment of the Lord's will. The state, especially the empire, is considered by the Russians (they do not recognize other types of state for themselves) as important in itself, because it simply exists, because without it there is no national self-identification and nothing at all - it is like a body without thoughts and memory. It cannot be said that the state does not need people, but it cannot be said that there is no state without people - after all, it is an idea that always exists by itself, as long as there are its carriers. So the church needs parishioners, but if they are not there, services will still be held as long as there is a priest, for worship has a high sacred meaning that cannot be reduced to satisfying the spiritual needs of the flock. Moreover, the antinomy "state-people" usually refers only to people living at the moment - but what about those who lived in the old days and have already died, and those who have not yet been born? If the state is a joint-stock company, as we like to say, then the logic strictly leads to the fact that then the meeting of shareholders can decide to liquidate the company by selling it to another company or merging with it. Great, so be it, say the Russians, but how in this case do you propose to ask the opinion of the dead? And if you believe only in the flesh and the dead do not exist for you, then there is nothing to talk about with you. Therefore, when choosing "state or people", the answer is obvious for Russians, and therefore no price, including human life, is too high for maintaining a powerful state. And that is why the lobbying by various groups of influence, natural for us and for any democracy in general, is an abomination for Russians. Why, after all, this is a criminal invasion of the lowly earthly into the sacred sphere - like money changers in the Temple.

Here lies the Russian answer to the question of which nation is worthy of forming an empire: one that will stop at nothing to preserve its state. This is what the Russians did in 1941, losing millions of people and gigantic pieces of their territory, but not giving up - and thereby paying not only for the victory itself, but also for the right to create the current Empire in 70 years, the largest in the history of mankind. And it was possible to surrender, at least when the situation looked hopeless, as the French did in 1940, and avoid material and human losses (the French even regained independence four years later, though not through their own efforts). But everything has its price - and in 2020 the French had to become an object, not a subject of imperial expansion.

Moreover, even those nations that are ready to fight for their independence, but not for their greatness and are not ready to go their own way, do not deserve to become an empire and even maintain this very independence from the empire. For example, until 2020, the British eked out for decades the miserable, in the opinion of the Russians, existence of a well-fed, but second-rate country that does not have any independence in the world, although they could claim more in terms of their glorious history and economic power, at least potential. The Russians themselves could also relax when, in the first decade of our century, they overcame the consequences of the second Time of Troubles and began to sharply add to the prosperity and security of their existence. Even recognition from the powerful of this world has already begun to return to them - how, back in 2006 they were the next chairman of the G8 (then a regular meeting of eight industrialized countries, claiming to solve world problems, something like the current World Five-Power Forum on Saint Helena). And there was a great temptation to settle down on this, to be satisfied with the place of "one of the equals", to give up one's special path and any special greatness - and in return to receive recognition of one's equality among the rest, even if at first through gritted teeth and without enthusiasm. Then a sonorous slogan appeared in Russia, accurately expressing the essence of this temptation: "We want a place on the board of directors of the planet." But the Russians found the strength to abandon the fate of a second England, to reject other people's ways and return to their own: continuing the same analogy, to abandon the shares of the planet along with a seat on the board of

directors and achieve the allocation of their share in kind. And the fact that such inner determination arose in them not when there was nothing to lose, but on the contrary, when things went pretty well and clearly promised to get even better, is for the Russians one of the main apologies for the existence of their Third Empire.

This attitude towards the state distinguishes Russians from us much more than ideas about freedom, equality and democracy - more precisely, the difference in these ideas is itself to a large extent a derivative of a different attitude towards the idea of the state. And do not think, dear compatriots, that this is some kind of purely academic or political issue: the difference between the humanistic and religious-metaphysical outlook on life exists at a very deep, non-verbal level of the human psyche and permeates all of his worldview.

Power. Russians have a completely different idea of both the source of power and its meaning (these two aspects are in fact closely interconnected) than ours. We imagine power as a way to ensure the most reasonable, according to current ideas, life of the country, bringing maximum prosperity and freedom to its inhabitants, and therefore meeting their interests (because what other interests can they have, besides these, perhaps not in any way related to the public sphere). Thus, the democratic principle, like the republican organization of our power, directly follows from our ideas about its essence. For example, a feudal ruler considered the maximum provision and exaltation of his kind as the essence of his power - and therefore he simply would not understand why he needed democracy. For Russians, the existence of a strong Russian Orthodox state, built on God's commandments, is an end in itself, the value of which cannot be justified because of its self-evidence - just as we cannot intelligibly explain why we believe that the country should be good for its population, and not, on the contrary, bad. Therefore, democratic and republican principles are as alien to Russians as they are natural to us: strategically, the interests of citizens always correspond to the interests of the state (although in tactical [short?] time periods the majority may not understand this), while for Russians they will often contradict rather than coincide. Therefore, Russian political thought considers the responsibility of the authorities, first of all, to the people, to be similar to death for the state.

The quintessence of what has been said is this: in our civilization, citizens are the state, while in Russia the state and the people are two completely different things. That is why, and not because of some barbarism or an innate tendency to authoritarianism, the interests of citizens are not at all a priority for the Russian authorities, although they are certainly taken into account and, if possible, satisfied (not animals!) - but always not as the main goal.

Gabriel the Great said about it this way: "What does it matter to us whether people live richly or poorly - let them live as they want. But a just structure of life, including the concern that no one dies of hunger, yes, this is our duty to God. And what material wealth they have, how many suits or sausages they buy is their own business, we do not stifle them with extortions or prohibitions. It is clear that with such an understanding of the essence of the power of democracy, in our view, the Russians simply should not have it - because otherwise the voters will think about their own interests, and not about the state (in our country, I repeat, this is essentially the same thing). As Valit (in baptism Valentin) Maganov, the Prime Minister of Russia in 2036-2043, and now the head of the Imperial Education Department, figuratively told me in a conversation: "We, guardsmen, pronounce in the first vow that we are shepherds of the flock belonging to the Shepherd. It is absurd that the leader of our order should be chosen by the flock." In this sense, even those political rights and freedoms that the population still has in Russia are given to it by the ruling service class, not on the basis of natural or divine law and not under pressure from below, but solely for "instrumental" reasons: for example, it was considered useful for the effective management of the country or for greater stability of its functioning. Or they even simply decided that people would be happier from something, and there would be nothing terrible in this - why not do it that way. As the Russians say, "the heart is not a stone, blood is not water"; It has nothing to do with the essence of power.

But besides the source and essence, there are also mechanisms of power - and Russians, despite the outward similarity of structures, fundamentally differ from ours. The question, in fact, is about how the authorities ensure that they obey her, do not sabotage her decisions, and, finally, do not overthrow her one fine day. Always and everywhere, since tribal times, this has been achieved by a combination of two factors, coercion and persuasion - the threat of the use of force, on the one hand, and the generally accepted idea that there is no other way, on the other.

But the ratio of these factors varied greatly at different times. In the premodern era, before the New Age, the share of coercion was great, and in terms of persuasion, the sanctification of the order of things by religion and tradition played the main role. In the era of modernity, the importance of military force decreased, and in the belief that increased its weight, religion and tradition largely gave way to the “ordering” of society through the mechanisms of society and law. In our time of postmodernity (I’m talking here about our American civilization), the importance of force has decreased even more - why is it, if the interests of the authorities and the population do not and cannot diverge. In terms of persuasion, primarily to neutralize marginal manifestations, the “standardization” of the population came to the fore through the creation of a uniform model of life, common ideas, and even a socio-political language (because what cannot be expressed in words, the essence is unrepresentable and, therefore, is not feasible).

From this brief review of history, it is important to extract not only the vector of the steady decline in the role of force in the mechanism of power, but also the fact that even in the old days it was not decisive. Both are connected with the fact that the conductors of power, the soldiers, are not robots, they themselves are part of society and can easily turn their weapons against the rulers, no matter how much you give them praetorian privileges.

Not so in Russia: they consider even the social ordering characteristic of modernity to be a sin (at least if the authorities do it on purpose), and the postmodern desire to make society essentially uniform is a foreshadowing of the approaching Antichrist. (The concept of social engineering, which is carried out by the Imperial Service for Social Arrangement, is something else - it is nothing more than the creation and dissemination of social customs, fashions and ideas, and not political attitudes: the introduction of the latter, such as love for the regime, is expressly prohibited.) In Russia, the main mechanism of power, much more significant even than in ancient times, is force. The Russians can afford it, because they have their own, special conductor of power - the estate of guardsmen, which is the power and in which the power is therefore confident as in itself (I apologize for the involuntary pun).

The majority of the population in Russia, as in any normal country, approves of the authorities and the general principles of the state structure and therefore is not going to rebel - but the authorities do not count on this. She relies only on her strength and is always ready to use it. It even seems to me that implicitly, drawn by the craving of their class worldview, guardsmen secretly dream about this. Whether this is so, I do not know, but that they will not hesitate a second before drowning any rebellion in the blood of the civilian population is an indisputable fact - not because they are soulless beasts, but because they are not part of society.

However, this fascination with force has its merit: since the authorities are focusing on suppressing any rebellion, and not on preventing it, they should think much less about preventing and suppressing any dissent - and indeed, the Russian authorities allow a huge (according to our opinion) or even excessive (by standards) level of pluralism of opinions in the country.

But the most surprising thing I see is that, despite their negative and even contemptuous attitude towards the words “democracy” and “republic”, despite their elitist estate in our view, the Russians call their system of power “democracy” (this is also recorded in the Constitution) and sincerely consider it as such.

I thought about it for a long time before I realized that this is really not hypocrisy. The fact is that the very

word “power” in all our three languages (power or poder, authority or autoridad) comes from such roots as “strength” or “authority”, clearly related to the sphere of management - which for us and there is power. Not so among Russians: the word “power” comes from “to own”, that is, to own (in the Little Russian dialect of Russian, this word sounds like this - “power”). The traditional appeal to the tsars was “own us and all the Russian land.” That is, the ruler is the ruler, and the owner is the owner; and the *oprichnina* estate is considered the ruler of Russia, and its owner is the whole people, and those living today are also, as it were, authorized representatives of past generations. By the way, guardsmen perceive themselves in exactly the same way: their most common metaphorical self-names are “shepherds” and “watch”. But after all, the shepherd does not own the flock, and the watch over the land. And this is not an abstraction: if in power matters the guardsmen are least of all interested in the voice of the people (at least as decisive), then in socio-economic issues, and especially in matters of public property, they often do not consider themselves entitled to make decisions independently. For example, according to the imperial law of 2025, the privatization of any state enterprise (from 2033 - in general, any state property) worth more than ten tons of gold is impossible without the consent of the House of Peoples of the Zemsky Duma, and more than a hundred tons - without the decision of the all-Russian *veche* (in our opinion, a referendum). Moreover, the *veche* makes decisions according to the conciliar principle I have described above, that is, by 75 percent of the votes. And the obligatory decision of the *veche* to transfer on any terms even the smallest piece of territory to another state is directly written in the Constitution, and all agreements of this kind in 2020-2022, preceding the establishment of an ordered world, Gabriel the Great signed only after the decision of the *veche*.

In fact, the imperial government announces *veche* much more often, on many socio-economic issues (but only on them); and although it is not obliged to do this by the Constitution and, accordingly, has the right to decide all such issues (except for the *zemstvo* competence) itself, it does not abuse this right. It may seem strange to us that on the issue of privatization of a medium-sized enterprise it is necessary to ask the opinion of the people, but not on issues of war and peace, but this is quite consistent with the ancient Russian archetype: war is a princely business, in it he is free, especially since the guardsmen fight and die there, not the people. But in the issue of salt trade or fur trade, and even more so land surveying, the world decides.

Justice. I cannot say that Russian ideas of justice are radically different from ours, but they are definitely different from those that were previously characteristic of themselves. Violent disagreements about what is fair and what is not have always existed among the Russians - but due to their common worldview, only about public life, and not individual. They only wondered, “Is universal happiness worth the tears of an innocently tortured child?” – but never thought about whether individual happiness is worth it. The answer to the second question was obvious to them: happiness in this case is impossible. But the first question, or rather the choice of a positive answer to it, brought them a lot of blood - from the Socialist-Revolutionary and Red Terror to Stalinist repressions. No wonder - the Russian national attitude is very characteristic of the desire to get others happiness at any cost, often - alas! - leading to quite the opposite. After all, the temptation to commit evil for the sake of others, especially if at the same time you sacrifice yourself, is the most difficult temptation that the devil throws at people. But no less temptation is it to commit evil (or justify its commission) for the sake of the strength of faith and the greatness of the state. Therefore, extremes converge here: at the beginning of our century, many Russians, who adhered to completely Orthodox and conservative views, approved of Stalin’s repressions against innocent people (except perhaps the repressions against the clergy) - and no less sincerely than staunch communists. How, after all, this was done for the sake of strengthening the Russian state - it means that it was done correctly.

Both of these ideas exist in Russian society to this day, only now they are not so important, since Russian society has no political rights. In reality, those who want to benefit the people against their will do not even have illegal opportunities to influence politics - I would like to look at underground organizations, at least of the Socialist-Revolutionary or Bolshevik, at least of the “dem-Russian” type in modern Russia!

Here they will be confronted not by the relaxed tsarist and not by the impotent demoralized late Soviet, but by the ruthless and determined *oprichnina* political police - any underground terrorist organization is unlikely to exist in the Empire for even a month. And for the *oprichnina* itself, the question of whether the end justifies the means is completely irrelevant due to its complete obviousness - of course not.

The fact is that the goal for the guardsmen, as I already wrote, is the state; but the state is not as a superstructure over the nation, but as a testimony before the Son of God that His covenants are alive. After all, you cannot show the returned Son either victory over enemies, or order in the country, or prosperity of the people, if you could not keep His covenants; as He Himself said: "What good is it for a man if he gains the whole world, but loses his soul." Therefore, the power of a state at the cost of committing injustice is not even a temptation for the guardsmen - they simply do not need such a power: they are not interested in power for the sake of power, and even less interested in people's happiness. Evil, of course, can be defeated by evil (as a rule, even more), but it is unlikely that the only Judge, Whose sentence is important for the guardsmen, will credit the victory.

This is how the guardsmen, and therefore the Empire itself, understand justice: the ancient Roman maxim "let the whole world collapse rather than justice be violated" is not an abstraction for them, but a specific guide to action: it's not for nothing that they are the Third Rome!

The *oprichniki* are not sleazy and, being warriors and rulers, are well aware that there are situations in the life of the country when one cannot do without victims, but they do not believe that one cannot get out of these situations without smearing one's honor and conscience. And if they were in power in the country in Stalin's times, they, quite possibly, would also have seen that the country could not do without mass semi-slave labor - but then they would have decided that they were all working on digging canals and building railways in turn. If they saw, as Joseph the Great saw, that the country needs to be intimidated, they would not bury their heads in the sand - but at the same time they would never choose the path of punishing the obviously innocent, justifying it with the barbaric truth "beat your own - others will be afraid." Instead, they would only execute the really guilty and carry out other acts of intimidation, but in public and in such a way that the whole people would be dumbfounded with horror. The guardsmen understand that there are situations in the life of the country when innocent people have to be destroyed - for example, if a deadly epidemic arises for which there is no treatment, and the outbreaks must be localized. But they will never take such measures if there is another way out, and this is how they relate to the Stalinist repressions.

Only by following these principles, guardsmen believe, is it possible to build a state worthy of pride in it, a state that is worth defending at any cost. And this is not a theory, but the very practice: in an effort to be fair, the guardsmen did not declare a state of emergency and did not begin mass repressions even at the difficult moment of the 2037 rebellion - although activists were shot, and rebellious crowds were dispersed without hesitation by machine-gun fire. Also during the third Caucasian war, the guardsmen refused to shell villages, run sweeps and filtration camps, but when occupying settlements, they were required to subject all residents to field techno-interrogation (in front of fellow villagers) and those who confessed to torture or murder of Russian prisoners - whether they were women, the elderly or children were shot on the spot. And when suppressing the uprising of the Palestinians on the island of Israel (before the eviction of the Arabs from the Empire in 2023), they banned the demolition of houses and settlements of the rebels, which had previously been used by Jews - the family is not responsible for its head - but when throwing stones at Russian patrols, shoot to kill was opened even on teenagers: no one dares to raise a hand against the Empire! Even when the question was being decided which relics to give to the Roman Catholic Church at its exodus is a paramount issue for the Orthodox state! - The Empire has decided: only that which at one time or another was stolen or taken away by the Catholics from any of the Orthodox churches is left. Only in this way will it be fair, and nothing else. And everything else contradicts the honor of the knights without fear and reproach, which are, without any exaggeration, the

Russian guardsmen.

This understanding of justice (as an absolute imperative) radically distinguishes guardsmen from right-wing Russian conservatives. They [conservatives] approve not only the repressions and murders of innocents in the Second Empire, but also the slavery that existed in the First Empire (and consider its abolition a mistake), the peasant's attachment to the community, hereditary class discrimination and other manifestations of extreme lack of freedom, justifying them with all sorts of pseudo-Orthodox and mystical nonsense. Needless to say, the conservatives are ideologically just as alien and even hostile to the Empire as the liberals, although from the other side.

The position of the Empire, of which the guardsmen are the bearers, is very simple: the Kingdom of Christ is not of this world, and therefore no state system can be blessed by God. Moreover, no dynasty was chosen by God, as the family of King David was chosen - this happened only in the Old Testament times and ended with the incarnation of God the Word. Nevertheless, the dynasties of the New Testament time were founded either by those who wielded the sword better and commanded other sword-bearers, like Rurik, or those who knew how to intrigue better, like the Romanovs. And if they themselves or some of their descendants were very worthy rulers and people, this does not change the source of the origin of the dynasty. All this, of course, is from God, like everything else in the created world, but only in the sense in which the fire from heaven that burned Sodom and Gomorrah is also from God. So to say that some kind of royal family is from God hardly means to compliment them - they can be sent by God and as a punishment to the country and people. States are not from God at all, but this does not mean at all that they are contrary to His providence - God simply created people, and states have been created and are being created by people endowed with free will, at their own discretion. And according to what kind of state the people will create, God will judge them, because in this the conciliar part of the human soul is manifested; if it is right, it will hasten salvation for all generations of this people. To declare any particular state order *of God*, and even more so to make a cult out of it and declare it forbidden to change it, is complete stupidity, and this applies to the First Russian Empire in full measure. The guardsmen will not even consider a potential attempt on the Third Russian Empire, which they themselves created, to be Godfighting, despite the fact that it was created, according to their ideas, with the help of the Archangel Gabriel himself. But they are determined to defend it with their human strength, and with their own strength they will not allow injustice to happen in it.

It would seem that such a reverent attitude to justice does not quite correspond to Orthodox ideas - "mercy is higher than judgment, and love is higher than justice"; but the *oprichniki*, like most Russians in general, consider this to apply only to private life, and not to public life. Such a difference in approaches to the personal and social spheres is well expressed in the words of St. Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, about the attitude towards enemies: "Forgive your enemies, kill the enemies of the fatherland, hate the enemies of the faith." The sphere of personal and collective relations between people should be built on love, and the sphere of state policy should be based on justice, which is quite consistent with the old folk archetype expressed in the formula (about the state) that appeared since the 15th century: "God does not love faith as much as truth (i.e. justice)". The guardsmen see the Church and the clergy as the bearer of faith, and the state and themselves as the bearer of justice. Therefore, in relation to other people, justice replaces love for them, as far as possible. This is not an ideal for true Christians - well, guardsmen are not the first estate, but only the second, as they themselves like to say. So the general spirit of the Russian state (not the country, but the state machine, if considered separately), despite the presence of Christian values in it, is to a large extent the harsh spirit of pre-Christian times: the Old Testament kings, Roman consuls and Varangian kings.

Civilizational place. Russia is, of course, a separate civilization - in our modern ordered world, each of the five countries is a separate state-civilization. But even half a century ago, and even more so earlier, it was not at all obvious - disputes about whether Russia is a separate civilization or part of Western

civilization were conducted both in Russia and in the West from the end of the 17th century until very recently (with a break which is 73 years of the Second Empire). Therefore, even those thinkers who, even in the era of disunity, foresaw that the world in the future would break up into a small number of states-civilizations, as a rule, did not see Russia among them - they saw it either as part of Europe under the auspices of the European Union, or even as part of China or an Islamic superpower.

Nevertheless, having looked at Russian life, I am not inclined to laugh at these disputes - on the contrary, I understand them well. How is it, you ask, because you explained to us so much about the differences between Russians and us in the most basic issues? Yes, everything is so - but only these differences are all somehow not too radical. If our country [the American Federation] is considered a modern society (more precisely, postmodern - classical modern takes place in the Celestial Empire), then its real antagonist, the complete opposite in almost everything, is the traditional religious society: in our world, this is not Russia at all, but the Caliphate. There, the denial of Western values and the establishment of traditional ones are carried out absolutely consistently, and there, indeed, everything is arranged the other way around compared to us. Adulterers are executed there, and “unfaithful dogs” are enslaved. If it were the same in Russia, it would not arouse any interest in our public - in any case, it would not carry any riddle: when all plus signs change to minus, this is alien, but completely understandable. And in the Empire, the denial of Western values, as well as the general regression towards a traditional society, is very half-hearted - this can be seen in everything. The Russians formalized the special status of Orthodoxy, proclaimed Russia a constitutionally Orthodox country - but they did not unite the Church with the state, they did not announce a symphony, as they did from antiquity until 1917. Therefore, there is no obligation of religion and other religions are allowed, unlike the Caliphate. The Russians secured a special status and a special role in the Empire of the Russian race, but did not introduce any elements of Nazism, as well as forced assimilation, although this was in the order of things in ancient traditional societies. And in general, the Empire is now not entirely Russian, but rather Russian-German. Further, the Russians abolished democracy and introduced the authoritarian rule of the emperor, but retained his election. They eliminated the representative and legislative power in the person of the parliament, but to a large extent recreated it in the form of *zemstvo* power and the *zemstvo* Duma. Classes were introduced, but they did not allow it to become hereditary. A number of minorities, such as homosexuals or some sectarians, were impaired in their rights, but they limited themselves to a ban on professions and measures of public influence instead of violent punishment, natural for traditional societies. They banned public statements against the country and religion, but did not extend the ban on criticism of the actions of the authorities. They limited super-large fortunes, but did not in any way encroach on medium and large ones, as well as on freedom of enterprise in general. And so it is in everything - after reading the book, you can continue this list yourself.

Such a position did not appear suddenly - back in the mid-10s of our century, when an understanding of the need to return to the values of traditional Russian society was just beginning to crystallize in Russia, other views dominated, as already mentioned above. Their bearers, the Russian conservatives, being the successors of one of the main Russian philosophical trends of the 19th century (the most prominent representative of which was K. Leontiev), denied any social progress - both evolutionary and revolutionary - and considered the Russian autocratic monarchy of the Romanovs almost an ideal social order. Oddly enough, they were very sympathetic to Joseph the Great; if at one time he had made autocracy the state religion of the USSR (which is by no means unimaginable), then in their understanding it would be quite close to the ideal - Leontiev saw this option as the phenomenon of “socialist Constantine”.

It is easy to understand that if this conservative line prevailed, then all the two-part antinomies listed in the previous paragraph (what they did and what they did not do) would be resolved in the spirit of the second parts. But the path that Russia’s development has taken is different - in it, despite the well-known fundamentalism, there is a place for social progress with all the ensuing consequences.

However, this path cannot be called a compromise between left-wing liberalism and right-wing conservatism – there are no compromises between such extreme extremes. Yes, and Gabriel the Great, like the entire state elite he created, was not at all inclined to compromise. Rather, we can say that conservatism itself turned out to be ambiguous as an ideological trend; and what is now the philosophical basis for the structure of the Russian Empire, I would call left-wing conservatism - no matter how strange it may sound.

What's wrong with that, you ask, isn't the golden mean preferable to extremes (at least, such as in the Caliphate)? Nothing bad, but civilizational attitudes are a specific thing: only extremes are stable in them, and intermediate states tend to slide towards the poles. This is clearly seen in the example of the same Russia during the Second Empire: from 1917 to the second half of the 50s of the twentieth century, there was a setting for the complete denial of personal material well-being. An almost complete equalization reigned, and if then it were said that, they say, in the capitalist countries people live better materially, then the majority would sincerely answer: so what? Is it important? For us, on the other hand, this and that is good, and for them, this and that is bad. And this attitude made the system very stable, because the strongest defense against criticism is when it is recognized, but not considered criticism at all. And from the second half of the 50s, Nikita Chudnuy [Khrushchev] for some reason proclaimed the main goal of state policy to be the all-round improvement in the material well-being of Soviet people. Surely many were delighted, but very soon the following question began to confuse their minds: if the main thing is well-being, then why do we need a system that is clearly inferior to Western countries in this respect? And before that, under Joseph the Great, the question could not have been raised, well-being was not considered a priority - and if something is of purely third-rate importance, then what difference does it make that somewhere else it is better? And it was precisely the named strategic turn under Nikita Chudnum [Khrushchev], and nothing else, that predetermined the beginning of the decline of the Second Empire and its subsequent transformation back into a capitalist country.

In this sense, the Third Russian Empire as a civilization is clearly not up to the Second in its distinctiveness, that is, in the degree of difference in basic ideas from other civilizations. That one was a completely different world compared to the West - and this one is still its version, although quite radical (advanced or worsened - depends on the point of view). Interestingly, most of my interlocutors in Russia were forced to agree with this view, although not immediately, but whether our compatriots agree, time will tell.

What do I mean first? We are two, although different, but Christian civilizations - and therefore our difference from each other cannot be as radical as the difference from the Islamic Caliphate or the pagan Red Empire. But if the Empire is a version of Western civilization, then this means, based on the above, that one of the versions is primary, and the second is its derivative and inevitably, sooner or later, will slide to the primary, that is, return to its origins.

All the time that I was in Russia and looked closely at her, I did not have the feeling that this is the case. But which of our two civilizations is primary, and which is a departure from the original idea? Looking for an answer in the past is unproductive: it will be different depending on how far back in the past we turn, and it is not a fact that the most distant past is more important. The appeal to the original Christian idea is not very productive either: the Western Church derives humanism from it, while the Eastern Church derives its denial from it. It seems to me that a more constructive, although also not obvious approach would be to assess how resistant these two civilizations will be to possible future threats and cataclysms that tomorrow may prepare for us. Not even because something original and primary will surely turn out to be more stable than its versions, but because in a serious crisis, a less stable option will inevitably slide into a more stable one.

I do not undertake to make unambiguous predictions, especially since no one knows what kind of crises we can talk about, but Russian civilization, especially in its current form, impressed me as having great

vitality and a huge margin of safety. I mean not only its ability to mobilize efforts - this is traditional for Russia - but also the fact that their system in a difficult time of trials will clearly ensure high state and social stability. That is, it will not go rogue, adding to the initial threat the self-catalyzed disintegration from which empires usually collapse: there will not be many such manifestations, due to the general Russian attitude towards consensus (“*sobornost*”), and those that happen will be quickly and ruthlessly crushed - because there is someone to do it. In the state organism of the Empire, the *oprichnina* plays the role of a skeleton - it is not large in comparison with the bulk of citizens, but it informs the state of rigidity. Our society is very homogeneous, despite the presence of various groups, and this gives it more dynamism - but deprives it of rigidity. And if the criterion of stability in a critical situation for solving our problem is correct, then it is very likely that the primary of our two civilizations, and therefore the one that will survive the second, is the Russian civilization.

So if we return to the question with which I began this conclusion - what can we expect from Russia - then we must say the following. The Empire is neither a friend nor an enemy to us, it does not care much for us, as well as for the rest, so that in a moment of serious danger we do not need to expect from it either a knife in the back or a helping hand. But it is possible that in fact we are waiting for unification, and not conquest or any other subjugation, but a true civilizational merger as a result of evolution: in the end, few will doubt that we come from the same source. However, no one knows the future.

* * *

Before I finish my work, I can not help but share one more feeling. I read a lot of different science fiction novels where in the future all people at birth will be subjected to certain surgical or mental influences to eliminate any aggressive manifestations in them - this is a very common plot. And in all these novels it is quite rightly asserted that in this case any risk and danger become socially forbidden and even internally impossible for a person, at least without a vital need for it - they really are the reverse side of aggressiveness. So, having visited the Empire, I suddenly felt that this future has already arrived in our Federation.

Look at our athletes: in almost all sports we have all kinds of protective equipment to prevent injuries, and in Russia even in boxing there are no gloves - the fists are wrapped only with an elastic belt, and the head is not protected at all. In our case, in any martial arts match, the referee will instantly stop the fight if one of the participants “swim” [*sic*: faints?], and in the Empire they will fight until one of the rivals is completely turned off [killed?]. Of course, with the current state of regenerative and restorative medicine in general, almost any injury will be quickly cured - but this is very painful and looks extremely cruel from the outside! The Russians, however, are not embarrassed at all. No wonder, because gladiator fights are very popular there (we have forbidden prisons under pain), with real edged weapons, which often cause injuries that are incompatible with life, even with the current level of medicine.

It's the same in everyday life: for example, all our cars have built-in speed and sharpness limiters for turning and braking, as well as automatic forced switching to computer control in dangerous situations. And the Russians not only do not have this (not in the sense that it was not invented, but the law does not require this), but in general the speed of movement on the highways is not limited. Therefore, by the way, even drunk driving is not prohibited there - but the punishment for an accident while drunk is much tougher (we have a mandatory indicator of alcohol that will physically prevent you from starting the car). It is believed that the threat of punishment for an accident, not to mention the fear of one's own and others' injuries, is a sufficient limiter for responsible people - and the irresponsible cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment for speeding or drunk driving. And they also allow carrying firearms - and using them in case of any attack - in our country it has been prohibited since the 2010s, and even for the last thirty years before that it was not allowed everywhere and with big reservations.

That is, compared to us, Russians are much less afraid of blood and death - both their own and someone

else's: in the abstract, they seem to be afraid (of their own, in any case), but judging by their behavior, they are not. Also, they are not too afraid to offend each other - in communication they are much more straightforward than us. I think that this is precisely the reason for their lack of concepts of political correctness. And the fact that revenge is actually allowed in them (the law does not directly declare this, but there is no criminal liability for appropriate revenge - see the "Crime" section of the chapter "[Law Enforcement System](#)") fits into the same pattern.

All this, if you look at the root, is undoubtedly a manifestation of greater aggressiveness. It is believed that this is a sign of a younger and more vital civilization (because aggressiveness - alas! - is the main sign of vitality), although they are not younger, but much older than us - they are about eleven centuries old, and we are only three. (Even if we consider our history together with the European West, then we still have the same eleven or twelve centuries as them.) But the great vitality of their civilization is felt in everything - which is very strange, because, according to the now generally accepted theory of their own compatriot Lev Gumilyov, in the twelfth century of its existence, the race must be in decline. It seems that they, as a people, had a second wind (this was actually felt back in 1917, although they were already under a thousand years old) - but no one knows what a second wind is in relation to civilization, because the theory doesn't talk about that. Whether this is good or bad, it is not easy to say: older civilizations provide a calmer, more comfortable life and more tolerant and gentler relations between people.

But if you call a spade a spade, then the comfort of the old civilization is the calmness and gentleness of a castrated animal: everything seems to be normal in it, and it is much more pleasant in communication, but it is difficult to call it full-fledged. Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, our society looks very much like a castrated society - I realized this only when I lived in the Russian Empire. Of course, such a society acquires the same positive characteristics as a castrated animal - the aggressiveness of the population is reduced, which means that the likelihood of wars and revolutions is reduced, as well as individual antisocial manifestations. But, as in the case of animals, everything has its price - along with aggressiveness, the vitality of the nation goes away. In the Russian Empire, aggressiveness is quite high, which naturally reduces the comfort of life and creates its own problems, but the vitality there is great. Therefore, God knows whether she has more advantages or disadvantages and what is destined for her in the future - but no one will call her castrated.

Author's afterword [2006]

Dear readers! This time I'm not addressing the fictitious compatriots of Alvaredo dos Santos, but ordinary Russian readers. The book you have read is not a forecast, but a utopia, that is, a positive image of the future. In other words, I do not at all assert that everything will be exactly like this - I only show that it can be so and that it is good. In utopia, the most important thing is its realism, that is, that the reality described is viable and not internally contradictory. So that you can try it on yourself and decide whether you would like to live in this reality or not. This is the only thing worth paying attention to.

Everything that is written in this book, in my opinion, is the best future that our country can have. Because in this future the state, having become powerful and great, does not get into the personal life of an individual citizen, appreciates the uniqueness of each nation and does not interfere with the manifestation of the unique qualities of any person. In this future, loyalty to the state is valued, but at the same time, enterprise and professionalism are valued. In this future, true freedom and true equality are established. Here, the innocent cannot be condemned and punished, and the guilty cannot escape responsibility, especially if he is a representative of authority. Here, real free enterprise is absolutized (interest-free credit, tax system, creation of equal conditions), which is not reduced to usury or parasitism. Here in the army they serve exclusively at will, but at the same time only servicemen have political rights and personify imperial power. There are estates here, but they are completely open, like all social groups in general.

This future country is self-sufficient, it does not depend on the opinions and desires of other countries, because it forced them to reckon with themselves. The structure of this country - whatever she herself calls it - is classical democracy, which has found expression in effective local self-government. There is no commanding unanimity here, but there is no squabbling for power either. The empire is a guardian, it exists for itself and monitors only the security, justice and general development of the country, primarily for its compliance with its original goals. Life in this country is meaningful - having lived it correctly, it is easier to appear at the Court of the Creator.

As for the assumptions about how history will actually turn out, no one knows the future. So everything can happen differently than what is written in this book, but at the same time, on the whole, it is right and good - many different paths often lead to the same goal. And yet I am sure of some things.

Our state, of course, will soon change its basic type - the current state, intermediate between a liberal state ("night watchman" concept) and a goal-setting state-empire, is not viable and does not suit anyone. It exists only because we have already left the first type, and we have not yet reached the second, but we will certainly get there - first in deeds, and then in words. Because a liberal state is, according to the basic ideas of our people, not a state at all, but simply a territory controlled by various leaders or institutions (or self-governed by residents, which is no better). To call a certain geographical space a state is not enough.

In one form or another, our country will have to restore, or rather, create a service estate, no matter what it is called - guardsmen, nobility, members of the party, or something else. And this service class should be created on the basis of motivations that lie in the sphere of the spirit: on the ideas of service, loyalty and honor. Then you can no longer be afraid of the very concept of "estate" - in this case, there is nothing wrong with it, especially if the estates turn out to be completely open. If the new service class is built on ordinary material incentives or, God forbid, becomes formally or at least *de facto* hereditary, then this will certainly lead the country to a new catastrophe - as it happened in 1917 and 1991.

In general, in order to throw a civilizational challenge to the rest of the world, we will definitely have to solve the epoch-making task of sharing wealth and power, which no one has yet been able to fully solve: whoever solves it will become a world leader. And the desire of society that already exists today to "equally distance" the oligarchs (in other words, to take power away from the bearers of wealth), as well as the desire to end corruption (to take away wealth from the authorities) is an unconscious desire to solve this particular problem. It is likely that these trends will continue.

We will definitely get away from universal equal suffrage, because in modern society it does not work - not only in our country, but nowhere else, it's just that they haven't fully realized it yet. Probably, the withering away of parliamentarism will take place in parallel - apparently, these two processes are inseparable, like two sides of the same coin. Further - the transition to one or another system of "elected king".

We will certainly embark on a path leading to greater autonomy for the country, to reducing its dependence on the outside world for everything - even if this path does not lead as far as described in the book.

Just as inevitable is the revival and strengthening of nationalism in our country - both Russian and other Russian peoples. This is a completely natural trend, and it is already taking place. Either the authorities will saddle it and direct it into a civilized direction, or nationalism will take on more and more extremist and destructive forms for the country - it is impossible to crush such deep tendencies by force.

The same applies to a number of elements of the state system - strengthening the autocracy of governance, reducing the role of the regional link and strengthening the local: these processes began yesterday.

Obviously, the task of increasing the birth rate, which everyone has already recognized as fundamental,

cannot be solved exclusively by socio-economic methods, without changes in the social system of values, including in the field of sexual attitudes. And the state has yet to master the skills of influencing such areas, because it will need it not only to solve demographic problems.

It is also obvious that we will have to radically change the system of education and science, as well as many other things, and without enthusiastically following someone else's experience - if only because other people's achievements in these areas should be recognized as not very impressive.

The same applies to specific historical events that will or will not happen in our country in the near future: a wide range of options is possible in some ways, but there is no particular doubt about something. Putin's successor may not be called Gavriil Sokolov and come to power not in 2012, but in 2008 or some other year - but he will be a great person, not inferior in scale of his personality to our current president. Because the next decade will be fateful for Russia, and a mediocre person at the head of the country, even with personal honesty, will not be able to meet the challenge of the time. And when there is an objective need for a great leader, he always appears. Some will say that such is the providence of God, others that such are the laws of history.

Dealing with all the oligarchs, especially the Yeltsin wave, as well as a massive purge of the state apparatus in order to eliminate corrupt ties, even the most odious ones, are inevitable: I cannot imagine that this would not happen over the next few years, regardless of who will be in power. And after this, sooner or later, a complete revision of the large capital holdings created from the late 80s to the early 2000s will certainly happen - those who believe that the country and the people will come to terms with them do not understand Russia at all. Very large fortunes, frankly stolen from the country, will not necessarily be simply requisitioned, but some decisions on them will certainly be made.

Without a doubt, the economic course of the state will be changed - with the unambiguous preservation of the market and private property, the liberal madness will end: this turn is already beginning, and if it were not for some purely subjective factors in the leadership of our country, it would have already happened. The priority will be the development of domestic business, primarily the real sector, through government incentives for investment, exports, and especially import substitution. And there is also no doubt about the return to large-scale nationwide economic projects implemented by the state: after all, everything in the country that today brings a lot of money, without a single exception, arose as a result of the implementation of such projects during the Soviet era.

There will be a cooling, and then an aggravation of relations with the West - in fact, it has already begun: after our complete self-abasement in front of them, which took place until recently, it is extremely difficult for them to accept anything else. Yes, and in our society there has already been a realization that for hundreds of years we have not seen anything but bad from Western states (unlike individual Western people). Whether it will come to a direct war with the West, I don't know, but I'm sure it will come to the last line before it - and then, as God wills. The transition of this aggravation to a new phase will most likely be facilitated by certain events in the post-Soviet space, although this will not necessarily be a civil war in Ukraine. Because it is obvious that in the near future the authorities will recognize and voice the task of returning, in one form or another, our own territories lost by us in 1991 as the main national task in the near future. This will also be accepted by society: everyone now understands, although for this we needed to lose half the country, that the centuries-old dominant of Russia in expanding its territory to the west and south is not a great-power "show-off", but a vital necessity. It is also obvious that the West will never kindly agree to this - but it is not the whole life to build its strategy to please the West: today is not the Yeltsin time, and tomorrow it will be different and even more so.

A close alliance between Russia and Germany is inevitable - this is obviously very beneficial for both sides, which Bismarck understood, and that is why sooner or later such an alliance will take shape. The Anglo-American civilization managed to prevent the creation of the Russian-German alliance twice,

respectively, before the First and before the Second World Wars, but the third time they are unlikely to succeed: it is impossible to fool the whole people for a very long time.

There is also little doubt that when America is weakened and its influence on the rest of the world is sharply reduced (not “if”, but precisely “when”), then Europe, with or without the European Union, will not be able to maintain its sovereignty. It will turn out to be in the sphere of influence of Russia (or the Russian-German union), as it is written in the book, or, for example, in the sphere of interests of the Islamic world - God knows; but it is clear that dreams of the European Union as one of the future major world players are completely anecdotal, although they are widespread.

The unification of the entire or almost the entire Islamic world into one state is almost inevitable, and precisely under religious slogans. And just as inevitable is the unification of East and Southeast Asia and Australia under Chinese hegemony, or at least dominance, in one form or another. The catalyst for both will be the dramatic weakening of America, as well as the disappearance of Europe as an independent power.

In general, the fact that in the near future there will be a radical enlargement of countries and “powers” the size of a small area of Moscow will disappear from the world map is more or less obvious, although this can happen in very different ways.

Finally, I am not saying that exactly the wars described in the book will take place, with and without the participation of Russia. But the fact that the relatively peaceful period of world history in the second half of the 20th century is ending and the 21st century will be the century of wars, moreover, the most “hot” ones, is for me - alas! - practically undeniable.

Notes

1. Genesis 9.27
2. Here and below, the dates in parentheses indicate the time of the reign.
3. The old legend lists the 3 Empires as Rome, Byzantium & Russia. The present author (& many modern Russians) give the Czarist empire, the USSR (particularly under Stalin), & a future Russian Empire, the subject of this book.
4. The recognised cause of death was a cerebral haemorrhage, ie natural causes.
5. ie the Chinese Empire.
6. A literal translation: presumably meaning “super-new”, ie latest pattern.
7. Some kind of weapon?
8. *sic*. See below: the word may have a special significance.
9. See “call” above.
10. *oprichnina* [опри́чнина] Ivan the Terrible’s political police; the first of many incarnations.
11. Presumably revaluation.
12. *zemstvo* - the general populace.
13. A legend of a marked (or tagged) ruler.
14. Is the Celestial Empire intended?
15. A 19th-century “school” of artists.
16. *obshchak*: a mutual-support fund.
17. The [fictional] author being a Brazilian Catholic.
18. Schismatics?
19. In groups?
20. ie the American Federation.
21. Jesus is recorded in the opposite sense: Matt. 12:30.
22. не императорскими, а имперскими

23. ie Jochi Khan, of the Mongol Ulus clan.
24. Presumably nuclear propulsion, not explosives.
25. Although not mentioned, the 75th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima.
26. *Artel*: a trade co-operative in Tsarist Russia.
27. 9K38 *Igla*: a man-portable anti-aircraft missile.
28. Called a “horse” in Western schools.
29. [*sic*]: possibly tai-chi.
30. [*sic*]: the school enterprise, as a whole?
31. *major*: a scion (often undeserving) of a wealthy family.

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